The New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Gopu

Reportable 2025 INSC 511 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.2466 of 2020)

THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. APPELLANT

VERSUS GOPU & ANR. RESPONDENTS

O R D E R

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against an order dated

01.03.2019, passed by the High Court of Kerala in MACA No.627 of

2016, by which the compensation awarded to the claimants by the

Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha (for short, `the

Tribunal’) was enhanced.

3. On 02.06.2000 at 3.00 P.M., the deceased was riding

pillion on a motorcycle being driven by one V.G. Shibu, 1 st

respondent before the Tribunal. Near the Avalookunnu Post office,

respondent No.1 applied sudden brake to save a cyclist and the

deceased fell and was injured. Ultimately, the deceased succumbed

to her injuries on 07.06.2000 at the Medical College Hospital. It

is alleged that the accident was due to the rash and negligent

driving by the bike driver. The owner and driver were ex-parte in

the Tribunal.

Signature Not Verified 4. The legal representatives of the deceased, husband Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV

and two minor children, preferred a claim petition under Section Date: 2025.04.19 10:33:41 IST Reason:

166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Accidents Claims

Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.6,53,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh 2

Fifty Three Thousand only). Against the award dated 23.11.2006,

after 10 years, in 2016, the children alone preferred an appeal

before the High Court. The High Court of Kerala enhanced the

compensation from Rs.6,53,000/- to Rs.14,95,000/- and further

directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay interest @ 7% p.a.

interest. This is the order which has been challenged before us.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully

perused the material placed on record.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submits

the deceased was working as a Junior Public Health Nurse at PHC,

Thenipalam and was getting an amount of Rs.5,955/- per month. The

appellants Gopu and Goukul are her children, who were minors, when

the deceased aged 32 died as a result of the accident. Learned

counsel submits that just amount was not awarded by the Tribunal;

as after the death of Rasimol (the deceased), three Pay Commission

Reports dated 25.03.2006, 26.02.2011 and 20.01.2016 were

implemented. And a considerable increase in the salary was

recommended in the Pay Commission. Learned counsel contends that

the future prospects and the hike in salary was not considered by

the Tribunal while awarding compensation.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-

Insurance Company submits that there are discrepancies in the

judgment of the High Court in apportioning the enhanced

compensation and that the cause of action had occurred in the year

2000, hence the salary received at the time of accident alone can

be considered. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment

passed by the High Court is not sustainable in the eye of law as 3

respondent No.1-Gopu himself attained majority in the year 2011 as

per his affidavit filed with the MAC appeal in year 2016 and he has

not given any satisfactory explanation as to why the MAC Appeal was

not filed immediately thereafter; when he attained majority. The

respondents/claimants have filed the MAC appeal after 10 years of

the award and further after about 8 years (2877 days) from the date

of attaining majority.

8. Learned counsel for the respondents rely upon

Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which read as under:

“6.Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule.

(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-

section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’ includes a child in the womb.

4

7.Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.

Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property”

9. Section 6, of the Limitation Act, 1963, as is evident

from the extract enables a person disabled, by reason of minority,

insanity or idiocy, to institute a suit or make an application for

the execution of a ‘decree’, within the period of limitation

provided, after the disability has ceased. The provision applies

only with respect to a suit or an application for the execution of

a decree and not in an appeal or any other proceeding. Here, we

must notice the definition clause, Section 2(l) which though does

not define a suit but provides that ‘a suit does not include an

appeal or an application’. An appeal, an application and a suit are

hence dealt with differently insofar as the Limitation Act is

concerned, as evidenced from Section 3 also. In this context, we

have also to notice the distinction, insofar as Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, providing for admission of an appeal, or any

application, other than an application under any of the provisions 5

of Order XXI of the C.P.C., even after the prescribed period, if

sufficient cause is shown to satisfy the Court.

10. It is pertinent that till the Act of 1963 came into

effect applications for execution of the decree were not

specifically excluded from the purview of the provision allowing

condonation of delay, (Section 5(b) of the Limitation Act of 1871

and Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908) which was excluded for

the first time under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. It has been held

that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit in

Ajay Gupta v. Raju1. Likewise legal disabilities specified in

Section 6 creates an exemption and enables the period of limitation

to run from the date on which the disability has ceased, only in

the case of a suit or an application for the execution of a decree;

the last of which we already noticed is excluded under Section 5.

11. In this context, we refer to the decision of the

Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah

Khan2 [ILR (1890) 12 All 461 (FB)] and make the following extract

from Mahmood, J’s opinion which was concurred by all the other

three Hon’ble Judges:

“What effect the minority of some of the defendants has upon the case is the subject of the second question as enunciated by me. And upon this point, I am of the opinion that the defendants-respondents have no case. It is true that some of them are minors, but they are duly represented by guardians whose interests are the same as theirs, and the fact of minority could not prevent the guardians from showing due diligence on behalf of the minors. It is noticeable that Section 7 of the Limitation Act, in extending the period of limitation on account of minority, refers only to suits and applications and makes no mention of

1 (2016) 14 SCC 314 2 1890 SCC OnLine All 1 6

appeals, and its provisions are, therefore, unavailable to the minor defendants.”

Section 7 referred to in the above extract is from the: Limitation

Act (XV of 1877) and the provisions we are concerned with also is

similarly worded, without any mention of appeals.

12. In Musthafali v. Subair3, the High Court of Kerala

considering the word ‘suit’ used in Section 6 and defined in the

Limitation Act held that the proceedings under Section 110A of the

Motor Vehicles Act are in the nature of a suit under the Code of

Civil Procedure; since the lis is instituted by presentation of an

application, which is more or less like a plaint. The Division

Bench of the High Court relied on a Constitution Bench decision of

this Court in H.H. Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of

Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan4 which held

“A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claimant is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within Section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure..” [sic paragraph 5].

Impliedly, the exemption by reason of a disability applies to the

institution of an original proceeding or an application for

execution of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of an

appeal. Appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and if,

as is the case here, when the original proceeding was instituted at

the time of minority, why should there be a subsequent disability

inferred, when the natural guardian, the father, who instituted the

appeal was alive and did not suffer from any disability himself,

3 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 269 4 1963 SCC OnLine SC 119 7

even when the appeal period stood expired. The above observation of

ours may not be taken as Section 6 being applicable to appeals,

which the legislature did not intend.

13. In the present case, the father as the natural guardian

has instituted the original proceeding before the Motor Accidents

Claims Tribunal, filed for compensation on the death of his wife in

a motor vehicle accident, with both the minor children in the party

array of claimants, represented by the father, the natural

guardian. The father did not choose to file an appeal from the

award. In fact, as per Annexure P-4, it is seen that the Insurance

Company had filed an appeal from the award of the Tribunal on the

ground of the policy not covering the risk of a pillion rider,

which stood dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court, based

on a clarification issued by the Insurance Regulatory Development

Authority that a package policy will also cover the risk of a

pillion rider. In the said appeal the father and the two minor

children were made parties, and they appeared through counsel. The

father did not choose to file a cross appeal seeking enhancement of

the claim amounts. The father who is the natural guardian took a

conscious decision not to file an appeal and was satisfied with the

award. The statements made in the application for condonation of

delay, that; the father had married again; the children were

abandoned; who were in the care of their grandparents are not

substantiated. We make this observation fully conscious of the fact

that any substantiation would also have not enabled the filing of

an appeal under Section 6, the exemption under which, based on a

disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution of 8

a decree. The intention of the legislature being very clear, it is

not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced

sympathies. Even Section 5 has no application in the facts of the

case, insofar as the long delay occasioned, especially when in the

original proceedings, the children were represented by the father,

the natural guardian.

14. On the above reasoning, we set aside the judgment of the

learned Single Judge finding the appeal filed to be grossly delayed

and hence not maintainable. The appeal stands allowed.

.........................J. (SUDHANSHU DHULIA)

........................J. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN) NEW DELHI;

APRIL 08, 2025.