Judgment
As delivered
PETITIONER:THE SENIOR ELECTRIC INSPECTORAND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:LAXMI NARAYAN CHOPRA AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:16/08/1961
BENCH:SUBBARAO, K.BENCH:SUBBARAO, K.GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.HIDAYATULLAH, M.
CITATION:1962 AIR 159 1962 SCR (3) 146CITATOR INFO :APL 1963 SC 445 (4)R 1964 SC 828 (18)E&R 1978 SC 548 (8)R 1988 SC 191 (45)RF 1992 SC 573 (33)
ACT:Telegraphy-Wireless-Station-Expression "Telegraph line",Meaning of-If includes electric lines used for the purposeof wireless telegraph-Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of1910), ss.2,34(2) (b) Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (13 of1885), 3(4)-Electricity (Supply) Act (54 of 1948) Statute-Construction-Maxim Contemporanea Expositio eat optima etfortissima in lege-If applicable to Acts comparativelymodern-Mode of Interpretation.
HEADNOTE:Severe electrical interference was observed in a Post andTelegraphs Wireless Station which was traced to therespondent No. 1's factory where a number of motors,-wereoperated for the purpose of working electric drills. TheSenior Electric Inspector issued a notice to the first res-pondent to show cause as to why an order under s.34(2) (b)of the Indian Electricity Act requiring discontinuance ofthe operation of the electric motors in the said factoryshould not be made.The first respondent challenged the said order by a writpetition contending inter alia that there was no "TelegraphLine" in the Posts and Telegraphs Wireless Station withinthe meaning of s.34(2)(b) of the Act.The High Court held, firstly, that the word 'line' in theexpression telegraph line' connotes the existence of adefined channel of communication which has got a physicalexistence and that wireless telegraphy is dependent upontransmission through space of electric waves and that is nota defined physical channel. Secondly, the expression"telegraph line", as used in s. 34 2)(b) of the Indian Elec-tricity Act, has, in the absence of any new definition inthat Act, to be given the same sense as the Legislature hadintended in 1885 by the definition of that expression in theearlier Act. This reason is based upon the maximcontemporaries exposition west optima et fortissima in lege(contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest inlaw).The appellants contended that the definition of "telegraphline" in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, was wide enough totake in electric lines used for the purpose of147wireless telegraph and the High Court went wrong in invokingthe old maxim contemporanea expositio est optima etfortisima in lege in construing the provisions of a modernstatute.Held, that the combined reading of the relevant, provisionsof the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the IndianTelegraph Act, 1885, a "Telegraph line" is comprehensiveenough and means a wire or wires used for the purpose of anappliance or apparatus for receiving telegraphic or othercommunications by means of electricity, and it need not be acontinuous physical channel from the point of transmissionto the point of reception.A wireless transmitter transmits sound as electro-magneticwaves and the said waves are detected by the aerial and fedinto the receiving apparatus by wires. So the wires of theaerials well as of the apparatus are used for the purpose ofthe apparatus receiving communications. Thus, thereceivingapparatus employs "telegraph lines" within themeaning ofs.3 (4) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.Held, further, that the maxim contemporanea expositio aslaid down by Coke was applied to construing ancientstatutes, but not to interpreting Acts which werecomparatively modem:The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether thecourt is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statuteor that of a modern one, namely what is the expressed,intention of the Legislature. In a modern progressivesociety it would be unreasonable to confine the intention ofa Legislature- to the meaning attributable to the word usedat the time the law was made, and unless a contraryintention appeared, an interpretation should be given to thewords used to take in new facts and situations, if the wordsare capable of comprehending them.The maxim "contemporanea expositio" could not be invoked inconstruing the word "telegraph line" in the IndianElectricity Act, 1910.Assheton Smith v. Owen, (1906)1 Ch. 179, Attorney- Generalv.. Edison Telephone Co. of London, (1880)6 Q. B. D. 244 Inre Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada,(1932) A. C. 304, The King v. Brislan,.Ex parte Williams,(1935) 54 C.L.R. 262 and James v. Commonwealth ,ofAustratia, (1936) A.C. 578, referred to.State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Go. (Madras) Ltd.(1959) S.C.R. 379, relied on.,148
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 328,of 1958.Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 12,1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from OriginalOrder No. 15 of 1955.
B. Sen P. K. Chatterjee and P.K. Bose, for the appellants.Dipak Datta Choudhri and P. D. Menon., for respondent No. 2.1961. August 16. The Judgment of the Court was deliveredbySUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal raises the question ofconstruction of the expression ,,telegraph line" in S.34(2)(b) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Act 9 'of1910), (hereinafter called the' Act).
The first respondent, Laxmi Narayan Chopra, carries onbusiness, as motor coach builder;, under the name and styleof "Chopra Motors" having, his factory at 139, Regent Park,Tollygunge in the suburbs of Calcutta., In the said factorya number of "Universal Electric Motors" are operated for thepurpose of working electric drills. Within a distance of100 feet of the said factory, there is a Post and TelegraphWireless Station, which, besides functioning as a coaststation communicating with ships at sea, handles publicmessages in large volume from Darjeeling, Shillong, Gauhati,Agartala and New Delhi. In or about Aril, 1953 severeelectrical interference was observed in the said station andexperts attributed the same. to local induction from thefirst respondent's factory. On October 13, 1953, the SeniorElectric Inspector issued a notice to the first respondentto show cause writing as to why an order under s. 34(2)(b)of the Act, read with notification No. 4193-COM, datedAugust 1 14, 1929 requiring discontinuation of theoperation of the Universal Electric Motors in the149said factory premises should' not be made. After somecorrespondence: on: December 1, 1953, the Senior ElectricInspector made an order under a. 34(2)(b) of the Actrequiring the first respondent to remedy the injuriesaffecting the lines used for wireless telegraphiccommunications at- the Wireless Receiving Centre. OnJanuary 12, 1954, the first respondent filed a petition inthe High Court at Calcutta under Art. 226 of theConstitution pray for a writ of mandamus or any otherappropriate mug writ directing the appellants to withdrawand cancel the said order and to forbear from giving effectto the same. The petition came up for hearing, in the firstinstance, before Sinha J., of that Court. It was contended,interalia, that there was no "telegraph line" in the Postand Telegraph Wireless Station within the meaning ofs.34(2)(b) of the Act, and, therefore, the notice issued bythe Senior Electric Inspector was without jurisdiction.Sinha J., rejected the contention and dismissed thepetition. But on appeal, a division bench of that HighCourt, consisting of Mookerjee, A. C, J., and H.-K. Bose J.,accepted the contention of the first respondent and issued awrit as prayed for. The present appeal is directed againstthe said order.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends that thedefinition of ",'telegraph line" in the Indian TelegraphAct, (Act 13 of 1885), which is included by reference in theAct,- is wide, enough to take in electric lines used for thepurpose of wire. less telegraph and that the Appellate Benchof the High Court went wrong in invoking the old maximcontemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege inconstruing the provisions of a modern state. The firstrespondent is ex parte; but in this case hisviewpoint isforcibly expressed in the judgment of the High Court underappeal.
To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary at theoutset. to read I the relevant provisions of the Act and theTelegraph Act.
150The Indian Electricity Act, 1910Section 34. (2) If at any time it is estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the appropriateGovernment-
(b)that any electric supply lines or otherworks for the generation, transmission, supplyor use of energy are attended with danger tothe public safety or to 'human life orinjuriously affect any telegraph line, theappropriate Government may, by order inwriting, specify the matter complained of andrequire the owner or user of such electricsupply-lines or other works to remedy it insuch manner as shall be specified in theorder, and may also in like manner forbid theuse of, and the supply of energy to, anyelectric supply-line or works 'until the orderis complied with or for such time as is speci-fied in the order.
Section 2. In this Act, expression,.; definedin the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, or in theElectricity (Supply) Act, 1948, have themeanings assigned to them in either of thoseActs............
The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885Section 3. (1) "telegraph" means an electric,galvanic or magnetic telegraph, and includesappliances and apparatus for making,transmitting or receiving telegraphictelephonic or other communications means ofelectricity, galvanism or magnetism.
(4)"telegraph line" means a wire or wiresused for the purpose of a telegraph with anycasing, coating, tube or pipe enclosing thesame and any appliances and apparatus con-nected therewith the purpose of fixing orinsulating the same.
A combined reading of the relevant provisions of151the two Acts may-be expressed thus: "'Telegraph line" meansa wire or wires used for the purpose of an appliance orapparatus for receiving telegraphic or other communicationsby means of electricity.
If it is established to the satisfaction of the appropriateGovernment that any works for the generation transmissionsupply, or use of electrical energy injuriously affects sucha telegraph line the said Government is authorized to takeappropriate action under.s. 34 of the Act. It is notdisputed that in the said factory a number of UniversalElectric Motors are operated for the purpose of workingelectric drills and it is also established that theinterference with the reception of messages at the TelegraphWireless Station is, attributable to local induction fromthe said factory. But the, dispute between the partiescenters round the question whether the said interferencewith the reception of messages at the said Stationinjuriously affects any telegraph line within the meaning ofs. 34 of the Act. The Telegraph Wireless Receiving Stationclearly comes within the definition of "telegraph" in theTelegraph Act. The Telegraph Act was passed in 1885.
"Telegraph" then meant "an electric, galvanic or magnetictelegraph and appliance, and apparatus for telegraphic,telephonic or other communications by means of electricity,galvanism or magnetism". At that time wireless telegraphyor radio had not been developed. In the year 1914,s. 3(1)of the said Act was amended and the following words wereinserted after the words "apparatus for" : "'makingtransmitting or receiving". With the result that, after theamendment, receiving of communications by means ofelectricity was included in the definition. A wireles.receiving station certainly receives communications by meansof electricity, and therefore, it. is "telegraph" within themeaning of said definition. Though the., said station maybe within the definition of "telegraph", the question stillremains152whether there is a "telegraph line", for, under thedefinition, to be a ',,telegraph line" there shall.be a wireor wires used for the purpose of an apparatus receivingcommunications by means of electricity Under the heading"wireless telegraphy" in. the Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.28, a brief but adequate description of a wirelesstelegraphy is given thus"A wireless transmitter is a device forproducing rapid oscillatory motion of electri-city which is the origin of electric waves.Such electric waves are detected at awireless receiving station b 'the effects ofthe rapidly varying electric and magneticforces Which constitute the electric wave-motion."
Are any wires used for the purpose of the apparatusreceiving the said communications ? In the EncyclopediaBritannica some of the receiving stations ate described and'it shows that wires are invariably used as aerials forreceiving the said communications. In the present case ,the Senior Electric Inspector filed an affidavit wherein hestated "it was established to my satisfaction that theoperation and use of the 'Universal drills during theworking hours of the factory caused serious interference byinduction to the existing lines as well as to the receivingapparatus containing wires which are/were expressly used fortelegraphic communication at the said centre." It is there-fore manifest that wires are used for the purpose of theapparatus receiving communications that is, wires are usednot only for the aerial but &ISO inside the apparatus. A'wireless transmitter transmits sound as electromagneticwaves and the said waves are detected by the. aerial and fedinto the receiving apparatus by wires. To put it shortlythe wires of the aerial as well as of the apparatus are usedfor the purpose of the apparatus receiving communications.Ifso, it follows Chit the receiving153appartus employs "telegraph lines" within the meaning of s.3(4) of the Telegraph Act.
The High Court gave two reasons for rejecting theappellants' contention. The first reason is that the wordline' in the expression 'telegraph line' connotes theexistence of a defined channel of communication which hasgot a physical existence and that wireless telegraphy isdependent upon transmission through space of electric wavesand that is not a defined physical channel. We cannotaccept this reasoning, for a telegraph line is not definedto mean a defined continuous physical channel from the pointof transmission to the point of reception. The definition,as we have pointed out, is comprehensive enough to take inany wire used for the purpose of an apparatus for receivingcommunications by means of electricity.The second reason given by the learned Judges is that theexpression "'telegraph line", as used in s. 34(2)(b) of theIndian Electricity Act, has, in the absence of any newdefinition in that Act., to be given the same sense as theLegislature had intended in 1885 by the definition of thatexpression in the earlier Act. This reason is based uponthe maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimain lege (contemporaneous exposition is the best andstrongest in law). To state it differently, in the year1885 the Legislature could not have dreamt of the futurediscovery of wireless telegraphy and, therefore, could nothave intended to use the expression "telegraph line" in acomprehensive sense so as to take in electric wires of areceiving station of wireless telegraphy.It is necessary to consider the scope of the said maxim inits application to the interpretation of modem statutes. InCraies on Statute Law, 5th edn., the said rule is explainedin the words of Coke thus at p. 77.
154"This and the like were the forms of ancient Acts andgraunts, and,, the. ancient Acts and graunts must. be''construed and taken as the law was holden at that time whenthey were, made.",The discussion ended with the following words at p. 79"In Assheton Smith v. Owen(1), Cozens Hardy, L. J. said donot think that the doctrine of contenporaneaexposition can be applied in construing Actswhich are, comparatively modern and the Courtdeclined to apply the rule 1 to theinterpretation of local Acts of 1793 and1800."
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd edn., Vol., 32, it isstated in the context of telegraph legislation thus at p. 4The fact that new methods of telegraphy have been inventedsince the date of passing of the Acts containing thedefinition does not prevent the application of the Acts tosuch methods, provided that they answer the requirements andfall within the terms of the definition."In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd. edn., Vol. 2,dealing with the said maxim,-the learned author states at p.508 as follows"As a general rule it may be stated -that legislative intentshould be determined as of the time the legislation goesinto effect. But surrounding circumstances and situationsoccurring after the enactment of the statutemay be of great or even conclusive assistancein determining a meaning which was intended to be conveyed.Legislative standards are generally couched ill terms whichhave, considerable breadth. Therefore a. status may beinterpreted to include., circumstances or(1) (1906) 1 Ch. 179, 213.
155situations which were unknown or did not existat the time of the enactment of the statute."Decided cases accepted the said liberal approach inconstruing modern statutes. In The Attorney-General v. TheEdison Telephone Company of London (1),a telephone was heldto be a "telegraph" within the meaning of the TelegraphsActs, 1863 and 1869, although the telephone was not inventedor contemplated in 1869. Stephen, T., observed at p. 254 :
"Of course no one supposes that thelegislature intended to refer specifically totelephones many years before they wereinvented, but it is highly probable that theywould, and it seems to us clear that theyactually did, use language embracing futurediscoveries as to the use of electricity forthe purpose of conveying intelligence."
The Privy-Council in re Regulation and Control of-Radio Communication in Canada ( 2) held that broadcasting fell within the m eaning of the expression in s.92 of British North America Act,1867, though at the time when that Act was made broadcasting was not in vogue. In The King V. Brislan ; ex parte Williams(3) the question was whether a law of the Commonwealth Parliament with respect to radio broadcasting was one with respect to "Postal, telegraphic telephonic and other like services" under s. 1(5) of the Australian Commonwealth Act, and the Court held that the words were wide enough to take in radio broadcasting. In James v. Commonwealth of Australia(4),Lord Wright has state the principle in felicitous language thus (1) (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 244.. (2) (1932) A. C. 304. (3) (1935) 54 C L.R. 262. (4) (1936) A.C. 578, 641.
156 "...... the meaning of the words changes, but the changing circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full import of that meaning."
This Court in construing the words "sale of goods" in Entry 48, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, accepted the aforesaid principle in The State of Madras V. Gannon Dunkerley and Co., (Madras) Ltd. (1),and restated it at p. 416 thus "The principle of these decisions. is that when, after the enactment of a legislation, new facts and situations arise which could not have been in its contemplation, the statutory provisions could properly be applied to them if the words thereof are in a broad sense capable- of containing them."
The legal position may be summarized thus: The maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down by Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes but not to interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. There is a good reason for this change in the mode of interpretation. The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether the Court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed intention of the Legislature. It is perhaps difficult to attribute to a legislative body functioning in static society that its intention was couched in terms of considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments comprehended by the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was made. But in a modem progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a modern Legislature making laws to govern a society which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware (1) [1959] S.C. R. 379.
157 of an enlarged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human. activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could be invoked in construing the word "telegraph line" in the Act.
For the said reasons, we hold that the expression "'telegraph line" is sufficiently comprehensive to take in the wires used for the purpose of the apparatus of the Post and Telegraph Wireless Station.
In the result, we set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the petition filed by the first respondent. The appeal is allowed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.
