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The State Bank Of India And Ors. vs P. Soupramaniane

Supreme Court26 April 2019M.R.Shah · L. Nageswara Rao

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. An employee of a banking company is disentitled from continuing in employment upon conviction by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, provided such conviction is for an offence that actually involves moral turpitude. 2. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and requires examination of: (a) whether the act could shock the moral conscience of society; (b) whether the motive was a base one; (c) whether the perpetrator could be considered of depraved character; and other relevant factors including the person committing the offence, the person against whom it is committed, the manner and circumstances of commission, and the values of society. 3. Not every offence involving bodily injury or assault constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude; a simple assault or simple hurt cannot ordinarily be so categorized, whereas use of a dangerous weapon capable of causing death may result in such an offence depending on the facts. 4. A criminal court's order releasing a person on probation under Section 360 CrPC does not entitle the employee to claim a right to continue in service, nor do observations made by a criminal court bind the employer in determining the employee's tenure. 5. An order of discharge from service issued on grounds of conviction for an alleged offence involving moral turpitude, where the show-cause notice and decision specifically reference the statutory provision and the grounds, does not fail for lack of reasoning merely because the statutory provision is not explicitly stated in the discharge order itself.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7011 of 2009
The State Bank of India & Others. .... Appellants
Versus
P. Soupramaniane …. Respondent
JUDGMENT
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. The Respondent who was working as a Messenger in
the State Bank of India at Puducherry was discharged from
service by an order dated 15.05.1986. The appeal filed by
the Respondent against the order of discharge was
dismissed on 03.07.1986. Later, the Staff Union took up
the cause of the Respondent and made a representation
on his behalf which was also rejected on 04.05.1992.
Challenging the aforementioned orders, the Respondent
filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at
Madras which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on07.06.2000. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent filed
a Writ Appeal which was allowed by the Division Bench of
the Madras High Court. The order of discharge of the
Respondent from service was set aside and the Appellants
were directed to reinstate the Respondent. The Appellants
were directed to pay 1/4th of the salary from the date of
discharge till the date of reinstatement as back wages.
Notice was issued by this Court in Special Leave Petition
filed by the Appellants on 01.09.2009 and the judgment of
the High Court was stayed. Thereafter, leave was granted
on 19.10.2009 and the interim order was made absolute.
We are informed that the Respondent has attained the age
of superannuation on 31.12.2012.
2. Since the discharge of the Respondent from service is
on the basis of conviction for an offence involving moral
turpitude, it is necessary to refer to the facts of the
criminal case. A report was submitted by the Station

House Officer (SHO), Grand Bazaar Police Station,

Puducherry that on 17.06.1983 at 9.00 hours the

Respondent voluntarily stabbed Karthiban s/o

Dharamssivam and Sivagurunathan s/o Brame Dhanabal with a broken soda bottle. On completion of investigation,

charge sheet was filed against the Respondent.

Thereafter, charge was framed under Section 307 IPC.

After appreciation of the evidence on-record, the trial

court found that the Respondent had no intention to cause

murder of the victims who were examined as PWs-1 and 2.

The injuries were certified as simple by PW-5. The trial

court was of the opinion that there was no material to

convict the Respondent under Section 307 IPC. However,

the trial court convicted the Respondent under Section 324

IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three

months. The motive for the crime was an earlier dispute

between two groups belonging to different political parties.

The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court. The

Appellate Court released the Respondent on probation as it

was of the opinion that the Respondent was a fit person to

be dealt with under Section 360 CrPC. One of the reasons

given by the Appellate Court to release the Respondent on

probation was that the Respondent was employed as a

Messenger in a Bank and any sentence of imprisonment

would affect his career.

3. As stated earlier, discharge of the Respondent from

service was on the ground of his conviction by a criminal

court for an offence involving moral turpitude.

4. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act,

1949 provides that conviction by a criminal court of an

offence involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person

from continuing in employment of a banking company.

The Writ Appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed by a

Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the

criminal court released the Respondent under probation in

exercise of its power under Section 360 CrPC to enable the

Respondent to continue in service. The High Court was of

the opinion that the purpose of the order of the criminal

court would be defeated if the Respondent is discharged

from service. Another reason given by the High Court is

that the provision of law under which the bank discharged

the Respondent from service was not mentioned and no

reasons were assigned by the bank in the order of

discharge.

5. We do not agree with the reasons given by the High

Court for setting aside the order of discharge and directing

the reinstatement of the Respondent in service. A show-

cause notice was issued to the Respondent in which it was

categorically mentioned that the Respondent cannot

continue in service after his conviction in a criminal case

involving moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of

the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After considering the

explanation of the Respondent, an order of discharge was

passed. The High Court is not right in holding that no

reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the

Respondent from service. The High Court committed an

error in holding that the order of discharge should be set

aside on the ground that the provision of law under which

the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the

order. Yet another reason given by the High Court for

interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal

court released the Respondent on probation only to permit

him to continue in service. The release under probation

does not entitle an employee to claim a right to continue in

service. In fact the employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an

offence involving moral turpitude.1 The observations made

by a criminal court are not binding 2 on the employer who

has the liberty of dealing with his employees suitably.

6. Though we do not agree with the reasons given by

the High Court for setting aside the order of discharge of

the Respondent from service, it is necessary to examine

whether Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act is

applicable to the facts of the case. Conviction for an

offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person

from continuing in service in a bank. The conundrum that

arises in this case is whether the conviction of the

Respondent under Section 324 IPC can be said to be for an

offence involving moral turpitude.

7. Moral Turpitude’ as defined in the Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th ed.) is as follows:

“The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to

1 Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573 2 This Court has observed on multiple occasions that in criminal jurisdiction, Courts do not have the power to pass a direction that the said conviction will not have any impact on the convict’s services. See: Girraj Prasad Meena v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 13 SCC 674 his follow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.”3 “implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being punishable by law”; “restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind.” 4

According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, ‘Moral

Turpitude’ is :

“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.”

Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral Turpitude’

as :

“Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency, discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, ice, wrong.”

3 p. 1008 4 p. 1517

8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the

Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an

employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for

an offence involving moral turpitude. 5 Though every

offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from

service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be

only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude.

Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character

can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude.

Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not

depends upon the facts6 and the circumstances7 of the

case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging

an offence involving moral turpitude are:

a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was

such as could shock the moral conscience or

society in general;

b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a

base one, and

c) Whether on account of the act having been

committed the perpetrators could be considered

5 Sushil Kumar Singhal (supra) 6 Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola 7 Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 ¶12 to be of a depraved character or a person who

was to be looked down upon by the society. 8

The other important factors that are to be kept in

mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude

are :– the person who commits the offence; the person

against whom it is committed; the manner and

circumstances in which it is alleged to have been

committed; and the values of the society. 9 According to

the National Incident – Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a

crime data collection system used in the United States of

America, each offence belongs to one of the three

categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes

against property, and crimes against society. Crimes

against persons include murder, rape, and assault where

the victims are always individuals. The object of

crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary

is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits.

Crimes against society for example gambling, prostitution,

and drug violations, represent society’s prohibition against

engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any

8 Mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 ALL 527 9 Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana, AIR 1996 Guj

3. alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for

deportation under the Immigration Law in the United

States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral

turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible

conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent,

deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness. 10

9. There can be no manner of doubt about certain

offences which can straightaway be termed as involving

moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of

Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises

for our consideration in this case is whether an offence

involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime

involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned

with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every

assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude.

A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All

cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes

involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a

dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim

may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the

instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause

10 Cristoval Silva – Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG 2008) the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that

the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an

overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the

opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not

involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an

offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be

discharged from service.

10. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment

of the High Court. The Appeal is dismissed accordingly.

.................................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

..................................J. [M.R.SHAH]

New Delhi, April 26, 2019.

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