The Chief Manager Central Bank Of India vs M/S Ad Bureau Advertising Pvt Ltd
- Neutral2025 INSC 288
- SCR[2025] 2 SCR 1445
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A person who avails a service (including a loan facility) is not a "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, if the dominant intention or dominant purpose of the transaction is to facilitate profit generation for that person, even if the person is not excluded from the definition merely by virtue of being a commercial entity. The transaction must have a close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity; the identity of the person or the value of the transaction alone is not conclusive. A borrower who obtains a project loan from a bank for a business venture, where the dominant purpose is to generate profits through that venture, avails of the loan for a commercial purpose and therefore falls outside the definition of consumer, notwithstanding any incidental branding or self-employment elements in how the loan is deployed.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2025 INSC 288 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7438 OF 2023 THE CHIEF MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK
OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
M/s AD BUREAU ADVERTISING
PVT. LTD & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (@ DIARY NO. 20192 OF 2024)
M/s AD BUREAU ADVERTISING
PVT. LTD. …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE CHIEF MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK
OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora Date: 2025.02.28 16:48:59 IST Reason: JUDGMENT
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. The question which arises in these two appeals for our
determination is that whether the borrower of a project loan,
falls within the definition of ‘Consumer’ under the provisions of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter, ‘the Act’).
2. These statutory appeals arise from the order dated 30.08.2023
passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter, ‘NCDRC’) in Consumer
Complaint No. 23/2021. The appellant before us in Civil
Appeal No. 7483 of 2023 is the Chief Manager, Central Bank of
India and has filed the appeal under Section 23 of the Act,
assailing the finding arrived at by the NCDRC holding that
there was a deficiency in service on part of the appellant and
thus, it is liable to pay compensation to the respondent No. 1,
which is M/s Ad Bureau Pvt. Ltd., (a company engaged in the
business of branding, consulting & advertising).
2
3. On the other hand, Civil Appeal (Diary) No. 20192 of 2024 has
been filed by M/s Ad Bureau Pvt. Ltd., challenging the
quantum of compensation awarded by the NCDRC, on the
ground that the same has been awarded inadequately. For the
sake of convenience, we shall refer to the parties as per their
respective status in Civil Appeal No. 7483 of 2023.
4. The NCDRC vide its order dated 30.08.2023 has allowed the
Consumer Complaint filed by respondent No.1 herein and has
directed the appellants1 to pay a compensation of Rs.
75,00,000/ to respondent No.1 and to issue a certificate
stating that the loan account of respondent No.1 with the
Central Bank of India was settled and no outstanding dues
remained in the said account and also holding that the Bank
had wrongly reported the status of respondent No.1 as a
defaulter to CIBIL2, which caused loss to the respondent No.1
in the market. Additionally, the appellants were also directed
to pay to respondent No.1, litigation costs of Rs. 20,000/.
5. At the outset, it would be necessary to state the relevant facts.
On 28.04.2014, a Project Loan of Rs. 10 crores was sanctioned 1 Appellant Nos. 1, 2 & 3 are the Chief Manager, Mount Road Branch, Chennai; Field General Manager, Chennai; and the Managing Director & Chief Executive Officer of the Central Bank of India respectively.
2 Credit Information Bureau of India Limited.
3 by the Central Bank of India in favour of respondent No.1,
which is a private limited company carrying on advertising
business. The purpose behind availing this loan was that
respondent No. 1 was to engage in the postproduction of a
movie. A property located at old D.No. 61, new D. No. 194, St.
Mary's Road, Abhiramapuram, Chennai, which stood in the
name of the Chairman and Managing Director of respondent
No.1 was pledged as collateral for the loan. After availing the
said loan, respondent No. 1 defaulted in repayment and its
loan account and was classified as NPA 3 on 04.02.2015. When
respondent No.1 failed to repay the amount even after
issuance of Demand Notice by the appellantbank, a
Possession Notice was issued on 21.05.2015 and pursuant to
the same, symbolic possession of the property pledged as
collateral for the loan was taken in terms of the provisions of
the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘SARFAESI Act’).
6. Thereafter, on 09.10.2015 the Bank filed an application under
Section 19 (1) of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
3 NonPerforming Asset.
4 Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as
'RDDBFI Act') before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai for
recovery of an amount of Rs 4,65,39,715/. This application
came to be allowed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai
vide order dated 05.12.2016 and the Bank was held to be
entitled to recover an amount of Rs.4,65,39,715/ with interest
@ 12% p.a. till the date of realisation along with costs.
Pursuant thereto, a communication was addressed to the
appellantbank by respondent No.1 offering a OneTime
Settlement of Rs. 3.56 Crores and the offer was duly accepted
by the appellantbank.
7. Thereafter, the appellantbank called upon respondent No.1 to
pay the ‘delayed period interest’ which was computed as Rs.
14.43 lacs. Admittedly, this amount was also paid by
respondent No.1 to the appellantbank, pursuant to which
‘NoDues Certificate’ was issued on 13.01.2017 and
20.03.2017 by the appellantbank towards respondent No.1.
Further, a ‘fullsatisfaction memo’ was also filed before the
DRT by the appellantbank, wherein the factum of payment of
the onetime settlement amount and delayed interest by
respondent No. 1 was accepted by the appellantbank.
5
8. The precise case of the respondent No. 1 before the NCDRC, as
well as before this Court, has been that the appellantbank
was grossly negligent and deficient in providing banking
services to respondent No. 1 and has consequently caused
monetary damages and a loss of reputation to it. As per the
‘Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters’4 by the Reserve Bank of
India (hereinafter, ‘RBI’), all nationalised banks and financial
institutions have to report information regarding borrower
accounts which are classified as doubtful and loss accounts
with outstanding amount aggregating Rs. 1 Crore and above.
These borrowers are classified and reported as ‘wilful
defaulters’ by the respective banks and financial institutions to
the RBI, which in turn, consolidates the entire information
reported in the form of a list on a yearly basis. The grievance of
respondent No. 1 towards the appellantbank has been that
the appellantbank, despite issuing a NoDues Certificate and
despite filing a FullSatisfaction Memo before the DRT,
incorrectly reported the name of respondent No. 1 to RBI as a
defaulter with a total outstanding amount of Rs. 4.17 Crores.
4 Circular No. DBOD No. BC/CIS/47/20.16.002/94 dated 23.04.1994.
6
9. This incorrect reporting by the appellantbank not only led to a
significant loss of goodwill and reputation, but it also resulted
in the respondent No. 1 losing an exclusive advertising
tender/license by the Airports Authority of India, which
although, was initially awarded to respondent No. 1 but was
subsequently cancelled for the reason that a Bank Guarantee
was required to be submitted, but the same could not be done,
as when the respondent No.1 approached HDFC Bank for
issuance of the same, the bank refused to do so upon finding
the name of respondent No.1 in the list of wilful defaulters.
10. Aggrieved by the wrongful reporting and the losses which it
faced on account of the same, respondent No. 1 filed
Consumer Complaint No. 23 of 2021 before the NCDRC. Vide
Impugned Order dt. 30.08.2023, NCDRC partly allowed the
complaint, holding that the appellantbank was deficient in
service and also engaged in an unfair trade practice. It was
observed by the NCDRC that since the wrongful reporting by
the appellantbank constitutes a serious breach of duty, it is
liable to compensate respondent No. 1 for the losses it has
incurred and accordingly, the NCDRC awarded a
compensation of Rs. 75,00,000/ to respondent No. 1 which
7 was to be paid jointly and severally by the appellants herein
and also directed them to pay litigation costs of Rs. 20,000/.
Further, the appellants were directed to issue a certificate in
favour of respondent No. 1, wherein it was to be stated by the
appellantbank that loan account of respondent No. 1 stood
settled and no outstanding dues remained. The appellantbank
had to further state that it had been wrongly reporting the
status respondent No. 1 as a ‘defaulter’ from 31.03.2017 till
30.06.2020.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as
Shri M. Abirchand Nahar, who appeared and argued as party
inperson, on behalf of respondent No. 1 and we have also
heard the learned counsel for respondent No. 2, i.e.
TransUnion CIBIL Limited.
12. At the outset, it has been submitted by the learned counsel
for the appellants that the order dated 30.08.2023 of the
NCDRC is not sustainable in law, as it was passed without
first adjudicating whether the respondent No. 1 falls within the
definition of consumer in terms of Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the
Act. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for
the appellants as well as learned counsel for respondent No. 2
8 that respondent No. 1 does not come within the definition of
‘consumer’ under Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act since the
service availed (sanction of project loan) by respondent No. 1
from the appellantbank was purely for a commercial purpose
and it was a loan transaction between two business entities. In
other words, it was businesstobusiness transaction as
opposed to a businesstoconsumer transaction. This is the
first limb of the argument. The second limb, which is a
continuation of the first, is that this service was availed by
respondent No.1 with the ‘dominant intention’ of generating
profits and the main purpose behind the loan transaction was
to increase/generate additional revenue for the company. In
support of this argument, learned counsel(s) have relied upon
two decisions of this Court in National Insurance Company
Limited vs. Harsolia Motors & Ors. (2023) 8 SCC 362 &
Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti
Developers, (2020) 2 SCC 265.
13. Before dealing with the rival submissions advanced on
behalf of the respondent No. 1, we consider it necessary to
9 refer to Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, which is reproduced as
under:
(d) "consumer" means any person who—
(i) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who 'hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purposes;
Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, “commercial purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment;
(emphasis provided)
14. A plain reading of the above makes it clear that where a
service is availed, for any “commercial purpose” then the
person who has availed such a service is not a “consumer” for
purposes of the Act. All the same, this is subject to a caveat
which is provided by the Explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) of the
Act. The explanation clarifies that when the person uses the
10 goods bought, or avails any service for the sole purpose of
earning his livelihood, by means of selfemployment, then such
a person would not be excluded from the definition of
‘consumer’ under the Act.
15. As a counter to the submission of the appellants that
respondent No.1 is not a ‘consumer’ on account of fact that the
it had availed the loan facility, with the purpose of generating
profits for its business, respondent No. 1 would argue that it is
squarely covered by the Explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) of the
Act and that loan was availed by it only for ‘selfuse’. This
argument was also put forth by respondent No. 1 before the
NCDRC, where it claimed that loan amount of Rs. 10 crores
was used by it to engage itself in the postproduction of a
movie titled “Kochadaiiyaan” and to see to it that the name of
respondent No.1 is displayed on the movie title, the posters of
the movie as well as the advertisements of the movie. In other
words, it was a selfbranding exercise, the sole purpose being
building a brand name for respondent No.1, in order to earn
livelihood and thus, there is no nexus to generation of profits.
16. We are not convinced by this argument put forth on behalf
of respondent No. 1 for the simple reason that even if partly, it
11 may be true that the loan was availed for a selfbranding
exercise, the dominant purpose behind brandbuilding itself is
to attract more customers and consequently generate profits or
increase revenue for the business. A bald averment that
company engaged itself in the postproduction of the movie
solely for the purposes of brandbuilding does not alter the
fundamental nature of the transaction, i.e. the availing of
credit facility from the appellantbank, which was purely a
businesstobusiness transaction, entered into for a
commercial purpose. Postproduction of a film involves
multiple activities, which finally gives shape and presentation
to a film, which is a commercial venture.
17. In Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique
Shanti Developers, (2020) 2 SCC 265, this Court has
observed that no straitjacket formula can be laid down for
determining whether an activity or transaction is for a
commercial purpose and has laid down certain principles
which are to be kept in mind. The relevant excerpt is
reproduced hereunder:
“19. To summarise from the above discussion, though a strait jacket formula cannot be adopted in every case, the following broad
12 principles can be culled out for determining whether an activity or transaction is “for a commercial purpose”:
19.1. The question of whether a transaction is for a commercial purpose would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, ordinarily, “commercial purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business tobusiness transactions between commercial entities.
19.2. The purchase of the good or service should have a close and direct nexus with a profitgenerating activity.
19.3. The identity of the person making the purchase or the value of the transaction is not conclusive to the question of whether it is for a commercial purpose. It has to be seen whether the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction was to facilitate some kind of profitgeneration for the purchaser or their beneficiary.” (emphasis provided)
18. We are cognisant of the fact that respondent No.1 would not
be excluded from the definition of consumer merely on account
of the fact that it is a commercial entity/enterprise. But what
has weighed with us in coming to the conclusion that in the
instant case, respondent No.1 cannot be said to be a
‘consumer’ is the fact that the transaction in question i.e.
obtaining a project loan did have a close nexus with a profit
generating activity and in fact, the dominant purpose for
13 getting this loan sanctioned was to generate profits upon
successful postproduction of the movie titled “Kochadaiyaan”.
19. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Shrikant
G. Mantri vs. Punjab National Bank (2022) 5 SCC 42. The
facts of this case were that the appellant therein was a stock
broker who availed an overdraft facility from the respondent
bank, the purpose of which was to facilitate his daily
transactions in the stock and share market. As collateral for
the overdraft facility, the appellant therein had pledged his
shares, which were not returned to him despite the matter
being settled between the parties through a onetime
settlement. Alleging deficiency in service by the respondent
bank, the appellant approached the NCDRC which dismissed
the complainant on the grounds of maintainability, holding
that he is not a consumer under the provisions of this Act.
When the matter came up before this Court, it was the
appellant’s case that he had availed the overdraft facility for
his ‘selfemployment’. This Court found no merit in this
argument and held that the overdraft facility was taken by the
appellant therein to expand his business profits and the
relationship between the appellant and respondentbank
14 would purely be a ‘businesstobusiness’ relationship and
therefore, the transaction would clearly come within the ambit
of the term “commercial purpose”.
20. Further, in National Insurance Company Limited vs.
Harsolia Motors & Ors. (2023) 8 SCC 362, this Court has
laid down the determining factors which have to be kept in
mind while considering whether a service is availed for a
commercial purpose or not. The relevant excerpt is reproduced
hereunder:
“39. Applying the aforesaid test, two things are culled out : (i) whether the goods are purchased for resale or for commercial purpose; or (ii) whether the services are availed for any commercial purpose. The twofold classification is commercial purpose and non commercial purpose. If the goods are purchased for resale or for commercial purpose, then such consumer would be excluded from the coverage of the 1986 Act. For example, if a manufacturer who is producing product A, for such production he may be required to purchase articles which may be raw material, then purchase of such articles would be for commercial purpose. As against this, if the same manufacturer purchases a refrigerator, television or air conditioner for his use at his residence or even for his office has no direct or indirect nexus to generate profits, it cannot be held to be for commercial purpose and for aforestated reason he is qualified to approach the Consumer Forum under the 1986 Act.
15 40. Similarly, a hospital which hires services of a medical practitioner, it would be a commercial purpose, but if a person avails such services for his ailment, it would be held to be a noncommercial purpose. Taking a wide meaning of the words “for any commercial purpose”, it would mean that the goods purchased or services hired should be used in any activity directly intended to generate profit. Profit is the main aim of commercial purpose, but in a case where goods purchased or services hired is an activity, which is not directly intended to generate profit, it would not be a commercial purpose.” (emphasis provided)
21. From an analysis of the aforementioned decisions, it is
quite clear that what is to be seen here is that whether the
dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction
was to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the person
who has availed the service. Therefore, it is our considered
opinion that the respondent No.1 is not a ‘consumer’ in terms
of Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act.
22. In view of the aforesaid, we find merit in this appeal and
accordingly set aside the order dated 30.08.2023 passed by
the NCDRC. The Civil Appeal stands allowed, accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
16
23. However, we deem it necessary to add that we have only
dealt with the issue of maintainability of the Consumer
Complaint filed by respondent No.1 before the NCDRC, and we
have allowed this appeal only on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of NCDRC. We have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the dispute between the parties herein. We also
clarify that this judgment shall not come in the way of
respondent No.1 to pursue appropriate remedies in accordance
with law.
Civil Appeal No. of 2025 (@ Diary No.20192 OF 2024)
24. Delay condoned.
25. In view of the aforesaid, we see absolutely no scope for our
interference with the order dated 30.08.2023 of the NCDRC as
regards the quantum of compensation awarded.
26. The civil appeal stands dismissed, accordingly.
27. Pending application(s), if any shall stand disposed of.
……....................................J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
……....................................J. [PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
New Delhi, February 28, 2025.
17
This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.
Research this judgment with Miss Lucy
Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.
Try Miss Lucy free