Suresh Chandra vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

2025 INSC 156 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1283 OF 2024

SURESH CHANDRA AND ANOTHER …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad dated 29th October 2021 in Criminal Appeal

No.3036 of 1983, vide which the learned Judges of the

Division Bench of the High Court have dismissed the appeal

filed by the accused persons (including the appellants

herein), arising out of the judgment and order passed by the

Special Judge (E.C.Act)/Additional Sessions Judge,

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Farrukhabad (hereinafter referred to as “trial court”) in NARENDRA PRASAD Date: 2025.02.07 16:45:24 IST

Sessions Trial No. 347 of 1982, thereby convicting all the Reason:

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accused persons for the offences punishable under Section

302 read with Section 149 and Sections 147 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) and sentencing them

to undergo life imprisonment and one year rigorous

imprisonment respectively. Sentences to run concurrently.

2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are

as follows:

2.1 The deceased/Ram Dulari was married to the accused

No.3/Umesh Chandra. On 14th of July 1981 at around 6:00

A.M., PW.1/Chhote Lal who is the uncle of the deceased

lodged a complaint stating therein that, Nand Kishore and

Ram Prakash, residents of village Rasoolpur came to his

house and informed him that Ram Dulari had died due to

burn injuries. The complainant and others rushed to the

house of the accused persons where they found that the body

of Ram Dulari was kept on a cot and she was burnt from top

to bottom. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased

was ill-treated on account of non-fulfillment of demand of

dowry. Another motive that is attributed to the accused

persons is that the deceased had not given birth to a child

though a period of three years of marriage had been over.

2 2.2 On the basis of the oral complaint lodged by

PW.1/Chhote Lal, an First Information Report (FIR) came to

be registered for the offences punishable under Sections

302/149 and 147 of the IPC. Upon completion of the

investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed against six

accused persons and since the case was exclusively triable by

the Sessions Court, it was committed to the Sessions Judge.

Vide judgment and order dated 8th December 1983, the trial

court convicted and sentenced all the six accused persons, as

aforesaid. Being aggrieved thereby, the accused persons

preferred a Criminal Appeal before the High Court which was

dismissed vide impugned judgment and order.

2.3 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants, who are

original accused Nos.1 and 4, have approached this Court.

3. We have heard Shri Rajul Bhargava, learned senior

counsel appearing for the appellants, assisted by Shri Jasir

Aftab and Shri Kartikeya Bhargava, learned counsel, and

Shri Vikas Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-State, assisted by Shri Suryaansh Kishan

Razdan, learned counsel.

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4. Shri Bhargava, learned senior counsel for the appellants

submits that the present is a case which is without any

evidence. It is submitted that the learned Judge of the Trial

Court has convicted the appellants and learned Judges of the

High Court have confirmed the same only on the basis of

conjunctures and surmises. It is submitted that in the house

there were twelve persons residing, however the investigating

agency, for the reasons best known to them, have only

chosen to proceed against the six accused persons. He

further submits that even the prosecution has failed to prove

that the death was homicidal. It is submitted that the

possibility of the death being accidental cannot be ruled out.

Learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Shivaji Chintappa

Patil v. State of Maharashtra1. He, therefore, submitted

that the appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. Shri Bansal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State, on the contrary, submits that both the learned Trial

Court as well as the High Court have concurrently, on the

basis of correct appreciation of evidence, convicted the

1 (2021) 5 SCC 626 : 2021 INSC 136

4 appellants. He submits that the conduct of the appellants is

also important, inasmuch as they were absconding after the

incident had taken place. He, therefore, submits that this

Court shall not interfere with concurrent findings of the

courts below.

6. With the assistance of the counsel for the parties, we

have perused the evidence on record.

7. The present case rests basically on the evidence of

PW.1/Chhote Lal and PW.2/Hari Narain, uncle and father of

the deceased respectively. No doubt that the prosecution has

examined one independent witness i.e., PW.3/Raja Ram to

establish that there was commotion in the house of the

accused persons and that he had heard about the same

when he was passing by the house. However, both the trial

court as well as the High Court has found that he is a chance

witness and his testimony was not trustworthy. As such his

testimony has been discarded.

8. The present case occurred prior to Section 304-B of the

IPC, being brought on the statute book. As such, the present

case would fall only within the parameters of Section 302

IPC.

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9. For this Court to uphold the conviction of the appellants

for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, the

prosecution will have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that

it is the appellants who have committed the offence. No doubt

that in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

the burden would shift upon the accused. However, for the

burden to shift upon the accused, the initial burden will have

to be discharged by the prosecution. In a case such as the

present one, the prosecution will have to show that before the

death occurred it is only the appellants who were in the

company of the deceased. The issue would have been

different if it was only the husband and the wife who were

residing together and the death had occurred in suspicious

circumstances. In such an event, the issue would have been

covered by the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of

Maharashtra2.

10. However, in the present case there were around twelve

persons residing along with the deceased. In such

circumstances, it was necessary for the prosecution to

establish as to which of the accused persons was in the 2 (2006) 10 SC 681 : 2006 INSC 691

6 company of the deceased prior to her death being noticed.

Unfortunately, in the present case the prosecution has

chosen to proceed against all the male members of the family

and the mother-in-law of the deceased. Only the other

women in the family i.e. the wives of the other brothers of the

accused/Umesh have not been proceeded against.

11. Indisputably, the present case rests on circumstantial

evidence. The law on conviction in the case of circumstantial

evidence has been very well crystallized by this Court in the

case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra3. It will be relevant to refer to the observations

made by this Court in the aforesaid case:

“151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this: where various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court. In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court.

3 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121

7 ………….

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the observations were made:

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable

8 ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”

12. As such, the prosecution will have to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that it is the appellants and the appellants

alone, who have committed the crime. Every hypothesis

except the guilt of the appellants will have to be ruled out. As

held by this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda (supra), there is not only a grammatical distinction

between ‘may’ and ‘must’ but also a legal distinction.

13. In the present case we find that no such chain of

circumstances has been established by the prosecution,

which proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is appellants

and the appellants alone who have committed the crime.

14. The motive that is alleged is non-fulfillment of the

demand of dowry. However, from the perusal of the evidence

of PW.2/Hari Narain, it would reveal that the relationship

between appellants and the family of PW.2/Hari Narain was

cordial. His evidence would show that the appellants used to

visit Hari Narain’s house. He has further admitted in his

9 examination that he had not made any complaint to anyone

with regard to ill-treatment of the deceased on account of

demand of dowry. His evidence further shows that the

deceased was an educated person. He has also admitted that

there is no letter addressed by the deceased to her family

members regarding demand of dowry and ill-treatment on

account of non-fulfillment thereof.

15. As such, in the present case, we are of the view that the

conviction is based only on suspicion. As held by this court

in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), however strong the

suspicion, it cannot take place of proof beyond reasonable

doubt.

16. We are further amazed with the approach adopted by

the High Court. The High Court has observed that the motive

for killing the deceased was a plausible one. The High Court

has further observed that the prosecution case that the

appellants set the deceased on fire was a possible and

acceptable view. The approach in the criminal trial has to be

of proof beyond reasonable doubt and not the probability or a

possibility.

17. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the

10 conviction of the appellants is not sustainable. The

judgment and order of the High Court as well as of the Trial

Court are not sustainable in law. The appeal is, therefore,

allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court as well as the judgment and order passed by the

trial court are hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants

are acquitted of all the charges they were charged with.

18. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if

their detention is not required in any other case.

19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..............................J. (B.R. GAVAI)

.............................................J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

..................................J. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 30, 2025.

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