Thankamma George vs Lilly Thomas

2024 INSC 494 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6495 OF 2023

THANKAMMA GEORGE ... APPELLANT VERSUS

LILLY THOMAS AND ANOTHER ... RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX

1. Thankamma George/Appellant, and Lilly Thomas/Respondent No. 1, are

sisters, and the daughters of one late George. P.M. Thomas/Respondent No. 2

is the husband of Respondent No. 1. The Appellant filed O.S. No. 139 of 2011

dated 11.05.2011 before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Pathanamthitta for the

relief of declaration that the Appellant is the sole title holder of the suit schedule

property and for recovery of possession from the Respondents. The Appellant

prayed that she be declared as the exclusive and sole owner of one-half of the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Deepak Joshi Date: 2024.07.09 16:47:38 IST plaint schedule property, sale deed no. 345/2008 dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) of Reason: 1 Enathu Sub-Registrar office as void ab initio, for consequential relief of

perpetual injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating and from

encumbering the suit schedule property in any manner. The frame of the suit is

for more than one relief and the suit schedule consists of an extent of 8.47 ares

(1013 sq. yds.) in Re-Sy. No. 216/6, Block No. 19 of Village Ezhamkulam. The

suit schedule reads thus:

“8.47 Ares of land to the South and West of the North Eastern 3.03 Ares in 11.50 Ares in Re-Sy. No.216/6 of Block No.19, corresponding to old Sy. No.621/6 with the double-storeyed residential and shop building presently bearing Panchayath Nos.X/17, A, B and C, of Ezhamkulam Grama Panchayath”.

2. The Appellant and Respondent No. 1, on 16.01.1991, through sale deed

no. 61/1991 purchased 11.50 ares of open plot from one Sivadasan Pillai. On

04.12.2003, the Appellant, since had been working abroad, executed Power of

Attorney No. 44/2003 (Ex. A-4) concerning the property covered by the sale

deed dated 16.01.1991, in favour of Respondent No. 1. The Power of Attorney

authorized Respondent No. 1 to execute appropriate deeds, if necessary, sale

deeds, and receive sale consideration for and on behalf of the Appellant. The

Power of Attorney (Ex. A-4) creates the relationship of the principal and the

agent between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1. Ex. A-4 recites that sale

can be effected, subject to necessity and accounting for sale proceeds. On

18.01.2008, the Appellant and Respondent No. 1, contrary to the principal and

agent relationship, executed a sale deed in favour of one Joemon and his wife.

Thus, upon the sale of a portion of the open plot, the Appellant/Plaintiff retained

2 an extent of 8.47 ares as described in the suit schedule. On 16.04.2008,

Respondent No. 1, by way of sale, transferred the suit schedule in favour of her

husband/Respondent No. 2 vide sale deed no. 345/2008 (Ex. A-5). On

26.02.2009, the Appellant filed a petition before the Taluk Legal Services

Authority for redressal of the dispute, i.e., the alienation of the Appellant’s half

share in the suit schedule in favour of Respondent No. 2. The Appellant did not

get any relief from the Legal Services Authority; hence, on 11.05.2011, the

Appellant filed the Suit for the reliefs noted above.

II. PLAINT AVERMENTS:

3. The Appellant has resided abroad since 1966 and worked as a Nurse in

Bahrain, the U.K. and the U.S.A.. She claims to have remained as a spinster.

From the earnings as a Nurse, the Appellant has supported Respondent No. 1

in more than one sense. The plaint refers to a few circumstances claiming

exclusive ownership of the property purchased through sale deed nos. 61 and

877 of 1991. We are not referring to these averments for the appeal, which is

confined to the relief granted by the Trial Court, i.e., half share in the suit

schedule property. Having regard to the Appellant working overseas,

Respondent No. 1 was authorised to act as the Appellant's agent, depending

upon necessity. Contrary to the Power of Attorney dated 04.12.2003 (Ex. A-4),

the Appellant in her capacity as the owner of the property, sold an extent of 3.03

ares in favour of Joemon and his wife. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1, through

3 Ex. A-5, i.e., sale deed dated 16.04.2008, sold the property retained by the

sisters to Respondent No. 2. The Appellant averred that the agency granted

was withdrawn when the Appellant joined in the execution of sale deed No. 59

of 2008 in favour of Joemon and his wife. Therefore, the sale deed dated

16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5), executed after implied revocation, is void ab initio. Ex. A-

5 was executed without, both, the Appellant's knowledge, and the transfer of

sale consideration by Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 1; thus, no right or

title to the extent of half share of the Appellant is created or transferred in favour

of Respondent No. 2. The sale unsupported by consideration is illegal and void

ab initio. The cause of action for filing the suit arose when the Appellant moved

the Legal Services Authority on 26.02.2009. Knowledge of the execution of Ex.

A-5 is stated to have been acquired about that time.

III. AVERMENTS IN WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 & 2:

4. The Respondents admit the relationship. The Appellant has been a U.S.

citizen since 1991. It is admitted that the Appellant retired from service in 2007

and stayed and lived with Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 between 2007 and 2009.

After filing the suit, the Appellant again left for the U.S.A. The sale deed dated

16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) in favour of Respondent No. 2 was executed when the

Appellant resided with the Respondents in India. Respondent No. 1 admits the

joint execution of the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3) in favour of Joemon

and his wife. It is explained by averring that the total consideration received as

4 sale consideration under Ex. A-3 was Rs. 7,00,000/-, and a sum of

Rs. 2,00,000/- was paid in foreign currency to the Appellant. The balance of

Rs. 5,00,000/- was deposited in the joint account of Appellant and Respondent

No. 1. Respondent No. 1 asserts to have the authority of an agent given through

Power of Attorney dated 04.12.2003 (Ex. A-4); therefore, the sale deed dated

16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) in favour of Respondent No. 2 is valid and binds the

Appellant. In fine, the defense taken by Respondent No. 1 is that she has the

authority to act on behalf of the Appellant. The Appellant received sale

consideration in the previous transaction. The suit is filed beyond the limitation

period and, therefore, is liable to be dismissed.

5. The Trial Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration as prayed for?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of plaint scheduled property?

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled for ½ right over plaint scheduled property?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for separate possession of her share by metes and bounds?

5. Whether the sale deed No.345/08 is liable to be set aside?

6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for?

7. Relief and cost.”

6. The Appellant marked Exs. A-1 to A-11 and examined P.Ws. 1 to 5.

Respondent No. 1 was examined as D.W.1 and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked

on behalf of Respondent No. 1. On third-party evidence, Exs. X-1 to X-12 were

marked.

5

7. The Trial Court, on examination of oral and documentary evidence,

rejected the claim of the Appellant for declaration as the owner of the entire suit

schedule property but accepted the alternate prayer for partition and decreed

the suit accordingly. The Trial Court on whether the authority granted in favour

of Respondent No. 1 continued to remain until the execution of the sale deed

dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3), as late as 16.04.2008, when the sale deed (Ex. A-

5) was executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2, held that

the execution of Ex. A-3 by the Appellant as a co-executant along with

Respondent No. 1 results in revocation of power granted in favour of

Respondent No. 1. The finding recorded is that the agency in favour of

Respondent No. 1 by an act of implied revocation stood terminated.

Consequently, it is held that the alienation of the Appellant’s half share by the

Respondents in the suit schedule property is illegal and not binding on the

Appellant. Adverting to the absence of consideration under Ex. A-5, the Trial

Court relied on the categorical admission of Respondent No. 1 as D.W.1 and

noticed that no consideration was passed from Respondent No. 2 to

Respondent No. 1 and the sale in Ex. A-5 is void ab initio. On the above

consideration, the Trial Court decreed the suit for partition, and the operative

portion of the judgment reads thus:

“1. Plaintiff ½ right over plaint scheduled property is hereby declared.

2. The Ext.A5 sale deed No.345/08 executed by 1st defendant in favour of 2nd defendant is void, hence set aside.

3. Intimate the cancellation of Ext.A5 to SRO concerned.

6 4. The plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint scheduled property as follows:-

a) Plaintiff is entitled for ½ share right over plaint scheduled property.

b) Plaintiff is entitled for separate possession of that share by metes and bounds.

c) File final decree application within 3 months from date of the preliminary decree.

d) Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of that ½ share after final decree.

5. Defendants are hereby restrained by a permanent prohibitory injunction from alienating plaint scheduled property, inducting strangers into possession, encumbering the same and from committing any act of waste therein tell ommitting any act of waste therein effecting affecting recovery of possession of plaintiff ½ share from plaint scheduled property.

6. The suit is kept in sine-die.

7. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to cost”.

8. Respondent No. 1, aggrieved by the Trial Court judgment, filed R.F.A. No.

405 of 2016 before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. Through the

impugned judgment dated 08.03.2022, the Appeal was allowed at the instance

of Respondent No. 1. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, noted what (i)

would be the effect of a registered power of attorney authorising the agent to

execute and transfer immoveable property; (ii) whether unilateral cancellation

after the exercise of the right of alienation given under the power of attorney is

available; (iii) what would be the effect of the sale executed by the power holder

with respect to an immoveable property; (iv) what amounts to a document void

ab initio or void document; (v) whether the Trial Court is justified in decreeing

the suit of the Appellant. We may observe that the question framed by the High

Court as a preface for consideration suffers from more than one fallacy, one of

them being unilateral cancellation after exercising the right of alienation in

7 favour of Respondent No. 1. To explain, it is noted at this juncture that the

chronology and the plaint averments disclose that the Appellant's implied

cancellation of power of attorney is not after execution of the sale deed dated

16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5). That apart, the Appellate Court held that the frame of the

suit is incorrect and illegal since the plaint does not pray for setting aside the

Ex. A-5 on available grounds such as fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc.

Therefore, the declaration of Ex. A-5, in the absence of available legal grounds

as void ab initio, reflects the failure of the Trial Court to appreciate the concept

of void ab initio and the underlying legal implication involved in the said concept.

The Appellant came to know of the execution of the sale deed dated 16.04.2008

(Ex. A-5) in the year 2009. The Appellant did not question Ex. A-5 till the suit

was filed on 11.05.2011. The registration of the sale deed amounts to

constructive notice to the Appellant. The suit for the relief of setting aside Ex. A-

5, it is noted, that though the plea of limitation is not taken, the suit is still barred

by limitation. The Appellate Court records in the impugned judgment that the

mere fact of the Appellant joining in execution along with Respondent No. 1 in

executing the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3) does not amount to implied

revocation. The joint execution of the sale deed will neither affect the

cancellation nor the revocation of the power of attorney. The non-receipt of sale

consideration once the sale was completed in terms of Section 54 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908,

8 the vendor under a deed not supported by a sale consideration has the remedy

of receiving the sale consideration from the vendee. The legality of the sale is

not affected by the non-receipt of sale consideration. Through the impugned

judgment, the Appeal was allowed. Hence, the Civil Appeal at the instance of

the Appellant.

IV. SUBMISSIONS:

9. We have heard the Shri V. Chitambaresh, for the Appellant and Shri

Harish Beeran for the Respondents.

10. Shri V. Chitambaresh, Ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant, argues that

the impugned judgment is inconsistent with the case pleaded or proved by the

parties. Insofar as the finding recorded against the Appellant by the Trial Court,

she does not propose to reopen the findings accepted by the Appellate Court.

Still, denying half share to the Appellant in the suit schedule property is per se

illegal. The consideration by the impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous

appreciation or application of Sections 207 and 208 of the Indian Contract Act,

1872 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The Appellant, being the principal, is

authorised by law to expressly cancel or recall the authority granted to

Respondent No. 1. The Appellant can plead and prove that by an implied act of

revocation, which is to the knowledge of Respondent No. 1 and Respondent

No. 2, the Power of Attorney (Ex. A-4) stood cancelled. The execution of the

sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) by Respondent No. 1 in favour of

9 Respondent No. 2 does not bind the Appellant and the Appellant continues to

be the half shareholder of plaint schedule. It is argued that the Power of Attorney

(Ex. A-4) is one in the nature of necessity enabling Respondent No. 1 to act in

accordance with the conditions stipulated. One of the conditions is that the

Appellant was absent from the country when the requirement to execute arose.

The Appellant retired in 2007 and was in India on the date of execution of the

sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3) in favour of Joemon. For the above

reasons, Respondent No. 1 ceased to be an agent of the Appellant and, hence,

Ex. A-5 was executed without authority.

10.1 It is argued that one of the essential ingredients of a legal and valid sale

is receipt of sale consideration by the vendor. Under Section 55 of the Transfer

of Property Act, 1882, to constitute a sale, the conveyance must be for

consideration, and the vendor must receive the sale consideration. The receipt

or non-receipt of consideration insofar as parties to the document present more

than one remedy, a third party to Ex. A-5 can raise the plea of Ex. A-5 being

illegal and void ab initio. The admission, on non-receipt of sale consideration,

goes to the root of the legality of Ex. A-5.

11. Shri Haris Beeran, Ld. Counsel for the Respondents, argues that,

patently, the suit is barred by limitation. The plea of implied revocation of

authority vis-à-vis Respondent No. 1 is illegal and not available in the facts and

circumstances of the case. The impugned judgment examined each of the

10 circumstances stated in the case, the evidence adduced by the parties together

with the contemporaneous conduct and dismissed the suit of the Appellant.

Once it is admitted that power of attorney is executed by the Appellant, thereby

Respondent No. 1 is the agent, recalling the said power of attorney must be

established as a matter of fact. The joint execution does not amount to the

implied revocation of the authority of Respondent No. 1 as the power of attorney

of the Appellant. Ld. Counsel fairly states that keeping in perspective the view

expressed by this Court in Amar Nath v. Gian Chand & Anr.1, the power of

attorney need not be cancelled by a registered deed alone. We find it convenient

to excerpt the following paragraph from the above citation, and it reads thus:

“83. We need not pronounce on the question whether the power of attorney being registered, it could be cancelled only by a registered power of attorney. This we say as even in the absence of a registered cancellation of the power of attorney, there must be cancellation and it must further be brought to the notice of the third party at any rate as already noticed. Such a cancellation is not made out”.

12. Given the above-accepted position in law, we need to examine the

method and mode of recalling the power of an agent. In the circumstances of

this case, whether the implied revocation is made out. In the case on hand, the

controversy centers around the implied revocation of the agency. In this

judgment, we are not dealing with a power of attorney coupled with interest and

revocation, etc. The Appellant accepted the sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-

5), and the total sale consideration of her share was said to have been received

1 (2022) 11 SCC 460.

11 at the time of execution of the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3). The

consideration by the Appellate Court is legal and valid, and the jurisdiction of

this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not made out. It is

argued and brought on record that the Respondents are in a settled possession

of the suit schedule property by constructing a house. The house in existence

is constructed by Respondent No. 2. The Appellant is not entitled to partition of

the constructed portion.

V. ANALYSIS

13. We have perused the record and noted the rival submissions.

14. The admitted circumstances of the case are (i) the relationship between

the Appellant and Respondent No. 1, and Respondent No. 1 and Respondent

No. 2; (ii) the employment of the Appellant as a Nurse in Bahrain, the U.K. and

the U.S.A.; (iii) purchase of suit schedule property in 1991 by the Appellant and

Respondent No. 1; (iv) execution of the Power of Attorney dated 04.12.2003

(Ex. A-4); (v) execution of the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3) in favour of

Joemon; (vi) execution of sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) by Respondent

No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2. The Appellant and Respondent No. 1 are

co-owners of the schedule property. Respondent No. 1 was the Appellant's

agent. Therefore, the question for decision is whether the execution of Ex. A-3

amounts to implied revocation under Section 207 read with Section 208 of the

Act.

12

15. We examine the plea of limitation raised by the Respondents. The

Respondents’ case is that the suit was filed on 11.05.2011, and in effect, the

suit seeks to set aside the sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5). The suit was

filed beyond the limitation period and should have been dismissed. Limitation is

a question of law and fact. The period of limitation and the time from which the

period begins to run, depend on the article in the schedule appended to the

Limitation Act of 1963. The case falls under “Part III – Suits Relating to

Declarations”. Article 58 reads thus:

Description of Period of Time from which period suit Limitation begins to run To obtain any other Three When the right to sue first declaration years accrues.

15.1 The words “when the right to sue first accrues” have been interpreted and

held by this Court in Smt. Neelam Kumari & Anr. v. U.P. Financial

Corporation2. The starting point for the limitation in the case of setting aside

sale deeds has two limbs: the date of execution and the date of knowledge.

There is no difficulty in applying the period of limitation expiring three years from

the date of execution, provided that the Appellant had knowledge of Ex. A-5 on

the date of registration and the right to sue first accrued. The Respondents, in

the circumstances of the case, failed to establish the Appellant’s knowledge of

the execution of Ex. A-5. In the final analysis, Ex. A-5 is held as without authority

2 AIR 2009 Utt 5.

13 and void. The applicability of limitation has a different perspective. So, the

starting point is when the right to sue first accrued to the Appellant. The admitted

case of the Respondents is that the Appellant is a US citizen and she stayed

abroad. Therefore, unless it is clearly established as a fact that the Appellant

had knowledge of Ex. A-5, it cannot be inferred that the Appellant had

contemporaneous knowledge of Ex. A-5 and the limitation started running from

the date of execution of Ex. A-5. That apart, another fact is whether the said

exhibit is void or voidable and this depends on the implied revocation relied on

by the Appellant. From a consideration of relevant circumstances, including the

filing of a grievance petition before the Legal Services Authority and the reply of

the Respondents in the instant suit, we are of the view that the suit is filed within

three years from the date when the right to sue first accrued to Appellant and,

therefore, the suit is not barred by limitation. Even if the plea of limitation is held

against the Respondents, the outcome still depends on the relationship as

principal and agent between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 and the

existence and effect of implied revocation pleaded to question the validity of Ex.

A-5.

16. The terms ‘agent’ and ‘agency’ have several different meanings, but in law

the word ‘agency’ is used to connote the relationship which exists where one

person has the authority or capacity to create a legal relationship between a

person occupying the position of principal and third parties. The relationship of

14 agency arises whenever one person, called the agent, has the authority to act

on behalf of another, called the principal, and consents to act as such. The

relationship has its genesis in a contract, as has been held in Syed Abdul

Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors3. The case of Respondent No. 1 is that the Power

of Attorney dated 04.12.2003 (Ex. A-4) is the contract authorising her to act as

the power of attorney holder of the Appellant. The sale deed dated 16.04.2008

(Ex. A-5) is not for consideration, but on the contrary, it imposed restrictions on

the discretion of Respondent No. 1. We are not invited to interpret these clauses

and, hence, we do not examine them. The Appellant executed Ex. A-4 in favour

of Respondent No. 1. In law, the Appellant is bound by the acts performed by

Respondent No. 1 in due course and under the authority given by the Appellant

to Respondent No. 1 through Ex. A-4. The Appellant, when she was residing

with the Respondents in India post-retirement, executed the sale deed dated

18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3) in favour of third parties. The co-execution of Ex. A-3 is

not disputed, and Respondent No. 2 is one of the witnesses to Ex. A-3. Sections

207 and 208 of the Act read thus:

“207. Revocation and renunciation may be expressed or implied.—Revocation and renunciation may be expressed or may be implied in the conduct of the principal or agent respectively.

208. When termination of agent’s authority takes effect as to agent, and as to third persons.— The termination of the authority of an agent does not, so far as regards the agent, take effect before it becomes known to him, or, so far as regards third persons, before it becomes known to them”.

3 AIR 1979 SC 553.

15

17. The Act provides for express or implied revocation and renunciation of

agency. Section 207 provides for express or implied revocation or renunciation.

Section 208 sets out the effective date of termination of authority with regard to

an agent and a third person. Let us refer to a few citations dealing with the

revocation of agency.

18. This Court, in Deb Ratan Biswas & Ors v. Most. Anand Moyi Devi &

Ors.4 dealt with a case of signing of compromise by the principal/defendants

during the existence of the agency, and if such independent signing amounts to

implied revocation of power of attorney executed in favour of the attorneys.

Relevant paragraphs read thus:

“9. The principal Pushpa Biswas and Apurva Kumar Biswas have signed the compromise for partition of the property, which in our opinion in law amounts to implied revocation of power of attorney in favour of Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Mishra vide Illustration to Section 207 of the Indian Contract Act. Pushpa Biswas and Apurva Kumar Biswas cannot be allowed to say that their own act of signing the compromise petition was collusive and fraudulent.

xxx xxx

11. The principal is not bound to consult his attorney before signing a compromise petition.

12. It is well-settled that even after execution of a power of attorney the principal can act independently and does not have to take the consent of the attorney. The attorney is after all only an agent of the principal. Even after executing a power of attorney the principal can act on his own”.

4 2011 SCC OnLine SC 633.

16 19. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amrik Singh (deceased)

represented by his legal heirs Darshan Singh & Ors. v. Sohan Singh

(deceased) by his legal heirs Gurudev Kaur & Ors.5, tracing the power of

revocation under Section 207 of the Act, held that the revocation of the power

of attorney could be either express or implied as provided under Section 207 of

the Act.

20. In N. Shivkumar & Anr. v. R. Peter Pereira6, the Madras High Court dealt

with a case where the principal executing a settlement deed in the subsistence

of a power of attorney, and held as under:

“23. WhenSec.207 preceding Sec.208 of the Act provides for revocation and renunciation by even an implied conduct of the principal, there is no impediment for the principal to deal with the property that belongs to the principal. When a settlement deed came to be executed on 18.04.2007, and the same was also duly registered before the concerned Sub Registrar, it was an implied act of revocation/renunciation of the Power of Attorney dated 29.05.2002 executed in favour of the 1st Appellant. Therefore, on the date of the execution of the settlement deed by Thelma Cecelia Pereira on 18.04.2007, it resulted in an implied revocation of the Power of Attorney dated 29.05.2002 and the 1st Appellant had no authority to deal with the property of the principal on or after 18.04.2007.

xxx xxx

25. Though the counsel for the Appellants would also draw any attention to Ex.B.3 Will under which Thelma Cecelia Pereira bequeathed the suit property to the defendant, the said Will also gets superceded and impliedly revoked by the testatrix, by executing a settlement deed in favour of her brother, Raymond Pereira. xxx xxx

5 1987 SCC Online P&H 891.

6 S.A. No.1206 of 2014 (Madras HC). 17

27. A con-joint reading of Sections 201 and 207 of the Contract Act and especially the illustrations appended to these Sections, I am of the view that the principal viz., Thelma Cecelia Pereira was well within her right and authority to deal with the suit property, dehors the Power of Attorney and during its subsistence and the moment the settlement deed was executed by the principal herself, it resulted in an automatic implied termination of the Power of Attorney given to the power agent.

(Emphasis supplied)”

21. In the absence of a particular mode suggested for revocation of the

authority of an agent, the manner adopted by the principal to revoke the

authority of the agent must be one which clearly and unequivocally

communicates to the parties i.e., to be affected by such revocation, that the

agent’s authority has been withdrawn. In the framework of Sections 207 and

208 of the Act, the revocation/renunciation of authority may be made by express

words or may be implied from the words and conduct of the principal, viz., which

is inconsistent with the continuance of the agency. This is one facet of

renunciation or revocation of authority of an agent; the other facet is governed

by Section 208 of the Act. Section 208 provides for the effective time and date

of termination of the agent’s authority and third parties. From a plain reading,

Section 208 infers and gives effect to revocation upon the twin conditions being

satisfied, (i) communication to the agent and (ii) knowledge to a third party i.e.,

one who deals with or is likely to deal with the agent. Then, the revocation of

authority becomes known to the agent and the said third parties. In other words,

an idea in the mind of the principal to revoke cannot be construed as implied

revocation or renunciation of agency. There ought to be an act or conduct of the

18 principal which implies that the agency is revoked or withdrawn. If the revocation

is expressed, such as by publication in newspapers, public notice or

advertisement, communication to the agent etc., the parties who deal with the

agent have a reasonable opportunity to know the revocation of agency by the

principal. Two stages of revocation are, firstly, one dealing with the agent, and

secondly, one which applies to the third parties. For attracting the consequence

of revocation to either of the situations, the revocation of the agent’s authority is

made by the principal in a manner that clearly implies that the principal has

withdrawn the authority to act on his or her behalf by the agent. Followed by

knowledge to third parties, let us examine the circumstances of the case on

whether implied revocation coupled with communication is established.

22. The Power of Attorney (Ex. A-4) was executed on 04.12.2003. The

Appellant, on 30.11.2007, claims to have retired from service and settled in

India. A power of attorney confers power for the execution of deeds in situations

of necessity, including in the absence of the Appellant in the country. From the

record, it can be noted that from 2007 onwards, the Appellant was not entirely

absent from India or residing exclusively in the U.S.A. Therefore, the Appellant

and Respondent No. 1 executed the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3).

Respondent No. 2 is one of the witnesses to Ex. A-3. The execution of sale

deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) is inconsistent with and contradictory to the

power granted to Respondent No. 1 in Ex. A-4. This is an explicit conduct of the

19 Appellant to act for herself on the share she holds in the property purchased in

1991. In Deb Ratan Biswas (supra), this Court held that the signing of a

compromise by the defendants themselves would amount to implied revocation

of power of attorney. In a case where the principal chooses to act for himself,

particularly to the agent's knowledge and a person to be affected, then it can be

held that Section 207 of the Act is attracted. We have no doubt in holding that

the Appellant, in terms of Section 207, impliedly revoked the authority of

Respondent No. 1, and as required by Section 208, Respondent No. 2 had the

knowledge of the independent dealing with the property by the Appellant.

Therefore, the revocation takes effect on 18.01.2008. Ex. A-5 was executed on

16.04.2008. Thus, with the operation of implied revocation of authority,

Respondent No. 1 cannot act as an agent of the Appellant and, hence, the sale

deed insofar as the Appellant’s share in the suit schedule is held void ab initio.

23. The ancillary argument is on non-receipt of consideration under Ex. A-5.

Let us refer to the evidence of D.W.1, which reads as follows:

“(Q) No. Immediately after the marriage, I sold the property to my husband. On 16-4-08, after the marriage, the property was sold to the husband for consideration. Agreed to pay an amount of Rs.80,000 as consideration. But not given. We are wife and husband. The consideration other than what is stated in the deed has not been given? (Q) No. When the property was sold to the husband the plaintiff was in the native place”.

24. Evidence of D.W.1 is clear that Ex. A-5 is not supported by consideration.

The Appellant is a third party to Ex. A-5. For the view, we have taken on implied

20 revocation of Ex. A-4 by the Appellant, the deliberation of this issue does not

influence the conclusion. Therefore, we merely express our agreement with the

findings recorded by the Trial Court on this behalf.

25. As already noted, the impugned judgment excerpted a slew of unavailable

questions and answered them in an axiomatic way. Since the findings are

conflicting, we have, within our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India, examined the record and the contentions urged by the parties. We are

convinced that the impugned judgment is unsustainable, and consequently, the

appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the Trial Court

are confirmed.

25.1 We take note of the close relationship between the Appellant and the

Respondents, and that the Respondents have constructed the house and reside

in the house. Admittedly, the Appellant is not successful in her claim for half

share in the house constructed in the plaint schedule. Therefore, it would be

legal and equitable to direct the Trial Court first to explore the possibility of

determining the market value of the Appellant’s half share in the suit schedule

property and subject to the Respondents paying the current market value to the

Appellant towards her half share, a final decree be passed accordingly. If the

parties do not arrive at a consensus on the current market value, the operative

portion in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court could be put to final decree

proceedings and execution in accordance with the law. In such an event, the

21 Appellant compensates the Respondents for possessing the constructed area

along with her half share in the plaint schedule.

26. Civil Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.

..………...................J. [ C.T. RAVIKUMAR ]

...……….................J. [ S.V.N. BHATTI ]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 9, 2024.

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