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The Govt. Of India vs P. Venkatesh

Supreme Court1 March 2019D.Y. Chandrachud · Hemant Gupta

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A claim for compassionate appointment must be made within a reasonable period of time from the date of the employee's death, and delay in initiating proceedings to obtain such appointment is fatal to the claim, as the essential purpose of compassionate appointment is to enable the family to tide over the immediate financial crisis caused by the death of the employee, and this purpose is defeated where the claim is made years later after the crisis has passed. The principle that judicial orders directing reconsideration of rejected representations cannot cure or overlook the fundamental defect of delay in making the original claim; successive orders of tribunals or courts for fresh consideration do not restart the clock or remove the prejudicial effect of the initial delay in bringing the matter before the adjudicatory authority.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2425 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) No.5810 of 2017)

THE GOVT. OF INDIA & ANR. APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

P. VENKATESH RESPONDENT(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Leave granted.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at

Madras, by its judgment dated 9 August 2016, issued a

mandamus, while setting aside the order of the Central

Administrative Tribunal, and directed the appellants to

grant appointment on a compassionate basis to the

respondent within a period of three months from the date

of the order.

The father of the respondent, who was working in the

Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, died on

25 May 1996. The widow of the deceased employee made a

representation for compassionate appointment. On 3

January 1997, the representation submitted by her was Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date: 2019.03.06 rejected. Thereafter, a fresh representation was made, 17:00:13 IST Reason:

which was considered and rejected in the Minutes of a

Meeting held on 1 July 1999, which considered similar 2

requests by several other employees.

In 2007, the respondent initiated proceedings1 before

the Madras Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The Tribunal, by its order dated 26 June 2007, directed

the appellants to consider the representation of the

respondent dated 14 February 2006 by a speaking order.

The OA was disposed of. Accordingly, on 13 November

2007, a speaking order was passed rejecting the

representation.

The respondent then filed another OA2 before the

Tribunal on which an order was passed on 16 March 2011

directing the appellants to dispose of the representation

after re-consideration. Again, when the claim for

compassionate appointment was rejected on 25 August 2011,

the respondent moved the Tribunal in a third OA3. The

Tribunal dismissed the OA by an order dated 30 April

2013, holding that the claimant was not eligible under

the Scheme4 under which the maximum period for which the

name of a candidate for compassionate appointment could

be kept for consideration was three years.

Following the order of the Tribunal, the respondent

filed a Writ Petition before the High Court in which the

impugned order has been passed, setting aside the

judgment of the Tribunal and granting a mandamus for

1 OA 430 of 2007 2 OA 1389 of 2010 3 OA 183 of 2012 4 DOP&T OM No.14014/3/2011 – ESST(D) dated 26.07.2012 3

appointment on a compassionate basis. The High Court

observed, after perusing the record, that though the

representation had been rejected on the ground that the

elder brother of the respondent was gainfully employed,

as a matter of fact, his salary certificate indicated

that he was working on a daily wage basis.

We have heard Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned Additional

Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellants

and Mr. Aravindh S., learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the respondent.

The primary difficulty in accepting the line of

submissions, which weighed with the High Court, and were

reiterated on behalf of the respondent in these

proceedings, is simply this: Compassionate appointment,

it is well-settled, is intended to enable the family of a

deceased employee to tide over the crisis which is caused

as a result of the death of an employee, while in

harness. The essence of the claim lies in the immediacy

of the need. If the facts of the present case are seen,

it is evident that even the first recourse to the Central

Administrative Tribunal was in 2007, nearly eleven years

after the death of the employee. In the meantime, the

first set of representations had been rejected on 3

January 1997. The Tribunal, unfortunately, passed a

succession of orders calling upon the appellants to

consider and then re-consider the representations for

compassionate appointment. After the Union Ministry of 4

Information and Broadcasting rejected the representation

on 13 November 2007, it was only in 2010 that the

Tribunal was moved again, with the same result. These

successive orders of Tribunal for re-consideration of the

representation cannot obliterate the effect of the

initial delay in moving the Tribunal for compassionate

appointment over a decade after the death of the deceased

employee. This ‘dispose of the representation’ mantra is

increasingly permeating the judicial process in the High

Courts and the Tribunals. Such orders may make for a

quick or easy disposal of cases in overburdened

adjudicatory institutions. But, they do no service to

the cause of justice. The litigant is back again before

the Court, as this case shows, having incurred attendant

costs and suffered delays of the legal process. This

would have been obviated by calling for a counter in the

first instance, thereby resulting in finality to the

dispute. By the time, the High Court issued its

direction on 9 August 2016, nearly twenty one years had

elapsed since the date of the death of the employee.

In Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana5, this

Court held thus:

“2...The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further,

5 (1994) 4 SCC 138 5

mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non- manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency.”

Bearing in mind the above principles, this Court

held:

“6. For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.”

The recourse to the Tribunal suffered from a delay of

over a decade in the first instance. This staleness of

the claim took away the very basis of providing

companssionate appointment. The claim was liable to be

rejected on that ground and ought to have been so

rejected. The judgment of the High Court is

unsustainable.

We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the

impugned judgment and order of the High Court. In 6

consequence, we affirm the judgment of the Tribunal

dismissing the Original Application. There shall be no

order as to costs.

.............................J. (DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD)

.............................J. (HEMANT GUPTA)

NEW DELHI MARCH 01, 2019 7

ITEM NO.54 COURT NO.12 SECTION XII

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2425 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) No.5810 of 2017)

THE GOVT. OF INDIA & ANR. APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

P. VENKATESH RESPONDENT(s)

Date : 01-03-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

For Petitioner(s) Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG Ms. Uttara Babbar, Adv.

Mr. Dhruv Pall, Adv.

Ms. Bhavana Duhoon, Adv.

Mr. Gurmeet Singh Makker, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Aravindh S., AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed

reportable judgment. There shall be no order as to

costs.

Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

(SANJAY KUMAR-I) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR) AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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