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State Of U.P.& Anr vs Santosh Kumar Mishra & Anr

Supreme Court3 August 2010S.S. Nijjar · Altamas Kabir

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a rule of service or recruitment has been applied in a particular manner to deprive candidates of an opportunity of appointment, that same rule cannot later be discarded or reapplied differently at a subsequent stage so as to disadvantage those same candidates again. A rule cannot be used inconsistently against the same class of persons at two different points of time—first to deny them consideration, and then later to prevent their appointment—without rectifying the original deprivation. A long-standing and consistently followed departmental practice in interpreting service rules should be given effect to, even when subsequently enacted general rules are silent on whether such practice is to continue; the practice should not be summarily abandoned to the detriment of those who were prejudiced by its earlier application. When a rule or practice has been applied to exclude candidates from a recruitment process at one stage, and those excluded candidates would be aged out or otherwise permanently barred from future consideration if the rule were not applied to accommodate them in the next recruitment round, equity requires that the rule be applied in the manner it was originally applied to prevent a second deprivation of the same candidates.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(C) No.20558 of 2009
STATE OF U.P. & ANR. ... Petitioners
Vs.
SANTOSH KUMAR MISHRA & ANR. ... Respondents
WITH
SLP(C)NOS.20769, 20774, 20785, 20901, 20908, 22114,22655, 22678, 22732, 22749, 22851, 22955, 25647,25649 & 32977 of 2009
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. The same criteria differently applied at two
different points of time leading to different
results and consequences, is the problem we are

faced with in these Special Leave Petitions. The 2

same principles which were applied in the case of

the Respondents to deny them the benefit of

appointment, were not given effect to when it came

to their turn to get the benefit thereof.

2. In order to appreciate this unusual situation,

it is necessary to relate some of the relevant

facts of these cases.

3. The Respondents have passed the diploma course

in Pharmacy from different institutions which have

been recognized by the Pharmacy Council of India

and are also registered with the State Pharmacy

Council of U.P. Their claim is for selection and

appointment to the post of Pharmacist, which is

governed by the U.P. Pharmacists Service Rules,

1980, hereinafter referred to as the `1980 Rules'.

According to them, under Rule 15(2) of the 1980

Rules, all diploma holders were required to be

appointed against the vacancies which became

available in each recruitment year by first 3

appointing those Pharmacists who had obtained their

diplomas earlier.

4. They claim that appointment to the post of

Pharmacist should be made batchwise from each year

and that the vacancies which had accrued, should be

filled up by giving appointment to those

Pharmacists according to the dates on which they

had obtained their diplomas, irrespective of their

merit. According to the Respondents, till those

belonging to the earlier batches were not

considered and given appointments in such

vacancies, the diploma holders of the subsequent

batches should not be given appointment,

irrespective of their merit.

5. The aforesaid controversy was triggered by an

advertisement dated 12th November, 2007, whereby 766

vacancies were advertised for being filled up by

diploma holders. The advertisement provided that

the recruitment would be made in accordance with 4

the U.P. Procedure for Direct Recruitment of Group

`C' Posts (Outside the Purview of Public Service

Commission) Rules, 2000, as amended by the U.P.

Procedure for Direct Recruitment of Group `C' Posts

(Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission)

(First Amendment) Rules, 2003, and the relevant

Service Rules in force with regard to educational

qualifications and other conditions of service.

6. According to the Respondents, on an

interpretation of Rule 15(2) of the 1980 Rules by

the State Government, they were entitled to be

selected and appointed first on the vacancies

advertised, as they belonged to previous batches

and were denied appointment by the State Government

earlier on the plea that notwithstanding their

merit being superior to those of some of the

diploma holders, who had obtained diploma prior in

point of time, the latter candidates were to be

given appointment first. As a result, those 5

diploma holders, who had obtained diploma before

the Respondents, were adjusted against the

vacancies first, irrespective of their merit vis-`-

vis the diploma holders of subsequent batches and

the said practice was continued till 2002.

However, when the fresh vacancies were declared and

the Respondents were to be appointed on the same

principle and practice, they were denied the

benefit of the same citing the Rules of 1980 read

with Rules of 2002, as amended by the Rules of

2003. According to the Respondents, it was not

open to the State government to take a different

stand in interpreting the Rules to severe prejudice

of the Respondents' right to appointment, though

similarly situated persons have been given the

benefit of the said Rules and whereunder the

Respondents had been denied appointment when their

turn came to be appointed.

6

7. Questioning the said discriminatory and

arbitrary treatment, the Respondents herein moved

several writ petitions before the Lucknow Bench of

the Allahabad High Court for quashing the above-

mentioned advertisement dated 12th November, 2007

and for a writ in the nature of Mandamus to command

the Petitioners herein to make recruitment to the

vacant posts of Pharmacists strictly in accordance

with Rules 14 and 15 of the 1980 Rules, by

specifying the vacancies year-wise, and,

thereafter, appointing the writ Petitioners to the

post of Pharmacists after providing for age

relaxation. A further prayer was made in one of

the writ petitions (Writ Petition No.7771 (SS) of

2007) to declare Rule 5(2)(iv)(b) of the amended

Rules as ultra vires. After a detailed

consideration of the rules and the existing

procedures, the amended Rules were held to be intra

vires. Considering the same, the Petitioners

herein were competent to issue the advertisement 7

and to constitute a Selection Committee in terms of

Rule 6 of the 2002 Rules and the First Amendment

Rules 2003. It was, however, also indicated that

until and unless Clause (a) of Sub-Rule (3) of Rule

5 of the 2003 Rules was amended, selection could

not be undertaken by computing the marks as per the

procedure prescribed therein and selection had to

take place as per the provisions of Rule 15(2) of

the 1980 Rules on the basis of the marks obtained

in the Pharmacy Diploma Examination.

8. The said order of the learned Single Judge was

challenged by the Respondents herein in several

writ appeals before the Division Bench of the

Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

9. Taking notice of the peculiar situation which

had developed on account of the differing

interpretations of the Rules in question, the

Division Bench very succinctly summarized the issue 8

in the following words :

"A peculiar and a piquant situation has arisen in the instant case, where it is not the case that an aspirant of the higher post in service on becoming eligible for promotion or a person seeking direct appointment on the date when he is to be considered for such a promotion or appointment, seeks to interpret the rule of recruitment in a particular manner, looking to the past practice, to his advantage, but here is a case where the appellants were excluded from consideration of their appointment at the relevant time earlier, by interpreting the rule to their disadvantage, and were made to believe that likewise their candidature shall be considered later on, for which various circulars and instructions were also issued by the State Government, but when their turn came for getting employment, they were again being put out of consideration, by interpreting the rule in a different manner."

10. On the basis of its aforesaid observations, the

Division Bench disposed of the several appeals with

a direction that the case of the Appellants therein

would be considered in accordance with pre-existing

practice by considering their appointment on the

basis of their merit taking their objects into 9

consideration as was being done earlier, but this

process would be available only for said

appellants. They would be accommodated if they were

otherwise found eligible and the remaining

vacancies would be filled in by following Rule

15(2) strictly as directed by the Single Judge. A

direction was also given to the respondents in the

said appeals to give age relaxation to the said

appellants as per the Rules, if they had crossed

the age limit, for the reason that right from the

year 1998 no selection had been made and in certain

cases, age relaxation had already been given. A

further direction was given to complete the

selection process within three months from the date

of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

11. Appearing for the Petitioners, Ms. Shobha

Dikshit, learned Advocate, submitted that the 1980

Rules prescribe the eligibility conditions for

selection of Pharmacists. Rule 10 provides for the 10

minimum and maximum ages while Rule 14 provides for

determining the number of vacancies to be filled

during the course of the year. Rule 15 provides the

procedure for direct recruitment by the

constitution of a Selection Committee and

preparation of a select list in order of merit,

which would be valid for a period of one year. On

the other hand, the 2003 Rules provide the detailed

procedure for determining the merit and suitability

of candidates with technical qualifications. Ms.

Dikshit submitted that there was no clash or

contradiction between the said two Rules and that

both, therefore, exist side by side.

12. Ms. Dikshit submitted that the 2003 Rules were

being followed by the State Government for direct

recruitment to Class III posts which were outside

the purview of the Public Service Commission, such

as Pharmacists, Lab. Technicians, ECG Technicians,

etc. She submitted that the last advertisement 11

dated 11th February, 2007 was a composite

advertisement inviting applications from all

paramedical trades such as Pharmacists, Lab.

Technicians, X-ray Technicians, Physiotherapists

and ECG Technicians and selections had already been

made. It was also submitted that while filling the

backlog of reserved category candidates for filling

up the posts of Pharmacists for the year 2007, the

Rules of 1980 read with the Rules of 2003 had been

followed and about 73 vacancies had been duly

filled in. Furthermore, since the matters relating

to selection and appointment of Pharmacists were

pending consideration before this Court for other

trades other than the selection of Pharmacists, the

Rules of 2003 had been applied and the selected

candidates had already joined their posts.

13. Ms. Dikshit, submitted that Rule 5 of 2003

Rules made it very clear that only the merit of the

eligible candidates was required to be judged on 12

the basis of the minimum technical qualifications,

as provided in the Educational Regulation Act,

1991, for the diploma course in Pharmacy, and the

marks obtained in the qualifying examination and

the diploma in Pharmacy are taken into

consideration for determining merit. The method

adopted for allocating certain percentage of marks

as contained in Sub-Rule (2) is only to give more

credit to meritorious candidates as compared to

candidates having lesser merit. Ms. Dikshit urged

that the special procedure did not offend Article

14 of the Constitution nor was it contrary to the

1980 Rules, since it did not result in any kind of

bias or prejudice to the candidates of any

particular batch. Ms. Dikshit submitted that all

eligible candidates were graded similarly and the

object of the procedure, as provided in the 2003

rules, is to adjudge the merits of the candidates

on the basis of the technical qualifications

uniformly throughout the State so as to maintain 13

efficiency in Government service.

14. Ms. Dikshit submitted that the observations

made to the contrary by the learned Single Judge of

the High Court were erroneous and instead of

appreciating the same, the Division Bench also

erroneously accepted the contentions that

notwithstanding the 2003 Rules, the past practice

should be followed. Ms. Dikshit submitted that

neither was there any past practice nor was there

any other rule or guidelines for selections to be

made for appointment to the post of Pharmacist

after the year 2003, when the 2002 Rules came into

operation. According to Ms. Dikshit, even

otherwise, the directions issued by the Division

Bench in the impugned judgment would create two

different procedures to select candidates in one

selection process.

15. Ms. Dikshit also urged that the tenor of the

impugned judgment gives the impression that the 14

State Government had been following a practice of

giving preference to earlier batches over later

batches. According to Ms. Dikshit, such a practice

was factually incorrect and till date, no candidate

from previous batches had been left out. However,

having regard to the decision of the High Court in

case of Rajat Yadav & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

(Writ Petition No.2473 (SS) of 2000), issuing a

mandamus to the State Government to accommodate the

54 candidates left over from the selection, the

State Government, while implementing the said

direction, had filled up the posts accordingly. In

the process of such an exercise, candidates with

lesser merit came to be appointed, more so, having

regard to the fact that the State Government did

not choose to challenge the correctness of the

judgment. Ms. Dikshit submitted that even on such

grounds the stand of the Respondents that past

practice should be followed in future also ignoring

merit, was not capable of being accepted. 15

According to Ms. Dikshit, such an action would be

contrary to the 1980 Rules and the established

service jurisprudence. She also pointed out that

the learned Single Judge had come to the positive

conclusion that only an amendment was made to Rule

5(3)(a) since selection could not be undertaken by

computing the marks in terms of the procedure

prescribed, and, on the other hand, selection would

have to take place as per the provisions of Rule

15(2) of the U.P. Pharmacists Service Rules, 1980,

on the basis of the marks obtained in the Pharmacy

Diploma Examination, irrespective of the year in

which the candidate had appeared in the Diploma

Examination.

16. Several Special Appeals were filed by the writ

Petitioners before the High Court which were

disposed of by a common judgment dated 4th May,

2009, with a direction that the age of the

Respondents be relaxed as per rule, if they had 16

crossed the age limit for the reason that right

from the year 1998, no selection had been made and

in certain cases, age relaxation had been granted.

17. Ms. Dikshit further pointed out that while

disposing of the Writ Appeals, the Division Bench

of the High Court had also relied on the submission

that unless the Respondents were considered for

selection, they would lose their right to be

considered for such selection for all times to come

on account of an incorrect interpretation of the

Rule, forgetting that the Respondents could have

challenged their non-selection at the time when

they were excluded from the zone of consideration

on the ground that their case would be considered

only after the diploma holders who had obtained

diploma prior to them were accommodated or selected

irrespective of their merit. Ms. Dikshit concluded

on the note that if the State Government had

interpreted the rule in question otherwise and had 17

adopted a policy which would accommodate all

diploma holders and the same was not challenged by

the Respondents and, on the other hand, the State

Government deliberately and consciously, in the

interest of the diploma holders, adopted a policy

which would accommodate all diploma holders, the

Petitioners could not be penalized for not coming

to court earlier. Ms. Dikshit submitted that

having regard to the rules for appointment to the

post of Pharmacist having been promulgated in the

year 2003, there was no justification in the claim

of the Respondents that for filling up future

vacancies the cases of the candidates who had

obtained their diplomas earlier should be

considered for appointment in earlier batches till

such time as all such candidates were accommodated

against the vacancies that existed or were to arise

in future. Ms. Dikshit submitted that the judgment

and order of the learned Single Judge, as also the

Appeal Court, was liable to be set aside. 18

18. In support of her aforesaid submissions, Ms.

Dikshit firstly referred to the decision of this

Court in S. Prakash & Anr. vs. K.M. Kurian & Ors.

[(1999) 5 SCC 624], which deals with the question

of rules of interpretation and in this case the

interpretation of the maxim "generalia specialibus

non derogant" and "generalia specialibus derogant".

The first of the two maxims indicate that general

things do not derogate from special things and it

was held by this Court that although, ordinarily

the special law would override the general law, in

special circumstances if the language of the

general provision is clear and unqualifying, it

would prevail over the special provision and the

special provision would have to give way, if the

legislature intended to establish a rule of

universal application. Ms. Dikshit urged that in

the instant case, since there was no existing rule

and only a practice was being followed, when a 19

special provision was enacted relating to

recruitment, the same would have precedence over

the past practice which had been followed till such

time as the rules were promulgated.

19. Ms. Dikshit also referred to the decision of

this Court in Maya Mathew vs. State of Kerala &

Anr. [2010 (2) SCALE 833], which deals with the

rules of interpretation when a special matter is

governed by two such rules. The ratio which was

laid down by this Court is that if a subsequent law

did not repeal the earlier rule, there cannot be a

presumption that the earlier rule was intended to

be repealed. It was indicated that when two

provisions of law, one of which is general and the

other is special, govern the same matter, the court

should make an attempt to give a harmonious

construction to both the provisions, but when there

was a clear expression in the general rules to

exclude the special rules, the same would have to 20

be given effect to. Applying the aforesaid

decision to the facts of the instant case, Ms.

Dikshit urged that in the present case when special

rules have been framed for appointment to the post

of Pharmacist and earlier appointments to the said

post were made on the basis of the prevailing

practice, it is the enacted rules which would

prevail and the practice as followed so far would

have to give way.

20. On the question of acting on the basis of the

past practice for the purpose of appointment or

promotion, Ms. Dikshit referred to the decision of

this Court in Suraj Prakash Gupta & Ors. vs. State

of J&K & Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 561], wherein while

considering the question of promotion on the basis

of the quota and rota rules, this Court had

occasion to consider the legal value of past

practice in such matters. This Court went on to

hold that in the absence of any provision for rota 21

in the rules, the same could not be claimed on the

basis of past practice. Ms. Dikshit submitted that

since in the 2003 Rules no mention had been made

regarding the continuance of the appointment to the

post of Pharmacist on the basis of past practice,

both the Single Judge, as well as the Division

Bench of the High Court, had erred in placing

reliance on the said practice and the appointments

to be made on the basis thereof.

21. Ms. Dikshit submitted that out of the 16

Special Leave Petitions being heard, the State is

the petitioner in 12 and the 4 other SLPs have been

filed by the private parties. Ms. Dikshit submitted

that the submissions in respect of all the SLPs are

common to those made in the instant SLP.

22. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior Advocate

appearing for the Respondents in SLP(C)No.21570 of

2006, submitted that the said Special Leave

Petition was in fact the lead matter and all the 22

other Special Leave Petitions were filed

subsequently for the same relief. Joining issue

with the submissions made by Ms. Dikshit, Mr. Rao

submitted that in order to prevent the perpetrating

of an injustice which had been caused to the

candidates who had successfully completed the

diploma course in Pharmacy prior to 2003 and had

been denied appointment solely on the ground that

those who had completed Pharmacy course before each

year, had to be accommodated first, and were being

denied appointment on the basis that such

appointment could not be made batch-wise, the High

Court had to work out a formula by which they could

also be provided relief without interfering with

the provisions of the 2003 Rules, as has been

indicated in the very beginning of this judgment.

Mr. Rao submitted that in 1998 only a part of the

1992 batch of Pharmacists had been appointed in

general category and upto 1997 the reserve category

had been cleared. However, the Respondents were 23

only concerned with the question of batch-wise

promotion from prior to the promulgation of 1993

Rules on the ground that having been deprived once

on the basis of the past practice, they could not

be deprived for the second time by virtue of the

promulgation of 2003 Rules. Further more, it was

also pointed out that the State Government had

itself admitted in paragraph 22 of its affidavit

that the past practice was being followed for a

long time prior to the promulgation of 2003 Rules.

23. In support of his submissions, Mr. Rao relied

on the decision of this Court in N. Suresh Nathan &

Anr. vs. UOI & Ors. [(1992) Supp. (1) SCC 584],

wherein, while considering the question of

promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in the

Public Works Department, this Court had occasion to

consider the construction of the service rules in

consonance with the long-standing practice in the

concerned department and it was held that such long 24

standing practice was to be preferred. In fact, in

the said decision, this Court was considering the

decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal

which had held that in considering the question of

preferring the decree holders in Civil Engineering

to Diploma holders in the same discipline, the case

of the decree holders was to be preferred on

account of their superior qualification and

question of past practice could not be introduced

while considering the respective cases of their

promotion. Disagreeing with the view expressed by

the Tribunal, this Court was of the view that the

rules must be interpreted to mean that the three

years' service in the grade of a degree-holder for

the purpose of Rule 11 is three years from the date

of obtaining the degree and that the same is quite

tenable and in conformity with past practice which

had been followed consistently. Accordingly, the

Tribunal was not justified in taking a contrary

view and unsettling the settled practice in the 25

said department.

24. Reference was also made to another decision in

Shailendra Dania & Ors. vs. S.P. Dubey & Ors.

[(2007) 5 SCC 535], where a similar question arose

in connection with the eligibility for promotion

wherein differential service experience based on

differential educational qualifications had been

prescribed and longer period of service experience

was prescribed for diploma holder Junior Engineers

in comparison to degree holder Junior Engineers for

the post of Assistant Engineer. Explaining the

rationale behind the permissibility of making such

a distinction, this Court held that the difference

between the service qualifications has been an

essential criterion for promotion based on interest

of an establishment. While considering the said

question, this Court had also the occasion to

consider the possibility of two views being taken

while interpreting a particular set of service 26

rules. In such a situation, this Court held that

the rules should be interpreted in consonance with

the practice followed by the department for a long

time. In fact, while arriving at such a

conclusion, this Court had also the occasion to

consider the earlier case of N. Suresh Nathan

(supra).

25. Mr. Rao urged that having applied the relevant

Rules in a particular manner at a particular point

of time to the prejudice of the Respondents, the

Petitioners have acted arbitrarily and unfairly in

not applying the same set of Rules, again to the

prejudice of the Respondents, thereby completely

eliminating the chance of appointment in case of

some of the Respondents, who, in the meantime, had

become over-aged. Mr. Rao submitted that such

arbitrariness should not be allowed to continue and

the decision of the Petitioners not to give batch-

wise promotion to those Pharmacists, who have 27

obtained their diplomas prior to 1998, was liable

to be quashed.

26. The same line of submissions was advanced by

Mr. Mukesh Giri, learned Advocate, appearing for

some of the Respondents in SLP(C)No.22678/09 and

SLP(C)No.22749/09. In addition to what was

submitted by Mr. Rao, Mr. Giri submitted that

having regard to Rule 3(g) of the 1980 Rules, the

vacancy position should have been provided by the

State. On the other hand, there was a complete

violation of the provisions of Rules 14 and 15 of

the said Rules which provided for the same.

Reiterating Mr. Rao's submissions, Mr. Giri

submitted that the Respondents could not be denied

an opportunity of employment twice on the basis of

the same set of Rules, but on being applied

differently.

27. Mr. D. Roy Choudhary, learned Senior Advocate,

appearing for some of the Respondents in SLP(C)No. 28

20558/09 and various other Special Leave Petitions,

contended that if any inconsistencies were to be

found in the 1980, 2002 and 2003 Rules, the benefit

would have to be presumed to be in favour of the

Respondents. Mr. Roy Choudhary submitted that the

question of discontinuance of the past practice was

irrelevant and having followed the 1980 Rules

consistently, it was not open to the State to

resile from its position to the detriment of those

candidates who were available for appointment

according to the said Rules, but were not

considered, since the earlier diploma holders in

Pharmacy had to be adjusted against the existing

vacancies. Mr. Giri submitted that the decision of

the High Court was sound and did not require any

interference.

28. Mr. S.K. Verma, learned counsel, who appeared

for the private Respondents in SLP(C)No.22732/09,

also supported the judgment of the High Court and 29

urged that this was not a case where any of the

candidates, who had the necessary qualifications,

was rejected. On the other hand, it would appear

that their cases were deferred in order to

accommodate those diploma-holders who were waiting

from previous batches for appointment in the

vacancies occurring from time to time. He too

submitted that the impugned order of the High Court

did not merit any interference and the Special

Leave Petitions filed by the State of U.P. were

liable to be dismissed.

29. The submissions made by Mr. Rao, Mr. Choudhary

and Mr. Giri were reiterated by Mr. Shree Pal Singh

appearing in SLP(C)No.20558/09. He, however, added

that the Rules of 2000 and 2003 would have to be

read in harmony with the Rules of 1980, which had

not been repealed by the subsequent Rules and

continued to be in existence.

30

30. Mr. Kailash Vasudev and Mr. P.S. Narasimhan,

learned Senior Advocates, appearing for some of the

Respondents in two of the Special Leave Petitions,

reiterated Mr. Rao's submissions that the practice

which had been followed since 1980, could not be

discarded, till all those who were to be benefitted

under the said Rules had been duly accommodated.

In fact, it was submitted that there was no

provision which prevented the State Government from

following such practice merely because of the

intervention of the 2000 and 2003 Rules.

31. We have carefully considered the submissions

made on behalf of the respective parties, having

particular regard to the fact that a practice which

had been consistently followed and had deprived

some of the diploma-holders in Pharmacy earlier, is

now being discarded against them to deprive them of

an opportunity of employment. Although, an attempt

has been made by Ms. Shobha Dikshit to justify the 31

action of the State authorities, in the face of

apparent injustice caused to the private

Respondents in these Special Leave Petitions, we

are unable to accept her contentions. In our view,

the learned Single Judge while deciding the various

writ petitions filed by the private Respondents

herein and allowing the benefit of relaxation of

age, erred in directing that the selections of even

the said Respondents were to be made strictly on

the criteria of merit, irrespective of the batch in

which the incumbents had obtained their diplomas in

Pharmacy. The said error was rightly corrected by

the Division Bench in the Special Appeals, which

had been filed, which is reflected in the extract

of the impugned judgment set out hereinbefore. The

Division Bench quite rightly held that the

injustice caused to the private Respondents on

account of the interpretation of the Rule to their

disadvantage at a subsequent stage by the State

Government, required to be corrected. 32

32. It is on account of a deliberate decision taken

by the State Government that the private

Respondents were left out of the zone of

consideration for appointment as Pharmacists in

order to accommodate those who had obtained their

diplomas earlier. The decision taken by the State

Government at that time to accommodate the diploma-

holders in batches against their respective years

can no doubt be discontinued at a later stage, but

not to the disadvantage of those who had been

deprived of an opportunity of being appointed by

virtue of the same Rules. In our view, the same

decision which was taken to deprive the private

Respondents from being appointed, could not now be

discarded, once again to their disadvantage to

prevent them from being appointed, introducing the

concept of merit selection at a later stage. The

same may be introduced after the private 33

Respondents and those similarly-situated persons

have been accommodated.

33. The various decisions cited by Ms. Dikshit are

of little help to the case of the Petitioners. The

facts in the case of Suraj Prakash Gupta & Ors.

(supra) bear no comparison to the facts at issue in

these Special Leave Petitions. There can be no

divergence of opinion with regard to the principles

of law laid down in the said decision, but the same

was referred to in the facts of that case, where it

was held that in the absence of any provision for

rotation in the Rules, the same could not be

claimed on the basis of the past practice. As

indicated hereinbefore, in this case a certain set

of Rules were applied in a manner which deprived

the private Respondents of an opportunity to be

considered for appointment as Pharmacists, despite

having acquired the requisite qualification and

being deprived of appointment once again by 34

discarding the same Rules to their detriment. In

our view, the decision in N. Suresh Nathan & Anr.

(supra) is more apposite to the facts of this case.

Of course, this is not a case for applying the

"doctrine of past practice" alone, in addition,

this is a case which involves the deprivation of

certain candidates by application of the procedure

differently at two different points of time.

34. We, therefore, are of the view that in the

facts of this case no interference is called for

with the decision of the Division Bench of the High

Court impugned in these SLPs. The 12 Special Leave

Petitions filed by the State of U.P., being S.L.P.

Nos. 20558, 20769, 20774, 20785, 20901, 20908,

22655, 22678, 22732, 22749, 22851, 22955 of 2009,

along with S.L.P.(C) Nos. 25647 and 25649 of 2009,

filed by Vaibhav Kumar Singh and Ors. and Brijesh

Kumar Sharma and others, whose cases are similar to

that of the State of U.P., are dismissed, but 35

without any order as to costs. Special Leave

Petition (C) Nos. 22114 of 2009 and 32977 of 2009

filed by Ajay Singh and others and Shravan Kumar

Pandey and others, stand allowed. The petitioners

therein shall be entitled to the same benefits as

those Diploma holders governed by the 1980 Rules,

having obtained their Diplomas in Pharmacy prior to

1998. There will be no order as to costs in these

S.L.Ps also.

................................................J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

................................................J. (S.S. NIJJAR) New Delhi Dated: August 03, 2010.

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