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State Of A.P vs E. Satyanarayana

Supreme Court30 April 2009Mukundakam Sharma · D.K. Jain · Arijit Pasayat

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an extra-judicial confession is alleged against the accused, the court must satisfy itself that the confession was voluntary and not procured by inducement, threat, or promise within Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and was not brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. The court must scrutinize all relevant surrounding circumstances including the person to whom the confession was made, the time and place of its making, and the circumstances in which it was made, to determine whether the confession was inspired by any improper or collateral consideration. An extra-judicial confession, though admissible and possessing probative value if unambiguous and free from suspicion, cannot be relied upon when material inconsistencies emerge between the testimony of the witness claiming to have heard it and corroborating witnesses or investigating officers, particularly where such inconsistencies pertain to the sequence and timing of events immediately following the alleged confession and go to the credibility of the account itself. Where the investigating officer has had access to a crime scene and the relevant evidence (such as a murder weapon) for an extended period, the failure to discover or seize such evidence despite that access creates a suspicious circumstance casting doubt on the veracity of any subsequent disclosure statement by the accused relating to the same evidence.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2004

State of A.P. ....Appellant

Versus

E. Satyanarayana ....Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of the Division Bench of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court directing acquittal of the respondent who faced

trial for alleged commission of murder of his wife and minor son in the

intervening night of 14/15.11.1996.

2. Learned Sessions Judge, Nizamabad, had found him guilty of the

offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in

short `IPC') and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.

1

3. The whole prosecution case rested on the alleged extra judicial

confession purported to have been made by the accused before the Village

Administrative Officer (PW.1) around 8.00 a.m. The First Information

Report was given to the police at 11.30 a.m. on 15.11.1996. It was indicated

in the FIR that the accused had made a confession before Village

Administrative Officer to have killed the wife and son because of the quarrel

over family affairs.

4. The trial Court found the evidence of PW.1 so far as alleged extra

judicial confession is concerned to be reliable and directed the conviction.

In appeal, the primary stand taken by the accused respondent was that the

evidence of PW.1 is not believable. It contradicts the evidence of PW.2, and

the Investigating Officer. The High Court analaysed the evidence and came

to the conclusion that the so-called extra judicial confession has not been

established.

5. The High Court analysed the position in law relating to extra judicial

confession, namely, that the Court has to be satisfied that the so-called extra-

judicial confession is voluntary and not as a result of any inductment, threat

2 or promise as envisaged in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in

short `Evidence Act') or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to

circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

6. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (AIR 1954

SC 322), and Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1975 SC 1320), this

Court held that the evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by

the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence.

Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution.

If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is

satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then conviction

can be found on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P.

(AIR 1985 SC 1678) this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court

trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra judicial

confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature

of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the

credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction

of extra judicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases

would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a

confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P. (AIR 1990 SC 2140) this

3 Court held that an unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high

probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the

crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and

suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession,

the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of

inductment, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence

Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent

Sections 25 and 26. The Court is required to look into the surrounding

circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by

any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting

that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to

whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the

circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinized. To the same

effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana (AIR 1991 SC 37). After referring to the judgment in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1977

SC 2274), this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992 (3)

SCC 204) held that the extra judicial confession which is not obtained by

coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and

voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without

corroboration.

4

7. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the evidence of

PW.1 should not have been discarded by the High Court as he was a person

on whom the accused could have reposed confidence as he was the Village

Administrative Officer. Additionally, it is submitted that minor

discrepancies in the evidence of PW.1 vis-`-vis other witnesses should not

have been magnified to direct acquittal. Learned counsel for the respondent,

on the other hand, supported the judgment of the High Court.

8. We find there are some relevant aspects which High Court has rightly

taken note of. Firstly, the extra-judicial confession is said to have been

made at about 8.00 a.m. The First Information Report was given at 11.30

a.m. It has not been explained as to why there was delay in lodging the FIR

by the Village Administrative Officer. The evidence of PW.2 shows that

police was in the house of the accused around 8.00 a.m. If that be so, the

first thing PW.1 would have done was to report to the police about the extra-

judicial confession. That apparently has not been done. PW.1 stated that

after the extra judicial confession was made, he asked two persons to keep a

watch over the accused and then the police came and the accused was

handed over to the police officials. This runs contrary to the evidence of

PW.14 who has clearly admitted that the position was not so.

5

9. Another piece of material on which the trial Court had placed reliance

related to the recovery of the blood stained sickle on the basis of the

disclosure made by the accused. The High Court has noticed that the police

was at the place of occurrence from 8.00 a.m. till 4.00 p.m. If that was so,

no explanation has been offered as to why the blood stained sickle in the

house of the accused was not noticed. The conclusions of the High Court

leave no manner of doubt that the judgment of the High Court does not

suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

10. The appeal is dismissed.

11. We record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Mr.

Nikhil Goel who acted as Amicus Curiae in this case.

...............................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

............

....................................J. (D.K. JAIN)

.................................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi,

6 April 30, 2009

7

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