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State Through The Inspector Of Police vs Laly @ Manikandan

Supreme Court14 October 2022Krishna Murari · M.R. Shah

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of a single eye witness if that witness is found to be trustworthy and reliable, even in the absence of corroborating evidence such as recovery of weapons, examination of the original informant, or other independent witnesses. Material defects or contradictions relating to the timing of registration of the FIR, the lodging of the complaint, or the procedural aspects of the investigation cannot form the basis for acquitting an accused when the prosecution case is grounded upon credible direct evidence from an eye witness who has been subjected to thorough cross-examination and has consistently maintained his version. Recovery of the weapon used in the commission of an offence is not a prerequisite for conviction; if direct eye-witness evidence establishes the guilt of the accused, conviction may be secured in the absence of recovery of the instrument of crime.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1750-1751 OF 2022
State through the Inspector of Police …Appellant
Versus
Laly @ Manikandan & Another Etc. …Respondents
JUDGMENT
M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order dated 12.06.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Madras, at Madurai in Criminal Appeal Nos. 270/2017 and 362/2017, by

which the High Court has allowed the said appeals by acquitting the

respondents – accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302

and 302 r/w 34 IPC, the State has preferred the present appeals.

1

2. That the respondents herein – original accused were tried for the

aforesaid offences for having killed/committed the murder of deceased

Saravanan. It was the prosecution case that owing to animosity

between the friend of the accused viz., Selvakumar and one Periyavan

@ Murugan, there was a murder of Selvakumar on 31.07.2013.

Suspecting that the deceased Saravanan had informed the whereabouts

of Selvakumar, the accused, on a two-wheeler armed with weapons

obstructed the car in which the deceased, PW1 and one another were

travelling and dashed the car and broke the wind screen of the car with

aruvals. A1 caused the injury on the right shoulder of the deceased.

The deceased Saravanan tried to run away, however, the accused

chased him and thereafter all the accused caused injuries on the

deceased in the shed in which the deceased reached and due to the

injuries suffered the deceased Saravanan died on the spot. The

investigation started on the FIR being registered on the complaint

tendered by one Mahendran. All the accused came to the arrested on

02.08.2013/17.08.2013. During the course of investigation, the

Investigating Officer collected the material evidence and also recorded

the statements of the witnesses. After conclusion of the investigation, a

charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offences punishable

under Sections 341, 506(2), 302 IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act. The case

was committed to the Court of Sessions which was numbered as

2 Sessions Case No. 254 of 2014. All the accused pleaded not guilty and

therefore they came to be tried by the learned Sessions Court for the

aforesaid offences.

2.1 During the trial, prosecution examined 21 witnesses and marked

36 exhibits and 16 material objects. After the closure of the prosecution

evidence, further statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

were recorded. During the trial, PW2, PW3 and PW5 did not support the

prosecution case and were declared hostile. However, believing the

deposition of PW1, PW4 and PW6, the learned trial Court held the

accused A1 guilty for the offence under Section 302 IPC and A2 & A3 for

the offences under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC and sentenced each of them

to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default,

three months simple imprisonment.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of

conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court, the accused

preferred the present appeals before the High Court. By the impugned

judgment and order, the High Court has set aside the judgment and

order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court and

consequently has acquitted the accused for the aforesaid offences for

which they were convicted. The High Court has acquitted the accused

3 for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment,

which reads as under:

“9. These appeals succeed for the following reasons:

(i) The prosecution case is that the occurrence took place at 01.30 p.m., on 31.07.2013 and the FIR was registered at 01.45 p.m. on the same day, on the complaint tendered by one Mahendran at the police station.

The said Mahendran has not been examined.

(ii) The Prosecution has examined P.W.1 to P.W.6 as eye-witnesses. While P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 have not supported the prosecution and have been treated hostile, P.W.4 and 6 have been disbelieved by the trial Court. P.W.4 has been disbelieved as he informed that the occurrence took place at 2.30 p.m., and that the deceased fell down outside the thatched shed of P.W.2., whereas the prosecution case is disbelieved since he has spoken to an attack by 8 to 9 persons, whereas the prosecution case is of an attract by the three accused/ appellants herein.

(iii) Contra to the prosecution case, it is the admission of P.W.1 that the police were at the scene within 5 to 10 minutes of the occurrence. Both P.W.1 as also P.W.4 would submit that the statements of all the witnesses were recorded at the scene and their signatures were taken. P.W. 1 would particularly state that on recording the statement of Mahendran, the complainant, Mahendran; signatures were obtained and the same was attested by P.W.1 as also by P.W.4. The complaint in the case has not been marked, though by way of an inadvertent error, as we find from a perusal of the records, that the FIR has on the front side been marked as Ex.P.20 while on the reverse has been marked as Ex.21 and the complaint is found annexed thereto. A doubt arises as to whether the FIR marked as Ex.P.20 and the complaint annexed therewith inform the original version as not only has the complainant not has been examined, it is the version of the prosecution witnesses that the complaint was recorded at the scene.

(iv) P.W. 20 Sub Inspector of Police, who has registered the FIR informs the distance between the police station and the Court to be 7 kms, FIR informs the scene to be a distance of 2 ½ km from the police station. The FIR has reached the Magistrate only at 7.00 p.m. Such circumstance give rise to a doubt on the genuineness thereof and raises the question of whether the genesis of the occurrence stands suppressed. The detailed narrative from of FIR informing the grudge of the accused against the deceased and the need to murder him only further fuels such doubt, The

4 fact that the Constable entrusted with handing over the FIR to the Magistrate has not been examined makes matters worse for the prosecution.

(v) P.W. 1 has spoken to seeing the accused at the police station on the very next day of the occurrence ie., on 01.08.2013, whereas the prosecution case is that Al and A3 were arrested on 02.08.2013 and A2 was arrested on 17.08.2013.

(vi) According to the prosecution, the recovery of the aruvals have been effected from all the accused. P.W.1 in cross, would state that the aruvals were handed over by them ie., the prosecution party to the police.

(vii) Blood stained aruvals have been recovered. Postmortem stands conducted, but the blood group of the deceased has not been ascertained. Ex.P.16 would inform the presence of blood stains on the clothes worn by the deceased, and on the aruvals. No attempt has been made to correlate the blood group as admitted by P.W.21, Investigation Officer.

Giving the serious lacunae above noted, we do not consider it necessary to dwell on the delayed dispatch of the 161(3) Cr.P.C., statements to Court.”

2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court acquitting the accused, the State

has preferred the present appeals.

3. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of

the State and Shri Rao Ranjit, learned counsel has appeared on behalf

of the accused.

3.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has vehemently

stated that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court

has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused by quashing and

setting aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed

5 by the learned trial Court convicting the accused for the offences under

Section 302 and 302 r/w 34 IPC.

3.2 It is vehemently submitted that in the present case the prosecution

has fully proved the case against the accused by examining the relevant

witnesses. It is submitted that PW1 is the eye witness to the occurrence

of the incident and he has fully supported the case of the prosecution.

3.3 It is submitted that the incident occurred in two parts. The first part

was at the time when the deceased, PW1 and one another were

travelling in the car where A1 caused the injury on the deceased on the

right shoulder and thereafter is the second part when the accused

chased the deceased when he was trying to run away and reached the

shed and all the three accused entered the shed, caused injuries on the

deceased and thereafter they came out of the shed and ran away. It is

submitted that at both the places, PW1 was present and he had seen

the occurrence of the incident at both the places. It is submitted that

there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW1. Learned counsel

for the State has taken us to the deposition of PW1.

3.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision of

this Court in the case of Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC

81 (para 35), it is prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set

aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and

6 restore the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by

the learned trial Court against the accused for the offences under

Sections 302 and 302 r/w 34 IPC.

4. The present appeals are vehemently opposed by the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the original accused.

4.1 It is vehemently submitted that as such the High Court has given

cogent reasons while acquitting the accused.

4.2 It is submitted that out of the six witnesses examined by the

prosecution as eye witnesses, three witnesses – PW2, PW3 and PW5

have not supported the case of the prosecution. It is submitted that

PW4 has been disbelieved even by the learned trial Court due to

material contradictions in his deposition and the case of the prosecution.

4.3 It is further submitted that in the present case, Mahendran who

tendered the complaint at the police station and on the basis of which an

FIR has been registered has not been examined. It is submitted that

though other independent witnesses were available, none of them have

been examined by the prosecution. It is submitted that therefore to rely

upon the sole witness – PW1 is not safe to convict the accused.

4.4 It is further submitted that even there are material contradictions in

the deposition of PW1 and other witnesses about the injuries caused. It

7 is submitted that so far as the second part of the occurrence is

concerned, the same occurred in the shed and even according to PW1,

he was outside the shed and he has not seen the accused causing

injuries on the deceased. It is submitted that therefore PW1 cannot be

said to be reliable and trustworthy witness and therefore the accused

may not be convicted on the sole deposition of PW1.

4.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the accused that even the recovery of weapon cannot be said to have

been proved by the prosecution.

4.6 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision of

this Court in the case of Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kerala, (2004) 9

SCC 193 (paras 9 & 10), on the timing and place of incident, it is prayed

to dismiss the present appeals.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at

length. We have gone through in detail the judgment and order of

conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court as well as the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. We have gone

through in detail the deposition of PW1 who can be said to be a star

witness and the eye witness.

6. Having gone through the entire deposition of PW1, it can be seen

that PW1 is the eye witness to the occurrence at both places. When

8 first, the accused attacked while the deceased was travelling in the car,

PW1 was present in the car. At that time, the accused dashed the car

and broken the wind screen and A1 caused injury on the right shoulder

of the deceased. That thereafter the deceased tried to run away and he

reached the shed and at that time all the accused chased the deceased,

went into the shed, caused injuries on the deceased and then came out

of the shed and ran away. PW1 has categorically stated that he had

seen all the three accused entering the shed and thereafter they came

out and the deceased was lying with the injuries and he was found dead.

PW1 has been fully cross-examined on behalf of the accused. However,

even after thorough cross-examination, PW1 stood by what he has

stated and has fully supported the case of the prosecution. We see no

reason to disbelieve and/or doubt the credibility of PW1.

7. The submission on behalf of the accused that as the original

informant – Mahendran has not been examined and that the other

independent witnesses have not been examined and that the recovery of

the weapon has not been proved and that there is a serious doubt about

the timing and place of the incident, the accused are to be acquitted

cannot be accepted. Merely because the original complainant is not

examined cannot be a ground to discard the deposition of PW1. As

observed hereinabove, PW1 is the eye witness to the occurrence at both

9 the places. Similarly, assuming that the recovery of the weapon used is

not established or proved also cannot be a ground to acquit the accused

when there is a direct evidence of the eye witness. Recovery of the

weapon used in the commission of the offence is not a sine qua non to

convict the accused. If there is a direct evidence in the form of eye

witness, even in the absence of recovery of weapon, the accused can be

convicted. Similarly, even in the case of some contradictions with respect

to timing of lodging the FIR/complaint cannot be a ground to acquit the

accused when the prosecution case is based upon the deposition of eye

witness.

8. As observed hereinabove, PW1 is an eye witness. He has fully

supported the case of the prosecution. As per settled position of law,

there can be a conviction on the basis of the deposition of the sole eye

witness, if the said witness is found to be trustworthy and/or reliable. As

observed hereinabove, there is no reason to doubt the credibility and/or

reliability of PW1. Therefore, it will be safe to convict the accused on the

sole reliance of deposition of PW1.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the

accused for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 9 of the impugned

judgment and order is unsustainable and the same deserves to be

10 quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court acquitting the accused for the offences under

Sections 302 and 302 r/w 34 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside and

the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court convicting the

accused for the offences under Sections 302 and 302 r/w 34 IPC is

hereby restored. Now the accused to surrender before the concerned

Jail authorities/concerned Court to undergo the sentence as imposed by

the learned trial Court, within a period of six weeks from today. If the

accused do not surrender with the time stipulated hereinabove, the

concerned Superintendent of Police/Court is directed to take the

accused into custody to serve out the sentence.

10. The present appeals are allowed accordingly.

………………………………..J. [M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; …………………………………J. OCTOBER 14, 2022. [KRISHNA MURARI]

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