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Subramani vs State Of Karnataka

Supreme Court17 March 2026Pankaj Mithal

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a dying declaration has been properly recorded by a police officer with the medical certification that the declarant was in a fit mental and physical condition to make such a statement, and is corroborated by eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and circumstantial evidence including recovery of incriminating articles at the scene, the dying declaration shall be held reliable and admissible notwithstanding minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of other witnesses or their assertions that the declarant was unconscious at other times. An appellate court is justified in interfering with an acquittal and reversing it where the Trial Court's acquittal rests on discrepancies or infirmities in witness testimony that are outweighed by cogent direct evidence such as eyewitness testimony from a minor child who was present at the scene, medical evidence from treating physicians, post-mortem evidence, and the dying declaration of the victim, all pointing consistently to the guilt of the accused. Where evidence establishes that the accused had a motive for the commission of the offence—namely a history of cruelty, frequent quarrels regarding money, and documented ill-treatment of the deceased—such evidence of motive, combined with eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and a dying declaration, provides sufficient basis to conclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of independent witnesses or other minor evidentiary gaps.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

2026 INSC 249 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2432 OF 2010

SUBRAMANI … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. The appellant - Subramani and the deceased Chennamma were

husband and wife. They were married for seventeen years before

the date of the incident. They had two daughters and two sons.

Signature Not Verified The eldest daughter was aged about sixteen years at the Digitally signed by GEETA AHUJA Date: 2026.03.17 17:00:36 IST Reason: relevant time. They had lived a happy married life for about

three years. Thereafter, their relations became strained, and it 2

is alleged that the appellant started ill-treating the deceased and

kept on raising demands for money, which the father of the

deceased fulfilled most of the time. The appellant had even

started treating her with cruelty.

2. On the night of 20.07.2000, the appellant and the deceased as

usual again picked up a quarrel. The appellant, in anger, went

out and fetched some kerosene. The kerosene was poured on

the deceased in a bathroom, the appellant lit a candle and threw

it upon her, causing serious burn injuries. The appellant, after

burning her, left the house. On the alarm raised by the

deceased, the neighbours came and tried to save her. They

doused the fire by pouring water. The deceased was taken to the

Victoria Hospital by the neighbours and the mother of the

appellant. She was admitted at around midnight and died after

three days on 24.07.2000 in the hospital due to severe burn

injuries received by her.

3. An FIR No. 194 of 2000 under Section 302 and Section 498A of

the Indian Penal Code1 was lodged by the father of the deceased

1 For short, ‘IPC’ 3

on 24.07.2000 after she had died. The police inspector Shiva

Murthy, upon investigation submitted a chargesheet against the

appellant for committing offences punishable under Section

498A and 302 IPC.

4. The appellant was put to trial. The Trial Court acquitted him

primarily on the ground that the bathroom where the incident

took place was very small where two persons could not have

been accommodated. The testimonies of the family witnesses

were inconsistent and unreliable. The medical evidence

suggested that deceased had received more than 80 to 90

percent burn injuries and as such she may not be in a mental

state to depose or state anything either to the doctor or the

police. The dying declaration, if any, was therefore unreliable.

5. On an appeal by the State to the High Court, the Division Bench

reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The

acquittal was set aside, and the appellant was convicted under

both the above provisions. He was sentenced to two years of

simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in

default in payment of the same, with a further three months of 4

simple imprisonment under Section 498A. He was also

convicted under Section 302 IPC for killing the deceased and

was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-,

and in default, to undergo a further one month of simple

imprisonment.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the

appellant preferred a Criminal Appeal under Section 379 of

Cr.P.C which was admitted on 13.12.2010 after the delay in

filing the same was condoned. Thus, the appeal is before us for

consideration as to whether the appellant is guilty of the

offences under Section 302 and 498A of IPC and whether the

sentence awarded to him is justified.

7. We have heard Shri Shekhar G. Devasa, learned senior counsel

for the appellant-Subramani and Shri Sanchit Garga, Advocate

on record for the respondent-State of Karnataka.

8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the High

Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal

passed by the Trial Court, more particularly when the acquittal

had been recorded on cogent and valid reasons after considering 5

every piece of the evidence on record. It was submitted that

apart from the inconsistencies in the statements of the material

witnesses, particularly PW-7 and PW-16, who categorically

stated that the deceased was unconscious and not in a position

to speak, there was no credible evidence to prove that the

appellant had committed the offence as alleged. It was also

submitted that the prosecution failed to prove any motive for

homicidal death. It was inherently improbable that the offence

could have been committed inside the small bathroom, and that

no independent neighbour was examined to prove the

commission of the offence. The alleged dying declaration was

unreliable, as it was unsupported by any medical certificate and

stood contradicted by hospital documents, which record a

history of self-inflicted burns. Furthermore, the deceased had

admittedly received more than 80 to 90 percent burn injuries

and was under heavy sedation. She was not in a position to

make any statement. Therefore, the conviction based upon the

alleged dying declaration of the deceased was wholly illegal. 6

9. There is no dispute as to the fact that the parties were married

17 years prior to the date of the incident and that there used to

be frequent quarrels between them with regard to money. It has

also come on record through evidence that the appellant used

to beat and treat the deceased with cruelty. There were regular

demands for money by him. The aforesaid facts and the

evidence clearly establish that the appellant was not a satisfied

man who suffered from frustration and as such had a motive to

kill the deceased.

10. The testimony of PW-3, Niresha, the eldest daughter of the

appellant and the deceased who was aged about 16 year is very

crucial and material. She had clearly deposed that on the fateful

night, she, her mother, sister and brothers were in their house.

Her father came and questioned the mother that when he had

sent her to her paternal home to get money, why she had sent

her father to counsel and advise him. Thus, they picked up a

quarrel and her father threatened her mother to wait and see

what he was going to do. He went out and brought kerosene,

poured it on her mother and set her on fire. This was done at 7

around 11:00 p.m. in the night and thereafter, he ran away from

the house. On the screams of her mother, the neighbours came

and extinguished the fire. Her grandmother and one another

person took her mother to the hospital in the burnt state. Her

mother remained in the hospital for three days, undergoing

treatment, and thereafter, she died.

11. The aforesaid witness PW-3 is an eyewitness. She has narrated

the incident as was seen by her. There is no inconsistency in

her statement and there is no reason to disbelieve her. There is

no material on record to show as to why she would falsely

depose against her father. Her evidence clinchingly proves that

the appellant brought kerosene, poured it on her mother and lit

the fire.

12. The other crucial witness in the case is PW-4, Dr. S.

Rudramurthy who had conducted the post-mortem upon the

deceased. He categorically stated that the death occurred due

to septicaemia as a result of burn injuries sustained by her. He

proved the postmortem report ‘Exhibit P-2’ and his signatures

on it. He further stated that the burn injuries were antemortem 8

and were to the extent of 85 to 90 percent. He reported that

septicaemia naturally occurs with such high burn injuries. He

opined that the burn injuries received by the deceased were

superficial in nature. He further opined that even if the

deceased was given proper and best treatment, her chances of

survival were minimal. Hence, the postmortem report and the

statement of PW-4 as such establish that the deceased died of

septicaemia as a result of 80-90% burn injuries which were

superficial.

13. There is another witness named Dr. Gurumurthy, whose

statement was recorded as PW-10. He was the doctor who had

treated the deceased after she was admitted in the Victoria

Hospital, Bangalore. He stated that he was the in-charge of

burns ward of the hospital. The deceased was brought to the

hospital on 20.07.2000 at around 11.15 p.m. with a history of

burns. She was admitted in the hospital at 12:00 midnight.

According to the deceased, as informed to him, her husband

used to quarrel with her frequently. On 20.07.2000, he came

home at around 11.00 p.m., assaulted her and then poured 9

diesel over her, set her on fire and ran away. He stated that

there is a note to the above effect in the case sheet as well. He

had examined the deceased on 23.07.2000 and she made the

said statement at around 12.30 p.m. on the same day. He even

proved ‘Exhibit P-11’, the statement of the deceased and his

signatures upon it. He further stated that the deceased was in

hospital up to 24.07.2000 and expired at 9.35 a.m. on the said

date.

14. One doctor named Dr. HC Ramanna, PW-11, also treated the

deceased when she was admitted to the Victoria Hospital. He

stated that on 20.07.2000 while he was working in the aforesaid

hospital, a patient by name Chennamma was brought to the

hospital in a burnt state. He had examined the patient and had

noticed that she had 9 per cent burns on the face and neck, 18

per cent burns on the chest and abdomen, 9 per cent on the

upper right and left limbs, 10 per cent on the lower right and

left limbs and that the total burns received by her were to the

extent of 80 per cent. The patient was conscious when he had

examined her. She was admitted by him to the burns ward. On 10

the morning of 21.07.2000 at about 02:45 am (i.e. in the night

itself), the police of S.R. Nagar came to the hospital and

requested him to give permission to record the statement of the

patient. Since the patient was conscious and in a position to

give the statement, he gave permission to the police to record

her statement. The statement was recorded as Exhibit P-12 and

he had made an endorsement on it under his signatures that

the patient was in a fit condition to give a statement. He even

proved the endorsement and his signatures on Exhibit P-12. In

his cross-examination, nothing material turned up except that

he admitted that in the OPD slip, it is mentioned that she herself

had poured kerosene and had set fire to herself, but he does not

know who recorded the said statement on the OPD slip/case

sheet (Exhibit P-11). He further admitted that though according

to his examination the burns were to the extent of 80 per cent

but he does not know why the burns were recorded to be 98 per

cent. He denied the suggestion that the endorsement on Exhibit

P-12 was made by him to support the prosecution under any

pressure.

11

15. The aforesaid evidence of the two doctors who examined the

deceased clearly proves that the deceased was admitted to the

hospital as alleged on 20.07.2000 and that despite serious

injuries, she was in a conscious state. The attending doctors

have certified that she was in a fit position to make a statement

and, therefore, permission was granted to the police to record

her statement which is Exhibit P-12 which bear the

endorsement and signature of the doctor. We see no reason to

disbelieve the evidence of PW-4, PW-10 and PW-11.

16. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Head

Constable working in the SR Nagar Police Station. His statement

was recorded as PW-15. He categorically stated that he had

remained posted in the aforesaid police station from 1997 to

May, 2003 meaning thereby that he was posted at the aforesaid

police station at the time the alleged incident took place and the

deceased was taken and admitted to the hospital. He further

stated that on the said date he was on night duty and at about

01:30 am, the Station House Officer having received information

of the deceased being admitted in the hospital, had asked him 12

to go and record her statement. He as such reached the hospital

at 02:00 am and met the doctor of the burns ward of the

hospital. He informed him that he had come to record the

statement of the deceased. The doctor after talking to the

deceased for about two minutes informed him that the patient

was in a position to give the statement. He permitted him to

record the statement, whereupon he recorded her statement for

about half an hour. The deceased put her thumb (LTI) on the

statement recorded by him as she was not in a position to put

her signatures. The statement was endorsed by the doctor who

certified the condition of the deceased and signed the statement.

He proved the statement Exhibit P-12, the endorsement and the

certificate of the doctor and his signatures upon it.

17. The translated copy of the statement (Exhibit P-12) was not

placed before us, though the original in vernacular language

exists in the record. The same was proved by PW-15, as stated

earlier. He stated that the deceased told him that she was

married to the appellant and had lived happily with him for

about 2-3 years but thereafter the appellant had started 13

quarrelling with her demanding her to bring more money from

her parents. He started treating her cruelly by abusing and

beating her. On 20.07.2000, he quarrelled with her and forced

her to get more money from her parents. In the night, he again

picked up a quarrel with her and assaulted her. He then abused

her and even threatened to kill her. He poured kerosene on her

body and set her on fire. At that time her four children were

sleeping in the house and on hearing her cries, they went to

their grandmother’s house and called her.

18. Considering the circumstances and the evidence of PW-3, PW-

4, PW-10 and PW-11 coupled with the fact that there is no

adverse material to doubt the above dying declaration or to

suggest that it was not actually or properly recorded or that the

deceased was not in a state to make such a statement, there is

no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration.

19. The fact that the aforesaid PW-15 admitted that there was no

nurse present at the hospital when he recorded the statement,

is not enough to belie the above dying declaration. The same

was recorded in the night at about 02:00-02:30 am with the 14

permission of the doctor who has accepted having granted the

permission on being satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state

to make the statement. In the light of the above statements of

the doctors and the police officer, the oral evidence of PW-7 and

PW-16 that she was not conscious to give any statement, is not

reliable. The deceased, may have been momentarily in an

unconscious state due to the effect of sedatives, however, by

and large, as the burn injuries were superficial, though to great

extent, she was conscious most of the time and was in a fit state

of mind to get her dying declaration recorded.

20. This apart, the police had recovered a matchbox, a kerosene tin

and burnt cloth pieces from the site of the incident immediately.

The Recovery Memo was duly prepared in the form of Exhibit P-

1. The said exhibit was proved by the PW-6, D. Rangaswamy,

one of the neighbours who had visited the house of the deceased

immediately on the occurrence of the incident. He has stated

that the matchbox, kerosene tin and burnt cloths were lying at

the scene, a mahazar was prepared on the spot and the

aforesaid items were collected and seized by the police. He had 15

signed the mahazar prepared by the police which is before him

as Exhibit P-1 and bears his signatures. He denied the

suggestion that he was making a false statement.

21. The fact of recovery of the kerosene tin, matchbox and burnt

cloth pieces from the scene of the incident, the deposition of PW-

3, the daughter of the appellant and the deceased that she had

seen her father bringing kerosene tin, pouring it on her mother

and putting her on fire, coupled with the dying declaration and

the statements of the doctors PW-10, PW-11 who examined and

treated the deceased and PW-4 who conducted the post-

mortem, in unequivocal terms prove that the appellant alone is

responsible for the commission of the aforesaid offences. He is

the person who picked up quarrel with his deceased wife,

poured kerosene and burnt her and that his wife died due to the

burn injuries after consciously making a dying declaration and

naming the appellant as the main culprit.

22. In view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, there is hardly

any scope for the acquittal of the appellant.

16

23. The Trial Court was not justified in acquitting the appellant on

slight discrepancies in the statements of some of the witnesses,

particularly PW-7 and PW-16. PW-7 is a person who carried the

deceased to the hospital and his statement is not very

trustworthy. He has not deposed about her condition in the

hospital. PW-16 is the police inspector who conducted the

investigation. He might have deposed that the deceased was not

in a conscious state of mind but that would not override the

statement of the doctors who treated the deceased, especially

the one who was on duty and had permitted the police to record

the statement of the deceased on being satisfied that she was in

a fit condition to make a statement.

24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the

opinion that the High Court is perfectly justified in the facts and

circumstances of the case that the appellant is guilty of

commission of offences both under Sections 498A and 302 IPC

and has rightly been convicted and sentenced to the

imprisonment awarded.

17

25. The appeal, as such, is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The

appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender forthwith to

undergo the remaining part of the sentence.

26. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

……………………………………J. [PANKAJ MITHAL]

……………………………………J. [S.V.N. BHATTI] NEW DELHI;

MARCH 17, 2026.

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