Surinder Singh vs The Union Territory Of Chandigarh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2373 OF 2010

SURINDER SINGH ..... APPELLANT VERSUS STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH) ..... RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

Appellant–Surinder Singh has laid challenge to the judgement

dated 19th May 2010 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, whereby,

the order of his conviction and sentence dated 25 th July 2006 passed

by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh was confirmed.

The Appellant has been convicted under Section 307 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter ‘IPC’) and Section 27 of the Arms Act,

1959 (hereinafter, ‘Arms Act’), and sentenced to rigorous

imprisonment of 3 years for both the offences, with a direction that

sentences will run concurrently.

FACTS:

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2021.11.26 16:17:25 IST Reason:

2. The prosecution case in brief is that, on 10 th July 1999, Mansur

Page | 1 Ali, Advocate (Complainant) was sitting at his residential office along

with his clerk Maler Singh (PW­3), giving dictation to his steno,

R.K. Sood (PW­4). At about 5:30 PM, the Appellant, who was then a

Head Constable in Chandigarh Police, entered the residential office of

the Complainant in an inebriated condition and stating that he was a

beat officer of the lane, asked for a glass of water. He thereafter sat

across the Complainant and after consuming the water served to him

by Balbir Singh (PW­5), pulled out his service pistol and threatened

the Complainant by pointing the pistol at him and stated that “there

are 10 bullets in this gun and I will kill 10 people today”. Appellant also

asked the Complainant to stand and raise his hands. At the same

time, he directed Maler Singh and R.K. Sood to step outside the office,

to which they complied. In the meantime, the Appellant moved around

the table, towards the Complainant, pulled the lever and made himself

ready to fire. Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Complainant

lunged at the Appellant and pushed his hand towards the ceiling,

which resulted in the bullet, fired from the pistol, hitting the ceiling of

the office.

3. The Appellant then attempted to fire a second time, however, he

was unable to and in the said exercise a bullet fell from his pistol. By

that time, the ladies of the house had entered the office and raised a

holler. Panic­stricken, Appellant rushed out of the office, leaving

Page | 2 behind his wireless set on the table of the Complainant and his

scooter outside the house. No injury was caused to the Complainant.

The incident was then reported to the police. Upon receiving the

information, about 10­15 minutes later, police officials arrived at the

house of the Complainant and F.I.R. was lodged against the Appellant,

whereafter, the police officials sprang into action and the Appellant

was arrested by SI Ramesh Chand (PW­6), who found the Appellant

near the Masjid of Sector 20­A, with the pistol still in his hand.

Appellant was then taken for medical examination where he refused to

give his urine or blood samples.

4. The investigation ensued in light of the above­stated facts, and

upon collection of substantial evidence, the charge sheet was filed

against the Appellant. The case was committed to the Additional

Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, and charges under Section 307 IPC and

Section 27 of the Arms Act were framed. The Appellant abjured his

culpability and claimed trial.

5. In the eventual trial, a total of 14 witnesses were examined by

the Prosecution and 3 witnesses were led by the Defense. The case of

the Prosecution relied heavily on the testimonies of the eye­witnesses

present at the site of the incidence, including the Complainant (PW­2)

who in his deposition stood by the version of events as stated by him

Page | 3 in the F.I.R. The Complainant deposed candidly and admitted that had

the Appellant not come near him and shot while being seated, he

would not have been able to stop the Appellant. Complainant also

categorically stated that while moving towards him the Appellant

brought the pistol in firing mode by pulling the lever and aiming at his

face, which made him realize the gravity of the situation. Likewise,

R.K. Sood (PW­4) corroborated the deposition of the Complainant and

stated that he witnessed the shot being fired by the Appellant through

the mesh wired door, while standing in the veranda, right outside the

office. Maler Singh (PW­3), though denied having seen the shot being

fired, attested to the presence of the Appellant in a drunk state and to

have heard the shot having been fired while he was in the veranda

along with PW­4.

6. Dr. Bidhi Chand (PW­7), examined the Appellant at 7:20 PM on

the day of the incident, after his arrest by S.I. Ramesh Chand (PW­6).

This witness acknowledged the Medico­Legal Report dated 10 th July

1999 (Ex J MLR), and deposed that upon medical examination, the

Appellant was found under the influence of Alcohol.

7. The Statement of Mr. B. Badaniya (PW­13) also bears some

importance. This witness in his examination before the Court, relying

on the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (in short ‘CFSL’) Report

Page | 4 (Ex. PW­13/A), deposed that the empty cartridge found at the

residential office of the Complainant, upon forensic examination, was

proved to have been fired from the pistol used by the Appellant. In his

cross­examination, PW­13 testified as to the manner in which

semi­automatic or semi­loader guns, such as the weapon used by the

Appellant, function.

8. On the contrary, the Appellant raised a plea claiming an

alternate version of events under his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement.

He claimed that he was on visiting terms with the Complainant and on

the day of the incidence, he was routinely visiting the house of the

Complainant. He kept the gun along with his wireless set on the table

and unbeknownst to him, the Complainant picked up the weapon and

accidentally fired. He further asserted that the Complainant had

lodged a false version of events to save himself of any criminal liability.

Mukesh Mittal (DW­1) also supported the case of the Appellant,

claiming that the Complainant had himself told DW­1 right after the

occurrence that he had accidentally fired from the weapon. The Trial

Court found the version of events contended by the Appellant dubious.

As far as DW­1 is concerned, during his cross­examination, he was

unable to substantiate how or why he was present near the house of

the Appellant at the time of the event, and thereby failed to inspire

confidence.

Page | 5

9. Since there is no dispute regarding the presence of the Appellant

at the residential office of the Complainant at the time of the

incidence, or that the bullet was fired from his service pistol, the

pivotal question before the Trial Court was, whether the Appellant

fired the pistol, and, if so, was the weapon used with the intent to kill

the Complainant. The Trial Court observed that the prosecution

witnesses had, by and large, supported the prosecution version and

that no reason was adduced to depict why the Complainant would

want to falsely implicate the Appellant. Although the Trial Court noted

that there were some inconsistencies in the statements put forth by

the prosecution witnesses, however, the same were held to be minor

contradictions brought about naturally due to the passage of time. The

Court found version of the Defense to be “a patch of lies and figment of

imagination”, and rejected the same in its entirety.

10. As far as the charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act was

concerned, the Trial Court observed that the Appellant had used his

service pistol without any prior permission and for an illegal purpose.

The act of firing by the Appellant was thus held to be in contravention

of Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Trial Court therefore convicted the

Appellant under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and

awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years.

Page | 6

11. Discontented with his conviction, the Appellant preferred an

appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court

upon reappraisal of the evidence, sustained conviction and the

consequential sentence imposed by the Trial Court and dismissed the

appeal.

12. Aggrieved, the Appellant is now before this Court.

CONTENTIONS:

13. We have heard learned counsel(s) for the Appellant and the

Respondent­State at a considerable length and perused the record

in­depth. There are four principal contentions raised on behalf of the

Appellant. First, that there was an absence of ‘motive’ on behalf of the

Appellant to kill the Complainant. It is urged that, if either of the

versions are believed, at best, there were good relations between the

parties and at worst they were strangers, thus, the Appellant could

have no motive or desire to kill the Complainant. Second, there was an

absence of intent, which could not be imputed from the conduct of the

Appellant.

14. Third, doubts were sought to be created through re­appreciation

of evidence once again, including, by depicting that the statements of

the eye­witnesses suffered from material contradictions, fatal to the

case of the prosecution and also that PW­3 to PW­5 were interested

Page | 7 witnesses, they being employees of the Complainant. And, that as

against it, the version of the Appellant in his statement under Section

313 Cr.P.C. was the correct chronicle of events and was more probable

than the narrative of the prosecution. Fourth and finally, it was argued

that the conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act was not

sustainable as the weapon used by the Appellant was licensed and

misuse of a licensed weapon is not a mischief under Section 5 of the

Arms Act.

15. Learned State Counsel, on the other hand, reminded us of the

scope of interference by this Court in a case of concurrent finding of

fact and canvassed that no substantial question of law is involved in

this appeal.

ANALYSIS:

16. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival

contentions, we find that the following two questions fall for

our consideration:

A. Whether the High Court erred in maintaining the conviction of

the Appellant under Section 307 IPC?

B. Whether conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of the

Arms Act is sustainable?

17. It may be highlighted at the outset that although there are

Page | 8 spacious powers vested under Article 136 of the Constitution,

nevertheless, while imploring such powers in a criminal appeal by

special leave, this Court would ordinarily abstain from entering into a

fresh re­appraisement of evidence and doubt the credibility of

witnesses when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for certain

exceptional circumstances. Notwithstanding thereto and in the

interest of justice, we have endeavoured to peruse and discuss the

entire evidence on record to ascertain whether or not the concurrent

finding of conviction suffers from any perversity and/or whether the

conviction of the Appellant is legally and factually sustainable.

A. Whether the guilt of the Appellant under Section 307 IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt?

18. Before we advert to the factual matrix or gauge the

trustworthiness of the witnesses, it will be beneficial to brace

ourselves of the case­law qua the essential conditions, requisite for

bringing home a conviction under Section 307 IPC. In State of

Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr. 1, this Court, while

re­appreciating the true import of Section 307 IPC held as follows:

“12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to

1 (2005) 5 SCC 554

Page | 9 the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” (Emphasis Applied)

19. These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the

later decisions, including in State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors. 2,

Jage Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana 3 and State of M.P. vs.

Kanha @ Om Prakash4.

2 (2009) 4 SCC 26 3 (2015) 11 SCC 366 4 (2019) 3 SCC 605

Page | 10

20. It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting

an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a

Court must consider, first, whether there was any intention or

knowledge on the part of accused to cause death of the victim, and,

second, such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus

rea in execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to

whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may

deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding

circumstances of the offence, including the nature of weapon used or

the nature of injury, if any. The manner in which occurrence took

place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is

thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury

dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC.

21. It would also be fruitful at this stage, to appraise whether the

requirement of ‘motive’ is indispensable for proving the charge of

attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC.

22. It is significant to note that ‘motive’ is distinct from ‘object and

means’ which innervates or provokes an action. Unlike ‘intention’,

‘motive’ is not the yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive

would not constitute an offence but it may not be true when an

unlawful act is committed with best of the motive. Unearthing ‘motive’

Page | 11 is akin to an exercise of manual brain­mapping. At times, it becomes

herculean task to ascertain the traces of a ‘motive’.

23. This Court has time and again ruled:

“that in case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy.” [See: Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra5 and Bipin Kumar Mondal vs. State of West Bengal6]

24. We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is

infallibly a crucial factor, and is a substantial aid for evincing the

commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not

such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to

the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point

towards the guilt of the accused and testaments of eye­witnesses to

the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record.

25. Applying these broad parameters to the facts and circumstances

5 (1973) 3 SCC 219 6 (2010) 12 SCC 91

Page | 12 of the case in hand, we find the plea raised by the Appellant devoid of

any merit. The prosecution no doubt has failed to attribute any motive

to the Appellant for yearning to kill the Complainant, however, as

noted above, the absence of motive alone cannot abjure the guilt of the

Appellant. We are one with the concurrent findings of the two Courts

that the conduct of the Appellant is sufficient to surmise that his

action was intended to eliminate the Complainant, and that his

conviction under Section 307 IPC is fully justified.

26. We say so for the following reasons:

Firstly, neither the presence of the Appellant at the site of the

episode, nor the fact that the bullet was fired through his service pistol

is disputed by the Appellant. Even otherwise, the CFSL Report dated

15th September 1999 (Ex­PW 13/A), prepared by Mr. B. Badaniya (PW­

13) proves that the cartridge recovered from the office of the

Complainant was fired from the service pistol recovered from the

possession of the Appellant;

Secondly, the Medico­Legal Report (Ex. J MLR) and the testimony of

Dr. Bidhi Chand (PW­7) corroborate with the ocular versions of the

Complainant (PW­2), Maler Singh (PW­3) and R.K. Sood (PW­4), all of

whom have sworn in their respective depositions that the Appellant

was in an inebriated condition when he entered the residential office of

Page | 13 the Complainant;

Thirdly, both the Complainant and R.K. Sood (PW­4) have

categorically testified to the effect that after consuming water, the

Appellant pulled out his pistol and aimed the same at the

Complainant, whereafter, he directed Maler Singh and R.K. Sood to

get out of the room;

Fourthly, we also bear in mind that the offending weapon was a semi­

loader/semi­automatic pistol which was specifically pulled out of the

cover and aimed at the Complainant. Mr. B. Badaniya (PW­13) in his

cross­examination has categorically stated that a semi­automatic

pistol must be brought into firing mode by pulling back the frame of

the weapon manually for the first time, to enable a bullet to be fired.

Further, both the Complainant and R.K. Sood (PW­4) have

unequivocally asserted that the bullet was fired by the Appellant.

Fifthly, the version of the Complainant, that had he not interfered

and caught hold of the hand of the Appellant, the gun, which was

aimed onto his face would have unloaded the bullet, resulting in

unfortunate consequences carries weight; and

Sixthly and finally, the alternate version set up by the Appellant

looks to be incredulous that he took his loaded pistol out of the cover,

placed it on the table of the Complainant, and let him toy around with Page | 14 it as the Complainant pleased. There is also nothing on record

to support that the Appellant made any attempt at all to bring his

version to the notice of his Superiors, as claimed by him in his

statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

27. Consequently, and for the reasons afore­stated, we find that the

Trial Court and the High Court have unerringly convicted the

Appellant for the charge under Section 307 IPC.

B. Whether the Conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act is sustainable?

28. Adverting to the conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of

the Arms Act, it appears to us that the Trial Court has erred in

arriving at his culpability. There is no gainsay that in order to prove a

charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the prosecution must

necessarily demonstrate contravention of either Section 5 or Section 7

of the Act. In the instant case, although not explicitly stated, it

appears that the Trial Court has held it to be a case of breach of

Section 5 of the Arms Act, which stipulates that no person shall use,

possess, manufacture, etc. any firearms, unless such person holds a

license in this behalf, and prescribes a minimum punishment of 3

years of imprisonment. The relevant extracts of unamended Sections 5

and 27 of the Arms Act which were in force at the relevant time, read

Page | 15 as follows:

“5. Licence for manufacture, sale, etc., of arms and ammunition.―[(1)] No person shall—

(a) use, manufacture, sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove, or

(b) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof,

any firearm or any other arms of such class or description as may be prescribed or any ammunition, unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.

[(2)] xxxx

27. Punishment for using arms, etc.―(1) Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition in contravention of section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or does any act in contravention of section 7 and such use or act results in the death of any other person, shall be punishable with death.”

29. True it is that prior to the amendment of Section 27 of the Arms

Act, vide Arms (Amendment) Act 1988, the said provision penalized

the use of any arms and ammunitions for any ‘unlawful purpose’.

However, post its amendment, Section 27 of the Arms Act is strictly

Page | 16 confined to violation of conditions mentioned either under Section 5 or

7 of the Arms Act and the ‘unlawful purpose’ of using arms and

ammunitions is no longer an inseparable component of the

delinquency.

30. The Appellant was admittedly a police official at the time of the

incidence and the arms and ammunitions used for the commission of

the offence, were placed in his possession under the sanction accorded

by the Competent Authority. The Appellant being in authorised

possession of the weapon, cannot be said to have used an unlicensed

weapon, as prohibited under Section 5 of the Arms Act. It appears that

the Trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations such as illegal

use of the weapon, and lost track of the objective of the Statute, which

has been enacted to provide a licensing/regulatory regime, to enable

law­abiding citizens to carry arms, and also to prohibit the possession,

acquisition, manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms, unless

authorized by the Central Government. In other words, illegal use of a

licensed or sanctioned weapon per se does not constitute an offence

under Section 27, without proving the misdemeanour under Section 5

or 7 of the Arms Act. At best, it could be a ‘misconduct’ under the

service rules, the determination of which was not the subject of the

trial.

Page | 17

31. In light of the afore­stated discussion, we find that the order of

the Trial Court in convicting the Appellant or of the High Court in

maintaining such conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, is

unwarranted and unjust. Accordingly, the Appellant is acquitted of the

charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Quantum of Sentence under Section 307 IPC

32. The equality of ratio between two sets of variables is now well

known as the doctrine of proportionality. The bedrock of sentencing

policy in our criminal justice system is also based on the axiom of

proportionality. This principle of commensurate sentencing treats

offenders as agents capable of evaluating their own illegal conduct and

the social censure associated with it, which is communicated to them

by imposing a proportionate sentence. 7 The exercise for assessing

‘proportionality’ is thus dependent upon the gravity of the offence

which is determined according to ­ (a) mischief caused or risk involved

in the offense; (b) the overall conduct of the offender and; (c) motives

ascribed to the felon. Further, the equality of treatment so as to

eliminate discriminatory practices in the award of sentencing, is

integral to the canons of proportionality. Needless to say, the

guarantee of even­handedness before the law(s), as enshrined in

7 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edition, Cambridge University Press 2010)

Page | 18 Article 14 of our Constitution, encompasses the administration of

criminal justice system as well.

33. Having said that, we cannot be incognizant of the fact that there

are practical difficulties in achieving absolute consistency in regards

to sentencing. It must be candidly acknowledged that there is an

element of discretion present while adjudicating the issue of sentence,

however, the same cannot be exercised in an unprincipled manner.

This Court has explicitly ruled out the practice of awarding

disproportionate sentences, especially those that showcase undue

leniency, for it would undermine the public confidence in efficacy of

law.

34. The sentencing policy, therefore, keeps pace with changing time.

Undoubtedly, the primary emphasis while deciding the quantum of

sentence should lie on the gravity or penal value of the offense.

However, other guiding elements of rehabilitative justice model,

including, appreciation of grounds for mitigation of sentence also

deserve to be duly considered within the permissible limits of judicial

discretion. The awarding of just and proportionate sentence remains

the solemn duty of the Courts and they should not be swayed by non­

relevant factors while deciding the quantum of sentence. Naturally,

what factors should be considered as ‘relevant’ or ‘non­relevant’ will

Page | 19 depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no straight

jacket formula can be laid down for the same.

35. Adverting to the facts of the case, in hand, we are of the

considered view that at this stage, the sentence awarded to the

appellant is no longer in degree to the crime which he has committed.

Remitting the Appellant to the rigors of imprisonment at this juncture

of his life would not serve the ends of justice due to following

mitigating factors:

a. No motive or element of planning has been proved by the

Prosecution in the present case which indicates the possibility that

the offense could have been committed on impulse by the Appellant.

Hence, the culpability of the offender in such situations is less than

that which is ascribed in premeditated offenses as the commission

of planned illegal acts denotes an attack on societal values with

greater commitment and continuity in comparison to spontaneous

illegal acts.

b. Even though the factum of injury may not have a direct bearing on

a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the same may be considered by

a Court at the time of sentencing. No doubt, the offence committed

by the Appellant squarely falls within the four corners of Section

307 IPC, but fortunately neither the complainant nor any other

Page | 20 person was hurt by the untoward act of the Appellant.

c. Appellant has already undergone a sentence of 3 months and 19

days. Additionally, despite the occurrence taking place in 1999,

there is no indication that Appellant has been involved in any

untoward activity before or after the incident. This highlights the

Appellant’s good character and indicates that the incident can be

interpreted as an isolated lapse of judgment. Further, the

Appellant’s clean post­incident behaviour suggests that he is

rational individual who is capable of responding to the social

censure associated with the offence. Hence, the passage of a long

time period coupled with a clean record, both before and after the

incident is definitely a factor that calls for mitigation of sentence.

d. Barring this particular incident wherein he was under the influence

of alcohol, the Appellant had an unblemished service record with

sixteen good citations in his favour. This indicates that he was a

valuable member of society than the present criminal incident might

lead one to assume. This is not to say that courts should draw up a

social balance sheet when sentencing, but only to take these

positive social contributions as a factor for mitigation of sentence.

e. Lastly, it is to be noted that the Appellant was suspended in the

year 1999 and has also been subsequently dismissed from service

Page | 21 in the year 2007. Hence, this should also be considered as a

reasonable factor for mitigation because the dismissal and the

consequent loss of social security benefits such as pension, also

construes as a form of social sanction.

CONCLUSION:

36. Consequently and for the afore­stated reasons, the criminal

appeal is partly allowed. While the conviction and sentence awarded to

the Appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act is set aside, his

conviction under Section 307 IPC is maintained. The sentence under

Section 307 IPC is however reduced to the period already undergone.

Since, Appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are discharged.

……………………….. CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

………..………………… J.

(A.S. BOPANNA) NEW DELHI DATED: 26.11.2021

Page | 22