Sudevanand vs State Through Cbi

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 174 OF 2012

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO.6489 OF 2006]

SUDEVANAND ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE THROUGH CBI ... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 175 OF 2012

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO.6625 OF 2006]

SANTOSHANAND ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE THROUGH CBI ... RESPONDENT

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 176 OF 2012

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO.6800 OF 2006]

RANJAN DWIVEDI ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE THROUGH CBI ... RESPONDENT

2

J UD G M E N T

Aftab Alam, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. On March 20, 1975, at about 4.15 p.m. when the car in which Mr.

Justice A.N. Ray, holding the office of the Chief Justice of India at that time,

was travelling, along with his son Shri Ajoy Nath Ray and a Jamadar Jai

Nand and the driver Inder Singh, stopped at the intersection of Tilak Marg

and Bhagwan Dass road, at a stone throw distance from the Supreme Court

of India, two live hand grenades were lobbed inside the car. Fortunately, the

grenades did not explode and the occupants of the car, including the Chief

Justice of India, escaped unharmed.

3. A case was registered and investigation was started by the Crime

Branch of the Delhi Police. But, as the police investigation did not make

much headway, on June 30, 1975 the case was handed over to the CBI. On

the same day, one Santoshanand Avadhoot (appellant in Criminal appeal

arising out of SLP (Criminal) 6625 of 2006) was arrested followed by the

arrest of an advocate, namely, Ranjan Dwivedi (appellant in criminal appeal

arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6800/2006) on July 6, 1975.

3 4. Here, it may be noted that about two and a half months before the

attempt on the life of the Chief Justice of India, Shri L.N. Mishra, the

Minister of Railways in the Union Cabinet was killed in a bomb blast taking

place during a function on the platform of Samastipur Railway Station. In

connection with that case, Sudevanand Avadhoot (appellant in criminal

appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6489/2006) and one Vikram alias

Jaladhar Das were arrested at Bhagalpur. On July 27, 1975 they were also

arrested in the present case relating to the attempt on the life of the Chief

Justice and were brought to Delhi where they were sent on police remand

from July 31, 1975 to August 14, 1975. While on remand, Vikram made a

confessional statement and requested to be allowed to become an Approver.

He was produced before a Magistrate on August 14, 1975, before whom he

made a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in

short "Cr.P.C.") giving the details of the conspiracy to kill the Chief Justice

of India. He was again produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on

August 22, 1975 before whom he made a similar statement for grant of

pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C.

5. The CBI completed investigation of the case and submitted charge-

sheet against the three accused, namely, Sudevanand, Santoshanand and

Ranjan Dwivedi and they were put on trial in Sessions Case No.9/1976.

4 Sudevanand and Santoshanand were charged under Section 307 read with

Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4(b) of the Explosive

Substances Act, 1908. So far as Ranjan Dwivedi is concerned, he was

charged jointly with the other two accused under Section 120 B of the Penal

Code only. At the conclusion of the trial, the Additional Sessions Judge,

Delhi vide his judgment and order dated October 28, 1976 convicted

Sudevanand and Santoshanand under Sections 115, 307/120B of the Penal

Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years

under Section 115 read with 120-B(1), 10 years for attempting to kill Chief

Justice A. N. Ray and three other occupants of the car and 7 years under

Section 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Ranjan Dwivedi was

convicted under Section 115/120 B(1) of the Penal Code and was sentenced

to 4 years rigorous imprisonment.

6. It may be noted here that Vikram, the Approver was examined by the

prosecution as PW.1 and according to the appellants their conviction is

mainly based on his evidence.

7. Against the judgment and order passed by the trial court, Ranjan

Dwivedi filed appeal before the High Court on December 6, 1976 which is

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registered as Criminal Appeal No.436/1976. Sudevanand and Santoshanand

jointly filed a separate appeal which is registered as 443/1976.

8. After the appellants' trial was over, and they were convicted and

sentenced by the trial court, as noted above, and after they had filed their

appeals before the High Court against the judgment and order passed by the

trial court, certain developments took place in the L. N. Mishra murder case.

That case was also investigated by the CBI and in that case too Sudevanand

and Santoshanand (along with others) were accused and in that case also

Vikram was granted pardon on becoming an Approver. According to his

statements made before the Magistrates both the killing of L. N. Mishra and

the attempt on the life of Chief Justice of India were parts of a larger

conspiracy, at the instance of the same organisation and a common group of

persons.

9. On August 30, 1978, the Chief Minister of Bihar wrote a highly

confidential letter to the Prime Minister of India, a copy of which was

endorsed to the DIG (CID) Bihar. In pursuance of the Chief Minister's

letter, the DIG (CID) is said to have made an inquiry into the circumstances

in which Vikram @ Jaladhar Das had made the confessional statement and

was tendered pardon to become Approver. Following the enquiry, on

6

September 30, 1978 the statement of Vikram was recorded at Danapur jail

where he was lodged at that time. The statement was taken in the question

and answer form and it was recorded in the presence of Dr. D. Ram,

Superintendent; Danapur Hospital, (Ex-officio Jail Superintendent) and

Haider Ali, the Jailor. The statement was also recorded on a tape recorder. In

this statement Vikram retracted from his earlier statements incriminating

himself and the other accused in the case. He said that his earlier statements

were obtained by the CBI by subjecting him to great mental and physical

torture. He was beaten up and tortured to such an extent that he agreed to

make whatever statement CBI wanted him to make. The retraction made by

Vikram was placed before the Chief Minister who requested Mr. Tarkunde,

a former judge of the Bombay High Court to give a report in light of the

statement made by Vikram in jail on September 30, 1978. Mr. Tarkunde is

said to have given his opinion that the conviction of all the accused in the

Chief Justice's case was based on fabricated evidence of the Approver and,

therefore, the High Court should be requested to consider the appeals of the

three accused keeping aside the Approver's evidence. We need not go any

further in this matter, as all this was plainly outside the legal frame-work.

10. It needs, however, to be noted that upset by these developments, the

CBI moved this Court in Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 69/1979 praying for the

7

transfer of the trial of the L.N. Mishra murder case outside Bihar. In the

transfer petition though the State of Bihar was not formally made a party, a

number of allegations were made against some of its officers. In those

circumstances, the concerned officers after obtaining permission from the

State Government, filed affidavits/applications denying the allegations made

against them in the transfer petition filed by the CBI and supporting the

veracity of the retraction made by Vikram in Danapur jail on September 30,

1978 disowning the earlier statements made by him. In the overall facts and

circumstances of the case, however, this Court deemed just and proper to

transfer the trial of the L.N. Mishra murder case from Bihar to Delhi where

it now remains pending as Sessions Case No. 1/2006 (after being

renumbered) before the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi.

11. It is curious to note that in the L.N. Mishra murder case Vikram was

examined by the prosecution as PW.2 and in course of his deposition before

the court he said that the statement made by him at Danapur jail was not

voluntary but he was forced to make the statement under coercion and

threats by the Chief Secretary, Law Secretary and Home Secretary,

Government of Bihar and the SP and the DSP in the State Police. He said in

his deposition before the court that his statement in jail was made on the

8

basis of a statement prepared and given to him in writing by the State

Government officers.

12. Coming back to the appellant's appeal pending before the Delhi High

Court, both Sudevanand and Santoshanand were released on bail in 1986

after remaining in jail for almost 11 years. In 1997-1998, that is to say 11

years after coming out of jail, the appellants filed three criminal

miscellaneous applications in the pending appeals. Criminal miscellaneous

application No. 5786/97 was filed on September 24, 1997 praying to call for

and taking on the appeal record the statement made by Vikram, the

Approver, in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978, the affidavits of the

officials of the Bihar Government filed in the transfer petition before this

Court and the enquiry report of Justice Tarkunde. The second application

(criminal miscellaneous) No.5700/98 was filed on September 16, 1998 to

summon Vikram, the Approver (PW.1 in the case), for further cross-

examination in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The third

application (criminal miscellaneous) No.6300/98 was filed on October 15,

1998 praying to call the evidence of Vikram, the Approver (PW.2), recorded

in the trial of L.N. Mishra murder case.

9 13. The Delhi High Court took up all the three criminal miscellaneous

applications and disposed them of by order dated November 22, 2006. The

High Court noted that it was within the knowledge of the appellants that the

Approver had made the retraction in the year 1978 disowning his earlier

statements but the three applications in question were filed after a lag of

more than 20 years and primarily for that reason did not allow all the prayers

made in the three applications but granted the appellants only a limited and

partial relief. In the operative portion of the order the High Court observed

and directed as follows:

"The last application moved by the appellant for considering the

record, certified copies etc. u/s 80 and other provisions under the

Evidence Act, report of justice V.M. Tarkunde and other

documents which may be admissible under the Evidence Act has

to be permitted. This prayer is being kept open and would be

considered as per law.

Succinctly stated, the applications for leading further evidence

which would have entailed further time are hereby dismissed, but

the third application for considering those documents which have

already been placed on the record as per law, is hereby permitted.

This case is fixed for final arguments on 6th December, 2006 at

12.15 P.M. The case would be taken up on day to day basis."

Against the order passed by the High Court, the appellants have come to this

Court in these appeals.

14. Mr. Lahoty and Mr. Arvind Kumar, counsel appearing for the

appellants in the three appeals placed before the Court passages from the

10

statement of Vikram recorded in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978

describing the manner in which his earlier statements, incriminating himself

and the other accused, were obtained by the CBI. Referring to the latter

statement of Vikram, counsel submitted that denial to further cross-examine

him in light of his statement of September 30, 1978 would cause grave

prejudice to the appellants and would lead to a miscarriage of justice. Mr.

Lahoty stated that the accused in the L.N. Mishra murder case had earlier

come to this court for quashing the trial proceedings and their appeal

(Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1987) was heard along with the case of Abdul

Rehman Antulay and was disposed of by a common judgment reported in

(1992) 1 SCC 225. In paragraph 98 of the judgment, the Court noted the

submission made on behalf of the appellants that a very unusual feature of

the case was the exchange of charges and counter charges between the CBI

and the Bihar (CID) of false implication and frame up against each other.

According to the Bihar (CID), the CBI was guilty of frame up against the

members of Anand Marg, while according to CBI, the Bihar (CID) had been

deliberately proceeding against innocent persons while letting of the real

culprits. Mr. Lahoty submitted that as a result of the Central Investigating

Agency and the State Investigating Agency acting at cross purpose, the case

had become highly murky to the great detriment of the appellants. He further

11

submitted that in that situation if the appellants are not allowed the

opportunity to further cross-examine Vikram, the Approver (PW.1), it would

be highly unfair and unjust to them. He also submitted that the Delhi High

Court was wrong in rejecting the applications made by the appellants on the

ground of delay.

15. Mr. Arvind Kumar in support of the plea raised by the appellants

placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh

v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158, commonly known as the Best Bakery

Case. He also pressed into service a decision of this Court in Pandit Ukha

Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 (1) SCR 926 (939-940).

16. So far as the Best Bakery Case is concerned, we see absolutely no

application of that decision to the facts of the present case. Suffice to note

here that in Satyajit Banerjee v. State of W.B., (2005) 1 SCC 115, the Court

explained the very exceptional nature of the Best Bakery Case and observed

that the decision cannot be applied to all cases against the established

principles of criminal jurisprudence (See paragraph 25 & 26 in Satyajit

Banerjee).

17. We also fail to see how the decision in Pandit Ukha Kolhe might help

the appellants in the present appeals.

12 18. We agree with Mr. Lahoty's submission that the delay in filing the

applications should not have been the sole ground for rejecting the

appellants' applications before the High Court. The High Court does not say

that the appellants were in anyway responsible for the inordinate delay in

their appeals, that remains pending since 1976, being taken up for hearing.

That being the position, as long as the appeals were pending, the High Court

should have considered the appellants' request for summoning PW.1 for

further cross-examination on merits, and in light of the relevant legal

provisions. Mr. Lahoty is also right in submitting that any further cross-

examination of PW.1 would not have taken more than two or three days and

would not have contributed to any further delay in the disposal of the appeal

in any material way.

19. But the question remains to be examined whether the law permits the

summoning of PW.1 for the reason as stated on behalf of the appellants.

20. Mr. P.K. Dey, the counsel appearing for the CBI, strongly opposed the

appellants' prayer for summoning Vikram, the Approver (PW.1), for further

cross-examination in light of his statement recorded in Danapur jail on

September 30, 1978. Learned counsel submitted that Vikram had made his

confessional statements completely voluntarily and on three different

13

occasions. He was produced before the Magistrate on August 14, 1975 for

recording his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He was then produced

before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on August 22, 1975 for recording his

statement for grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. Finally, he was

produced before the trial court as PW.1 where he was examined first by the

prosecution and was then subjected to a lengthy cross-examination on behalf

of the accused. On none of the three occasions he made the slightest

complaint that his statements were obtained under coercion or threats. He

was also produced before the Magistrate many times for the purpose of

remand and for other purposes, such as taking cognizance, commitment of

the case to the court of Sessions and also before the trial court where the trial

proceeded and got concluded and at no point of time he gave any indication

that his statements/evidence were given under any coercion, threats or

inducement.

21. Mr. Dey also submitted that the statement of Vikram that was

recorded in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978 had no legal sanctity, as it

was recorded in a manner and by means completely unknown to law. It also

did not qualify as the previous statement within the meaning of Section 145

of the Evidence Act as in fact, it was later in time than the deposition of

PW.1 in this case before the trial court. He also referred to passages from the

14

deposition of Vikram, the Approver, made in the trial of the L.N. Mishra

murder case in which he was examined as PW.2 where he stated that his

statement of September 30, 1978 recorded in Danapur jail was not voluntary

but it was made under threats from the top officials of the State Government.

22. Mr. Dey submitted that the statement made by Vikram in jail on

September 30, 1978 could never be the basis for summoning him for further

cross-examination at the stage of the appeal and in support of this

submission relied upon a decision of this Court in Mishrilal v. State of M.P.,

(2005) 10 SCC 701. In that case, one of the prosecution witnesses (PW.2)

had supported the prosecution case before the trial court but before the

Juvenile Court that was trying some of the juvenile accused in the same case

he did not support the prosecution case and as a result, the juvenile accused

were acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC for having made an

attempt on the life of this witness. After his evidence before the Juvenile

Court, he was again summoned before the trial court where the other

accused were facing trial and was confronted with the evidence he had given

before the Juvenile Court. This Court found and held that the procedure

adopted by the Sessions Judge was not in accordance with law and in

paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment observed and held as follows:

15 "5. The learned Counsel for the appellants seriously attacked the

evidence of PW.2 Mokam Singh. This witness was examined by

the Sessions Judge on 6-2-1991 and cross-examined on the same

day by the defence counsel. Thereafter, it seems, that on behalf of

the accused persons an application was filed and PW.2 Mokam

Singh was recalled. PW.2 was again examined and cross-

examined on 31-7-1991. It may be noted that some of the persons

who were allegedly involved in this incident were minors and their

case was tried by the Juvenile Court. PW.2 Mokam Singh was also

examined as a witness in the case before the Juvenile Court. In the

Juvenile Court, he gave evidence to the effect that he was not

aware of the persons who had attacked him and on hearing the

voice of the assailants, he assumed that they were some Banjaras.

Upon recalling, PW.2 Mokam Singh was confronted with the

evidence he had given later before the Juvenile Court on the basis

of which the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under

Section 307 IPC for having made an attempt on the life of this

witness.

6. In our opinion, the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge

was not strictly in accordance with law. Once the witness was

examined-in-chief and cross-examined fully, such witness should

not have been recalled and re-examined to deny the evidence he

had already given before the court, even though that witness had

given an inconsistent statement before any other court or forum

subsequently. A witness could be confronted only with a previous

statement made by him. At the time of examination of PW.2

Mokam Singh on 6.2.1991, there was no such previous statement

and the defence counsel did not confront him with any statement

alleged to have been made previously. This witness must have

given some other version before the Juvenile Court for extraneous

reasons and he should not have been given a further opportunity at

a later stage to completely efface the evidence already given by

him under oath. The courts have to follow the procedures strictly

and cannot allow a witness to escape the legal action for giving

false evidence before the court on mere explanation that he had

given it under the pressure of the police or for some other reason.

Whenever the witness speaks falsehood in the court, and it is

proved satisfactorily, the court should take a serious action against

such witnesses."

16

23. The decision in Mishrilal was followed in Hanuman Ram v. State of

Rajasthan and others, (2008) 15 SCC 652. The case of Mishrilal had come

to this Court after the appeal court had maintained the conviction and

sentence passed against the accused. But Hanuman Ram came at the

intermediate stage when the trial court was directed by the High Court to

recall two prosecution witnesses under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. under

similar circumstances. In Hanuman Ram too, two of the witnesses (PWs 3

and 5) who had supported the prosecution case before the trial court did not

support the case of the prosecution before the Children's Court where one of

the accused in the case who was a minor was being tried. Before the trial

court an application was made under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for summoning

those two witnesses for cross-examination with reference to their statements

before the Children's Court. The trial court did not accept the prayer and

rejected the petition. On an application in revision, the High Court

intervened in favour of the accused and directed the trial court to recall and

re-examine the two witnesses. In appeal against the High Court order, this

Court following the earlier decision in Mishrilal, held that there was no legal

foundation for recalling the witnesses under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and set

aside the High Court judgment.

17 24. At first sight, the decisions in Mishrilal and Hanuman Ram seem to

clinch the issue arising in the case. But, on a deeper examination, it would

appear that the decision in Mishrilal did not interpret Section 311 Cr.P.C.

defining the import, scope and ambit of the provision contained therein. It

rather said that on the facts of the case, the provision had no application and

the procedure adopted by the trial court was not strictly in accordance with

law. Now, the interpretation of a legal provision and its application to a set

of facts are two different exercises requiring different approaches.

"Interpretation" means the action of explaining the meaning of something.

For interpreting a statutory provision, the court is required to have an insight

into the provision and unfold its meaning by means of the well-established

canons of interpretation, having regard to the object, purpose, historicism of

the law and several other well-known factors. But, what is important to bear

in mind is that the interpretation of a legal provision is always independent

of the facts of any given case. "Application" means the practical use or

relevance (of something to something); the application of a statutory

provision, therefore, is by definition case related and as opposed to

interpretation, the application or non-application of a statutory provision

would always depend on the exact facts of a given case. Anyone associated

with the process of adjudication fully knows that even the slightest

18

difference in the facts of two cases can make a world of difference on the

question whether or not a statutory provision can be fairly and reasonably

applied to it. Keeping in mind what is said here if we read Mishrilal, it

would be evident that in the over all facts of that case, the Court was

satisfied that the statement of the witness (PW.2, Mokam Singh) before the

Juvenile Court was for some extraneous reasons and, therefore, he should

not have been allowed an opportunity to completely efface the evidence

already given by him under oath. The Court with its vast experience of the

way criminal justice system works in our country was in a manner

commenting upon the serious and widespread malady of prosecution witness

being won over by the accused. Once the Court came to realise that the

witness was gained over before he was examined in the Juvenile Court, it

naturally felt that at least he should not have been allowed to spoil the other

case too and it would, therefore, logically follow that his recall and re-

examination in the trial of the other accused before the Sessions Court was

an abuse of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. To us, it appears that it was mainly

due to that reason that the Court frowned upon the latter evidence of PW.2

taken by the Sessions Court on his recall after his examination before the

Juvenile Court.

19

25. Moreover, in Mishrilal the question that came up for consideration

before the Court was whether the deposition of Mokam Singh (PW.2) before

the Juvenile Court would come within the meaning of "previous statement"

under Section 145 of the Evidence Act so as to justify his recall for further

cross-examination confronting him with his deposition before the Juvenile

Court. The Court answered the question in the negative pointing out that at

the time of his examination earlier before the Sessions Court there was no

such statement with which he could be confronted by the defence.

26. In Hanuman Ram, on identical facts and for the same reasons the

Court simply followed the decision in Mishrilal.

27. The facts of the case before us are quite different. It is not only

Vikram who is making diametrically opposite statements but the CBI and

the State (CID) seem to be at loggerheads with the one accusing the other of

manipulating and using Vikram for its own designs. It is an unusual case by

any reckoning.

28. It is obvious that one of the two statements of Vikram is false. But

unlike Mishrilal or Hanuman Ram where the Court was able to sense

without difficulty that the witnesses' depositions before the Juvenile Court

and the Children's Court respectively were false, it is very difficult to say at

20

this stage which of the statements is true and which of the statement was

made under the influence, threat or coercion by the State officials or the

CBI. The position may be clear in case he is subjected to further

examination with reference to his statement made in Danapur jail on

September 30, 1978.

29. The matter may be looked at from another angle. Section 391 of the

Cr.P.C. provides as follows:

"391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it

to be taken.- (1) In dealing with any appeal under this Chapter,

the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be

necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such

evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when

the Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a

Magistrate.

(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session

or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the

Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to

dispose of the appeal.

(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present

when the additional evidence is taken.

(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to

the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry. "

30. It is, thus, to be seen that the provision is not limited to recall of a

witness for further cross-examination with reference to his previous

statement. The Appellate Court may feel the necessity to take additional

21

evidence for any number of reasons to arrive at the just decision in the case.

The law casts a duty upon the court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means.

This is another reason why we feel any reliance on Mishrilal that considered

the recall of a witness in the context of Section 145 of the Evidence Act is

quite misplaced in the facts of this case.

31. Mr. Dey contended that Vikram's statement that he is alleged to have

made in jail has no legal sanctity and it came to be made and recorded in a

manner completely unknown to law. Mr Dey may be right but on that

ground alone it would not be correct and proper to deny the application of

Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. Take the case where, on the testimony of the

Approver, a person is convicted by the trial court under Section 302 and

120-B etc. of the Penal Code and is sentenced to a life term. After the

judgment and order passed by the trial court and while the convict's appeal

is pending before the High Court, the `Approver' is found blabbering and

boasting among his friends that he was able to take the Court for a ride and

settled his personal score with the convict by sending him to jail to rot at

least for 14 years. Such a statement would also be completely beyond the

legal framework but can it be said that in light of such a development the

convicted accused may not ask the High Court for recalling the Approver for

further examination.

22 32. As a matter of fact, if some later statement, has come to be made in

some legal ways, it may be admissible on its own without any help from

Section 311 or Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. It is only such statement or

development which is otherwise not within the legal framework that would

need the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction to bring it before it as part of the

legal record.

33. In light of the discussions made above, we have no hesitation in

holding that the High Court was in error in refusing to summon Vikram, the

Approver (PW.1) for his further examination as prayed for on behalf of the

appellants. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the High Court order and

direct the High Court to summon Vikram (PW.1) for his further examination

by the appellants and if so desired by the CBI. For the sake of convenience,

the High Court may direct a member of the Registry of the rank of a

Sessions Judge/Additional Sessions Judge to record the additional evidence

of Vikram (PW.1). The examination of the witness by the appellants and the

CBI must not go beyond two working days each so that the recording of his

evidence should be complete in not more than four days. The Registrar

recording the evidence would certify it and place before the Court and the

Court shall then proceed to dispose of the appeals.

23 34. The appeals are thus allowed.

35. Before parting with the record of the case we are constrained to say

that we are distressed beyond words to find that the case relating to the

attempt on the life of the CJI remains stuck up at the stage of the appeal even

after about 37 years of the occurrence. We are informed that the other case

of the killing of Shri L.N. Mishra is still mired before the trial court. We do

not wish to make any comment on that case as that is the subject matter of

Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 200 and 203 of 2011 that remains pending

before this Court. But so far as the present case is concerned, we would

request the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court with all the strength at our

command to take notice of the inordinately long time for which these

appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos.436 & 443 of 1996) are pending before the

High Court and to put a tab on them so as to ensure that the appeals are

disposed of without any further delay and in any case not later than six

months from the date of the receipt/production of a copy of this order.

...................................J.

(Aftab Alam)

...................................J.

New Delhi, (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

January 19, 2012.