Suresh vs State Rep.By Inspector Of Police

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 2025 INSC 318 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.540 OF 2013

SURESH …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. The appellant before us has challenged the order dated 28.02.2012 by

which the High Court of Madras has upheld the appellant’s

conviction and life sentence for an offence under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’).

2. The brief case of the prosecution is that on 12.09.2008 at around 6

pm, the appellant caused the death of his wife (‘deceased’) by

pouring kerosene on her body and setting her on fire, which

ultimately resulted in her death after a period of approximately three

weeks in a hospital. The appellant used to reside in his house at

Narayanachetti Street, Tuticorin with his wife and a 2 ½ year old Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora

son. The Mother­in­law (PW­1) and Father­in­law (PW­2) of the Date: 2025.03.04 18:36:23 IST Reason:

appellant used to reside in the street next to the appellant’s street. On the fateful day i.e., 12.09.2008 when the child of the deceased

was crying, the deceased called her mother (PW­1) to pacify the child

and the child was taken away by her mother (PW­1) to her house

which was in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, PW­1 and PW­2 were

informed by a neighbourhood child that their daughter Sumathi

(deceased) had caught fire. She was then immediately taken to a

nearby hospital, and then to another hospital (American Hospital)

and eventually admitted in a Government Hospital at Thoothukudi.

3. At around 9:30 pm, when police received the information, PW­9 (Head

Constable) reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the

deceased. In her statement to PW­9, the deceased stated that she

caught fire while working in the kitchen. She also states that at the

time of the incident, the appellant was sleeping and when she

screamed, the appellant woke up and tried to put off the fire. On the

basis of this statement, a general diary entry was made by police on

12.09.2008.

4. Thereafter, on 15.09.2008, a case for accidental fire was registered. On

the same day, PW­15 (Sub­Inspector) visited the scene of the

occurrence and seized a kerosene can and matchstick. On this day,

police recorded another statement of the deceased where she stated

that her husband had set her on fire by pouring kerosene and she

did not state so in her earlier statement as her husband was present

while PW­9 recorded her statement on 12.09.2008. On 15.09.2008, the accidental fire case was converted to a case under section 307 of

IPC against the appellant. Finally, upon the death of the deceased on

02.10.2008, section 307 of IPC was modified to section 302 of IPC.

5. Before the death of the deceased, on 18.09.2008, a Judicial Magistrate

recorded a statement of the deceased and this statement was used

by the prosecution as the dying declaration. In this statement, the

deceased stated before the Judicial Magistrate (PW­12) that it was

the appellant who had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire on

12.09.2008.

6. The Trial Court treated this statement given to PW­12 as the dying

declaration and convicted the appellant under section 302 of IPC. In

appeal before the High Court, the conviction and sentence of life

imprisonment, imposed by the Trial Court, have been affirmed by

the impugned order dated 28.02.2012. Aggrieved by the same, the

appellant is here before us.

7. We have heard both sides and perused the material before us.

8. Before coming to the issue of dying declaration, we would like to go

through the evidence of other witnesses who were there before the

Trial Court. There were as many as 17 witnesses from the side of the

prosecution. PW­1 and PW­2, who are the mother and father of the

deceased respectively, had both deposed that when they reached the

house of the deceased, they found the deceased was burnt and also deposed that PW­3 (neighbour) had already reached there and tried

to douse the fire. PW­1 and PW­2 also deposed that they were the

ones who had taken the deceased to the hospital.

9. PW­1 and PW­2 also tried to suggest that the appellant had set the

deceased on fire and neither did he make any attempt to douse the

fire nor did he accompany them when they took the deceased to the

hospital. On the other hand, it is to be noted that PW­3 and PW­4

deposed that they were the first to reach the deceased’s house and

they deposed that the appellant was the one who informed PW­1 and

PW­2 about the incident. PW­3 also deposed that she and her father

(PW­4), as well as, the appellant tried to extinguish the fire. However,

these two prosecution witnesses i.e. PW­3 and PW­4 were declared

hostile. Moreover, PW­13 (doctor) had deposed that when the

deceased was brought to the hospital, the appellant was with the

deceased. Here, it is to be noted that the appellant suffers from 40%

physical disability resulting from a polio attack. Also, the version

that the appellant had not made any attempt to take the deceased to

the hospital is not only in contradiction with the deposition of PW­13

but would also be fatal for the prosecution case itself as the

prosecution case mainly relies on the story that the deceased had

made a false statement due to the presence of the appellant in the

hospital, in other words, appellant was there in the hospital with the deceased when her statement was recorded by the Police,

immediately on the arrival of the deceased in the hospital.

10. PW­13 is the doctor who attended to the deceased when she was taken

to the Government Hospital. PW­13 deposed that the deceased had

told him that she caught fire while cooking. In his cross­

examination, this witness admitted that there was no smell of

kerosene oil emanating from her body. PW­11, the doctor who

conducted the post­mortem, deposed that the deceased died due to

burn injuries and complications therefrom. In the cross­

examination, PW­11 deposed that there were no external injuries on

the body of the deceased except the burn injuries. This rules out any

possibility of an assault on the deceased before she had caught fire.

11. While convicting the appellant under section 302 of IPC, the Trial

Court mainly relied upon the evidence given by PW­1 and PW­2 and

the dying declaration, which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate

(PW­12) on 18.09.2008. Thereafter, in appeal, without appreciating

the facts of the case in their proper perspective, the High Court also

mechanically upheld the conviction and life sentence of the

appellant.

12. Now coming to the issue of the dying declaration. There is no doubt

regarding the well­settled position of law that a dying declaration is

an important piece of evidence and a conviction can be made by relying solely on a dying declaration alone as it holds immense

importance in criminal law. However, such reliance should be placed

after ascertaining the quality of the dying declaration and

considering the entire facts of a given case. This Court in Uttam v.

State of Maharashtra (2022) 8 SCC 576, with respect to

inconsistent dying declarations, observed as follows:

“15. In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution.”

In other words, if a dying declaration is surrounded by doubt or there

are inconsistent dying declarations by the deceased, then Courts must

look for corroborative evidence to find out which dying declaration is to

be believed. This will depend upon the facts of the case and Courts are

required to act cautiously in such cases. The matter at hand is one

such case. In the present case, the deceased had given two statements

which are totally different from her subsequent statements including

the statement made before PW­12 on 18.09.2008, which has been

considered a dying declaration based on which the appellant has been

convicted. The first statement was made to the doctor (PW­13) on the day of the incident itself where she told PW­13 that the incident

occurred while she was cooking. On the same day, the second

statement was made to the police constable (PW­9) where the deceased

said the same thing i.e. she caught fire by accident while cooking in

the kitchen.

13. Now, the variances in deceased’s statements cast serious doubts on

the veracity of her subsequent statement of 18.09.2008 made before

the Judicial Magistrate (PW­12) where the deceased had blamed the

appellant for the incident. The deceased tried to explain her conduct by

stating that she made false statements on the day of the incident as

she could not tell the truth in the presence of her husband. It is very

difficult to believe this version of the deceased because no other

evidence corroborates the deceased’s statement that the appellant had

poured kerosene on her and then set her on fire. Moreover, in his

cross­examination, Judicial Magistrate (PW­12) admitted that he did

not question the deceased with regards to the details of her previous

statements made before the police. The deceased did not say anything

to the Judicial Magistrate regarding her previous statements of

12.09.2008 and 15.09.2008. In other words, the deceased did not tell

the Magistrate that she lied in her statement of 12.09.2008. It is not a

case of dowry harassment as all such possibilities were already ruled

out during the investigation. When the Judicial Magistrate (PW­12) questioned the deceased about the reason for which appellant had set

her on fire, as claimed by the deceased, the deceased answered as

follows:

“I had beaten my son Rubiston. My husband had asked me why you are beating the child. My husband had abused me with filthy language. I told him that I am going to die. He said that why do you die and he himself had poured kerosene and burnt me”

This is also contradictory to the other evidence on record and

here, the timeline of the events becomes important. From the

deposition of PW­1, it comes out that PW­1 was called by the

deceased around 2 pm and PW­1 went to deceased’s house and

brought the deceased’s son to her house. The incident occurred

in the evening at around 6 pm. As per the deceased’s dying

declaration, she was beating her child to which the appellant

raised objections and the matter escalated, leading to the

alleged incident. All of this makes the dying declaration

extremely doubtful.

14. As discussed above, in cases where the dying declaration is

suspicious, it is not safe to convict an accused in the absence of

corroborative evidence. In a case like the present one, where the

deceased has been changing her stance and has completely turned

around her statements, such a dying declaration cannot become the

sole basis for the conviction in the absence of any other corroborative evidence.

15. On this point, the prosecution would argue that Observation Mahazar

prepared by PW­15 talks about the recovery of an empty kerosene

can and match stick from the spot. PW­15 also mentioned in the

Observation Mahazar that when he visited the deceased’s house on

15.09.2008, it was full of the smell of burnt kerosene. According to

the prosecution, this Mahazar corroborates the dying declaration

made by the deceased. However, the veracity of this Observation

Mahazar is itself in doubt. Apart from the fact that there had been

an inordinate delay in sending the Mahazar to Court, the witnesses

(PW­5 and PW­6) to the seizure of the above articles had also been

declared hostile. PW­5 and PW­6 deposed that the site was visited by

PW­15 but they did not support that any articles with kerosene

smell were seized from the place.

16. Moreover, no other witnesses had deposed about seeing any empty

kerosene can or match stick. Even PW­1 and PW­2, who reached the

scene and hospitalised the deceased, had not deposed anything like

that. On the contrary, PW­13 (doctor) had categorically stated in his

evidence that there was no smell of kerosene in the body of the

deceased when she was brought to the hospital. Normally, where the

death is caused by burning through kerosene, the smell of kerosene

would definitely remain for a few hours, however, the smell does weaken after some time. Since, in the present case, the deceased

was immediately brought to the hospital barely within a few hours of

the incident, if kerosene was involved then the smell of kerosene

ought to have been there. Even the doctor (PW­13), who had

examined the deceased immediately after the incident, states that

there was no such smell.

17. There is also another aspect to the case. It has come on record that the

relations between the two families i.e., the family of the accused and

the family of the deceased, had soured. In 2006, barely two years

before the incident, the appellant’s brother had filed a criminal case

of assault against the appellant’s father­in­law (PW­2) and brother­

in­law. In that case, PW­2 and his son were convicted. Before the

Trial Court as well as the High Court, the appellant had tried to

unsuccessfully contend that the dying declaration of 18.09.2008 is

an afterthought of the deceased and the deceased made such a

statement upon being tutored by PW­1 and PW­2. We are not in a

position to give any definitive view on this aspect but considering the

other evidence on record, the possibility of what the appellant is

suggesting, cannot be ruled out. Thus, in our considered opinion,

inspite of a dying declaration here, for the reasons stated above,

total reliance on it would be misplaced. Consequently, the appellant

deserves to be given the benefit of doubt.

18. We accordingly allow this appeal and acquit the appellant by setting

aside the order of the High Court dated 28.02.2012. The appellant

shall be released from jail forthwith.

19. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

……...……….………………….J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

..….....………………………….J. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

New Delhi.

March 04, 2025.

ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.12 SECTION II-C

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 540/2013

SURESH Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE REP.BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE Respondent(s)

Date : 04-03-2025 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of Judgment today.

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Aravindh S., AOR

For Respondent(s) : Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. Sabarish Subramanian, AOR Mr. Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Adv.

Ms. Azka Sheikh Kalia, Adv.

Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Adv.

Mr. Danish Saifi, Adv.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia pronounced the reportable

Judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr.

Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah.

The operative portion of the Judgment reads as follows :-

“We accordingly allow this appeal and acquit

the appellant by setting aside the order of

the High Court dated 28.02.2012. The

appellant shall be released from jail

forthwith.”

Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed

of.

(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA) (RENU BALA GAMBHIR) ASST. REGISTRAR-CUM-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)