State Of U.P vs Ilyas
- SCC(2009) 1 SCC 365
- Neutral2008 INSC 1293
- AIRAIR 2009 SC 1145
- SCR[2008] 15 SCR 1088
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
An offense of dacoity can be committed and the perpetrator convicted under Section 394 IPC even where the charge sheet and charge were initially framed under Section 394 IPC, provided the factual ingredients of dacoity—namely, the use of deadly weapons in the commission of theft—are established by credible eyewitness evidence such as identification in a test identification parade, and the omission of explicit mention of Section 394 in the conviction order does not cause prejudice where the accused was properly charged under that section and convicted under a related penal section carrying equivalent or lesser punishment. Where a High Court's conclusions rest upon perverse reasoning—such as drawing inferences that an accused "must have been shown" to witnesses without factual foundation, or treating an acquittal in a separate case as casting doubt on a lawful arrest in an unrelated investigation—the appellate court may set aside those conclusions and restore a conviction properly grounded in the trial court's findings, provided the evidence on record establishes the essential ingredients of the offense.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
Ilyas ...Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge
of the Allahabad High Court directing acquittal of the respondent. Learned
IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, found the
respondent as well as one Multan guilty for offence punishable under
Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and
sentenced each of them to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment.
2. Two appeals were filed i.e. one by Multan and the other by the
present respondent. The High Court by the impugned judgment directed
their acquittal. According to the High Court the identification was not
established and that arrest of the respondents was doubtful and they cannot
be treated to have been arrested in the manner stated by the prosecution.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Written report (Ex. Ka. 5) of the incident in question was delivered by
Mahendra Singh at Police Station Bhagwanpur on July 4, 1979 at 1.30 P.M.
First Information report (Ex. Ka. 6) was then drawn up and relevant entries
were made in the general diary, of which Ex. Ka.7 is a copy. The
prosecution case, briefly stated, is that Mahendra Singh was employed as a
2 Munshi with Sardar Prithipal Singh and Company. On July 3, 1979,
Mahendra Singh reached village Comawala to settle accounts with the
labourers working at the brick-kiln owned by Prithipal Singh and company.
He stayed over night at the brick kiln. Others, who slept at the brick kiln
that night, were Sarnam Singh, Ram Rikhshpal, Ram Pal and Mustaque. A
lighted lamp was available at the spot. At about 1 0' clock in the night, three
miscreants, two holding country made pistols and one armed with a knife,
appeared at the brick kiln. The miscreants woke up all those sleeping on the
spot and robbed them of their belongings one after the other by brandishing
the arms they were carrying. Mahendra Singh was robbed of his wrist watch
of `Titus' Make and Rs. 40/- in cash, Satnam Singh was deprived of a wrist
watch of `Titus' make and Rs.125/- in cash and Ram Rikshpal was robbed
of his wrist watch and Rs.35/- in cash. The miscreants lifted an axe lying on
the spot and beat Mahendra Singh with bottom of the axe. The miscreants
locked the victim of robbery in the office room on the spot and carried away
the suitcase and clothes belonging to Ram Rikshapal. The doors of the
office were later pushed by those detained inside. The victim of robbery
then reported the incident to the residents of village Comawala and an
unsuccessful search of the miscreants was made around the village. The
complainant Mahendra Singh reported the matter to his employers on the
3 morning following the night of occurrence at Kankhel. The miscreants had
been seen and recognised in the light of the lantern on the spot who were
unknown persons.
Sub Inspector Kali Charan (P.W.9) conducted the investigation. He
interrogated Mahendra Singh and others at the Police Station on July 4,
1979 and later reached the place of occurrence on the same day. Ram
Rikshapal, Rampal and others were interrogated at the place of occurrence.
A site plan with index (Ex. Ka.8) was then drawn up on the basis of the spot
inspection. On the following day, the Investigating Officer examined the
lamp and entrusted the same to the custody of Mahendra Singh.
After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. It is to be
noted that the respondent was arrested alongwith another person on
4.7.1979 for offence punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 (in
short the `Arms Act'). On interrogation respondent Ilyas confessed his
involvement in the present incident and disclosed the name of co-accused.
The Test Identification Parade (in short the `TI Parade') was held where the
respondent was identified by the three eye witnesses i.e. PWs 4, 5 and 6.
Mahavir Singh (PW-1) had arrested accused Ilyas.
4 Placing reliance on the evidence of eye witnesses and the TI Parade
the accused persons were held guilty.
In appeal the appellants pointed out that in the sketch map the lamp
was not correctly shown. The lamp was allegedly kept at the height of 3/4 ft
and naturally very little light could have reached out of chapper. There was
no sufficient light for the witnesses to recognise the faces of the miscreants.
It was also pointed out that the respondent Ilyas was arrested in some other
cases alongwith some illicit arms. The High Court held that since he was
acquitted in the said case the arrest of Ilyas becomes doubtful and the
defence version that he was not arrested as stated by the prosecution but
was arrested from his house is believable. It was therefore concluded that
the accused was shown to the witnesses. It was also pointed out that
Section 397 is not a substantive offence and the accused could not have
been convicted under Section 397 only but could have been convicted under
Section 394 read with Section 397. As the conviction has been recorded
under Section 397 and the use of the weapons was not fully established, the
respondent is entitled to acquittal.
5
4. Learned counsel for the appellant in the present appeal submitted that
PWs 4 and 5 were stated to be eye witnesses and PW-6 was an injured
witness. The conclusions of the High Court are without any foundation. It is
pointed out that Section 397 does not contain the definition of substantive
offence. It only regulates the punishment. The trial Court itself noted that
charge was framed under Section 394 read with Section 397 IPC. Mere
omission to Section 394 did not cause any prejudice.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that
Section 397 does not speak of any substantive offence. The factual scenario
has been correctly analysed by the High Court. Therefore, no person can be
charged or convicted under Section 397 alone. It regulates the punishment
in a given situation. The emphasis is on use of deadly weapon. The
conclusions arrived at by the High Court are absolutely sketchy. It came to
abrupt conclusions that the accused must have been shown to the witnesses.
There is no foundation to such a plea. First Information Report was lodged
under Section 394 IPC and charge was accordingly framed. Because of the
use of deadly weapon, the trial Court convicted the accused under Section
397 IPC. The trial Court could have altered the charge, but that was not
6 done. The High Court could have altered the conviction and imposed
adequate sentence. There was no prejudice involved.
6. Since the High Court's reasonings were perverse the impugned
judgment is set aside. However, the respondent is convicted for offence
punishable under Section 394 IPC for which he was originally charged. He
is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. He shall
surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.
7. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
..........................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
..........................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi:
November 12, 2008
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