Sundar Babu & Ors vs State Of Tamil Nadu

Sundar Babu & Ors. ...Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Tamil Nadu ...Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,J.

Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned single

Judge of the Madras High Court rejecting the petition filed under Sec.482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').

Background facts in short are as follows:

Sukanya (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant') was married with

Sunder Babu-appellant No.1. Appellant No. 2-Mr. Venugopal and Mrs.

Ramathilagam appellant No.3 are the parents of Sunder Babu. A.4-Rajinishree is

his sister and Andalammal is his maternal grandmother. The marriage took place

on 25/11/1998. The -2-

appellant No.1 left for USA on 1/7/1999. The complaint was filed on 6/2/2000

alleging commission of offence punishable under Sec.498A of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in

short `D.P. Act').

The complaint was treated as First Information Report and investigation

was undertaken. On completiion of investigation charge-sheet was filed on

8/6/2000. A divorce petition was filed by the complainant which appears to have

been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001. According to the appellants, complainant-

Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002. It was a stand of the appellant that the

complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The allegations

were unfounded. There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant

No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage. Long thereafter on

6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the

complaint was offered. In essence, it was submitted that

-3- the continuance of the proceedings will be an abuse of the process of law. The

prosecuting agency before the High Court contested the petition filed under

Sec.482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses

commission of alleged offences and therefore it is not a case which needed to be

allowed. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent-State and

dismissed the application.

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the factual scenario indicated above and even a cursory glance of the complaint

petition shows that the same was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate the

accused persons. Learned counsel for the respondent State supported the

judgment.

Though the scope for interference while exercising jurisdiction under

Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of

Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:

-4-

1 Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2 Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1)

of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview

of Sec.155(2) of the Code.

3 Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not

disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the

accused.

4 Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.

-5-

1 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd

and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can

ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

2 Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of

the aggrieved party.

3 Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite

him due to private and personal grudge."

Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls

within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's

case (supra).

-6-

The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down

by this Court in several cases.

The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only

saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the

Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may

be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent

abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is

neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern

the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with

procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary

for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is

the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and

preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether

-7-

civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in

their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a

wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid

alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when

the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).

While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court

of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised

ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which

alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if

any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court

has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In

exercise -8-

of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of

these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.

As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482

of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great

caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of

this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be

exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest

court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a

case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence

has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved,

whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true

perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be

laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its

extraordinary jurisdiction of -9-

quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992

(4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1 ) and Minu

Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359). (See (2008) 11 SCALE 20)

Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The proceedings in

Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate,

Palladam, are quashed.

The appeal is allowed.

................. .J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

....................J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)

...................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, February 19, 2009.