State Of M.P vs Ramesh And Anr

State of M.P. ...Appellant

Versus

Ramesh & Anr. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh

against the judgment and order dated 31.3.2004 passed by the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (Gwalior Bench) in Criminal

Appeal No. 262 of 1997, reversing the judgment and order dated

16.8.1996 passed by the Sessions Court, Guna in Sessions Trial No.

155/1995, convicting the respondent No.1 under Section 302 of Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC') and respondent No.2

under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, and sentencing them

to life imprisonment.

2. FACTUAL MATRIX:

(A) Respondent No.2 Bhaggo Bai filed an FIR dated 31.1.1995 in

Police Station, Ashok Nagar, mentioning her name as Madhav Bai

stating that her husband Chatra died after falling during a spell of

giddiness at about 11.00 p.m. In respect of the same incident, another

complaint was lodged by Munna Lal (PW.2) along with Rannu Bai

(PW.1), daughter of deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai, aged about 8

years stating that both the respondents-accused had murdered Chatra.

After having a preliminary investigation, the Investigating Officer

arrested respondent No.2 Bhaggo Bai and lodged the FIR formally on

4.2.1995.

(B) After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed

against both the accused for committing the murder of Chatra. A large

number of witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Both the

respondents-accused examined themselves as defence witnesses

alongwith some other witnesses. After concluding the trial, both the

respondents-accused were convicted and sentenced, as mentioned

2

hereinabove, by the Sessions Judge vide judgment and order dated

16.8.1996.

(C) Being aggrieved, both the respondents -accused filed Criminal

Appeal No.262/1997 which has been allowed by the impugned

judgment and order and both of them stood acquitted. Hence, this

appeal.

3. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant-State, has submitted that the judgment and order of the High

Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has

gravely erred in showing unwarranted sympathy towards the accused

and dis-believed the prosecution case brushing aside the statement of

Rannu Bai (PW.1), merely being a child witness and pointing out that

there was contradiction in the medical and ocular evidence regarding

the injuries found on the person of Chatra, deceased. The High Court

further erred in holding that there was enmity between the accused

Bhaggo Bai and Ramesh. At the time of death of Chatra, Ramesh

accused was facing trial for committing rape on Bhagoo Bai; thus,

question of conspiracy between the said two accused could not arise;

several cases were also pending in different courts between Munna

Lal (PW.2) and his wife Kusum Bai on one hand, and Chatra and

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Bhaggo Bai on the other hand. Thus, there was a possibility of false

implication of Ramesh accused. Chatra died because of a fall when he

went to urinate, as he was suffering from giddiness all the time

because he used to take `dhatura' and had become a Lunatic. Chatra

used to eat soil etc. Rannu Bai (PW.1) though a child, was able to

understand the questions put to her and her duty to speak the truth.

She could not have any enmity with either of the accused. The rape

case filed by deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai against accused

Ramesh remained pending for a long time and Ramesh got acquitted

after the death of Chatra, deceased. The Trial Court after appreciating

the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that

accused Ramesh committed rape upon Bhaggo Bai during the period

between 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994. In fact, they were having illicit

relationship for a period of more than 3 years. The High Court

brushed aside the said finding without giving any cogent reason. The

allegation that Rannu Bai (PW.1) had been tutored by Munna Lal

(PW.2) could not be spelled out from her statement. The neighbours

had come at the place of occurrence after being called by Rannu Bai

(PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2). In spite of the fact that some of them

had declared hostile, part of their evidence still could be relied upon in

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support of the prosecution case. Therefore, the judgment and order of

the High Court, impugned is liable to be set aside, and appeal deserves

to be allowed.

4. On the contrary, Ms. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel appearing

for the respondents, has submitted that the facts and circumstances of

the case do not warrant interference by this Court against the

judgment and order of acquittal by the High Court. The High Court

being the first appellate court and the final court of facts had

appreciated the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion

that it was not possible that Bhaggo Bai could have hatched a

conspiracy with Ramesh accused for committing the murder of her

husband Chatra during the pendency of the case filed by her against

Ramesh under Section 376 IPC. Munna Lal (PW.2), his wife and son

had also assaulted the deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai, accused and

wanted to grab their property and so many civil and criminal cases

were pending between them, his evidence cannot be relied upon. As

per the medical evidence, it was possible that the injuries suffered by

Chatra could have been received by fall caused by giddiness. More

so, Chatra had become a lunatic and could not understand right or

wrong. The testimony of Rannu Bai (PW.1), has been rightly dis-

5 believed by the High Court as she had been tutored by Munna Lal

(PW.2). Admittedly, she had been living with him since the death of

her father Chatra. The High Court has rightly believed the defence

version and appreciated the depositions of defence witnesses,

including Radha Bai (D.W.1), elder daughter of Bhaggo Bai accused,

in the correct perspective. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be

dismissed.

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

CHILD WITNESS :

6. In Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan,

AIR 1952 SC 54, this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of

Indian Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of Evidence Act, 1872 and

held that every witness is competent to depose unless the court

considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to

him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme

old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the

same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the Court

considers otherwise.

6 The Court further held as under:

".....It is desirable that Judges and magistrates

should always record their opinion that the child

understands the duty of speaking the truth and

state why they think that, otherwise the credibility

of the witness may be seriously affected, so much

so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject

the evidence altogether. But whether the

Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion

can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances

when there is no formal certificate...."

7. In Mangoo & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC

959, this Court while dealing with the evidence of a child witness

observed that there was always scope to tutor the child, however, it

cannot alone be a ground to come to the conclusion that the child

witness must have been tutored. The Court must determine as to

whether the child has been tutored or not. It can be ascertained by

examining the evidence and from the contents thereof as to whether

there are any traces of tutoring.

8. In Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1998 SC 2726, this

Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier

judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find

adequate corroboration before it is relied on. However, it is more a

rule of practical wisdom than of law. It cannot be held that "the

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evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably

stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence

shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence

of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater

circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what

others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring."

9. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate & Ors. v. State of

Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460, this Court dealing with the child

witness has observed as under:

"The decision on the question whether the

child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily

rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners,

his apparent possession or lack of intelligence,

and the said Judge may resort to any examination

which will tend to disclose his capacity and

intelligence as well as his understanding of the

obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial

court may, however, be disturbed by the higher

court if from what is preserved in the records, it is

clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This

precaution is necessary because child witnesses

are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world

of make-believe. Though it is an established

principle that child witnesses are dangerous

witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be

influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is

also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny

of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion

that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no

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obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a

child witness."

10. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern

between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-

examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to

indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong.

The court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting

questions to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be

gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the

implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited

in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to

understand the sanctity of giving evidence on a oath and the import of

the questions that were being put to him. (Vide: Himmat Sukhadeo

Wahurwagh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC 2292).

11. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors., AIR 2010 SC

3071, this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is

inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to

recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to

abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget

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those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to

recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the

future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime

without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire

confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any

corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of

having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must

be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone

wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the

child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the

accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.

12. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be

relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from untutored part, in

case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an

eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into

consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a

hostile witness. (Vide: Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab,

(2006) 13 SCC 516).

10 13. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to

the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require

corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the

court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court

may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be

evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is

susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to

show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement

partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been

tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.

APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL:

14. We are fully alive of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal

against acquittal and in the absence of perversity in the said judgment

and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary

jurisdiction, is not warranted. It is settled proposition of law that the

appellate court being the final court of fact is fully competent to re-

appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own

decision. Law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or

condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to

arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides

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for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of

innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence

every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by

the competent court and there can be no quarrel to the said legal

proposition that if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of

the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the

findings of acquittal.

INJURIES:

15. Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) has performed Post Mortem of Chatra,

deceased. He found following injuries on his person vide Post Mortem

Report Ex.P-8:

(i) A contusion of size 1 cm x 1 cm on the L of mandible on right

side with an abrasion on upper part of contusion 1 cm x 0.3 cm

obliquely. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.

(ii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1-1/2" below the above

contusion over neck. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.

(iii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1.5 cm below and lateral to

L of mandible right on neck.

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(iv) An abrasion of size 3.5 cm x 0.5 cm over left side of neck

posterior laterally on upper part, transversely oblique going

upwards. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.

(v) A contusion over lower lip right side near to L of mouth of size

0.5 cm x 0.5 cm sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.

(vi) An abrasion over right shoulder posterior laterally of size 4 cm

x 1.5 cm post mortem in nature.

Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) opined that injury No.(vi) was after the

death. On internal examination, he found the right pleura adherent to

lung parietes. Both the lungs were enlarged. On further dissection, he

found a sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present in supra sternal notch

area. Blood mixed fluid with froth stood discharged through mouth

and noise. According to the doctor, cause of death was on account of

`asphyxia' as a result of throttling. No piece of cloth or thread was

found inside the mouth of the deceased. The deceased had an ailment

of the lungs.

16. The Trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record

came to the conclusion that the injuries found on the person of the

deceased could not have been received from a fall on the ground. The

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injuries found on his body are in consonance with the deposition of

Rannu Bai (P.W.1), who has stated that after hearing the noise, she

woke up and saw that accused Ramesh was beating her father with

"Gumma" (a hard object made of cloth), and her mother had caught

hold of the deceased by his legs. The doctor had found that blood had

oozed from his mouth and such injury could be possible as per the

case of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, Munna Lal (PW.2) has deposed

that Ramesh had caused injuries with the knife. The High Court has

given undue weightage to his statement. In fact, as per the prosecution

case, Munna Lal (PW.2) was not an eye witness. He was called by

Rannu Bai (PW.1) and reached the place of occurrence along with

some other persons.

17. In Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507, this Court has

explained the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, 1872

observing that it is an exception to the general rule whereunder the

hearsay evidence becomes admissible. However, such evidence must

be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an

interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be

admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been

made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The

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essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so

connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same

transaction" that it becomes relevant by itself.

18. Applying the ratio of the said judgment to the evidence of

Munna Lal (PW.2), we reach the conclusion that his statement

indicating that Rannu Bai (PW.1) had come to him and told that her

father was beaten by Ramesh with the help of her mother, is

admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.

19. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents has drawn our attention to certain minor contradictions in

the statement of Rannu Bai (PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2). She has

placed a very heavy reliance on the statement of Rannu Bai (PW.1)

that first she had gone to the house of her grandfather Lala and the

trial Court committed an error reading it as Munna Lal (PW.2). In

view of the fact that Bhaggo Bai, respondent/accused herself stated in

her cross-examination while being examined under Section 315

Cr.P.C. that she had sent Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna Lal

(PW.2), such argument looses the significance. Even otherwise, the

omissions/contradictions pointed out by Mrs. K. Sarada Devi are of

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trivial nature and are certainly not of such a magnitude that may

materially affect the core of the prosecution case.

20. The witness examined by the prosecution supported its case to

the extent that the door of the room wherein the offence had been

committed was bolted from inside. It was only when Ram Bharose,

village Watchman (P.W.5) threatened Bhaggo Bai, accused saying

he would call the police, the door was opened and, by that time,

accused Ramesh had left the place of occurrence and Chatra had died.

Thus, there is no conflict between the medical and ocular evidence.

The prosecution case is fully supported by Ram Bharose (PW.5) and

partly supported by Hannu (PW.7) and Anand Lal (PW.3). Even the

part of the depositions of hostile witnesses, particularly Basori Lal,

Sarpanch (PW.4) can be relied upon to the extent that on being called,

he reached the place of occurrence and found that the room had been

bolted from inside. It is also evident from the evidence on record that

Rannu Bai (PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2) had called the persons from

their houses and after their arrival, they found that the room had been

bolted from inside. So to that extent, the version of these witnesses

including of the hostile witnesses, can be believed and relied upon.

The post mortem report clearly explained that Chatra died of

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`Asphyxia' and this version has been fully supported by Dr D.K. Jain

(PW.8).

21. Bhaggo Bai, accused/respondent has admitted in her statement

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter called as `Cr.P.C.') that Rannu Bai (PW.1) was present

inside the room/place of occurrence and she further admitted that

Rannu Bai, (PW.1) had gone to call Munna Lal (PW.2) at the relevant

time. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid admission of the said

accused itself that both the persons were present inside the room and

are well aware of the incident.

22. Undoubtedly, there had been some minor contradictions in the

statements of witnesses in regard to the fact as to who had reached the

place of occurrence first. All the witnesses have affirmed in one voice

that Munna Lal (P.W.2) had entered the room and after coming out,

he disclosed that Chatra has died. In fact, this fact had been affirmed

by all the witnesses. In view of the contradictions in the statements of

witnesses as to whether torch was used to create artificial light in the

room or not to find out the scene therein, becomes immaterial. It is

evident from the material available on record that there was only one

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room house where the incident took place and no other space was

available. Thus, in case the other witnesses had not deposed that

Radha Bai (D.W.1) was also present in the house along with accused

Bhaggo Bai, remains immaterial for the reason that her presence is

natural.

23. The Trial Court after taking note of rulings of various

judgments of this Court as what are the essential requirements to

accept the testimony of a child witness held as under:

"In the present case, statement of child witness

gets affirmed by the circumstances of the incident, facts

and from the activities of the other witnesses carried out

by them on reaching at the place of occurrence. Thus,

on the basis of above-said law precedents, statement of

witness Rannu Bai not being unreliable in my opinion

are absolutely true and correct......Statement of child

witness Rannu Bai gets affirmed by the statements of

Munna and witness Hannu and from the medical

evidence. Therefore, facts of the above-stated law

precedents are not applicable to the present case."

In view of the above, it is evident that the statement of Rannu

Bai (P.W.1) is affirmed by the statements of other witnesses, proved

circumstances and medical evidence. Her deposition being precise,

concise, specific and vivid without any improvement or embroidery is

worth acceptance in toto.

18 24. A very heavy reliance has been placed by defence counsel Ms.

K. Sarada Devi on the statements of defence witnesses, particularly,

Radha Bai (D.W.1). However, it may be relevant to point out the

initial part of her statement made in examination-in-chief:

"In view of the witness's age before she was sworn

she was asked as under:

Q. Are you literate? Have you gone to school

for reading?

A. No.

Q. Do you understand right or wrong?

A. I do not understand.

Q. Do you understand Saugandh or Sau (Oath

or hundred)

A. I do not know.

Considering the said answers of the witness it

appears that the witness does not understand right,

wrong or oath, therefore the witness was not sworn."

(Emphasis added)

In view of the above, we are of the view that it cannot be safe to

rely upon her evidence at all.

25. So far as the deposition of Budha (DW.2), father of Bhaggo

Bai, accused, is concerned, he was 80 years of age at the time of

examination and not the resident of the same village. He has deposed

only on the basis of the information he had received from his daughter

19

Bhaggo Bai, accused. Thus, he is not of any help to the defence as

we see no reason to believe the theory put forward by the defence.

26. Complaint was lodged promptly at 6.00 a.m. on 1.2.1995 in the

Police Station, Ashok Nagar at a distance of 8.00 K.Ms. It may also

be relevant to mention herein that formal FIR was lodged on 4.2.1995

after having preliminary investigation and arresting Bhaggo Bai

accused. Bhaggo Bai herself has reached the Police Station and

lodged the complaint that her husband Chatra died because of falling

from giddiness when he went to ease himself outside the house. This

version has been dis-believed by the I.O. as well as by the Trial Court.

In our considered opinion, Bhagoo Bai would not have moved in the

night for 8 K.Ms. to lodge the FIR, if she was not at fault or having a

guilty mind. Secondly, she lodged the complaint in the name of

Madhav Bai and not in her own name Bhaggo Bai.

27. The cumulative effect of reading the provisions of Article 20(3)

of the Constitution with Sections 161(2); 313(3); and proviso (b) to

Section 315 Cr.P.C. remains that in India, law provides for the rule

against adverse inference from silence of the accused.

20 Statement of the accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can

be taken into consideration to appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise

of the prosecution case. However, as such a statement is not recorded

after administration of oath and the accused cannot be cross-

examined, his statement so recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can

not be treated to be evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the

Evidence Act, 1872.

Section 315 Cr.P.C. enables an accused to give evidence on his

own behalf to disprove the charges made against him. However, for

such a course, the accused has to offer in writing to give his evidence

in defence. Thus, the accused becomes ready to enter into the witness

box, to take oath and to be cross-examined on behalf of the

prosecution and/or of the accomplice, if it is so required. (Vide:

Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukla & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1050;

and Dehal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 85).

In such a fact-situation, the accused being a competent witness,

can depose in his defence and his evidence can be considered and

relied upon while deciding the case.

28. Bhaggo Bai, accused examined herself as a defence witness

(DW.3) and entered into the witness box. She has also been cross-

21 examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as on behalf of co-

accused Ramesh. Bhaggo Bai/accused (DW.3) deposed that accused

Ramesh had committed rape upon her 6 years ago and in that case,

criminal prosecution was launched against him. She has further

deposed that after her husband Chatra fell from giddiness, she had

brought him inside the room with the help of her elder daughter Radha

Bai (DW.1) and put him on the bed. She herself sent her younger

daughter Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna. Munna came and saw

Chatra. The relevant part of her deposition reads as under:

"...Then he (Munna) bolted the door from outside. He

called the watchman. The watchman and Munna seeing

me in the room went to the police station.....It is right

that for the last 8-10 years, I, Chatra and Munna had no

contact with Ramesh.....I got my name to be written as

Bhaggo Bai at the time of report Ext.D-7. My name is not

Madhav Bai. The Policemen recorded the report in the

name of Madhav Bai. I sent Rannu Bai to call Munna

because Munna was my husband's elder brother.

.................

Q.17 Had you illicit and immoral relations with the

accused Ramesh when Chatra was alive?

A. What can I say?

..............

Q. We are saying that you had given twisting

statement in a rape case on which the accused

Ramesh was acquitted?

A. I gave statement."

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Her aforesaid statement is not worth acceptance for the reason

that all the witnesses including those who turned hostile had admitted

that the room was bolted from inside and her statement that Munna

had bolted the room from outside has not been corroborated by any

person. In case she and her husband Chatra were not having any

relation with Munna (PW.2) for the last 8-10 years, it would be un-

natural that she would send her daughter Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call

Munna because he was her husband's elder brother. While lodging

report Ext. D-7 she told her name as Madhav Bai. However, in cross-

examination she has stated that police men recorded her name as

Madhav Bai though her name is Bhaggo Bai. More so, she has not

specifically denied having illicit relationship with Ramesh accused,

nor she has denied that she made a twisting statement to help the

accused Ramesh to get acquitted in the rape case.

29. The Trial Court after examining the entire material on record,

particularly the documentary evidence came to the conclusion as

under:

"43....It appears on viewing all the above documents

Exh. D-8 to D-42 that all these documents are related to

incident of rape of Bhaggo Bai committed by accused

Ramesh for the period 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994..."

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The High Court did not deal with this aspect at all.

30. All the witnesses examined by the prosecution including those

who have turned hostile are admittedly the neighbours of Chatra

deceased and Munna Lal. Thus, they are the most natural witnesses

and the Trial Court has rightly placed reliance on their testimonies.

31. After appreciating the entire evidence on record, we came to

the inescapable conclusion that the High Court has completely

ignored the most material incriminating circumstances which

appeared against the respondents/accused. The findings so recorded

by the High Court are contrary to the evidence on record and thus, are

held to be perverse.

32. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to be allowed and it is

hereby allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated

31.3.2004 in Criminal Appeal No.262 of 1997 is hereby set aside and

the judgment and order of the trial Court dated 16.8.1996 convicting

the respondents/accused under Section 302 IPC in Sessions Trial

No.155/1995 is hereby restored. A copy of the judgment be sent to

the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna, M.P. to take the said respondents

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into custody and to send them to jail to serve the remaining part of the

sentence.

....................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

....................................J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,

March 18, 2011

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