Surendra Mishra vs State Of Jharkhand
- SCC(2011) 11 SCC 495
- Neutral2011 INSC 17
- AIRAIR 2011 SC 627
- SCR[2011] 1 SCR 133
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
The distinction between legal insanity and medical insanity for the purposes of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is critical: an accused seeking exoneration must prove legal insanity, not merely that he suffered from a medical mental disease or disorder. The mere fact that an accused suffers from certain mental ailments, emotional weakness, unusual past acts, recurring fits of insanity at intervals, or epileptic fits, without abnormal behaviour at the time of commission of the offence, is insufficient to attract the protection of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. An accused invoking Section 84 bears the burden of proof under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but the standard required is preponderance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt; this burden must be discharged through evidence of the accused's conduct before the offence, at the time of the offence, and immediately thereafter, supported by medical evidence and other relevant factors. Even if an accused establishes unsoundness of mind, Section 84 provides no protection if it is found that the accused knew what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law; the court must therefore examine the circumstances and behaviour preceding, attending, and following the crime, including any conduct demonstrating desire for concealment of the weapon or avoidance of detection, as evidence that the accused knew the consequences of his act.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
had fits of insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to
epileptic fits and there was abnormal behaviour or the
behaviour is queer are not sufficient to attract the application
of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
10. Next question which needs consideration is as to on
whom the onus lies to prove unsoundness of mind. In law,
the presumption is that every person is sane to the extent that
he knows the natural consequences of his act. The burden of
proof in the face of Section 105 of the Evidence Act is on the
accused. Though the burden is on the accused but he is not
required to prove the same beyond all reasonable doubt, but
merely satisfy the preponderance of probabilities. The onus
has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct
of the accused prior to the offence, his conduct at the time or
immediately after the offence with reference to his medical 9
condition by production of medical evidence and other relevant
factors. Even if the accused establishes unsoundness of mind,
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code will not come to its
rescue, in case it is found that the accused knew that what he
was doing was wrong or that it was contrary to law. In order to
ascertain that, it is imperative to take into consideration the
circumstances and the behaviour preceding, attending and
following the crime. Behaviour of an accused pertaining to a
desire for concealment of the weapon of offence and conduct to
avoid detection of crime go a long way to ascertain as to
whether, he knew the consequences of the act done by him.
Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this
Court in the case of T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219, in which it has been held as
follows:
"9. Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.
10 10. In State of M.P. v. Ahmadull,AIR 1961 SC 998, this Court held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by the section, lies on the accused who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act [Illustration (a)]. The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions under Chapter IV.
11. In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is claimed, the court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission of the offence up to the time the sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bona fide or an afterthought."
11. In the background of what we have observed above, we
proceed to consider the facts of the present case. The first
evidence in regard to the unsoundness of mind as brought by
the appellant is the medical prescription dated 18th October,
1987 (Ext. A-1) in which symptom of the appellant has been
noted as psychiatric with paranoid features and medicine was
advised for sleep. Other prescriptions are dated 9th January,
1988 (Ext. A) and 5th of September 1998 in which only
medicines have been prescribed. Other prescriptions (Exts. A- 11
5 to A-7) also do not spell out the disease the appellant was
suffering but give the names of the medicines, he was advised
to take. The occurrence had taken place on 11th of August
2000. From these prescriptions, the only inference one can
draw is that the appellant had paranoid feeling but that too
was not proximate to the date of occurrence. It has to be
borne in mind that to establish that acts done are not offence
and come within general exception it is required to be proved
that at the time of commission of the act, accused by reason of
unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing that his acts
were wrong or contrary to law. In the present case the
prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that
immediately after the appellant had shot- dead the deceased,
threatened his driver PW.1, Vidyut Kumar Modi of dire
consequences. Not only that, he ran away from the place of
occurrence and threw the country-made pistol, the weapon of
crime, in the well in order to conceal himself from the crime.
However, it was recovered later on. The aforesaid conduct of
the appellant subsequent to the commission of the offence
clearly goes to suggest that he knew that whatever he had
done was wrong and illegal. Further, he was running a 12
medical shop and came to the place of occurrence and shot
dead the deceased. Had the appellant been a person of
unsound mind, it may not have been possible for him to run a
medical shop. We are of the opinion that the appellant though
suffered from certain mental instability even before and after
the incident but from that one cannot infer on a balance of
preponderance of probabilities that the appellant at the time of
the commission of the offence did not know the nature of his
act; that it was either wrong or contrary to law. In our
opinion, the plea of the appellant does not come within the
exception contemplated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code.
12. As regards the decisions of this Court in the cases of
Mohinder Singh (supra) and Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale
(supra), relied on by the appellant same are clearly
distinguishable. In those decisions, this Court on fact found
that the accused at the time of commission of crime was
suffering from Schizophrenia and in that background held that
accused is entitled to the protection under Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code. Here on fact, we have found that the
appellant was not suffering from unsoundness of mind at the 13
time of commission of the crime and therefore the decisions
relied on in no way advance the case of the appellant.
13. We do not find any merit in the appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly.
................................................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]
................................................J [P. SATHASIVAM]
................................................J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JANUARY 6, 2011.
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