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Surendra Mishra vs State Of Jharkhand

Supreme Court6 January 2011Chandramauli Kr. Prasad · P. Sathasivam · Harjit Singh Bedi

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

The distinction between legal insanity and medical insanity for the purposes of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is critical: an accused seeking exoneration must prove legal insanity, not merely that he suffered from a medical mental disease or disorder. The mere fact that an accused suffers from certain mental ailments, emotional weakness, unusual past acts, recurring fits of insanity at intervals, or epileptic fits, without abnormal behaviour at the time of commission of the offence, is insufficient to attract the protection of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. An accused invoking Section 84 bears the burden of proof under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but the standard required is preponderance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt; this burden must be discharged through evidence of the accused's conduct before the offence, at the time of the offence, and immediately thereafter, supported by medical evidence and other relevant factors. Even if an accused establishes unsoundness of mind, Section 84 provides no protection if it is found that the accused knew what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law; the court must therefore examine the circumstances and behaviour preceding, attending, and following the crime, including any conduct demonstrating desire for concealment of the weapon or avoidance of detection, as evidence that the accused knew the consequences of his act.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.177 OF 2006
SURENDERA MISHRA .... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND ..... RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
1. Sole appellant was put on trial for commission of the
offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code as also
Section 27 of the Arms Act. The trial court held him guilty on
both the counts and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment
for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but no
separate sentence was awarded under Section 27 of the Arms
Act. His conviction and sentence has been upheld by the High
Court in appeal and hence the appellant is before us with the
leave of the Court.
2
2. According to the prosecution, on 11th of August, 2000 the
deceased Chandrashekhar Choubey was going in a car driven
by PW.1, Vidyut Kumar Modi and when reached Chas Nala
crossing, he asked the driver to stop the car and call Shasdhar
Mukherjee (PW.2), the owner of Sulekha Auto Parts. As
directed, the driver called said Shasdhar Mukherjee and the
deceased started talking to him from inside the car. According
to the prosecution all of a sudden the appellant, the owner of
the Medical Hall came there with a country-made pistol,
pushed Shasdhar Mukherjee aside and fired at point-blank
range at the deceased. The driver fled away from the place of
occurrence and informed the family members of the deceased,
leaving the deceased in the car itself. PW.4, Vinod Kumar
Choubey along with the driver came back and rushed the
deceased to the Chas Nala Colliery Hospital, where he was
declared dead. On the basis of the aforesaid report a case
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of
the Arms Act was registered against the appellant. After usual
investigation police submitted the charge-sheet and ultimately
the appellant was put on trial for commission of the3
offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 27 of the Arms Act.
3. In order to bring home the charge the prosecution
altogether examined nine witnesses besides a large number of
documents were exhibited. Only plea of the appellant during
the trial was that by virtue of unsoundness of mind, the act
done by him comes within general exception under Section 84
of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, he cannot be held
guilty for the act done by him. The aforesaid plea did not find
favour with the trial court as also by the High Court, in
appeal. In this connection the High Court has observed as
follows:
"On the basis of the evidence, adduced on behalf ofboth the parties regarding mental status of accusedSurendra Mishra, learned court below came to asafe conclusion that accused was not suffering frommental instability even prior to the incident or at thetime of incident. I also find no ground to differ withsuch finding.
I have noticed the observations of the learnedcourt below that although some evidence wereplaced by the defence in support of the mentaltrouble of the accused, in absence of specific findingby the doctor or degree and nature of mentaltrouble, it can not be relied upon to declare theaccused Surendra Mishra mentally unfit or that hewas insane at the time of occurrence."
44. Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant
being a person of unsound mind at the time of the
commission of the offence, his act comes within general
exception as provided under Section 84 of the Indian
Penal Code and hence the appellant deserves to be
acquitted. In support of the submission he has placed
reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of State
of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (1983) 2 SCC 274, in
which it has been held as follows:
"The doctor had examined accused a littlebefore as also a little after the occurrence andhe was found insane. The detailed reasonsgiven by both Dr. Harbans Lal and Dr.Ramkumar have been corroborated by eachother. From the evidence also it is clear thathe was talking in a very unusual mannersaying things to the effect that he had seenLord Shiva in front of him and the alike. Itcannot be said that the finding of the HighCourt was wrong. In view of thesecircumstances we are not in a position to takea different view particularly when the appellantwas suffering from schizophrenia."
5. Another decision of this Court on which reliance
has been placed is in the case of Shrikant Anandrao
Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 748,5
and our attention has been drawn to the following
passage from paragraph 20 of the judgment:
"In the present case, however, it is not only theaforesaid facts but it is the totality of thecircumstances seen in the light of the evidence onrecord to prove that the appellant was sufferingfrom paranoid schizophrenia. The unsoundness ofmind before and after the incident is a relevant fact.From the circumstances of the case clearly aninference can be reasonably drawn that theappellant was under a delusion at the relevant time.He was under an attack of the ailment. The angertheory on which reliance has been placed is notruled out under schizophrenia attack. Havingregard to the nature of burden on the appellant, weare of the view that the appellant has proved theexistence of circumstances as required by Section105 of the Evidence Act so as to get the benefit ofSection 84 IPC. We are unable to hold that thecrime was committed as a result of an extreme fit ofanger. There is a reasonable doubt that at the timeof commission of the crime, the appellant wasincapable of knowing the nature of the act byreason of unsoundness of mind and, thus, he isentitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC. Hence, theconviction and sentence of the appellant cannot besustained."
6. Nobody had appeared on behalf of the respondent.
However, we have perused the records and bestowed our
consideration to the submission advanced by Mr. Agarwal and
we do not find any substance in the same. In view of the plea
raised it is desirable to consider the meaning of the expression
"unsoundness of mind" in the context of Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code and for its appreciation, we deem it
expedient to reproduce the same. It reads as follows:6
"84. Act of a person of unsound mind.--Nothing is an offence which is done by aperson who, at the time of doing it, by reasonof unsoundness of mind, is incapable ofknowing the nature of the act, or that he isdoing what is either wrong or contrary to law."
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is found in its Chapter IV,
which deals with general exceptions.
7. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident
that an act will not be an offence, if done by a person who,
at the time of doing the same by reason of unsoundness of
mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or what
he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. But what is
unsoundness of mind? This Court had the occasion to
consider this question in the case of Bapu alias Gujraj
Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66, in which
it has been held as follows:
"The standard to be applied is whetheraccording to the ordinary standard, adopted byreasonable men, the act was right or wrong.The mere fact that an accused is conceited,odd, irascible and his brain is not quite allright, or that the physical and mental ailmentsfrom which he suffered had rendered hisintellect weak and had affected his emotionsand will, or that he had committed certainunusual acts in the past, or that he was liableto recurring fits of insanity at short intervals,or that he was subject to getting epileptic fitsbut there was nothing abnormal in hisbehaviour, or that his behaviour was queer,7
cannot be sufficient to attract the applicationof this section."
8. The scope and ambit of the Section 84 of the Indian
Penal Code also came up for consideration before this Court in
the case of Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2008) 16 SCC 109 = AIR 2009 SC 31 in which it has been
held as follows:
"Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibilityin cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There isno definition of `unsoundness of mind' in IPC. Thecourts have, however, mainly treated thisexpression as equivalent to insanity. But the term`insanity' itself has no precise definition. It is a termused to describe varying degrees of mental disorder.So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is notipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility. Adistinction is to be made between legal insanity andmedical insanity. A court is concerned with legalinsanity, and not with medical insanity."
9. In our opinion, an accused who seeks exoneration from
liability of an act under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is
to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Expression
"unsoundness of mind" has not been defined in the Indian
Penal Code and it has mainly been treated as equivalent to
insanity. But the term insanity carries different meaning in
different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental8
disorder. Every person who is suffering from mental disease is
not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability. The mere fact
that the accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is
not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments
from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and
affected his emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or

had fits of insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to

epileptic fits and there was abnormal behaviour or the

behaviour is queer are not sufficient to attract the application

of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.

10. Next question which needs consideration is as to on

whom the onus lies to prove unsoundness of mind. In law,

the presumption is that every person is sane to the extent that

he knows the natural consequences of his act. The burden of

proof in the face of Section 105 of the Evidence Act is on the

accused. Though the burden is on the accused but he is not

required to prove the same beyond all reasonable doubt, but

merely satisfy the preponderance of probabilities. The onus

has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct

of the accused prior to the offence, his conduct at the time or

immediately after the offence with reference to his medical 9

condition by production of medical evidence and other relevant

factors. Even if the accused establishes unsoundness of mind,

Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code will not come to its

rescue, in case it is found that the accused knew that what he

was doing was wrong or that it was contrary to law. In order to

ascertain that, it is imperative to take into consideration the

circumstances and the behaviour preceding, attending and

following the crime. Behaviour of an accused pertaining to a

desire for concealment of the weapon of offence and conduct to

avoid detection of crime go a long way to ascertain as to

whether, he knew the consequences of the act done by him.

Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this

Court in the case of T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of

Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219, in which it has been held as

follows:

"9. Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.

10 10. In State of M.P. v. Ahmadull,AIR 1961 SC 998, this Court held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by the section, lies on the accused who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act [Illustration (a)]. The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions under Chapter IV.

11. In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is claimed, the court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission of the offence up to the time the sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bona fide or an afterthought."

11. In the background of what we have observed above, we

proceed to consider the facts of the present case. The first

evidence in regard to the unsoundness of mind as brought by

the appellant is the medical prescription dated 18th October,

1987 (Ext. A-1) in which symptom of the appellant has been

noted as psychiatric with paranoid features and medicine was

advised for sleep. Other prescriptions are dated 9th January,

1988 (Ext. A) and 5th of September 1998 in which only

medicines have been prescribed. Other prescriptions (Exts. A- 11

5 to A-7) also do not spell out the disease the appellant was

suffering but give the names of the medicines, he was advised

to take. The occurrence had taken place on 11th of August

2000. From these prescriptions, the only inference one can

draw is that the appellant had paranoid feeling but that too

was not proximate to the date of occurrence. It has to be

borne in mind that to establish that acts done are not offence

and come within general exception it is required to be proved

that at the time of commission of the act, accused by reason of

unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing that his acts

were wrong or contrary to law. In the present case the

prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that

immediately after the appellant had shot- dead the deceased,

threatened his driver PW.1, Vidyut Kumar Modi of dire

consequences. Not only that, he ran away from the place of

occurrence and threw the country-made pistol, the weapon of

crime, in the well in order to conceal himself from the crime.

However, it was recovered later on. The aforesaid conduct of

the appellant subsequent to the commission of the offence

clearly goes to suggest that he knew that whatever he had

done was wrong and illegal. Further, he was running a 12

medical shop and came to the place of occurrence and shot

dead the deceased. Had the appellant been a person of

unsound mind, it may not have been possible for him to run a

medical shop. We are of the opinion that the appellant though

suffered from certain mental instability even before and after

the incident but from that one cannot infer on a balance of

preponderance of probabilities that the appellant at the time of

the commission of the offence did not know the nature of his

act; that it was either wrong or contrary to law. In our

opinion, the plea of the appellant does not come within the

exception contemplated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal

Code.

12. As regards the decisions of this Court in the cases of

Mohinder Singh (supra) and Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale

(supra), relied on by the appellant same are clearly

distinguishable. In those decisions, this Court on fact found

that the accused at the time of commission of crime was

suffering from Schizophrenia and in that background held that

accused is entitled to the protection under Section 84 of the

Indian Penal Code. Here on fact, we have found that the

appellant was not suffering from unsoundness of mind at the 13

time of commission of the crime and therefore the decisions

relied on in no way advance the case of the appellant.

13. We do not find any merit in the appeal and it is

dismissed accordingly.

................................................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]

................................................J [P. SATHASIVAM]

................................................J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JANUARY 6, 2011.

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