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State Of Maharashtra vs Ravikant Shankarappa Patil & Ors

Supreme Court5 May 2011T.S.Thakur · V.S.Sirpurkar

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A challenge to an acquittal by the High Court will not succeed unless the prosecution demonstrates that the High Court's findings were perverse—that is, that they were not a possible view of the evidence or could not have been drawn in law. Where the High Court has carefully considered the evidence, drawn reasonable and plausible inferences, and arrived at findings that are justifiable on the record, an appellate court will not interfere with the acquittal merely because a different view of the evidence might have been taken. The absence of contemporaneous police reports of alleged threats, coercion and forced marriage—particularly when those affected were educated, well-to-do persons with ready access to law enforcement—is a relevant circumstance that courts may consider in assessing whether the prosecution's narrative of compulsion is credible, and the failure of key witnesses to come forward to report serious crimes when they were allegedly present and aware of them may reasonably cast doubt upon the prosecution story.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 262-263 OF 2005

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ... Appellant(s)

Versus

RAVIKANT SHANKARAPPA PATIL & ORS. ... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

V.S.SIRPURKAR,J.

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment dated

10.9.2004 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal

Appeal Nos. 658 and 644 of 2000 whereby the conviction and

sentence awarded by the trial court were set-aside and

appeals of the appellants were allowed and they were

acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Respondent

Nos. 1 to 5 were convicted by the trial court for the

offences punishable under Sections 148, 452 r/w 149, 366 r/w

149, 342 r/w 149, 323 r/w 149 and 506 (2) r/w 149, IPC.

Respondent No. 1/accused No. 1 Ravikant Shankarappa Patil

was also convicted for the offences punishable under Section

386 r/w Section 511, 376 IPC and 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.

2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that

prosecutrix Fatima Sabin Nazir Ahmad Shaikh was studying

in III year Computer engineering at Walchand Institute of

Technology at Solapur and had brilliant education record.

Her father was a professor. He left India for Libya in 1981

but returned to India in 1991 and started his hotel

business. Her brother was also getting education at Pune.

Accused No. 1 contested election from Solapur constituency

and was elected Member of Parliament. Due to political

activities, accused No. 1 came in close contact with the

family members of the prosecutrix and also helped her

family initially for the construction of their house.

3. It is further alleged that accused No. 1 developed

fatal attraction for the prosecutrix. After hearing the

proposal from accused No.1 for marriage with the

prosecutirx, her father got annoyed with accused No.1 and

asked him not to come to his house. It is alleged that

with his muscle and money power, accused No. 1 started

threatening the family members of the prosecutrix. On

5.5.2009, accused No. 1, under threat, took the prosecutrix

and her whole family to Bombay for getting married with

prosecutrix and for that purpose he also converted himself

to Islam. Thereafter, Nikaah was performed on 6.5.1999 at

Bombay in the presence of Kazi. In this nikaah, accused no.

1 was helped by other accused persons who were his henchmen.

Even after the nikaah, accused No. 1 is alleged to have

moved along with prosecutrix at various places including

Khandala, Mysore and Hyderabad where according to the

prosecutrix, under threat,she was raped by accused No. 1

from 9.5.1999 to 17.5.1999. In short, the case of the

prosecution appears to be that it was only with the muscle

and money power that the accused No. 1 forced the

prosecutrix for nikaah and ravished her. The prosecutrix

lodged an FIR against the accused persons on 5.6.1999.

4. In support of its case, the prosecution, in all,

examined 12 witnesses including prosecutrix PW 2- Fatima

Sabin Nazir Ahmad Shaikh, Kazi PW-3 Hajij Yusuf Shaikh and

her mother PW8- Rashida Begum Nazir Ahmed Shaikh.

5. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the

parties and gone through the record.

6. We were taken through the evidence of PW1, PW3 and

PW8 by Mr. U.B.Dube, learned counsel appearing for the State

of Maharashtra who painstakingly developed the whole

argument to the effect that the family of the prosecutrix

was a middle class family. With the help of muscle and

money power, accused No. 1 used to threaten the prosecutrix

and her family members. The whole family remained under the

threat of the accused No. 1 and the nikaah was performed

forcibly though the prosecutrix had not consented for it.

Learned counsel, therefore, argued that it is established

law that when the prosecutrix herself alleges the rape and

other ill treatments by accused No. 1, her evidence was

sufficient enough to convict the accused persons and

rightly believed to be true by the trial court and,

therefore, the High Court should not have upset the

conviction awarded by the trial court.

7. Mr. Dube submitted that in committing the crime,

accused No. 1 was helped by all the other accused persons

who were his henchmen. He also stated that accused No. 1

was an influential political leader having been once elected

as a Member of Parliament and once as a Member of

Legislative Assembly of Karnataka. He, therefore, pointed

out that accused No. 1 along with his henchmen overawed the

family of the prosecutrix and also obtained forceful

consent from the prosecutrix for their nikaah. He, further

argues that there was no valid nikaah and that the act of

the accused No. 1 in ravishing the prosecutirx would amount

to rape under Section 376 IPC. He also argued that the

prosecutrix was forcibly taken away from the custody of her

parents. The conviction and sentence ordered by the

Sessions court for the various offences including criminal

intimidation and causing injuries were well justified.

8. Mr. Sushil Karanjkar, learned counsel for the

respondent pointed out that the High Court has very

painstakingly gone through the whole list of events from

November, 1998 right up to 5.6.1999, the day when the first

information report was lodged by the prosecutrix. Mr.

Karanjkar, pointed out that even though it was alleged that

because of his desire to marry with the prosecutrix as he

was not happy with his wife, accused No. 1 overawed the

family with the revolver, but the incident was never

reported to the police. Mr. Karanjkar further pointed out

that even though in the Ramzaan Eid festival in January,

1999, when the prosecutrix and her family members had

shifted to new house at Jule, Solapur, accused No. 1 came

there and threatened them to pay Rs. 12,00,000/-, this

matter was also not reported to the police. Learned counsel

further argues that in the last week of April, 1999 when

accused No. 1 again came to the residence of the prosecutrix

and started threatening and insisted for payment of Rs.

8,00,000/- and also insisted the prosecutrix to marry him,

no report to that effect was lodged. Likewise, the learned

counsel pointed out the that the event of 5.5.1999 was not

reported to the police when the prosecutrix and her family

was made to travel to Bombay in a car belonging to accused

No. 1 for the purpose of nikaah. Learned counsel points out

that for the purpose of nikaah, accused No. 1 converted

himself to Islaam and there was a kazi who got the nikaah

performed between accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix.

Thereafter, learned counsel relied on all the documents

including the affidavit filed by the accused No. 1 to the

effect that he had converted himself into Islaam as also the

oral evidence of the Kazi - PW3. Therefore, there was no

question of any undue influence or coercion having been

exercised by or at the instance of accused No. 1.

9. Mr. Karanjkar also points out that for the purpose

of this nikaah, the rest of family members including the

father and mother of the prosecutrix travelled by train and

accompanied accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix to the house

of Shakil Noorani in Bombay where nikaah was performed.

Learned counsel further points out that there was no

question of this marriage having been performed under the

undue influence, coercion, threat or fraud. Learned counsel

points out that after the marriage, accused No. 1 and the

prosecutrix went to a resort in Khandala and thereafter,

they also went to Hyderabad, Mysore etc. including the

Vrindavan gardens where accused No. 1 is alleged to have

taken the photographs of the prosecutrix.

10. Mr. Karanjkar further points out that the High Court

has threadbare appreciated the evidence of PW2, her mother

PW8, Kazi- PW 3 and other prosecution witnesses. There is

nothing on record to suggest that accused No. 1, at any

point of time, coerced or threatened the prosecutrix and

her family members. Mr. Karanjkar wonders that the educated

family and well to do parents do not find time to report

the serious matter concerning their daughter to the police.

He further supports the finding of the High Court to the

effect that though accused No. 1 had ravished the

prosecutrix in her own house in a bed room when the other

family members were also present, but none of them came

forward to the rescue of the prosecutrix despite her cries

for help and lodged any report. Learned counsel points out

a very substantial discrepancy in the prosecution case that

the father and brother of the prosecutrix,who were professor

and student, have not been examined as prosecution

witnesses. Learned counsel further points out that the High

Court has taken a reasonable and plausible view of the

evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 8 and silence on the part of the

material witnesses and failure to explain as to why they

did not report the matter to the police of all these events

creates a doubt on the prosecution story.

11. Mr. Dube, learned counsel appearing for the State was

not in a position to justify the evidence of Kazi PW 3,

particularly, that he did not see happiness on the face of

the bride when he performed the nikaah.

12. Mr. Karanjkar argued that the High Court has rightly

concluded that from the solitary statement of PW3 that he

did not see happiness on the face of bride, no inference can

be drawn that it was a forced nikaah. It is also stated

that the father and the brother of the prosecutrix acted as

vakils of the prosecutrix and also gave consent for the

marriage and in consideration, Mehar of Rs. 25,0000/- was

given. There is also a valid nikaahnama on record.

13. We have gone through the impugned judgment very

carefully. We find that the impugned judgment cannot be

faulted with. The findings given by the High Court are

perfectly justifiable. The High Court has not erred in

coming to the conclusion that the whole prosecution story

was a myth. Undoubtedly, the whole matter is unfortunate.

However, this is an appeal against the acquittal. The

burden was on the prosecution to prove and justify its

contention that the findings of the High Court were perverse

and were not justifiable and in this case, the High Court

has miserably failed to do justice and the findings and

inferences drawn by it are not possible view or could not

not have been drawn in law. The prosecution has failed to

convince us.

14. Once the appeal fails against the main accused, there

remains nothing against the other accused. Mr. Dube, did

not seriously challenge their acquittal. The evidence also

does not suggest any criminal activity on their part. The

appeal against their acquittal has to necessarily fail.

15. This being the position, we are not inclined to

interfere with the well-considered judgment of the High

Court. The impugned judgment of the High Court, acquitting

the accused persons, is confirmed. The appeals are,

accordingly, dismissed.

...................J. (V.S.SIRPURKAR)

....................J. ( T.S.THAKUR)

New Delhi, May 05, 2011

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