Sunil Kumar Singh vs Bihar Legislative Council

2025 INSC 264 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 530 OF 2024

Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh … Petitioner

versus

Bihar Legislative Council

(Through Secretary) and Ors. … Respondents

JUDGMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

1. The Petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, laying challenge to Report

No. 1/2024 dated 14.06.2024 (Impugned Report), submitted by

the Ethics Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC)

recommending his expulsion as a Member of Legislative Council

(MLC). The consequential notification dated 26.07.2024 relieving

the Petitioner from the membership of the BLC issued by the BLC’s

Secretariat (Impugned Notification), is also assailed.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

2. The present controversy arises from allegations of unparliamentary Deepak Joshi Date: 2025.02.25 13:40:50 IST Reason:

conduct by the Petitioner, including the use of derogatory

1|Page expressions in his capacity as an MLC within the House of the BLC.

This conduct of the Petitioner prompted the initiation of

proceedings against him by the Ethics Committee. The allegations

were found to be substantiated, leading the Ethics Committee to

recommend the Petitioner’s expulsion from the BLC. Subsequently,

a resolution to that effect was passed by a majority of the members

of BLC, formalising the decision to expel and relieve the Petitioner.

The facts giving rise to the present petition are set out hereinbelow:

2.1. The Petitioner is a member of the political party known as the

Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). He was elected as a member of the

BLC on 29.06.2020 for a period of six years. The Petitioner was also

nominated as the Chief Whip by the RJD in the BLC.

2.2. The elections for the 17th Legislative Assembly in the State of Bihar

were held in November 2020, wherein a coalition government,

comprising the Janata Dal (United) (JDU) led by the incumbent

Chief Minister along with the RJD and the Indian National

Congress (INC), was formed. This coalition, however, wedged apart

in January 2024, and a new alliance between the JDU and the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was entered into to form the

Government in the State.

2.3. Following these developments, the Hon’ble Governor of Bihar was

scheduled to deliver his address on 13.02.2024, at the 206th

2|Page Session of the BLC. As soon as the Governor’s address was

completed and during the motion of thanks, the Petitioner and

another MLC, Md. Sohaib approached the well of the House and

hurled indecent slogans against the Chief Minister. They mocked

him as “Paltu Ram”, imitated his body language and sarcastically

remarked that “the man who has not contested a single Mukhiya

election till date is the Chief Minister of Bihar”. The Petitioner then

alluded to the Chief Minister as an ‘expert in manipulations’ and

insinuated that he was “just like a snake sheds its skin every year”.

This indecorous fracas led to the proceedings of the House being

indubitably obstructed, followed by a complaint on 19.02.2024

lodged against the Petitioner and Md. Sohaib before the Chairman

of the BLC by a fellow MLC belonging to the Ruling Party JDU.

2.4. The Chairman of BLC issued a letter to the Petitioner and Md.

Sohaib informing them about the complaint, which was then

forwarded to the Ethics Committee for necessary enquiry. The letter

also required both the MLCs to remain present and join the enquiry

proceedings on 03.05.2024 before the Ethics Committee.

2.5. Md. Sohaib joined the enquiry proceedings on 03.05.2024 and

expressed regret for his conduct in writing and further assured a

display of restraint and caution in the future.

3|Page 2.6. The Petitioner, in stark contrast, did not appear before the Ethics

Committee on the date fixed and instead sought exemption, citing

engagements and scheduling conflicts due to the onset of the Lok

Sabha elections. The Petitioner did not join even the subsequent

proceedings and continued seeking exemption from appearing for

one or the other reason, which are delineated for the sake of

convenience:

Date of Requests from Petitioner Response of the Ethics proceedings Committee

03.05.2024 ▪ The Petitioner was a star Exempted and directed to campaigner for his party in appear on 22.05.2024 the ongoing Lok Sabha elections and was in charge of the Saran Constituency.

22.05.2024 ▪ Busy on account of himself Exempted and directed to being a candidate in be present on 31.05.2024 elections of the Board of as a last opportunity.

Directors, National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (NAFAED).

31.05.2024 ▪ Tried to place the onus on Exempted, but the request the Ethics Committee by regarding the relevant

stating: “I do not know what documents was denied on is the hurry, haste and the grounds of impatience that the confidentiality; however, Committee has again fixed Petitioner was permitted to the date 31.05.2025 to peruse the same on the present the opinion”. next date of proceeding, i.e. 06.06.2024.

▪ He demanded information regarding the charges

4|Page against him and the necessary evidence corroborating such allegations.

06.06.2024 ▪ Sought exemption on the One last opportunity was grounds of his father’s given to the Petitioner to illness. present his side, and the Ethics Committee resolved to take action in case the Petitioner did not turn up for proceedings scheduled on 12.06.2024.

2.7. The Petitioner eventually appeared before the Ethics Committee for

the first time on 12.06.2024, when a copy of the charges was duly

supplied to him. The Petitioner instead of addressing the Ethics

Committee on those charges, started questioning its very authority

and legitimacy. Having chosen to continue his pattern of defiance,

the Petitioner communicated to the Ethics Committee that it was

not competent to question him, given his position as the

Opposition’s Chief Whip. Following a heated discussion between

them, the Ethics Committee concluded the proceedings without the

Petitioner having addressed any of the charges levelled against him.

The next date of the proceedings was then fixed on 19.06.2024.

2.8. The Ethics Committee, in somewhat of an unusual manner,

preponed the proceedings from 19.06.2024 to 14.06.2024 without

any notice to the Petitioner. The Ethics Committee then discussed

5|Page the behaviour of the Petitioner during the previous proceedings and

concluded that his conduct was wholly unjustified. The Ethics

Committee further mooted the demeanour of both the MLCs, i.e.

the Petitioner and Md. Sohaib and closed the proceedings.

2.9. The Ethics Committee thereafter submitted the Impugned Report,

recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner from membership of

the BLC. As regards to Md. Sohaib, the Ethics Committee

recommended his suspension for two days in the upcoming

Session.

2.10. The Ethics Committee’s report, along with its recommendations for

taking punitive measures against the Petitioner as well as Md.

Sohaib was presented and discussed on 26.07.2024 in the House.

After due deliberations, the majority of the House accepted the

recommendations and consequently, the Petitioner was expelled

from his membership of the BLC forthwith. Md. Sohaib, on the

other hand, was suspended for the first two days of the 208th

Session of the House.

2.11. As a sequel thereto, the Secretariat of BLC issued the Impugned

Notification dated 26.07.2024, relieving the Petitioner from

membership of the BLC and notifying the resultant vacancy caused

by such expulsion. The aforesaid measures have prompted the

Petitioner to approach this Court through these writ proceedings.

6|Page 2.12. We may hasten to add that during the pendency of this petition,

Respondent No. 6, Election Commission of India (Election

Commission), issued a Press Note dated 30.12.2024 declaring the

bye-election for the seat held by the Petitioner before his expulsion.

The election process was resolved to be completed before

25.01.2025. Considering the impact of the notified election on the

outcome of this petition, vide order dated 15.01.2025 the

declaration of the result of such bye-election was stayed.

B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan,

learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the Petitioner

vehemently contended that the Impugned Report and the

consequential Notification are illegal and unconstitutional. They

argued that the actions against the Petitioner were actuated by

mala fide and suffered from gross illegalities, both in procedure and

substance.

4. Dr. Singhvi and Mr. Sankarnarayanan canvassed the following

grounds in support of their submissions:

a) The expulsion of the Petitioner from the membership of BLC

was violative of the principles of natural justice, fair and just

play, as the relevant material, including the video clip

containing his transgressions were not furnished to him. The

7|Page Petitioner was denied access to the material evidence on the

pretext that the proceedings of the House are confidential and

could only be perused by him during the meetings of the Ethics

Committee. The Petitioner was thus caused inexorable

prejudice in the matter of preparing his defence.

b) The Ethics Committee explicitly assured the Petitioner on

12.06.2024 that charges would be framed only after receiving

all the relevant material, for which the next date of proceeding

was fixed on 19.06.2024. The Ethics Committee, however

unilaterally and deliberately advanced the date of hearing to

14.06.2024 without his knowledge. The Petitioner has thus

been condemned unheard, and in a manner which reeks of

malice and amounts to gross illegality.

c) Not only this, the Ethics Committee’s report dated 14.06.2024

was circulated selectively with the members belonging to the

Ruling Party, and was kept confidential from the members

belonging to the Opposition Parties. Such members being in

the minority could not effectively participate in the

proceedings.

d) In any event, the Petitioner has been hammered with severe

punishment, disproportionate to the attributed misconduct

and also in comparison to another MLC Md. Sohaib, who,

8|Page despite facing somewhat similar allegations, was awarded

suspension of two days from the upcoming Session.

e) It is settled law that a ‘graded’ approach is required where the

House is disciplining its members. Deviation from such an

approach in the case of the Petitioner is not based on any

sufficient material, and the disproportionate punishment

imposed on him falls foul of the Fundamental Rights enshrined

in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

C. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

5. Contrarily, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing

Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, strongly opposed the instant Writ Petition

urging that the Impugned Report and Notification expelling the

Petitioner from the BLC are based on concrete evidence. He

submitted that the action against the Petitioner was taken following

due process of law, which has been approved by the majority of the

House and thus warrants no interference.

6. In this vein, while opposing the Writ Petition, Mr. Kumar advanced

the following submissions:

a) At the outset, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. It is liable

to be dismissed in terms of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution

of India, which states that ‘the validity of any proceedings in

9|Page the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the

ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure’.

b) It is the prerogative of the House to regulate its Business and

Procedure, and the decision so taken cannot be tested on the

bedrock of proportionality. The issue of proportionality should

be left to the wisdom of the House. In other words, the Court

cannot examine the quantum of punishment imposed upon

the Petitioner, as such a recourse would amount to reviewing

the validity of the proceedings of the House.

c) The Ethics Committee adhered to the principles of audi alteram

partem as the Petitioner was given reasonable opportunity of

being heard. Such a plea is fortified by the fact that the Ethics

Committee asked the Petitioner to join its proceedings on

03.05.2024, 22.05.2024, 31.05.2024, 06.06.2024 and

12.06.2024. In fact, it is the Petitioner who deliberately and for

reasons best known to him, failed to avail such opportunity.

He kept on either avoiding the proceedings or threatening the

Ethics Committee with one or the other objection until

12.06.2024 when he entered appearance for the first time.

d) The Petitioner was duly served with the list of charges as soon

as he appeared on 12.06.2024. He, however instead of

addressing the charges, questioned the very legality and the

10 | P a g e authority of the Ethics Committee itself. The Petitioner, being

a member of the House, is deemed to have knowledge of the

formation of the Ethics Committee under Article 208 of the

Constitution and the manner in which its proceedings are

conducted.

e) The Petitioner cannot raise the plea of proportionality and seek

parity with the other MLC, Md. Sohaib for the reason that the

latter duly appeared before the Ethics Committee and

cooperated in the proceedings. On the other hand, the

Petitioner remained defiant and disregarded the prescribed

procedure. Being the Chief Whip of the Opposition, he held a

greater responsibility towards the policies, rules and

constitutional authority of the House.

f) The Petitioner has a habit of degrading the authority of the

House through his indecent and unparliamentary acts for

which he was earlier also suspended from the House on

28.03.2022 in the 200th Session of the BLC.

7. Mr. Ankit Agarwal, counsel for Respondent No. 6—the Election

Commission, submitted that in view of Section 151A of the

Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), the Commission was

duty-bound to notify the elections as soon as the vacancy occurred.

11 | P a g e He further submitted that the Election Commission had nothing to

add on the merits of the case.

8. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel, entered appearance

for the Intervener, Shri Lalan Prasad, who is the aspirant for

election to the MLC seat declared vacant upon the expulsion of the

Petitioner. She also asserted that the bye-election declared by the

Election Commission for the vacant seat aligned with Section 151A

of the RP Act. According to her Section 151A of the RP Act is

triggered the moment a ‘legal vacancy’ occurs, mandating the

immediate election to fill up the same.

D. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

9. Having traversed the sequence of events as they emanated, the

contentions put forth on behalf of the parties as well as the material

on record, we are of the considered view that the following vital

issues require analysis:

i. Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view of

Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the

proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial

review?

ii. Can this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction review the

proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House?

12 | P a g e iii. If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to

the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any

interference?

iv. If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this

Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment

that may be imposed on the Petitioner?

E. ANALYSIS

E.1. Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view of

Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the

proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial

review?

10. The Respondents have raised an objection against the very

maintainability of the Writ Petition in view of Article 212(1) of the

Constitution of India. Since this argument strikes at the core of the

instant matter, we find it imperative to address this contention at

the very outset. Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India bars any

enquiry regarding any proceeding in the Legislature on the grounds

of alleged irregularity of procedure.

11. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we find ourselves

unable to concur with the contentions asseverated by the

Respondents that the decision of the Ethics Committee is shielded

13 | P a g e by the immunity proffered under Article 212(1). We say so because

it is no longer res integra that there is no absolute bar on calling

into question the decisions taken by the Legislature. The protection

under Article 212(1) operates only with respect to the ‘Proceedings

in the Legislature’ on the grounds of ‘Procedural Irregularities’. It

could not have been the intent of the lawmakers to circumscribe

Constitutional Courts unconditionally from scrutinising the

validity of the actions of the Legislature, which may encroach upon

the Fundamental Rights of the members and/or citizens.

12. To simplify the understanding of the embargo postulated under

Article 212(1), we deem it appropriate to distinguish the terms—

‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ and ‘Legislative Decision’. These

terms represent distinct concepts, each serving a different function

in the law-making process.

13. To further explicate, the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ comprise

the formal steps, debates, and motions undertaken to facilitate

deliberations within the House. It is a structured mechanism that

ensures due consideration of a proposed measure, allowing for

discussion, amendment, and scrutiny before reaching a final

resolution. These procedural steps are not ends in themselves but

are designed to channel legislative discourse towards a definitive

outcome. Article 212(1) of the Constitution provides immunity for

14 | P a g e the manner of such proceedings, and hence, Constitutional Courts

would exercise restraint when such proceedings are called into

question on the grounds of procedural irregularity.

14. A ‘Legislative Decision’, on the other hand, is the culmination of the

legislative procedure—the formal expression of the will of the House

on a given matter. While Proceedings of the Legislature provide the

framework within which members exercise their deliberative

functions, the Legislative Decision is the authoritative

determination that follows such deliberation. These decisions of the

Legislature, though emanating from a coordinate branch of

Government, are not immune from scrutiny by Constitutional

Courts. Judicial review of Legislative Decisions is not an

encroachment upon legislative dominion but a necessary safeguard

to uphold constitutional supremacy.

15. In this regard, we deem it apposite to underscore the applicability

of the principle of ‘expression unius est exclusion alterius’, namely,

that whatever has not been included has, by implication, been

excluded. Applying the aforesaid principle, we have no doubt in

concluding that the prohibition under Article 212(1) operates only

with respect to the scrutiny of ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ on

the touchstone of ‘Irregularity of Procedure’. It does not oust the

power of judicial review of the decisions of the Legislature, whether

15 | P a g e Legislative or Administrative, on the grounds of illegality or

unconstitutionality.

16. Constitutional courts are entrusted with the responsibility of

ensuring the lawfulness of the decisions of the Legislature rather

than substituting their judgment to decide the rights of the parties.

A decision-making authority, be it the Legislature or otherwise,

while exercising its powers, must act within the limits prescribed

by the Constitution. Any determination by the authority concerned,

if found to be in excess of its constitutional authority or violative of

Fundamental Rights, is subject to judicial probe. Such overarching

decisions cannot be sustained to preserve integrity in the legal

system by preventing excess and abuse of power.

17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, the Impugned Report

recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the

Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions.

These functions have been assigned in the Rules framed by the

State Legislature under Article 208 of the Constitution. The Rules

so enacted govern the internal functioning, discipline of the House

and the procedure by which the House regulates its affairs.

However, such administrative actions, even though referable to the

Rules formulated under Article 208 of the Constitution, do not

constitute the legislative functions of the House. As discussed in

16 | P a g e the preceding paragraphs, the legislative functions pertain to law-

making, deliberation, and policy formulation, whereas the present

action of the Ethics Committee is purely administrative in nature,

aimed at enforcing discipline and ethical standards amongst the

members of the House.

18. The distinction between legislative and administrative functions is

well recognized in constitutional jurisprudence. When a legislative

body frames rules under Article 208 and subsequently enforces

them through disciplinary measures, such enforcement is an

exercise of administrative power rather than legislative power.

19. It is well established that administrative actions, even when

undertaken by legislative bodies or their committees, are subject to

judicial review where they affect the rights and interests of

individuals. In fact, this Court in Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. The

Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr.1 has held that the

substantive disciplinary or rationality of the self-security measure

inflicted upon the erring member is open to judicial review on the

touch stone of being unconstitutional, grossly illegal, irrational or

arbitrary.

1 Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr.; (2022) 12 SCC 273.

17 | P a g e

20. There can thus be no doubt that if such an administrative decision

is found to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of constitutional

rights, it is open to judicial intervention in the same manner as any

other executive action of the State. Determining whether an

impugned action or breach is an exempted irregularity or

justiciable illegality is a matter of judicial interpretation and would

undoubtedly fall within the ambit of Constitutional Courts.

21. We also clarify here that the scrutiny in the instant Writ Petition

pertains to the recommendation of the Ethics Committee

subsequently ratified by the majority of the House. This Court is

not concerned with the procedure adopted either by the Ethics

Committee or the House while making or acting on such

recommendation. In this context, the present action resulting in

civil consequences for the Petitioner, cannot be immune from

judicial review under the pretext of legislative privilege.

22. We cannot be ignorant that the grounds raised before us traverse

beyond mere procedural irregularity and challenge the Petitioner’s

expulsion on the footing of proportionality. Needless to say, the

imposed punishment has a significant impact on the Petitioner’s

Fundamental Rights and a chilling effect on the representative

democratic framework of our society, issues that we have dealt with

in greater detail, in the later parts of this judgement.

18 | P a g e

23. Consequently, on an overall consideration of legal position, we are

of the view that the Respondent’s argument qua maintainability of

the Writ Petition must fail. We hold that the action of the Ethics

Committee neither forms part of the ‘Proceedings of the Legislature’

nor is it tantamount to a ‘Legislative Decision’. Accordingly,

entertaining the instant petition would not fall foul of the

restrictions imposed by Article 212 (1) of the Constitution.

E.2. Can the Courts examine the proportionality of punishment

imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of the action

taken by the House?

24. Having held that the instant Writ Petition is maintainable, it would

now be apposite to address the preliminary question of plausibility

of judicial interference in the issue concerning the proportion of

punishment, when examining the validity of the action taken by the

House. We will undertake the analysis of this issue through a two-

pronged approach: (i) the relevance and nature of the ‘doctrine of

proportionality’; and (ii) the role of Constitutional Courts in

reviewing a decision taken by the House.

E.2.1. The Doctrine of Proportionality: A dynamic precept

25. The expression ‘proportion’ is derived from the Latin term proportio,

which corresponds to comparative size, number or degree. The

19 | P a g e ‘doctrine of proportionality’ essentially signifies that any action

should be steeped in reason or logic. This concept highlights the

need for clear justification in decision-making, asserting that

decisions made without sufficient objective reasoning are often at

odds with intended goals. In order to holistically understand the

‘doctrine of proportionality’ and the manner in which it is applied,

it is, therefore, imperative to examine its disposition in: (i) the

domestic sphere; and (ii) in international jurisprudence.

E.2.1.1 The Domestic Sphere

26. The doctrine of proportionality in Indian jurisprudence is guided by

the principle of selecting the most appropriate and least restrictive

measures to achieve the intended objective. The courts’ role is

limited to ensuring a proper balance between the adverse effects of

an action or penalty on an individual’s rights, liberties, or interests

and the purpose it seeks to serve. In summary, while there may be

a range of discretionary choices, it is within the courts’ purview to

assess whether the chosen measure excessively infringes upon

rights.

27. The test of proportionality, in this context, is satisfied by

considering a myriad of factors such as fairness, justice, absence

of vindictiveness, predominance of objectivity, adherence to natural

justice, fair play, and the recognition of mitigating circumstances

20 | P a g e etc. These factors, while not exhaustive, are instrumental in

maintaining the delicate balance between imposing consequences

for wrongful actions and ensuring that such measures do not result

in right-based transgressions.

28. In the Indian legal spectrum, the notion of proportionality finds its

place in a multitude of legal issues. To instantiate:

(i) Service and Labour Laws

29. This Court has time and again highlighted the importance of

proportionality when dealing with the question of punishment or

disciplinary action for misconduct at the workplace, whether it be

in public service or private organisations. The nature of the

misconduct, the circumstances of the occurrence, the history and

effect of the incident are all factors which ought to be taken into

consideration.

30. For example, in Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development

Corpn. Ltd.2, a public servant was penalised with dismissal from

service for the offense of misplacing and losing an official file. This

Court, in appeal, considered the facts that the employee was

serving the Corporation for twenty years with a previously

unblemished record, the misconduct was not deliberate or

2 Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. ; (2003) 8 SCC 9.

21 | P a g e motivated, and the file was not shown to be of grave importance or

sensitivity, reduced the punishment to withholding of increment of

the employee. On the other hand, in a case involving a delinquent

employee who did not join duty upon transfer, the Court considered

his extended absence of over 233 days and his refusal to visit the

appointed doctor to substantiate his claim for medical absence, and

concluded that the punishment of removal from service was

proportionate to the misdemeanour.3

31. Thus, service laws in India are riddled with such like precedents,

mandating employers, including the Government, to take all

circumstances into account and undertake proportionate action

against such offences.

(ii) Administrative Law

32. In similar parlance to service law, administrative law also places

great importance on approaching decision-making with

proportionality. For instance, blacklisting from Government tender

auctions, which is a harsh punishment is considered proportionate

in dire cases, such as where the contractor has embezzled funds in

collusion with Government employees.4 However, this Court has

3 LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani; (2006) 13 SCC 613. 4 Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors.; (2014) 14 SCC 731.

22 | P a g e also protected contract awardees from withdrawal of the contract

on mere hyper-technical grounds.5

33. Even beyond government auction, proportionality ought to go to the

root of decision making by the Government. The litmus test that

needs to be administered is whether the harshest or strongest

measure is necessarily required to be implemented in a given case.

In a situation where a lessee was in default of lease premium, rent,

and interest due to underdeveloped surroundings, this Court held

that the harsh step of resumption of the land as well as forfeiture

of the already paid sum would be too harsh, when recovery

proceedings are available.6 On the other hand, this Court has also

upheld the stronger step taken by the Railway Recruitment Board

for re-test of limited candidates, when there was evidence of paper

leaking and mass-cheating.7

(iii) Constitutional Law

34. Constitutional law is perhaps the area of law where the term

proportionality is used most commonly. This is so because the

proportionality test, initially identified in Modern Dental College

5 Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Anr. v. Shishir Realty (P) Ltd. & Ors.; (2022) 16 SCC 527. 6 Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors.; (2004) 2 SCC 130. 7 Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board & Anr. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors.; (2010)

6 SCC 614.

23 | P a g e & Research Centre v. State of M.P.,8 is widely used to consider

the vires of legislative as well as executive actions.

35. The test of proportionality, thus, applies to cases where action is

brought to protect the right guaranteed by the Constitution or other

laws. It largely seeks to identify whether the restriction sought to

be placed on the right is proportionate to the objective sought to be

achieved by the restriction. It often belies a comparison between

the importance of the public purpose of the restriction on one hand

and the public right on the other hand.

36. This comparison has played out distinctly in different

circumstances. When dealing with the laws empowering the

Executive to restrict internet in areas with underlying disturbances

(like the Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir), this

Court has compared the importance of the right to speech and

expression against that of national security concerns. 9 On the other

hand, when considering the arguments in Association for

Democratic Reforms v. Union of India10, a Constitution Bench of

this Court had the occasion to compare the importance of the right

to financial privacy and the right to political transparency, which

8 Modern Dental College & Research Centre & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors.; (2016) 7 SCC 353. 9 Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors.; (2020) 3 SCC 637. 10 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.; 2024 SCC OnLine SC

150.

24 | P a g e also led to the evolution of what is called the ‘double proportionality

standard’.

37. Perhaps the clearest application of proportionality principles on the

touchstone of constitutional law has been in the case of Internet

& Mobile Assn. of India v. RBI11. Here, this Court delved into

various circumstances surrounding the use, merits, and demerits

of virtual currencies, taking a view on the impact of its proliferation

as well as curtailment on the economy, individual investors, and

its exchanges, thus coming to the conclusion that the relevant RBI

circulars had a disproportionate impact on the market vis-à-vis the

RBI’s aim to regulate virtual currencies.

(iv) Criminal Law

38. In criminal law, of course, the dispensation of justice strives to be

ever more precise and perfect; this is doubtless because of the

ramifications of a verdict in such trials, which militate against

physical liberty and autonomy—an autonomy that is most dear to

modern society. Even here, it is most noticeable that the principle

of proportionality has been widely accepted and promulgated as the

vital safeguard against prejudice, excessiveness, and

unreasonableness.

11 Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India; (2020) 10 SCC 274.

25 | P a g e

39. We have consistently observed in cases of sentencing the

considerations of proportionality taking centre stage, such as in

Shivu v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka,12 which

held as follows:

“The principle of proportion between crime and punishment is a principle of just desert that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice it is hardly less familiar or less important than the principle that only the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed, the requirement that punishment not be disproportionately great, which is a corollary of just desert, is dictated by the same principle that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment without guilt.”

…..

Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences.” [Emphasis Supplied]

40. In fact, this Court has consistently acknowledged that the degree

of punishment should be commensurate to the gravity of the

offence, such that it is consistent with the principle of

proportionality. For illustration, nowhere in criminal law is the

discourse on proportionality vaster than in cases of death penalty,

where the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of the

12 Shivu & Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr.; (2007) 4 SCC 713.

26 | P a g e perpetrator are weighed in tandem and scrupulously studied.13

Thus, a sort of ‘balance sheet’ is drawn up which aids in

undertaking the exercise of satisfying proportionality.14 What

emerges, therefore, is that the application of proportionality is not

severable from the outcomes of that exercise.

41. We may also hasten to note the use of this principle in bail matters,

where the Court seeks to restrict its own discretion by levying

proportionality. In a catena of decisions,15 this Court has repeatedly

cautioned against excessively stringent or disproportionate bail

conditions as a side-effect of granting this important relief.

(v) Interpretation of Statutes

42. In our considered opinion, the principle of proportionality also finds

purchase in something as fundamental as the interpretation of

statutes, which, in turn, colours all the spheres of law we have

previously laid out. Statutory interpretation is that unique tool a

jurist possesses to give meaningful voice to the law enacted by the

Legislature, and it has been our jurisprudence to always read

proportionality into the laws we seek to interpret.

13 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab; (1982) 3 SCC 24. 14 Lehna v. State of Haryana; (2002) 3 SCC 76.

15 Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.; 2024 INSC 479; Munish Bhasin and Ors

v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr.; (2009) 4 SCC 45; Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 897; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.; (2020) 10 SCC 77.

27 | P a g e

43. Indeed, many landmark judgments of this Court, which have

interpreted key provisions of our legal code often operate with an

in-built proclivity towards simulating proportionality. Take, for

instance, the ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,16

wherein this Court held against excessive restrictions on liberty,

especially those which are disproportionate to the State’s purported

objectives. Thus, one might legitimately argue the Indian

experience with ‘due process’ began with the reading of

proportionality into our grund norm, i.e. the Indian Constitution.

44. Interpreting statutory provisions involves understanding and giving

effect to the Legislature’s intent, so as to avoid absurd or unjust

outcomes—an idea that aligns with ensuring that the means

adopted by a statute are commensurate with its ends. In essence,

an interpretation should not lead to outcomes that unduly burden

individuals or contradict the broader objectives of justice and

fairness. This concern reflects a proportional mind set: that the

impact of a statute should be weighed against its intended purpose,

much as Indian courts have done in cases like Maneka

Gandhi (supra) and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar.17 These

16 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India; (1978) 1 SCC 248. 17 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr.; (2014) 8 SCC 273.

28 | P a g e cases clearly demonstrate the wide prevalence of the principle of

proportionality in the application and implementation of law.

45. The doctrine of proportionality is also firmly entrenched in our

Legislative Policy. Some notable examples include: (a) the authority

vested in Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to modify the quantum of

punishment imposed on a workman; (b) the prescription of

minimum and maximum sentences in Penal Laws, such as the

Indian Penal Code, which is now succeeded by the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023 (c) the Statutory Rules and Bye-laws etc. regulating

the service conditions of government employees as also those

working in entities deriving their status from Article 12 of the

Constitution. These legal provisions meticulously calibrate the

imbibing of proportionality principles by the Indian Legislature.

Thus, while a minor infraction may warrant a ‘censure’, serious

offences such as the misappropriation of public funds may

justifiably result in ‘dismissal’ from service.

E.2.1.2 International Jurisprudence

46. Beyond the spectrum of domestic laws, we find that the doctrine of

proportionality is also widely applied in foreign jurisdictions,

following a similar rationale to that employed by Indian courts.

Some instances include:

29 | P a g e

(i) Germany

47. In similar parlance to that of Indian constitutional jurisprudence,

the doctrine of proportionality in German law is applied to every

case of a state act constituting an ‘eingriff’ or encroachment, into a

constitutional freedom or property right.18 To satisfy the

proportionality requirement, the act of state under scrutiny must

be:19 (a) appropriate to promote its objective; (b) necessary to

promote that objective; and (c) Adequate (balancing operation), i.e.

the prejudice to the freedom or property right in question must not

be inadequate in comparison with the weight of the interests

supposed to justify the intervention.

48. To further demystify these factors, the suitability test (a) is fulfilled

by demonstrating that the act in question be apt to promote the

objective against which it is measured.20 The necessity requirement

(b) mandates that, among several equally effective means to achieve

the objective, the least restrictive one must be chosen. An act of the

state is deemed unnecessary if its objective can be achieved

through a less intrusive method.21 The adequacy test (c) assesses

whether the benefit gained by restricting the right justifies the

18 BVerfGE 16, 194 (at 201, 202).

19 Cf. G. LübbeWolff, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal

Constitutional Court, Human Rights Law Journal 2014, vol. 34, pg. 12. 20 BVerfGE 104, 337 (at 345).

21 BVerfGE 121, 317 (at 344).

30 | P a g e extent of the intrusion, ensuring that the objective's value

outweighs the resulting loss.

(ii) European Union

49. In this instance, the principle of proportionality is laid down in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on the European Union (EU). It seeks to

set actions taken by EU institutions within specified bounds. In EU

law a proportionality test is applied both to EU acts and to acts of

the Member States.22

50. Under this principle, EU when reviewing an act or a measure,

analyses whether the same is:23 (a) an appropriate or suitable

measure; (b) in pursuit of a legitimate objective; (c) among the

appropriate measures constitutes the least restrictive means

(LRM); and (d) not manifestly disproportionate in terms of a cost

versus benefits balance.

51. It is pertinent to mention that not all of these steps are applied in

every case. Albeit, the LRM test and the manifestly disproportionate

standard are often used as alternatives rather than in conjunction.

22 Sauter W. Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? Cambridge Yearbook of European

Legal Studies, 2013;15:439-466.

23 Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of

State for Health ex parte Fedesa et al [1990] ECR I-4023 [13]; Principle of Proportionality, European Union, available here:

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://eur- lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of- proportionality.html&ved=2ahUKEwjR9aun6NSLAxXhzDgGHTAsHtcQFnoECCQQAQ&usg= AOvVaw14i3cuEILjPFx1jQZjNOuR.

31 | P a g e Even when proportionality in the strict sense is applied, an explicit

balancing of costs and benefits is uncommon. Instead, the

manifestly disproportionate test serves as a rough measure of

justice, as its terminology suggests.24 It is designed to allow a

relatively wide margin of discretion to the authorities whose

measures are under review.

(iii) United States of America

52. American jurisprudence though it has made limited use of the term

‘proportionality’, notions akin to proportionality including

balancing of constitutional values,25 often appear in the US system

of substantive doctrinal standards of constitutional judicial

review.26 Consequently, the US Courts have retained its two

standards of strict scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny, when

adjudicating challenges to State or Federal Legislation.

53. For the purposes of the present discussion, we will limit our

analysis to the strict scrutiny test, which posits that a government

action must be necessary to achieve a compelling government

interest.27 This method of constitutional analysis employs several

inquiries that are also present in a traditional proportionality

24 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd et al v Secretary of

State for Health et al ECR I-10423 [80]–[84].

25 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 61

(1992).

26 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 529–31 (Aspen Pub. 2001). 27 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–504 (1965).

32 | P a g e review. First, the Court must determine whether the Government

action infringes on a fundamental right or discriminates against a

suspect class.28 If it does, the Court must invalidate the

government action unless it is necessary for the attainment of a

compelling Government interest.29 The Government interest

involved must be sufficiently important to justify a suspect

classification or Government invasion of individual autonomy.30

The result is that the Government action is invalidated if the Court

is able to find a less restrictive, yet equally effective, alternative to

the proposed method.

54. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of proportionality is

fundamentally embedded in the concept of fairness in action across

domestic, foreign, and international legal systems. This principle

ensures that measures taken are appropriate, necessary, and

balanced in relation to the objectives they seek to achieve.

Proportionality is deeply intertwined with the principles of the Rule

of Law and natural justice, as it guards against arbitrary or

excessive actions. Consequently, it is interpreted as an implicit

requirement in almost every legal provision, unless it is explicitly

barred by the legislation itself.

28 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).

29 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.

30 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.

33 | P a g e

55. In the specific context of the instant appeal, what must therefore

be borne in mind is that when contemplating the decision of

expulsion of a Legal or Public Representative such as the Petitioner,

inflicting punishment beyond the necessary period may suffer from

the vice of being irrational and arbitrariness. Such action then

becomes prone to challenge on the grounds of being illegal and

unconstitutional.

E.2.2. Scrutinising the ‘Action’ of the House – The role of

Constitutional Courts

56. In the aforesaid context, Constitutional Courts assume a crucial

role in ensuring that the actions imposing punishments on

members are proportionate and just. This is achieved through a

structured approach that balances legislative authority with

judicial oversight. This Court, in a recent decision in Ashish

Shelar (supra), has eruditely held that:

“The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern the action of dismembering a member from the House of the legislative assembly in the form of expulsion or be it a case of suspension by directing withdrawal from the meeting of the Assembly for the remainder of the Session”.

[Emphasis supplied]

34 | P a g e

57. Insofar as the specific punishment of expulsion is concerned, this

Court, in Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha,31

recognised the power of the Legislature to expel a member.

However, it laced the existence of such power with a word of

caution. It was held that the “expulsion of a member is a grave

measure and normally, it should not be taken”. Needless to say, the

expulsion of a member from the House constitutes a higher degree

of deprivation and must only be sustained in exceptional

circumstances.

58. There is no gainsaid that imposing a disproportionate punishment

not only undermines democratic values by depriving the member

from participating in the proceedings of the House but also affects

the electorates of the constituency who remain unrepresented. It is

accurately stated that in our representative democracy, the main

function of a legislator is to act as a reflection of the people’s will.

That is to say, instead of being a free agent to follow their

conviction, the legislator is an agent of the electorates and thus

obligated to reflect the opinions and values of the people they

represent.

59. The removal of a member from the House therefore is a significant

issue for both the member and the constituency they represent.

31 Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha & Ors.; (2007) 3 SCC 184.

35 | P a g e The democratic process relies on the active participation of all

members, and even brief absences can impede a member’s ability

to contribute to critical legislative discussions and decisions. This

underscores the importance of their presence in all parliamentary

activities, as their absence can have far-reaching implications on

the legislative outcomes and the representation of their

constituency’s interests. We clarify that while representation of the

constituency is not the sole factor in determining the punishment

to be imposed on a member, it nonetheless remains an important

aspect that merits due consideration.

60. As stated, the absence of a duly elected representative disrupts the

democratic process and undermines the voice of the electorate. In

such a situation, if the punishment inflicted upon the member

concerned appears to be prima facie harsh and disproportionate,

Constitutional Courts owe a duty to undo such gross injustice and

review the proportionality of such disqualifications or expulsions.

61. It is pertinent to add that the aforementioned responsibility

involves a delicate balance where courts must act decisively to

strike down excessively harsh actions that threaten our democratic

fabric while simultaneously exercising restraint to avoid

encroaching upon the legislative domain. We reiterate that courts

must reflect a certain degree of deference to the legislative will and

36 | P a g e wisdom, intervening only when the action prescribed is so

disproportionate that it shocks the intrinsic sense of justice.

62. Given the foregoing discussion, we hold that there is no absolute

bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of

the punishment imposed on a member while reviewing the validity

of the action taken by the House. By focusing on the proportionality

of punishment, courts must ensure that justice aligns with

constitutional values and societal norms, thereby upholding the

integrity of the democratic process.

63. At this point, it must be added that the determination of what

constitutes a disproportionate measure is inherently complex and

context-dependent. Such assessment requires a nuanced scrutiny

of the specific circumstances surrounding each case. This means

that a one-size-fits-all definition is impractical while adjudicating

proportionality and the courts must exercise their discretion in a

prudent and judicious manner.

64. We deem it appropriate to outline a few guiding principles for courts

to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of actions taken

by the House against its member(s). We clarify that these

parameters are not exhaustive, as considerations will inevitably

vary from case to case. An indicative list of such parameters

includes:

37 | P a g e

(a) Degree of obstruction caused by the member in the

proceedings of the House;

(b) Whether the behaviour of the member has brought disrepute

to the dignity of the entire House;

(c) The previous conduct of the erring member;

(d) The subsequent conduct of the erring member, such as

expressing remorse, cooperation with the institutional scrutiny

mechanism;

(e) Availability of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the

delinquent member;

(f) Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and

motivated or a mere outcome of language largely influenced by

the local dialect;

(g) Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the

desired purpose; and

(h) Balancing the interest of society, particularly the electorates,

with those of the erring members.

65. We are of the view that a scrutiny of the punishment given to the

members by the House on the abovementioned framework will

ensure that the legislative actions are justified, necessary, and

38 | P a g e balanced, protecting both the integrity of the legislative body and

the rights of its members, as well as the larger societal objective. It

is also imperative that such legislative action remains mindful of

the fundamental principle that the purpose of imposing

punishment is not to serve as a tool for retribution but rather to

uphold and enforce discipline within the House. The primary

objective should be to maintain decorum and foster an environment

of constructive debate and deliberation. Any punitive measure

must be proportionate and guided by considerations of fairness,

reasonableness, and due process, ensuring that it does not unduly

stifle democratic participation or undermine the representative

nature of the institution.

E.3. Was the Petitioner’s expulsion proportionate to the offence

alleged against him, and whether it merits any interference?

66. Since we have reiterated the power which vests in this Court to

scrutinise the proportionality of punishment imposed on a member

while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House, we

may now proceed to examine whether the punishment imposed on

the Petitioner was proportionate or it merits any interference.

67. It needs no emphasis that there is no place for aggression and

indecency in the proceedings of the Parliament or the Legislature.

Members are expected to show complete respect and deference

39 | P a g e towards each other. This expectation is not merely a matter of

tradition or formality; it is essential for the effective functioning of

democratic processes. It ensures that debates and discussions are

productive, focused on the issues at hand, and conducted in a

manner that upholds the dignity of the institution. The right to

speak inside the House cannot be harnessed as a tool to insult,

humiliate or defame a fellow member, Ministers and most

importantly, the Chair itself.

68. Based on the material placed on record, it is evident that the

demeanour of the Petitioner in the House was abhorrent and

unbecoming of a member of the Legislature. We are constrained to

add that the Petitioner’s subsequent evasive and high-handed

demeanour before the Ethics Committee was even more egregious.

We have no hesitation in observing that the Petitioner actively

attempted to delay and obfuscate the proceedings by refusing to

cooperate with the Ethics Committee. We have already elaborated

on how the Petitioner sought exemption from appearing before the

Ethics Committee on some pretext or another. Such behaviour was

nothing but a brazen attempt to circumvent the authority of the

Ethics Committee.

69. Even when the Petitioner finally appeared before the Ethics

Committee, instead of answering the charges against him, he

40 | P a g e deemed it appropriate to question the authenticity and legitimacy

of the Ethics Committee itself. The Petitioner, who has served as

his party’s Chief Whip in the BLC, cannot possibly claim that he

was unaware of the provisions under which the Ethics Committee

was constituted and conducted its proceedings. The haughtiness

demonstrated by the Petitioner before the Ethics Committee is, no

doubt, highly undignified of a Public Representative.

70. At this stage, it is essential to mention that the Petitioner cannot

draw any parity with the other delinquent member, Md. Sohaib,

who duly cooperated with the Ethics Committee and expressed

remorse for his conduct. The behavioural pattern of the Petitioner,

on the other hand, underscores a deliberate attempt to undermine

the regulatory process and thwart the dispensation of justice. We

are also mindful of the fact that the Petitioner has demonstrated

similar misconduct previously as well, for which he was suspended

from the House for a brief period.

71. Be that as it may, notwithstanding the conduct of the Petitioner as

elaborated hereinabove, we are at the same time of the considered

view that the House, as custodian of constitutional values and

democratic principles, ought to exercise magnanimity and rise

above petty criticism and unwarranted remarks against its

members. In doing so, they would exemplify the virtues of

41 | P a g e tolerance, restraint, and institutional maturity, thereby reinforcing

the dignity, impartiality, and respectability of their office.

72. While we do not discount the fundamental principle that an

individual must bear the consequences of their actions, we are

equally mindful that the ramifications of such a decision extend

beyond the Petitioner alone. The actions prescribed against the

Petitioner will inevitably have a direct and significant impact on a

vast number of stakeholders, particularly the constituents who

have reposed their faith in the Petitioner as their representative.

Their voices, aspirations, and democratic rights cannot be

disregarded, and it is in furtherance of these principles that the

needs and interests of the electorate must take precedence in any

decision that affects their representation in a democratic forum.

73. While dealing with individuals, such as the Petitioner, it is

imperative that disciplinary measures are undertaken with due

regard to the principles of proportionality and fairness. The House,

in the exercise of its authority to regulate its own proceedings and

maintain order, must not lose sight of the necessity for a calibrated

and judicious approach.

74. In fact, this aspect is already prescribed in the Rules governing the

procedure of the BLC. In this regard, our attention was drawn to

Rule 10, Chapter 36 of the Bihar Vidhan Parishad – Rules of

42 | P a g e Procedure and Conduct of Business, which provides for the

penalties that the Ethics Committee may recommend. A perusal of

the provision depicts that if the Committee finds a member violating

the code/rules, it may recommend: (a) Censure, (b) Reprimand, (c)

Suspension from the House for a specified period; and (d) any other

punishment as deemed fit.

75. This Court, in a series of decisions, has consistently held that

punishment disproportionate to the offence or action is in direct

violation of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution

of India, particularly Articles 14 and 21.32 The expulsion of the

Petitioner from the House not only raises concerns about the

violation of Fundamental Rights but also impacts the legal rights of

his constituents. We find that the disproportionate nature of the

punishment imposed by the House in expelling the Petitioner pricks

the conscience of this Court compelling it to intervene on the sheet

anchor of justice and fairness.

76. Given the applicable provisions and the underlying objective of

imposing penalties on members of the House, we are of the view

that the primary purpose of imposing penalties is to discipline the

members and ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the

32 Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.; (1987) 4 SCC 611; Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya

Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain; (2013) 10 SCC 106.

43 | P a g e House. A more measured and balanced approach would have

sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the dignity and

decorum of the House.

77. We reiterate that the principle of proportionality is a cornerstone of

our judicial system, and it mandates that the severity of the

punishment must correspond to the gravity of the offence. Given

the aforementioned analysis, we hold that the punishment meted

out to the Petitioner was excessive and disproportionate to the

nature of the offence he committed.

E.4. If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this

Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment that

may be imposed on the Petitioner?

78. Having held that the punishment of expulsion imposed on the

Petitioner is harsh and disproportionate, the only natural corollary

would then be to consider the appropriate quantum of punishment

that should be imposed on the Petitioner and whether this Court

can undertake such determination.

79. In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the

gravity of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute its own

assessment of the appropriate penalty. Instead, the established

44 | P a g e judicial approach is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority

for reconsideration.

80. This principle stems from the recognition that the authority

imposing the punishment is best placed to evaluate the nature of

the misconduct and determine an appropriate sanction within the

framework of service rules and regulations. Judicial restraint in

such matters ensures that courts do not usurp the role of

administrative authorities by engaging in executive decision-

making.

81. Having said that, it is equally important to underscore that this

Court is not devoid of the power to intervene in exceptional

circumstances. In order to curtail perpetuating illegality, abridge

prolonged litigation, prevent unnecessary hardship to the parties

involved and to do complete justice, this Court in exercise of its

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, is vested with the

authority to substitute the punishment where the facts and

circumstances so warrant.33

82. We have already held that the expulsion of the Petitioner is

disproportionate and undoubtedly infringes his Fundamental

Rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.

33 B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.; 1995 (6) SCC 749.

45 | P a g e Furthermore, the expulsion also has a direct impact on a vast

number of stakeholders, particularly the electorates he represents.

We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the Petitioner has already

undergone almost 7 months of expulsion. He has also missed the

208th Session of the BLC held between 25.11.2024 and 29.11.2024,

and since his term is expiring in the year 2026, the Petitioner is left

with a short duration.

83. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we are of the

view that if this matter is now remanded to the Ethics Committee

for reconsideration of the appropriate punishment, the ensuing

process is likely to be protracted, which might deprive the Petitioner

in participating in the ensuing Sessions.

84. In such situations, the constitutional mandate empowers this

Court to transcend procedural limitations and provide equitable

relief in cases where rigid adherence to legal provisions may result

in injustice. When the established remedies fall short of addressing

exceptional circumstances or fail to meet the demands of justice,

this Court, as the final arbiter, must invoke its constitutional

powers to bridge the gap and ensure a just, fair, and equitable

resolution.

85. It is settled law that the extraordinary powers vested in this Court

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, may be invoked in

46 | P a g e cases where remitting the matter would result in undue delay and

where the interests of justice demand a swift resolution. In view

thereof, we are of the considered opinion that the exceptional

situation before us warrants invocation of our powers under Article

142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between the parties.

86. Balancing the competing considerations, we hold that the period of

expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to be

considered as a period of his suspension; and in our view,

constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by

him. Accordingly, the Impugned Report of the Ethics Committee

and the subsequent Notification notifying the expulsion of the

Petitioner deserves to be modified to that extent. As a segue thereto,

the Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as member of the BLC

with immediate effect.

87. We may clarify that the indulgence extended by this Court in

reducing the punishment imposed on the Petitioner should not be

misconstrued as condonation of his conduct. This Court has

exercised its discretion squarely in the interests of proportionality

and fairness. Consequently, the Petitioner is expected to uphold the

dignity of the House and adhere to the standards of discipline

befitting its members. Henceforth, it is incumbent upon the

Petitioner to conduct himself with decorum and responsibility in

47 | P a g e legislative proceedings. Any deviation from this expectation or

recurrence of misconduct will not be viewed lightly, and the

concerned authority shall be at liberty to take appropriate action in

accordance with law.

F. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

88. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the totality of

the facts and circumstances, we deem it appropriate to allow this

Writ Petition in the following terms:

a) The objection raised by the Respondents against the

maintainability of the instant petition is rejected. The issues

raised in this Writ Petition do not fall within the restrictions

outlined under Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India.

b) There is no absolute bar on the Constitutional Courts to

examine the proportionality of the punishment imposed on a

Member while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the

House.

c) The punishment meted out to the Petitioner was highly

excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the misconduct

committed by him.

d) The period of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner

shall be deemed as a period of his suspension from the House

48 | P a g e and will amount to be sufficient punishment for his

misdemeanour. Accordingly, we set aside the Impugned Report

of the Ethics Committee as well as the Notification of the BLC,

only to the extent of nature of punishment it recommends to be

imposed on the Petitioner.

e) The Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as a member of the

BLC with immediate effect. However, he shall not be entitled to

claim any remuneration or other monetary benefits for the

period of his disbandment. The Petitioner shall be entitled to

such other perks and privileges which any other similarly

placed MLC is entitled to upon completion of their full tenure.

For the limited purpose of post-tenure benefits, if any, the

Petitioner shall be deemed to have served as MLC for the entire

tenure.

f) Should the Petitioner indulge further in such misconduct upon

his reinstatement, we leave it to the Ethics Committee or

Chairperson of the BLC to take appropriate action, in

accordance with law.

g) As an upshot of the foregoing, the Press Note dated 30.12.2024

issued by Respondent No. 6, Election Commission, declaring

the bye-election for the seat earlier held by the Petitioner is

49 | P a g e hereby quashed, and any action taken pursuant to such Press

Note is annulled.

89. The Writ Petition is disposed of in the above terms.

90. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.

Ordered accordingly.

………..………………… J.

[SURYA KANT]

………..………………… J.

[NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH]

NEW DELHI DATED: 25.02.2025

50 | P a g e