T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy vs M. Mallappa

plaintiff. It is his case that entire Survey No.37

admeasuring 1 acre 29 guntas belonged to undivided family

of M. Shivalingaiah and upon partition, the entire land in

the said Survey number came to be allotted to the share of

M. Shivalingaiah. It is his case that M. Shivalingaiah had

sold plots in the said Survey number to different persons

and the suit property was sold to him. It is his further case

that he had made an application to B.D.A. for reconveyance

since the plot was under reconveyance scheme. It is his

case that compound wall was put up by him.

On the basis of the rival pleadings, the learned

trial judge framed the following issues:

“1. Does the plaintiff prove his lawful possession of the suit property as on the date of the suit?

2. Does he prove this alleged interference by the defendants?

3. Is he entitled to a decree of permanent injunction against defendants?” 5

All the issues came to be answered in favour of

the plaintiff­appellant and the suit came to be decreed as

prayed for.

Being aggrieved thereby, defendant No.2 i.e.

respondent No.1 herein filed Regular First Appeal before the

High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru.

The learned single judge of the Karnataka High

Court found that in the facts and circumstances of the case,

the suit simpliciter for permanent injunction without

seeking a declaration of title was not tenable and as such,

allowed the appeal and set aside the decree.

Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by

way of special leave.

4. We have heard Shri Ajit Bhasme, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff­appellant, Shri

Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing

on behalf of respondent No.1 (defendant No.2) and Shri S.K.

Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the BDA.

5. Shri Ajit Bhasme, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the plaintiff­appellant would submit 6

that the learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court

has grossly erred in interfering with the well­reasoned

judgment and order of the learned trial court. The learned

Senior Counsel would further submit that the learned trial

Court relying upon the voluminous documentary evidence

produced on record by the plaintiff­appellant has found the

appellant to be in peaceful possession and rightly decreed

the suit. Relying on the judgment and order of the learned

single judge of the Karnataka High Court dated 10.2.2000

in Writ Petition No.38853 of 1999, the learned Senior

Counsel submitted that possession of the plaintiff­appellant

has been found to be lawful by the High Court and as such,

another learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court

has grossly erred in reversing the judgment and order of the

learned trial court decreeing the suit.

6. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1

(defendant No.2), on the contrary, would submit that the

learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court has rightly

held that the issue involved had to be first decided on the 7

basis of title and until the plaintiff’s claim for declaration of

title is decided, the suit simpliciter for permanent injunction

was not tenable.

7. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior

Counsel, would further submit that the sale­deed of the

defendant No.2 was dated 5.4.1984 whereas the sale­deed

on which plaintiff­appellant claimed was dated 13.4.1992.

He therefore would submit that no interference is warranted

in the present appeal.

8. The short question that falls for consideration

before us is:

Whether the learned single judge of the High

Court was right in holding that the suit simpliciter for

permanent injunction without claiming declaration of title,

as filed by the plaintiff, was not maintainable?

9. The issue is no more res integra. The position

has been crystalised by this Court in the case of Anathula

Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1

in paragraph 21, which read thus:

1 (2008) 4 SCC 594 8

“21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:

(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have posses­ sion, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for posses­ sion with a consequential injunction.

Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.

(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for in­ junction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be estab­ lished on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.

(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appro­ priate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu The­ var [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or ren­ der a finding on a question of title, in a suit 9

for injunction. Even where there are neces­ sary pleadings and issue, if the matter in­ volves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of com­ prehensive suit for declaration of title, in­ stead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.

(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relat­ ing to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the excep­ tion to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and posses­ sion suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumber­ some remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to en­ croach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.”

10. It could thus be seen that this Court in

unequivocal terms has held that where the plaintiff’s title is

not in dispute or under a cloud, a suit for injunction could

be decided with reference to the finding on possession. It

has been clearly held that if the matter involves complicated 10

questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will

relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive

suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a

suit for mere injunction.

11. No doubt, this Court has held that where there

are necessary pleadings regarding title and appropriate

issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the

matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court

may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for

injunction. However, it has been held that such cases are

the exception to the normal rule that question of title will

not be decided in suits for injunction.

12. In this background, we will have to consider the

facts of the present case.

13. The plaintiff­appellant claims to be the owner of

the suit property on the basis of a sale­deed executed by

one K.P. Govinda Reddy in his favour on 13.4.1992. In

turn, according to him, the said property was sold by one

Smt. Varalakshmamma in favour of his vendor K.P. Govinda

Reddy on 26.3.1971. He claims that he had mortgaged the 11

suit property for taking loan from one financial institution.

He further claimed that an endorsement was also issued by

the Corporation of City of Bangalore that Khata regarding

the suit property is transferred to the appellant. According

to the plaintiff­appellant, when the Bangalore Mahanagar

Palike withdrew the Khata in his favour, he went to the High

Court and succeeded therein.

14. Per contra, the defendant No.2 (respondent No.1

herein) is specifically denying the title of the plaintiff­

appellant. He claims to be the owner of the suit property on

the basis of a sale­deed dated 5.4.1984 from one M.

Shivalingaiah. He also claims to be in peaceful possession

and enjoyment of the same on the basis of the said sale­

deed. It is his case that K.P. Govinda Reddy got the title set

up falsely and created fabricated documents with regard to

possession. It is also his case that compound wall was

constructed by him and not by the plaintiff, as claimed.

15. It could thus clearly be seen that this is not a

case where the plaintiff­appellant can be said to have a clear

title over the suit property or that there is no cloud on 12

plaintiff­appellant’s title over the suit property. The

question involved is one which requires adjudication after

the evidence is led and questions of fact and law are

decided.

16. In that view of the matter, we do not find any

reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by

the Karnataka High Court.

17. Insofar as the reliance on the order passed by the

learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court dated

10.2.2000 in Writ Petition No.38853 of 1999 is concerned, it

will be relevant to refer to the following observations made

therein:

“3. It is evident from the plain reading of the above that any entry made in the Corporation Register by fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of facts or by furnishing false, incorrect and incomplete material could be corrected within a period of three years from the date of such recording. The Order in the instant case was passed admittedly much beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the provision extracted above. The same is therefore unsustainable on that ground itself. The parties being in litigation before the Civil Court could upon adjudication of the controversy regarding the title to the 13

property approach the Corporation for any modification in the entry which is no more any modification in the entry which is no more than a fiscal entry relevant only for purpose of payment of taxes and does not by itself create or extinguish title to the property in regard to which it is made. Till such time the competent Court declared the 3rd respondent as the true owner of the property, the Corporation could not on its own correct the entry after a period of 3 years stipulated under Sec. 114­A of the Act.

4. This writ petition accordingly succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order shall stand quashed reserving liberty for the parties to have the matter adjudicated upon by the Civil Court and to approach the Corporation for a fresh entry/modification of the existing entry to bring the same in consonance with the Civil Court’s determination. No costs.”

18. It could thus be clearly seen that the High Court

in the said order has clearly noted that the parties are in

litigation before the Civil Court and that adjudication of

controversy regarding the title of the suit property could be

done only by the Civil Court. The entry with the

Corporation is nothing more than a fiscal entry relevant

only for the purpose of payment of taxes and does not by

itself create or extinguish title to the property. The Court 14

observed that till such time the competent Court declared

the third respondent therein as the true owner of the

property, the Corporation could not on its own correct the

entry after a period of 3 years stipulated under Section 114­

A of the Act. The High Court has therefore set aside the

order reserving liberty for the parties to have the matter

adjudicated upon by the Civil Court.

19. In that view of the matter, the said judgment and

order would be of no assistance to the case of the plaintiff­

appellant.

20. It will also be relevant to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the case of Jharkhand State

Housing Board v. Didar Singh and another2:

“11. It is well settled by catena of judg­ ments of this Court that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circum­

2 (2019) 17 SCC 692 15

stances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction.”

21. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said

at this stage that the dispute raised by the defendant No.2

with regard to title is not genuine nor can it be said that the

title of the plaintiff­appellant over the suit property is free

from cloud. The issue with regard to title can be decided

only after the full­fledged trial on the basis of the evidence

that would be led by the parties in support of their rival

claims.

22. In the result, the appeal is without merit and as

such, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

…….…....................., J.

[L. NAGESWARA RAO]

…….…....................., J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 07, 2021