T. Anjanamma vs State Of Andhra Pradesh
- AIRAIR 1995 SC 946
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where an eyewitness account is corroborated by multiple dying declarations, each identifying the accused as the perpetrator, and both courts below have concurrently found the accused guilty on this evidence, the appellate court will not disturb the conviction absent compelling reasons to take a different view.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
1. This appeal is by a woman. She was accused of having caused the murder of her husband. The prosecution case was that there was strife between the parties. The deceased suspected the appellant of infidelity. On the day of the occurrence, the appellant poured kerosene oil on her husband and put him to fire. The crime was witnessed by the daughter of the appellant, P.W. 8, then aged about 11 years and her minor son still younger, who was not produced as a witness. When the deceased was removed to the Government Hospital at Tirupathi with extensive burns, his statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. First Class which is a dying declaration on the record as Ex. P.3. Earlier thereto was an oral dying declaration made to P.W. 1, the Doctor attending on him in the Government Hospital and a later dying declaration before a Police Officer who came to the hospital on information received of the crime. Thus, in sum, we have evidence of an eye-witness, P.W. 8 and three dying declarations made one after the other. In all the dying declarations, the appellant pointedly has been named as the culprit of the crime. Both the courts below have believed the said evidence and held the appellant guilty. We find no reason to take a different view than the one concurrently taken by the two courts below.
2. A sad feature of the case cannot escape our attention. The Court of Session instead of recording conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. did so under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. for reasons which were far from convincing. Strangely, no appeal was preferred by the State against scaling down of the offence from one under Section 302, I.P.C. to one under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. The High Court presumably, on compassionate grounds, since the appellant was a woman, reduced the sentence from seven years to four years rigorous imprisonment. Ex-facie nothing is available from the High Court judgment as to why the sentence had been reduced. All the same, when the State seems to be submitting to the verdicts of the courts below, we on our part, would also put the matter to rest. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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