Srimati Sethy and others vs Competent Authority & Land Acquisition Officer, NH-6(49), Keonjhar
- SCC OnLine2025 SCC OnLine Ori 2830
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A co-parcener in an undivided Hindu joint family property cannot, in the absence of formal partition by metes and bounds, transfer to a third party any specific or demarcated portion of such property, nor can the purchaser acquire valid title to a defined share; the transferor may transfer only an undivided share, the extent of which is determinable only through partition, and any sale purporting to convey specific plots from unpartitioned coparcenary property is void ab initio to the extent it exceeds the transferor's own undivided share. This prohibition is further strengthened under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, Section 22, where alienation of property by members of Scheduled Castes to non-members without proper revenue authority scrutiny verifying partition, consent of other co-parceners, and compliance with protective legislation is similarly void, and revenue authorities' grant of permission for such transfer without due inquiry into these requirements does not cure the fundamental legal infirmity.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950).
Srimati Sethy and others .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
Competent Authority & Land .... Opposite Party (s)
Acquisition Officer, NH-6(49), Keonjhar & Ors.
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Dayananda Mohapatra, Sr. Adv.
Along with associates
Mr. Tarun Kanta Pattanayak, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Smt. Jyotsnamayee Sahoo, ASC
Mr. Sourya Sundar Das, Sr. Adv.
Along with associates
Mr. Soumya Mishra, Adv.
Mr. Umesh Chandra Mohanty, Adv.
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-23.04.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: -18.07.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. The Petitioners, through this Writ Petition, seek to challenge the Order dated 19.03.2024 passed by the District Judge, Keonjhar in C.M.A. No.
01/2024 in Execution Case No. 75/2019 (arising out of Arbitration
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
Award dated 24.11.2018 in Arbitration Misc. Case No. 13/2017 and L.A. Case No. 79/2017), whereby the petition filed under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rules 97, 101 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rejected.
2. The Petitioners, though admittedly not parties to the original proceedings, are the legal heirs of the original landowners and have a substantive interest in the land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956, specifically land notified under Section 3-A and compensation determined under Section 3-G(5). The impugned Order is alleged to have been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, excluding the Petitioners who are necessary parties with valid legal rights.
3. It is argued that despite these rights, the Executing Court dismissed the application, solely on the ground of prior litigation before this High Court and Supreme Court and the delay in the execution process, without proper judicial application of mind. The rejection is ex facie perverse, contrary to statutory provisions, and warrants interference.
4. Accordingly, the impugned Order dated 19.03.2024 is liable to be set aside with appropriate directions for impleadment of the Petitioners in the execution proceedings and for proper adjudication in accordance with law.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
5. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
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(i) The petitioners in the present matter are Scheduled Caste women belonging to a pardanshin community, residing in a remote tribal area of Keonjhar district.
(ii) The land in question, described in Schedule "B", is the ancestral property originally held by one Late Nabei Sethy, who belonged to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. He held absolute right, title, and interest over this land, which was duly recorded in his name in the Hal/Major Settlement Record of Rights. Upon his demise, his estate devolved upon his legal heirs: three sons, namely Kalakar, Pumachandra, and Moheswar, and three daughters, namely Parbati @ Srimati, Saraswati, and Malati (the latter being one of the present petitioners). Accordingly, the property left behind by Late Nabei Sethy, including the Schedule "B" land, became undivided coparcenary property among his successors.
(iii) The Schedule "B" land is situated under the jurisdiction of the Collectorate of Keonjhar District, within the Office of the Sub-
Registrar, Keonjhar, P.S. Town, in the village of Baniapat Khuntapada.
The land is recorded in Hal/Major Settlement under Khata No. 50 and comprises a total area of 4 acres and 400 decimals. The specific plots and their respective areas are as follows:
Plot No. Area
130 A0.300 dec
135 A0.200 dec
136 A0.190 dec
137 A0.180 dec
138 A0.170 dec
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
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Plot No. Area
139 A0.090 dec
142 A0.090 dec
143 A0.220 dec
144 A0.210 dec
145 A0.120 dec
148 A0.090 dec
149 A0.210 dec
150 A0.050 dec
229 A0.100 dec
230 A0.140 dec
231 A0.190 dec
232 A0.070 dec
237 A0.120 dec
238 A0.110 dec
245 A0.100 dec
249 A0.180 dec
250 A0.200 dec
251 A0.180 dec
252 A0.240 dec
253 A0.150 dec
254 A0.280 dec
257 A0.160 dec
258 A0.060 dec
(iv) During Kalakar's lifetime, his son Manoranjan predeceased him in the year 2011, leaving behind his wife Lily, son Sarat, and daughter Manisha. Kalakar passed away in the year 2015, leaving his wife Tulasi, sons Arjun and Gurucharan, daughters Kuila and Saila, and the legal heirs of his deceased son Manoranjan. Similarly, Moheswar died leaving behind his daughters Menak, Rashmita, Minka @ Japani, and son Basudeb. Gurucharan, one of Kalakar's sons, passed away on
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
26.11.2023, survived by his wife Reena, son Saumya Ranjan, and daughter Sonali. Despite the passage of time, no partition has taken place among the legal heirs, and the Schedule "B" land continues to be possessed by various heirs according to personal convenience without any formal demarcation or division.
(v) The Genealogy of the Sethy Family is produced hereinbelow:
(vi) It is submitted that Shri Dillip Kumar Pati ("Opp. Party No. 3") became aware that a portion of the Schedule "B" land, referred to as Schedule "C", was likely to be acquired by the Government of India for the construction of a bypass under National Highway No. 6. The three sons of Late Nabei Sethy i.e. Kalakar, Moheswar, and Pumachandra, thereafter executed various registered sale deeds in favour of Shri Dillip Kumar Pati and one Balaram Patra. These include:
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
a. RSD No. 11001101369 dated 13.06.2011, executed by the Opp .
Party No.3, Sri Dillip Kumar Pati had purchased the land from Kalakar, Maheswar and Puna without taking the consent of their 3 sisters (present petitioners) who are the daughters of Late Nabei Sethy beyond their share. b. RSD No. 11001200410 dated 02.03.2012, executed by Tulasi Sethy (W/o Late Kalakar Sethy) and Maheswar Sethy, in favour of Balaram Patra. c. RSD No. 11001300363 dated 14.03.2013, whereby the same land was re-transferred by Balaram Patra to Dillip Kumar Pati. d. RSD No. 11001300596 dated 27.04.2013, executed by Maheswar Sethy. e. RSD No. 11001301285 dated 11.09.2013, executed by Purna Sethy, S/o Late Nabei Sethy, in favour of Balaram Patra. f. RSD No. 11001400328 dated 25.02.2014, whereby Balaram Patra transferred the land to Dillip Kumar Pati.
(vii) Relevant permissions were obtained from the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar in respect of some of these transactions, including Anumati Nos. 29/12 and 27/12.
(viii) Subsequently, the Government of India issued Gazette Notification No. S.O. 3424(E) dated 16.12.2015 and Declaration No. S.O. 2036(E) dated 09.06.2016 for acquisition of Schedule "C" land for National Highway purposes. Compensation amounting to ₹6,96,09,267.00 was disbursed to Dillip Kumar Pati and others. Thereafter, pursuant to an appeal under Misc. Arbitration Case No. 3/2017, the Arbitrator-cum-
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
Collector, Keonjhar granted an enhanced compensation of ₹ 21,08,72 ,530.00/-
(ix) Meanwhile, when Dillip Kumar Pati and certain co-sharers attempted to interfere with the petitioners' possession over the unpartitioned land, the petitioners instituted C.S. No.105/2017 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Keonjhar seeking partition. The suit was eventually withdrawn when they were promised appropriate compensation. The petitioners are now arrayed as defendants in C.S. No. 9/2018 filed by others. They also initiated C.M.A. No. 01/2024 before the learned District Judge, Keonjhar under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 and Section 151 CPC, arising out of Execution Case No.
75/2019.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioners submit that as Class I legal heirs of Late Nabei Sethy, they continue to hold undivided coparcenary rights over the Schedule "B" property while the Opposite Party No.3 tries to dispossess them of their rightful property.
(ii) They contend that the six sale deeds executed between 2011 and 2014, many of which involved one Balaram Patra, a BPL cardholder and daily labourer, were executed without their knowledge or consent, and are therefore void ab initio. These transactions, they argue, do not convey valid legal title or interest to the vendees.
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
(iii) Specifically, the petitioners argue that: a. The sale deeds executed between 2011 and 2014, particularly those involving Balaram Patra, a daily labourer and BPL cardholder, raise concerns of procedural irregularity and lack of bona fide consideration. b. In RSD No. 11001200410 dated 02.03.2012, executed by Tulasi Sethy and Maheswar Sethy in favour of Balaram Patra, the consideration amount of ₹72,00,000/- was not supported by any recital as to mode of payment (cash or cheque). Both executants were illiterate and affixed thumb impressions. c. The subsequent sale by Balaram Patra to Dillip Kumar Pati under RSD No. 11001300363 dated 14.03.2013 for ₹79,20,000 cited "medical treatment" as the reason, although no supporting records were annexed. d. The petitioners submit that the RSD No. 11001300596 dated 27.04.2013, executed by Maheswar Sethy in favour of Dillip Kumar Pati, similarly does not disclose the manner of payment of the consideration of ₹45,65,000/-. e. In RSD No. 11001301285 dated 11.09.2013, another transaction was executed between Purna Sethy and Balaram Patra for ₹67,65,000/-. However, no mention is made regarding the source of funds or payment mechanism, which the petitioners argue is questionable given Balaram Patra's financial profile as a BPL. f. This was followed by RSD No. 11001400328 dated 25.02.2014, wherein Balaram Patra transferred the land to Dillip Kumar Pati
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
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for ₹1,23,00,000/- citing repayment of loan and medical expenses.
The petitioners raise doubt over the capacity of a BPL cardholder to engage in such high-value transactions.
(iv) Notwithstanding this, it is submitted that the revenue records were mutated in favour of Opposite Party No. 3 in connivance with revenue authorities and by suppressing the petitioners' lawful rights.
(v) It is further submitted that the sale deeds reflect various procedural irregularities, including lack of recitals regarding consideration paid, absence of credible documentation of financial capacity of the purchaser(s), and discrepancies in the stated reasons for transfer.
(vi) The petitioners assert that the illiteracy of some of the executants, coupled with the absence of any formal partition, rendered the sale deeds beyond the legal authority of the sellers. In particular, the petitioners never alienated their 50% share in Ac. 1.44 dec or Ac. 1.23 dec of land and were never party to the relevant transactions.
Moreover, the alleged consideration amounts, ranging from ₹45,65,000/- to over ₹1 crore, are not substantiated by credible evidence, especially given the financial background of some of the individuals involved.
(vii) The petitioners initiated C.S. No. 105/2017 seeking partition but, upon being misled by representations and promises made by Dillip Kumar Pati following the government's land acquisition notification, they withdrew the suit. Thereafter, Gurucharan, son of Late Kalakar, instituted C.S. No. 9/2018, which remains pending, wherein the petitioners are arrayed as Defendants Nos.3, 9, and 10. Despite this,
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
the land in question was subsequently acquired by the Government of India for construction of National Highway No. 6, and substantial compensation was paid exclusively to Dillip Kumar Pati and others without the knowledge or involvement of the petitioners. Initially, an amount of ₹6,96,09,267.00/- was disbursed; thereafter, on appeal, an enhanced compensation amount of ₹21,08,72,530.00 was granted by the Arbitrator-cum-Collector, Keonjhar. The petitioners assert that, being entitled to at least a one-sixth share in the said property and compensation, their exclusion amounts to an arbitrary and unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 300A of the Constitution.
(viii) In light of this, the petitioners filed W.P.(C) No. 10075/2024 before this Court, which was disposed of by order dated 25.04.2024 with a direction to Opposite Party No. 1 to decide on the apportionment of both original and enhanced compensation in L.A. Case No. 79/2013. It is only thereafter that the petitioners came to understand the extent of fraudulent mechanisms adopted by Dillip Kumar Pati in concert with certain officials and co-sharers; both to effect illegal mutation in his favour and to alienate land even while partition proceedings were pending. They allege that the process involved manipulation of official records, concealment of material facts, and misrepresentation of ownership rights.
(ix) Therefore, the petitioners contend that the entire course of action undertaken by Opposite Party No.3 amounts to systematic usurpation of their legal rights, achieved through deceit, coercion, and abuse of
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
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administrative machinery. They claim to have been deprived of both ancestral land and legitimate compensation without due process of law. These actions, they submit, warrant judicial intervention not only to safeguard their proprietary rights but also to prevent the further erosion of constitutional protections guaranteed to marginalized and vulnerable citizens.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the Opp. Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i). It is submitted that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable in the eye of law. This writ petition arises from an application filed by the petitioners under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned District Judge, Keonjhar, in Execution Case No. 75 of 2019. This application was registered as C.M.A. No. 01 of 2024, wherein the petitioners prayed for setting aside the arbitral award passed in favour of this deponent (the decree-holder) in Misc. Arbitration Case No. 13 of 2017 and for issuance of a fresh award.
(ii). The learned Executing Court, upon hearing the parties and examining the record, dismissed the said application by a reasoned and detailed order, rightly characterizing the same as frivolous and an abuse of process. The core findings of the Executing Court were that the petitioners were well aware of the proceedings and had earlier instituted Civil Suit No. 105 of 2017 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Keonjhar, raising similar grievances. However, that suit
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
was withdrawn with a categorical statement that no further legal proceedings would be initiated in connection with the properties in question.
(iii). Despite having knowledge of the proceedings from the inception, the petitioners never took steps to implead themselves as parties to the original arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, the matter has already been adjudicated at multiple levels, including by this Court and the Supreme Court. The present application was filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly five years from the initiation of proceedings, with no credible justification. It is evident that the petition was moved merely to delay the execution proceedings.
(iv). The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides a complete statutory framework for challenging an arbitral award. Section 31 deals with the form and contents of the award, Section 34 provides for filing an application to set aside an award, and Section 37 lays down the appellate remedy. If a party aggrieved by an award does not file an application under Section 34 within the prescribed time, the award attains finality under Section 35 and becomes enforceable as a decree under Section 36 of the Act. In the present case, no application under Section 34 was ever filed by the petitioners, nor did they object during the relevant stages of the acquisition process. As such, they are now estopped from raising objections at the execution stage, which is governed solely by the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. Once the award is final and the execution has commenced, the procedural law applicable is that of the CPC, not the parent Act of 1996.
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
(v). Order XXI Rule 97 deals with resistance or obstruction to possession, Rule 98 with the order after adjudication, and Rules 99 to 101 deal with claims to possession and the powers of the executing court in adjudicating such claims. Rule 103 further stipulates that such adjudications shall be treated as decrees and shall be subject to appeal.
Accordingly, the impugned order is deemed to be a decree under law, and hence, an appeal lies therefrom. In the presence of a statutory appeal remedy, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The Supreme Court has time and again held that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked where alternate efficacious remedies exist. The writ petition ought to be dismissed with exemplary costs to deter litigants from filing vexatious and forum- shopping applications.
(vi). It is also pertinent to note that when the writ petition was first listed on 17.09.2024 under the Fresh Admission category, this Hon'ble Court had directed the counsel for the petitioners to satisfy the Court on the maintainability of the petition in view of the availability of the appellate remedy. Instead of responding to this direction, the petitioners appeared through proxy counsel citing the illness of the arguing counsel and later took advantage of the change in bench composition to file the present interim application, which has unfortunately resulted in the passing of an interim order to their advantage. This conduct is not only reprehensible but clearly indicative of an attempt to mislead the Court and stall the lawful execution of the award.
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
(vii). Moreover, the petitioners have earlier filed W.P.(C) No. 17406 of 2024 before the Division Bench of this Court seeking similar reliefs, in which even interim relief was declined. They also filed CMP No.
28339 of 2024 challenging the same subject matter now urged in this writ petition, which was dismissed by the Registry. This amounts to forum shopping and an abuse of the process of law. The petitioners cannot be permitted to reopen issues that have been settled or withdrawn by them earlier, including in C.S. No. 105 of 2017 which they voluntarily withdrew before the National Lok Adalat after a settlement, expressly stating that they had no further claim over the disputed land.
(viii). It is also on record that after the death of Nabei Sethy, there was a family partition between his heirs on 19.01.2011, and the petitioners' brothers lawfully sold their respective shares to the Opposite Party No. 3, including the acquired lands. The Gazette Notification for acquisition was published in 2015 and the award was enhanced in 2018. Yet the petitioners remained silent and initiated proceedings only in 2024, clearly indicating malafide intent.
(ix). Further, the petitioners are already arrayed as defendants in C.S. No.
9 of 2018 but failed to file their written statements and were set ex parte. They have also moved an application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC in that suit admitting that the suit schedule land has vested in the Central Government and is not divisible. This very admission, juxtaposed with the reliefs sought herein, reveals a duplicitous and
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
opportunistic approach aimed solely at frustrating lawful possession and compensation of the answering respondent.
(x). The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery1 and Chancellor v. Bijay Ananda Kar2 has held that writ relief cannot be granted to a petitioner who approaches the court with unclean hands or suppresses material facts. The conduct of the petitioners herein squarely falls within that prohibition.
(xi). It is further submitted that the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), Opposite Party No. 4, attempted to implead itself in the Execution Case No. 75 of 2019 by filing an application under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, which was rejected. The NHAI pursued CMP No. 116 of 2024 before this Hon'ble Court, and then SLP(C) No. 13681 of 2024 before the Supreme Court, both of which were dismissed. The petitioners, in collusion with NHAI, are now seeking to reopen issues settled by the Apex Court itself, which is impermissible.
(xii). Lastly, the application by the petitioners for reference under Section 3H(4) of the NH Act was rejected by the competent authority in view of their previous conduct and withdrawal of civil suit. The petitioners have challenged that rejection in W.P.(C) No. 17406 of 2024 pending before the Division Bench. Having failed to secure interim relief there, they are now attempting a backdoor entry through the present writ petition.
1
AIR 1977 SC 781
2
AIR 1994 SC 579
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
(xiii). In view of the aforementioned facts and judicial precedents, the present Writ Petition is wholly misconceived, malafide, and not maintainable in law. It deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs for abuse of process and repeated forum shopping.
IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
8. Before adverting on the merits of the instant petition, this Court finds it apposite to discuss the settled law with regards to the "rule of alternate remedy" and its judicial exposition.
9. While the existence of an alternate remedy is a relevant consideration, it is not an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The rule of alternate remedy is a rule of self-restraint and not a jurisdictional limitation. Writ jurisdiction may still be invoked where the remedy provided by statute is not efficacious, where fundamental rights are violated, where principles of natural justice have been breached, or where the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or are vitiated by mala fides. Thus, the existence of an alternate forum does not preclude the High Court from exercising its constitutional powers when the circumstances so warrant.
10. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai,3 a two judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted that the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts is discretionary and is limited by the principle of exhaustion of equal and efficacious alternate statutory remedies. While as a general principle, exhaustion of equal and efficacious alternate statutory 3
1998 (8) SCC 1, 1998 (8)
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remedies is mandatory, there are certain exceptions and the High Courts do entertain writs and adjudicate matters basis principles. The relevant paragraphs are produced hereinbelow:
"14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose".
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on (1998) 8 SCC 1 ("Whirlpool") some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field."
(emphasis supplied)
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
11. Following the dictum of the Supreme Court in Whirlpool (supra), in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,4 the Apex court noted that:
"7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the
remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was
available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition
filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is
concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a
rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an
appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative
remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ
jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged."
12. In Radha Krishna Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh,5 the Supreme Court laid down a set of guiding principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the context of availability of alternative remedies, disputed questions of fact, and the scope of judicial discretion. The principles that emerge from the decision are as follows:
"(i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well;
(ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of 4
(2003) 2 SCC 107
5 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334
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the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person;
(iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged;
(iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with."
(Emphasis supplied)
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
13. The present writ petition is squarely maintainable as it concerns the unconstitutional deprivation of the petitioners' property rights under Article 300A through allegations of fraudulent alienation and arbitrary disbursal of compensation; without notice, consent, or due process. The existence of an alternate remedy does not preclude the exercise of writ jurisdiction in this case, which falls squarely within the recognised exceptions namely, violation of natural justice, actions taken without jurisdiction, and infringement of constitutional rights.
The petitioners, as co-parceners, were unlawfully excluded from both ownership and compensation without their express consent that stands affirmed by the very submissions of Opposite Party No. 3.
14. Now, the procedural irregularities shall be addressed in due course, however, at the outset, it is necessary to consider the foundational question: whether the properties in question were capable of lawful alienation in the first place, and if so, whether Opposite Party No. 3 could assert any exclusive right, title, or possession over any specific plot therein.
15. This inquiry assumes significance in view of the admitted position that the Schedule "B" land forms part of a consolidated and unpartitioned ancestral estate, governed by the principles of co- parcenary under Hindu law. In such circumstances, absent a formal partition, no individual co-sharer could have conveyed valid title to a defined portion of the property, and any purported transfer in favour of Opposite Party No. 3 would, at best, be subject to the undivided rights of all coparceners, including the petitioners.
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
16. It is no longer res integra in transfer of property jurisprudence that a person cannot convey a better title than what he has. It was laid down by the Supreme Court in Kavita Kanwar v. Mrs Pamela Mehta and Others,6 where the testatrix purported to bequeath certain immovable properties through a registered Will in favour of respondent.
However, the testatrix neither held any right, title, nor interest in the said properties. The principal bequeathing clause in the Will thus suffered from fundamental uncertainty and was declared void by the court. It was observed as under:
"30.6. It remains trite that no one can convey a better title
than what he had; as expressed in the maxim: 'Nemo dat
quod non habet'. [ See, for example, Narinder Singh Rao vs.
Air Vice-Marshal Mahinder Singh Rao & Ors., (2013) 9
SCC 425, where the testatrix had bequeathed property
in excess to her share and this Court held that the
bequest has to be treated only to the extent of the
share held by the of testatrix.] The testatrix never had
any right over the property belonging to the appellant
and could not have conveyed to respondent No.1 any
property which was of the ownership of the appellant
or which might be acquired or raised by the appellant
in future by her own funds. On this ground alone, the
Will in question is required to be considered void as per
Section 89 of the Succession Act, when the principal
bequeathing stipulation in the Will suffers from uncertainty
to the hilt."
(Emphasis supplied)
6
AIR 2020 SC 2614
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
17. Similarly, in Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese,7 on death of their father, the property devolved upon his two daughters, Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar, the Appellant, and her sister. The sister sold the property without the consent of the Appellant or a valid partition. Observing this, the Supreme Court held as following:-
"19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that "no one can confer a better title than what he
himself has" (Nemo dat quod non-habet). The appellant's
sister did not have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the respondent could not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to the respondent,
except perhaps the litigation."
18. However, a reference should be made to Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which deals with 'transfer by one co-owner'. Plain reading of section 44 suggests that as such there is no legal embargo restricting a co-owner from selling his undivided share without consent of the other co-owners. But it may be noted that in such cases since no legal partition has been effected, it is not practically possible to handover possession to the purchaser as his share can't be properly demarcated.
19. In Ramdas vs. Sita Bai and others,8 the Supreme Court was considering the case of the appellant who had bought land from a co- tenure holder one Sudam, of a property of which the defendant no.1, 7
(2022) 7 SCC 90
8
2009 (7) SCC 444
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
his sister, Sitabai was co-sharer. The transfer was made without the consent and knowledge of the defendant/Respondent. The Court considered the legality of such a transfer and held that Sudam could not have sold off more than his share nor he could have delivered possession of the property till its partition. It was held that under the Transfer of Property Act, a purchaser cannot have a better title than what his vendor had. The court considered judgements rendered by it earlier in M.V.S. Manikyala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors.,9 and Siddeshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubaneswar Prasad Narayan Singh,10 and the Court observed as follows:-
"15. Without there being any physical formal partition of an undivided landed property, a co-sharer cannot put a vendee in possession although such a co-sharer may have a right to transfer his undivided share. Reliance in this regard may be placed to a decision of this Court in M.V.S. Manikayala Rao Vs. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors. [AIR 1966 SC 470], wherein this Court stated as follows:
"Now, it is well settled that the purchaser of
a co-parcener's undivided interest in the
joint family property is not entitled to
possession of what he had purchased. His
only right is to sue for partition of the
property and ask for allotment to him of
that which, on partition, might be found to
fall to the share of the co- parcener whose
share he had purchased."
16. It may be mentioned herein that the aforesaid findings and the conclusions were recorded by the Supreme Court by 9
AIR 1966 SC 470
10
AIR 1953 SC 487
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
placing reliance upon an earlier judgment of this Court in
Sidheshwar Mukherjee Vs. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain
Singh & Ors. [AIR 1953 SC 487], wherein this Court held
as under:-
"All that (vendee) purchased at the
execution sale, was the undivided interest of
co-parcener in the joint property. He did not
acquire title to any defined share in the
property and was not entitled to joint
possession from the date of his purchase. He
could work-out his rights only by a suit for
partition and his right to possession would
date from the period when a specific
allotment was made in his favour (Emphasis
added)
17. In view of the aforesaid position there could be no
dispute with regard to the fact that an undivided share of co- sharer may be a subject matter of sale, but possession cannot
be handed over to the vendee unless the property is
partitioned by metes and bounds amicably and through
mutual settlement or by a decree of the Court."
20. In Dharmendra Singh Parihar v. Ramgopal Chaudhary,11 the Madhya Pradesh High Court elucidated that a co-sharer in joint or unpartitioned property has the legal right to alienate only their undivided share in the property, but not any specific or demarcated portion thereof. In the absence of a valid partition or relinquishment of rights by other co-sharers, any transfer purporting to convey more than the transferor's own share is invalid to that extent. The relevant portion is as follows:
11 2023 SCC OnLine MP 293
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
"22. The Courts below have rightly held that in absence of any relinquishment of share by the defendants No. 3 to 5, they were also equally entitled for their share and have
rightly apportioned the property in eight equal shares
amongst the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 2 to 5. It is
true that a co-sharer can alienate his share but cannot
alienate any specific piece of un-partitioned property. Since the defendant No.2 had only 1/8th share in the property in disputed, therefore, both the Courts below have rightly held
that the sale deed executed in favour of the
appellant/defendant No.1 by defendant No.2 is valid only to the extent of share of defendant No.2. It has been rightly held the sale deed is null and void in excess of share of
defendant No.2 and accordingly, the decree of permanent
injunction to that extent has also been rightly issued."
21. In Ahamad Khan v. Bhaskar Datt Pandey,12 a division bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reiterated the long standing heard a matter wherein the subsequent purchaser/appellant was transferred with the entire suit property by the transferor/co-owner via sale deed despite there existing other co-owners. Moreover, the share of the transferor was not determined in the suit property. While transferring the suit property, it was claimed by the transferor that initially his uncle and father had equal share in the property. Before his uncle's death, he (uncle) had gifted his share to transferor's father, and after the death of the transferor's father, it was claimed that the transferor became the absolute owner of the property as his sisters had also relinquished her share in the suit property.
12 2024 SCC OnLine MP 5157
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
22. The Court held that if the disputed property was indeed Joint Hindu Family property, a specific piece of land could not be alienated by a coparcener or co-sharer without partition, and at the most, the petitioners could only claim a share in the property, not any specific portion of the land. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:
"Although a coparcener or co-sharer can alienate to the extent of his share but he cannot alienate any specific piece of land. Therefore, at the most the petitioners can be said to have purchased a share of coparceners/Co-sharer still they are not entitled for any specific piece of land."
23. Thus, it is clear that when there exist various co-owners in the property, then the subsequent purchaser of the suit property cannot acquire right, title and interest in the whole of the suit property solely based on the sale deed executed by one co-owner/transferor. The transferors who are the brothers and other relatives of the petitioners was only entitled to share his part in the suit property and not the entire suit property with the appellant. Therefore, the appellant could not claim ownership over the entire suit property but only to the extent of the share held by the transferor.
24. It is thus settled that an undivided share in a joint family property cannot be sold off by one of the co-sharers without there being any partition by metes and bounds. Even if there is an assertion that an oral partition took place, the value of the property involved in the partition being more than hundred rupees, such oral partition is not permissible. Registration of such partition was also required. If the
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
partition has not been proved by independent and competent witnesses before the court of law, such partition could not be said to have taken place at all. The Counsel for the Opp. Party No.3 has contended that the concerned property has been partitioned in 2011.
However, he does not say in his order that the share of the Vendee was proved to have been determined by a family partition by such witnesses.
25. The facts of this case are a glaring example of failure to exercise jurisdiction by the Revenue Authorities to consider the validity of the sale deeds set up by the brothers of the petitioner of a joint holding which had mentioned definite boundaries demarcating the share of vendors allegedly sold off to the vendee without the family settlement being proved at any stage of the proceedings.
26. In Sk. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw,13 the Court observed that the actions of the transferor to sale the entire suit property (where the other co-owners also had interest) could not bind the other co-owners as it would tantamount to depriving them from their valid share in the suit property. The relevant share is produced hereinbelow:
"20. In this view of the matter, the entire property
purchased by the two brothers late Salik Ram and late Sita Ram in the year 1959 vide Exh.1 continued to be the joint property in which both of them had equal rights. On their death, the same devolved upon their respective heirs and legal representatives including Brij Mohan, his three sisters on one side and plaintiff-respondent Nandu Lal, his three
brothers and five sisters on the other side. Thus, Brij
13 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2456
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
Mohan alone was not competent to execute a sale of the entire property in favour of the defendant- appellant S.K. Golam Lalchand, that too without its partition by metes and bounds.
21. Since the suit property has many co-owners including the plaintiff-respondent Nandu Lal and Brij Mohan, the defendant-appellant S.K. Golam Lalchand could not have acquired right, title and interest in the whole of the suit property solely on the basis of the sale deed dated 19.05.2006 executed by Brij Mohan. The said sale deed, if at all, in accordance with Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 may be a valid document to the extent of the share of Brij Mohan in the property and defendant-appellant S.K.
Golam Lalchand is free to take remedies to claim appropriate relief either by suit of partition or by suit of compensation and damages against Brij Mohan."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Coming to the facts of the case, the Schedule "B" property is an admitted co-parcenary asset, forming part of a joint and unpartitioned estate devolving from Late Nabei Sethy. No formal partition has ever taken place, and the petitioners, as co-parceners, continue to hold undivided rights in the property. The transfer of specific plots from within this joint estate to Opposite Party No. 3, purportedly through sale deeds executed by certain male co-parceners without the knowledge or consent of the petitioners, raises serious legal infirmities and cannot, in law, convey exclusive title or possession.
28. In the absence of a legal partition of the property in question, the transferors of the impugned sale deeds cannot transfer any defined portion of joint property nor can the purchaser take possession of
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
such specific land. At best, the purchaser steps into the shoes of the transferor and may seek partition, but cannot claim possession simpliciter. The law is equally clear that no one can transfer a better title than they possess. Therefore, any sale deed purporting to convey specific demarcated land from within unpartitioned coparcenary property is legally void to the extent it exceeds the seller's undivided share, and is not merely voidable.
29. In the present case, Opposite Party No. 3 claims to have acquired absolute rights over defined plots of land by virtue of sale deeds executed by certain male co-sharers. However, there is no evidence of any lawful family settlement, registered partition, or mutual relinquishment by the petitioners. On the contrary, the petitioners being daughters and coparceners were not made party to any such transaction.
30. Ordinarily, Opposite Party No. 3, having purchased the undivided share of certain co-parceners, could have worked out his rights only by instituting a suit for partition, and any right to possession would arise only upon specific allotment of share pursuant to such partition.
However, the legal position acquires a more complex dimension when viewed in light of Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, which places restrictions on the transfer of immovable property belonging to members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
31. Given that the petitioners belong to a Scheduled Caste community and the impugned transfers were made in favour of individuals not belonging to Scheduled Castes, the legality of the alienation in favour
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
of Opposite Party No. 3 is further circumscribed by the statutory safeguards under Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, which aims to prevent the unauthorized transfer of land from members of Scheduled Castes to non-SC individuals. Such transactions are subject to strict scrutiny to ensure they do not result in circumvention of protective provisions intended to guard against exploitation of marginalized communities.
32. Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act reads as provided:
"22. Restriction on alienation of land by Scheduled Tribes-
(1) any transfer of holding or part thereof by a raiyat, belonging to a Scheduled Tribe shall be void except where it is in favour of-
(a)) a person belonging to a Schedule Tribe; or
(b) A person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe
when such transfer is made with the previous
permission in writing of the Revenue Officer;"
33. Section 22(5) of OLR Act stipulates that the provisions contained in Sub-section (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis, to the transfer of a holding or part thereof a raiyat belong to the Scheduled Caste.
34. Admittedly, permission was erroneously granted by the Revenue Authorities for the execution of the impugned sale deeds by certain co-parceners in favour of Balaram Patra and Dillip Kumar Pati, the former being a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste community and the latter not. This irregularity becomes particularly significant given the undisputed fact that the Schedule "B" property remains undivided ancestral coparcenary land, in which the petitioners, who
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
also belong to the Scheduled Caste community, continue to hold subsisting and undivided rights. The sale transactions were carried out without any lawful partition and in complete disregard of the petitioners' interests.
35. In such a scenario, where a portion of unpartitioned ancestral property belonging to Scheduled Caste co-parceners is alienated without their consent, even if the transferee is also from a Scheduled Caste background, the transaction still violates the protective spirit of the law. However, when such land is subsequently transferred to a person outside the Scheduled Caste community, as in the case of Dillip Kumar Pati, the legal infirmity deepens. The transfer not only circumvents the safeguards under the Orissa Land Reforms Act and other protective statutes, but also raises a serious concern of property being diverted from a constitutionally protected group to a non- entitled individual under a veil of procedural legality. Allowing such transactions to stand would defeat the very object of the legislative scheme, which seeks to protect SC/ST landholders from exploitation and unauthorized dispossession. If a single co-sharer, regardless of community, acting without formal partition and without the consent of other co-parceners, is permitted to alienate defined plots, it would amount to unlawful deprivation of rights guaranteed to other co- parceners, particularly those from historically disadvantaged communities. Such transactions, particularly when facilitated or overlooked by revenue officials, strike at the heart of the statutory protections and cannot be sustained in law.
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
36. Based on the legal principles derived from statutory provisions and established Supreme Court jurisprudence on co-parcenary rights, the following legal guidelines may be framed for regulating the alienation of undivided property by members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes:
(i). A Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe co-parcener cannot legally transfer or alienate any specific portion of joint co- parcenary property in the absence of a formal partition among all the co-parcenors, either through mutual agreement reduced to writing and registered, or by a decree of a competent civil court.
(ii). In case such partition cannot be effectuated, any proposed alienation of a specific property of an undivided share by an SC/ST co-parcener shall be preceded by the express, informed consent of all other co-parceners belonging to the SC/ST community. The transferor must establish that all interested co- parceners have agreed to such sale.
(iii). Where the transferee does not belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, the sale of land by an SC/ST co-parcener shall be permissible only with the prior permission of the competent revenue authority, and only after verifying: a). That the transferor has a defined and partitioned share in the
property;
b). If not, the transferor has obtained express consent of the other co-parcenors of the specified cumulative property.
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
c). That the transfer does not affect the livelihood, dwelling rights, or subsistence of any other SC/ST co-parcener; d). That the transaction is not in circumvention of Section 22 or any other protective legislation.
(iv). Revenue authorities shall not grant permission for alienation unless: a). The title of the transferor over the portion proposed to be transferred is clearly demarcated and partitioned; b). All co-parceners' rights have been adjudicated or acknowledged through a registered partition deed or a civil court decree; c). Independent inquiry has been conducted to rule out any suppression of material facts or manipulation of records.
(v). No mutation in favour of the transferee (particularly a non-
SC/ST transferee) shall be effected in revenue records unless the transferor produces proof of lawful partition and/or consent of other SC/ST co-parceners, or a declaratory decree recognizing his exclusive title.
(vi). Any sale or alienation of joint property in violation of the above principles shall be deemed void ab initio and not merely voidable. The burden shall lie on the transferee to prove that the transaction complied with all legal requirements and protected the interests of other SC/ST co-parceners.
(vii). Where any sale is found to have been made in breach of these guidelines, the competent authority may suo moto initiate
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
cancellation proceedings under the Orissa Land Reforms Act or other relevant laws, and take steps to restore possession to the rightful SC/ST co-parceners.
37. Thus, the claim of Opposite Party No. 3 over any specific portion of the said land is legally untenable, not only due to the absence of partition by metes and bounds, but also because the transaction runs afoul of the protective intent underlying Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act.
38. In addition to that, Proviso to sub-section 1 stipulates that in case of a transfer by sale, the Revenue Officer shall not grant such permission unless he is satisfied that a purchaser belonging to a Scheduled Caste willing to pay the market price for the land is not available, and in case of a gift unless he is satisfied about the bona fides thereof.
39. However, the series of transactions culminating in the transfer of undivided ancestral land to Opposite Party No. 3 raises serious concerns suggestive of a potentially orchestrated pattern of irregularity and procedural manipulation. Between 2011 and 2014, a sequence of high-value sale deeds appears to have been executed, involving one Balaram Patra, a daily labourer and BPL cardholder with no discernible financial means, as an intermediary through whom substantial tracts of land were transferred to Dillip Kumar Pati.
These sale deeds, reflecting consideration amounts such as ₹72,00,000, ₹79,20,000, ₹67,65,000, and even ₹1,23,00,000, notably lack any reference to banking instruments, payment receipts, or credible
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
financial documentation, thereby casting considerable doubt on the authenticity of the transactions.
40. It is particularly troubling that the original executants of the impugned sale deeds, namely Tulasi Sethy and Maheswar Sethy, were both illiterate individuals who affixed thumb impressions on the documents. There is nothing on record to suggest that adequate safeguards were put in place to ensure their informed consent or understanding of the legal consequences of such transactions. This raises a legitimate apprehension as to whether these individuals were taken advantage of in the absence of legal or independent assistance.
41. It is difficult to reconcile how a person of limited means, such as Balaram Patra, could have entered into multiple transactions involving crores of rupees within a span of months, citing broad and unsupported justifications like "medical treatment" and "loan repayment." The subsequent resale of these lands to Opposite Party No. 3, often in close proximity to the original purchases, gives rise to a strong suspicion that these transactions were not bona fide sales, but rather a contrived mechanism to construct a legal facade in favour of Opposite Party No. 3, particularly in view of the subsequent land acquisition and disbursement of compensation. While conclusive findings would require further inquiry, the sequence and structure of events bear the appearance of a carefully engineered arrangement designed to exclude lawful co-parceners, including the petitioners.
42. The role of the revenue authorities in this chain of events is deeply concerning. Instead of exercising vigilance in safeguarding the rights
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
of Scheduled Caste co-parceners, the authorities appear to have acted with undue haste and inadequate scrutiny. Permissions for transfer were granted without probing into the financial capacity of the purchaser or the legal status of the land. Mutation entries were made without notifying or consulting other co-parceners who stood to be materially affected. These administrative lapses, when viewed collectively, suggest more than mere negligence; they raise a reasonable apprehension of institutional complicity or, at the very least, wilful blindness. The failure of the revenue machinery to discharge its statutory obligations calls for urgent judicial scrutiny and accountability.
43. The entire transaction, therefore, reeks of illegality, fraud, and abuse of process. It is not just a case of a buyer exploiting legal loopholes, but of an institutional machinery actively failing those it is duty- bound to protect. The High Court cannot turn a blind eye to what is effectively a disenfranchisement of Scheduled Caste co-parceners through bureaucratic complicity and legal subterfuge.
44. In light of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the transfers effected in favour of Opposite Party No. 3 are legally unsustainable to the extent that they purport to convey specific demarcated plots from an undivided coparcenary estate, and to the extent they disregard the lawful rights of the petitioners, who remain co-parceners with undivided interest in the Schedule "B" property. The impugned sale deeds, executed without partition, without consent, and under highly
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
questionable circumstances, cannot confer exclusive ownership upon the vendee and are, therefore, liable to be declared void ab initio.
45. The consequential benefits flowing from these transactions, particularly the receipt of compensation pursuant to land acquisition, must be reconsidered in light of the petitioners' rightful entitlement to an apportioned share.
46. Accordingly, the petitioners, being Scheduled Caste women from a vulnerable socio-economic background, cannot be lawfully divested of their ancestral property through backdoor transactions carried out without their knowledge or consent. If co-parceners belonging to Scheduled Castes are not restored to possession of their rightful share and if mechanisms are not enforced to prevent the exploitation of SC landholders by economically or socially dominant entities, it would not only subvert the legislative intent of protective statutes but also disturb the fragile peace in Scheduled Areas. The law must intervene to uphold equity, prevent dispossession, and reinforce the constitutional promise of justice for the historically marginalized.
V. CONCLUSION:
47. Having considered the pleadings, perused the record, and heard learned counsel for the parties, and for the reasons recorded in the foregoing judgment, this Court finds that the sale deeds executed in favour of Opposite Party No. 3 in respect of Schedule "B" property, being ancestral and unpartitioned coparcenary land, were executed in contravention of established legal principles and in disregard of the rights of the petitioners, who are undisputed co-parceners belonging
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
to a Scheduled Caste community. The series of transactions leading to the alienation of land in favour of Opposite Party No. 3 appear to be tainted with procedural impropriety, lack of bona fide consideration, and material suppression of facts, rendering the entire chain of title highly questionable.
48. It is hereby declared that the sale deeds executed in favour of Opposite Party No. 3, in so far as they pertain to specific and defined portions of Schedule "B" property without partition by metes and bounds, are void ab initio and confer no right, title, or interest upon the said Opposite Party No. 3. Consequently, no interest, possession, or proprietary entitlement shall be deemed to have lawfully vested in Opposite Party No. 3 in respect of any part of the Schedule "B" land.
49. All transactions and derivative rights, if any, emanating from the impugned sale deeds executed between 2011 and 2014 in relation to the Schedule "B" land are held to be vitiated. Such transactions, having been made without partition, without consent of all co- parceners, and in violation of statutory protections applicable to members of the Scheduled Castes, shall be treated as non-est in law and shall not form the basis for any mutation, possession, or claim by any party, private or institutional.
50. The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), or any other agency tasked with disbursal of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act or the National Highways Act, is hereby directed not to release any compensation amount to Opposite Party No. 3 or his nominees in respect of the Schedule "C" land being part of the
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
unpartitioned Schedule "B" estate. NHAI may proceed to recover any award that has been disbursed into the account of Opposite Party No.3.
51. The NHAI shall instead initiate a process of apportionment, with notice to and participation of all recorded co-parceners of the original holder, Late Nabei Sethy, including the petitioners herein. The disbursement of compensation shall be made strictly in accordance with the undivided shares as may be determined either through mutual settlement or through adjudication in appropriate proceedings.
52. The competent revenue authorities are directed to place the mutation entries made in favour of Opposite Party No.3 under suspension until such time as lawful partition is carried out and a final determination of title is made with respect to the Schedule "B" land.
53. The Collector, Keonjhar is directed to cause an inquiry into the manner in which permissions for the sale of coparcenary property were granted without scrutiny, and how mutation and other revenue entries were effected in favour of a private individual in the absence of due process and consultation with all interested parties, particularly members of the Scheduled Caste community.
Appropriate disciplinary proceedings, if warranted, shall be initiated against the erring revenue officials involved.
54. Liberty is granted to the petitioners and other co-parceners to initiate appropriate proceedings for partition or declaration of title before the
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 23-Jul-2025 14:05:19
competent civil court, if so advised, and to seek such consequential reliefs as may be available in law.
55. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.
56. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 18th July, 2025/
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