State Of M.P vs Pappu & Ajay
- SCC(2008) 16 SCC 758
- Neutral2008 INSC 897
- AIRAIR 2008 SC Supp 461
- SCR[2008] 11 SCR 793
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where the High Court reduces a sentence imposed by the trial court merely by reference to the period already undergone by the accused, without providing reasons or considering the gravity of the offence, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was committed, and the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, such reduction is not sustainable. In cases involving offences with serious social impact—particularly offences against women—a court imposing sentence must balance aggravating and mitigating factors in a dispassionate manner with due regard to the social order and the requirement of deterrence, and undue sympathy manifested by imposing inadequate sentences undermines public confidence in the efficacy of law; accordingly, sentencing must conform to the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated and must reflect the society's need for justice.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
last offence, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with
default stipulations.
4. He preferred an appeal before the High Court and the
High Court, by the impugned order, held that since the
respondent had undergone imprisonment for about five
months and 25 days, the sentence should be reduced to the
period already undergone in respect of the first offence.
5. The State of Madhya Pradesh has questioned
correctness of the judgment on the ground that considering 3
the gravity of the offence involved, the High Court ought not to
have reduced the sentence to the period undergone which, as
noted above, was less than six months.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
judgment of the High Court.
7. In the instant case the victim was examined as PW-3.
It is to be noted that three persons faced trial and the
co-accused persons were acquitted of the charges.
8. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the
appellant - State, no reason has been indicated by the High
Court to direct reduction of sentence.
9. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates
conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and
property of the people is an essential function of the State. It
could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law 4
must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are
required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine
social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law
which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of "order"
should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman
in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal
law continues to be as it should be a decisive reflection of
social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the
sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery
or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation
sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered
with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive
for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the
nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances
are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.
5
10. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and
society could not long endure under such serious threats. It
is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
which it was executed or committed etc. This position was
illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v.
State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1991 SC 1463).
11. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the
culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows
some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a
sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that
reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised
by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm
that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that 6
are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the
desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes
even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these
considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis
of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are
serious and widespread.
12. After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has
been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of
really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by
the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It
has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha
v. State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no
formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a
reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate
punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may
affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof 7
formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to
correctly assess various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in
the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment
may be equitably distinguished.
13. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect
on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to
offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation
of public money, treason and other offences involving moral
turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on
social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and
per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by
imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view
merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences
will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and
against societal interest which needs to be cared for and
strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing
system.
8
14. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate
punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been
committed not only against the individual victim but also
against the society to which the criminal and victim belong.
The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be
irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the
atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public
abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for
justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of
murder perpetrated in a very brutal manner without any
provocation, most deterrent punishment is not given, the case
of deterrent punishment will lose its relevance.
15. These aspects have been elaborated in State of M.P.
v. Ghanshyam Singh (2003(8) SCC 13), and State of M.P. v.
Babbu Barkare alias Dalap Singh (2005 (5) SCC 413).
16. Considering the legal position as indicated above the 9
High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly
set aside. The judgment of the Trial Court is restored. The
respondent shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the
remainder of sentence.
17. The appeal is allowed.
...........................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
.............................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi, August 4, 2008
This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.
Research this judgment with Miss Lucy
Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.
Try Miss Lucy free