State Of H.P vs Manoj Kumar @ Chhotu

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code'). The

respondent faced trial for alleged commission of offence

punishable under Sections 376/511 and 506 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC'). The Trial Court found that

the accusations were not established and directed his

acquittal giving him the benefit of doubt. An application for

grant of leave in terms of Section 378 of the Code was filed

which was dismissed summarily stating "Dismissed".

3. According to learned counsel for the appellant-State it

was imperative on the High Court to indicate reasons as to

why the prayer for grant of leave was found untenable. In the

absence of any such reasons the order of the High Court is

indefensible.

4. Section 378(3) of the Code deals with the power of the

High Court to grant leave in case of acquittal. Section 378(1)

and (3) read as follow:

2

"378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),-

(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;

(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, 3 [the Central Government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal--

(a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;

(b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

3 (3) No Appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-

section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court."

5. The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the

entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial

Court was at lapse in this regard the High Court was obliged

to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the appeal. The

trial Court on the facts of the case did not perform its duties,

as was enjoined on it by law. The High Court ought to have in

such circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a first

court of appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the

record independently and returned its findings objectively as

regards guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do

so. The questions involved were not trivial. The High Court

has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file

appeal against acquittal, and seems to have been completely

oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a close scrutiny of

the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost

once and for all. The manner in which appeal against

acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much

4 to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On

plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have

set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of

an application of its mind, all the more when its order is

amendable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of

reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.

Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors.

(2001 (10) SC 607). About two decades back in State of

Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan (AIR 1982 SC

1215) the desirability of a speaking order while dealing with

an application for grant of leave was highlighted. The

requirement of indicating reasons in such cases has been

judicially recognised as imperative. The view was reiterated in

Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC

222). Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this

Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority

or Court, be it even the Highest Court in a State, oblivious to

Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the

`Constitution').

5

6. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning

M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All

E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the

fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander

Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was

observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of

justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the

decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision

or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by

objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the

decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by

its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to

perform their appellate function or exercise the power of

judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right

to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,

reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to

the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected

party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of

the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out

reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out.

6 The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous

with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.

7. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned

judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is set aside.

We grant leave to the State to file the appeal. The High Court

shall entertain the appeal and after formal notice to the

respondent hear the appeal and dispose it of in accordance

with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in the

present appeal. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.

..........................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

..........................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi September 29, 2008

7