State Of U.P vs Munshi & Etc

reasons has rendered the High Court's judgment not

sustainable.

6. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning,

M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union (1971) 1 All ER

1148, observed: "The giving of reasons is one of the

fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander

3 Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it

was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of

justice." "Reasons are live links between the mind of the

decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision

or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by

objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the

decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by

its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to

perform their appellate function or exercise the power of

judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right

to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system;

reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to

the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected

party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of

the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out

reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out.

The "inscrutable face of the sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous

with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.

4

7. In the instant case, let alone any discussion of the

evidence, the High Court has not even indicated any basis for

departing from the conclusions of the trial Court.

8. Even assuming that the victim was previously

accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative

question. On the contrary, the question which was required

to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the

victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is

hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity

earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person

to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the

victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been

promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right

to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone

and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey

for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone.

9. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having

been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after

the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be

5 acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She

stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the

latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the

former it is both physical as well as psychological and

emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to

accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may

search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would

lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of

corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice

would do.

10. In our view, the High Court should re-hear the matter

and dispose of the appeal by a reasoned judgment. We,

therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and remand the

matter to the High Court for fresh disposal. We make it clear

that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the

case.

11. The appeal is allowed.

6 ...........................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

...........

................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, August 28, 2008

7