Sri S Hareesh vs The State Of Karnataka

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT THE ACQUISITION IN RESPECT OF THE PETITION SCHEDULE PROPERTY VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 15.07.1982 AT ANNEX-C ISSUED BY R-1 AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED 16.08.1985 AT ANNEX-D ISSUED BY R-2 IS DEEMED TO HAVE LAPSED UNDER SEC. 24(2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013; AND ETC.,

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016

BETWEEN:

1. SRI C. SANDEEP BABU AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,

2. SRI C. CHETAN AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,

3. SRI C. MADHUSUDAN AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,

4. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, S/O. LATE GUMMAIAH, -5-

ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO.21, PANTHARAPALYA, MYSORE ROAD, BANGALORE - 560 039. ... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI: LOHITASWA BANAKAR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001.

2. THE COMMISSIONER BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, K.P. WEST EXTENSION, BANGALORE - 560 020.

3. M/S. LAKSHMI MALLEABLES (P) LIMITED (A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER COMPANIES ACT, 1956) HAVING ITS REGESTRED OFFICE AT #144, NAYANDAHALLI MYSORE ROAD BANGALORE - 560 039. (REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR MR. RAJATH RAMACHANDRA MANJAPPA).

(R-3 IMPLEADED V.C.O DATED 15/06/2016)

4. ALL COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT WELFARE SOCIETY BY ITS SECRETARY SRI S.R. HEGDE MAJOR NO.826/A, 5TH MAIN ROAD, VIJAYANAGARA, BANGALORE - 560 040.

5. B. KUSUMAKAR SHETTY S/O. MANJAYYA SHETTY AGE: 61 YEARS, R/O. NO.1764, 22ND CROSS, GOVINDARAJ NAGARA, BANGALORE - 560 040.

6. SMT. M.N. VIJAYALAKSHMI W/O. M.N. PRASANNA, -6-

R/O. NO.3390/35, 5TH MAIN ROAD, 3RD CROSS VIJAYANAGARA, 2ND STATE, BANGALORE - 560 040.

7. MISS. NIVEDITHA RESHME D/O. RAVINDRA RESHME, AGE: 30 YEARS, R/O. NO.5/2, POPULATION CENTRE QUARTERS MALLESHWARAM, BANGALORE - 560 003.

8. SMT. GEETHA SHETTY W/O. SANTHOSH SHETTY, AGE: 54 YEARS, R/O. NO.94, 5TH CROSS BAPUJI LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGARA, BANGALORE - 560 040.

9. SMT. VIJAYAMMA W/O. T. PRABHAKARA, AGE: 70 YEARS, R/O. NO.1780, 23RD CROSS KHB COLONY, BANGALORE - 560 023.

10. SMT. DEEPA W/O. SAMPATH KUMAR AGE: 43 YEARS, 85, 3RD CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD, CHOLURPALYA MAGADI ROAD, BANGALORE - 560 023.

11. SRI K.R. VIJAYAKUMAR A/O. K. RAJASHEKARAIAH AGE: 75 YEARS, R/O NO.831- A, 4TH MAIN, 5TH CROSS, VIJAYANAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 040.

12. SMT. PRATHIMA PRASAD D/O. SAMPANGIRAMAIAH, AGE: 45 YEARS, R/O. NO.1123, 18/1A VANI VILAS ROAD, MYSORE.

13. SRI SHARATH KUMAR HEGDE S/O. SEETHARAMA HEGDE, AGE: 41 YEARS, R/O NO.6, KRISHNA RESIDENCY, -7-

4TH CROSS, AMARJOTHINAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 040.

14. DR. SUNIL SHETTY S/O. RAJEEV SHETTY AGE: 39 YEARS, JANANI DENTAL CLINIC, R/O. NO.70, 50 FEET ROAD, CHANDRA LAYOUT, BANGALORE - 560 040.

15. MISS. SARITHA HEGDE D/O. S.R. HEGDE, AGE: 45 YEARS, R/O. NO.312, SALARPURIA CAMBRIDGE RESIDENCY, SOMESHWARAPURA, 1ST CROSS, ULSOOR, BANGALORE - 560 008.

(R-4 TO R-15 ARE IMPLEADED V.C.O. DATED 05/07/2016) ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI: VIJAYA KUMAR A. PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1; SRI G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2; SRI B.VACHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-3; SRI AJITH ANAND SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R-4 TO R-15)

*****

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT THE ACQUISITION IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER SCHEDULE PROPERTY VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DTD.15.07.1982 [ANNEX-C] AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DTD.16.08.1985 [ANNEX-D] IS DEEMED TO HAVE LAPSED UNDER SECTION 24[2] OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 AND ETC.,

W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017

BETWEEN:

1. SRI M.S. SHANMUKHA S/O. M.K. SHIVANNA, -8-

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, MUDDALINGANAHALLI VILLAGE, THYAMGONDALU HOBLI, NELAMANGALA TALUK, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT - 562 132.

2. SRI S. HAREESH S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, 73/52, 2ND FLOOR, CHANDRA APARTMENT, 4TH CROSS, BASAWESHWAR LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 040.

3. SRI S. GURUPRASAD S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, NO.24, 13TH CROSS, GAYATHRI LAYOUT, BASAVANAPURA ROAD, K.R.PURAM, BANGALORE - 560 036. ... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI: UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. MAYA HOLLA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT M.S. BUILDINGS, BANGALORE - 560 001.

2. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD KUMARA PARK WEST BANGALORE - 560 020. (REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER).

3. THE ENGINEER MEMBER BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD, KUMARA PARK WEST, BANGALORE - 560 020.

4. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER HOUSING PROJECT DIVISION-1 BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, -9-

T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD, KUMARA PARK WEST, BANGALORE - 560 020.

5. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD, KUMARA PARK WEST, BANGALORE - 560 020.

6. M/S. K. GOWDA AND COMPANY (H.R.K. GOWDA) NO.3/1, 1ST FLOOR, (REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY), JNANABHARATHI MAIN ROAD, NAGARABHAVI, BANGALORE - 560 072. ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI VIJAYA KUMAR .A PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1; SRI G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2 TO R-5; SRI D.L.N. RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. VIDYULATHA B.V., ADVOCATE FOR R-6)

*****

THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN THE MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION OF 3 BHK HOUSING PROJECT SY.NO.103 OF NAGARBHAVI, YESHWANTHPUR, BANGALRE NORTH TALUK, ON THE FILE OF R-4; AND QUASH AND SET ASIDE WORK ORDER DATED 10.03.2017 AT ANNEX-P ISSUED BY THE R-4 IN FAVOUR OF R-6 IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE PETITION SCHEDULE PROPERTY AND GRANT ALL CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEFS THERETO; AND ETC.,

THE ORDER IN THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN DICTATED FROM 02/02/2018 ON VARIOUS DATES AND RESERVED ON 02/03/2018 AND IT BEING LISTED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT TODAY, COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: - 10 -

ORDER

These writ petitions pertain to land bearing Sy.No.103

of Nagarabhavi Village, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bengaluru North

Taluk, totally measuring four acres thirty guntas (hereinafter

referred to as "land in question"). Originally, the said land

belonged to one Muniveerappa. Muniveerappa sold two acres

in favour of G.Chennarayappa under a registered sale deed

dated 09/10/1978. He is one of the petitioners in

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016. The remaining

land measuring two acres thirty guntas was retained by

Muniveerappa and on his demise, his sons M.Muniramaiah

and M.Gangadhar became the owners of said land.

2. The reason as to why these writ petitions have

been clubbed together are on account of the similar

grievances ventilated by the petitioners herein in respect of

preliminary notification issued by the Bangalore Development

Authority ("BDA" for short) under Section 17(1) of the

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 ("BDA Act" for

short) dated 15/07/1982 and declaration and final

notification issued under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act on

16/08/1985. Hence, these writ petitions have been clubbed

- 11 -

together and they have been heard together and are

disposed of by this common order.

3. The main prayer in all these writ petitions pertain

to, seeking a declaration that the acquisition is deemed to

have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

referred to as "2013 Act" for the sake of convenience). In

addition, in W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017, the petitioners

have sought a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed

having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act. Alternatively,

they have sought a declaration that endorsement dated

04/12/2014 withdrawing their "no objection" issued vide

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexures "M" and "B")

respectively, by third respondent - Deputy Commissioner

(Land Acquisition), BDA as arbitrary, illegal and non est and

not binding on the petitioners in any manner and

consequently to quash the same. Further a direction is

sought to second and fifth respondents in the said writ

petitions to act strictly in conformity with endorsement dated

11/06/2014. Further, in W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017, the

petitioners who are the very same persons in

- 12 -

W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017 have sought quashing of work

order bearing No.BDA/EE/HPD-1/TEN/WO/T-19/2016-17

dated 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") to the said writ petitions

issued by fourth respondent, in favour of sixth respondent in

the said writ petitions insofar as it relates to the petition

schedule land and they have further sought an order of

restraint with regard to altering the nature of the schedule

land. At this stage itself, it may be stated that these

petitioners have purchased only 37.08 guntas of land in

question, which is equivalent to 43,544.82 sq.ft.

4. As already noted, petitioners have sought their

respective reliefs on the basis of Section 27 of the BDA Act

and/or Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, as the case may be,

having regard to the acquisition made by the BDA pursuant

to the notifications issued under Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of

the BDA Act dated 15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 respectively.

5. The pleadings in respect of each of these cases

could be succinctly stated as under:

(i) W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017:

(a) Petitioners herein are stated to be purchasers of

43,544.82 sq.ft. of the land in question from Muniramaiah and

- 13 -

Gangadhar, sons of Muniveerappa, the original owner of the

land in question. They have averred that subsequent to the

preliminary and final notifications issued by the BDA, an

award was passed on 16/05/2002 and the same was

approved on 20/05/2002 in respect of the entire extent of

land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village. Copies of the

preliminary notification and the final notification are at

Annexures "C" and "D" respectively. According to the

petitioners a cyclostyled mahazar was drawn in respect of the

entire extent of the land in Sy.No.103 and possession is said

to have been taken on 16/08/2002. That the said mahazar

does not bear the names and addresses of the witnesses and

further the boundaries of the land in question have not been

mentioned therein. It is stated that such a mahazar is not

proof of taking possession. It is further averred that the

names of the owners have continued in RTC pertaining to the

land in question and hence, the mahazar cannot be accepted

or believed. It is further stated that in the year 2012, BDA

took actual possession of only 20 guntas out of 2.30 acres

from the land owners, having regard to the Exchange Deeds

executed pursuant to resolution of BDA bearing

No.102/2006, dated 04/07/2006. This was a case wherein

- 14 -

owners of the land in question handed over possession of the

said 20 guntas of land to BDA for the purpose of the same

being utilized for ring road and BDA gave free of cost

alternative land equivalent to 75% of the land so utilized.

(b) It is further averred that in W.P.No.19532/2005

filed by owners of the land namely, Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar they sought for a declaration that the acquisition

proceedings in respect of the land in Sy.No.103 to an extent

of 2 acres 30 guntas had lapsed as per Section 27 of the BDA

Act, on the ground that the Scheme has not been

substantially implemented, but the same came to be

dismissed by this Court by order dated 03/08/2006

(Annexure "Q"). At this stage itself, it may be noted that

there was no appeal filed against order dated 03/08/2006. It

is averred by the learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioners that in the said writ petition, BDA had contended

that out of the total extent of 1,210 acres of land notified,

BDA had utilized an extent of 608 acres 30 guntas of land for

formation of Nagarabhavi layout. Therefore, the Court came

to the conclusion that the Scheme had been substantially

implemented and on that ground the petition filed by

- 15 -

Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, owners of the land was

dismissed. However, in some other writ appeal i.e.,

W.A.No.1053/2007, BDA had filed a tabular statement

indicating total extent of lands utilized under various

Schemes initiated by it in respect of lands acquired by the

BDA. That as per Annexure "L" to the writ petitions at

Sl.No.15, in respect of Nagarbhavi Layout, the total extent of

land utilized is 608 acres 30 guntas. It is submitted that this

is contrary to what was contended by BDA in

W.P.No.19532/2005, which was filed by Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar. It is contended that BDA has misled this Court

in W.P.No.19532/2005 and that fraud was played upon this

Court in obtaining a order of dismissal.

According to the petitioners, BDA entered into

exchange of 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 with site bearing

No.2BM-741 in Sy.No.37/1 of Banaswadi village free of cost.

That the said 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 was handed

over by the owners namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar to

BDA for the purpose of formation of the ring road connecting

Magadi Road to Mysore Road. Petitioners have further

- 16 -

submitted that the total extent of land covered under the

seven sale deeds under which they have purchased the land

is 75% of 20 guntas of land utilized for the road. It is further

averred that as 20 guntas of land was surrendered by the

vendors of the petitioners to BDA, 75% of 20 guntas of land

was allotted to their vendors in Banaswadi area as per

Resolution No.102/2006 of the BDA dated 04/07/2006. This

fact is adverted to by the petitioners to contend that

possession of land in Sy.No.103 remained with petitioners'

vendors and that they voluntarily handed over possession of

only 20 guntas of land to the BDA.

(c) Petitioners have next averred that one of their

vendors namely, Gangadhar had filed W.P.No.214/2014

before this Court, seeking a declaration that the acquisition

in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. nearly one Acre of land in

Sy.No.103 had lapsed and the said writ petition was allowed

by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 27/01/2014 at

Annexure "H". Thereafter, BDA issued an endorsement

dated 11/06/2014 to the effect that it had accepted the

judgment passed in W.P.No.214/2014 and that in Sy.No.103,

43,544.82 sq.ft. of land (roughly 1 Acre was deleted from

acquisition) and a copy of the said endorsement is at

- 17 -

Annexure "B" to the writ petitions. According to the

petitioners, prior to the issuance of the said endorsement,

there were discussions held and notings on the file of the

BDA to the effect that the land should be deleted from

acquisition. The said documents are produced at Annexures

"X" and "W" in the second additional statement of

objections.

(d) Thereafter, petitioners sold several of their

properties and from out of the sale proceeds as well as

compensation received by them from their land being

acquired by National Highway Authority of India, they

purchased 37.08 guntas of land, which is equivalent to

48,837.50 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 (on the premise that

the said extent of land had been deleted from acquisition) for

a valuable consideration of Rs.8.57 crores. Petitioners have

averred that they purchased the said property based on the

endorsement issued by the BDA to one of their vendors and

that the principles of estoppel and promissory estoppel apply

in the instant case as BDA could not have withdrawn the said

endorsement on 04/12/2014 as per Annexure "M" of

W.P.No.214/2014. It is averred that the endorsement at

Annexure "B" dated 11/06/2014 was issued after a lapse of

- 18 -

nearly six months after disposal of the writ petition and

subsequently, after a further lapse of six months i.e., nearly

one year from the date of disposal of W.P.No.214/2014,

impugned endorsement dated 04/12/2014 at Annexure "M"

of W.P.No.214/2014 withdrawing the earlier endorsement at

Annexure "B" has been issued, which is highly improper on

the part of the BDA. That on the very same day, when the

earlier endorsement was withdrawn by the BDA i.e., on

04/12/2014, BDA filed W.A.No.3124/2014 before the Division

Bench of this Court challenging order dated 27/01/2014

passed by this Court in W.P.No.214/2014.

(e) According to the petitioners, in the aforesaid

writ appeal, BDA suppressed the fact that it had issued

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to Gangadhar, one of the

vendors of the petitioners. This, according to the

petitioners, is another instance of fraud played on this

Court. That the withdrawal of said endorsement as per

Annexure "M" dated 04/12/2014 is nearly three months

after the lands had been purchased by the petitioners,

which was on 10/09/2014. According to the petitioners, the

said endorsement is wholly illegal. It is further stated that

W.A.No.3124/2014, along with other writ appeals, was

- 19 -

allowed by judgment of the Division Bench of this Court on

16/07/2015 (Annexure "G"). That the petitioners herein

were not parties to the said proceedings. They preferred

S.L.P.Nos.19774-776/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme

Court. However, they withdrew the special leave petitions to

avail other remedies in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

permitted withdrawal of special leave petitions reserving

liberty to the petitioners to move the Supreme Court once

again, if so required. Thereafter, petitioners filed review

petition in R.P.No.59/2016 before this Court seeking review

of the order passed by the Division Bench in

W.P.No.3124/2014. On 10/03/2017, Division Bench

dismissed the review petition and observed that petitioners

not being parties to the writ appeal, judgment passed in the

writ appeals did not bind them. A copy of the order passed

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the order passed by

the Division Bench of this Court in review petition are at

Annexures "J" and "K" respectively, in the writ petitions.

(f) According to the petitioners, on 10/04/2017, some

officers of the BDA went near the property purchased by the

petitioners and sought to dispossess them. Under the

circumstances, petitioners filed these petitions seeking a

- 20 -

declaration that the acquisition has lapsed in respect of

43,544.82 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 and alternatively, to

declare that the endorsement dated 04/12/2014 is illegal and

to direct BDA to act in conformity with the earlier

endorsement dated 11/06/2014.

(g) Respondent - BDA has filed its statement of

objections contending that the petitioners are not the owners

of the property bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavai village,

measuring 37.08 guntas or 43,544.82 sq.ft. That vendors of

the petitioners had executed a General Power of Attorney in

favour of a person named Byadagi and the said person had

formed revenue sites and sold them to certain individuals.

Copies of the said sale deeds are produced as Annexures "R-

1(a)" to "R-1(m)". That in the year 1980-81 itself there were

fifteen other sites which were sold by the GPA holder and

copy of the Encumbrance Certificate evidencing sale of the

said sites is at Annexure "R-2". The vendors of the

petitioners have admitted execution of the GPA and the

power of attorney holder alienating the sites, which is evident

from Annexure "R-3", which is a copy of the representation

made to the BDA. That the purchasers of the sites from the

GPA holder, represented to the BDA seeking allotment of the

- 21 -

very sites in their favour by accepting developmental

charges, as per Annexure "R-4". Therefore, an extent of two

acres out of Sy.No.103 was not within the ownership and

possession of the vendors of the petitioners when they sold it

to the petitioners herein. It is further stated that the

petitioners are not bona fide purchasers of the property as

the petitioners entered into sale agreements through GPA

holder of the vendors of the petitioners namely, Muniramaiah

and Gangadhar. That Muniramaiah had filed

W.P.No.46953/2013 and the said petition was allowed by a

learned Single Judge of this Court against which, BDA filed

W.A.No.1024/2014, which writ appeal was also allowed and

the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside on

16/07/2015. It is further stated that the petitioners herein

have not made any payment to the owners of the property

and that the entire sale consideration of Rs.7.57 Crores has

been paid to the confirming parties, who claim to be the GPA

holders of the vendors of the petitioners, who entered into an

agreement with the vendors of the petitioners on

03/09/2013. That as on the said date, acquisition

proceedings had been completed and this Court had already

declared so in the year 2006 in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by

- 22 -

the petitioners therein, and the said writ petition had been

dismissed. Therefore, petitioners' vendors had no right, title

or interest over the petition schedule property, so as to

alienate the same in favour of the petitioners.

(h) That on 03/09/2013, the vendors of the petitioners

represented by their power of attorney executed an

agreement in favour of one J.T.Satish Chandra and others

represented by their GPA holder, which is a nullity in the eye

of law as the land in question had not remained with the

owners, so as to enter into any such agreement. That

Muniveerappa and the other land owner, Chennarayappa,

had executed power of attorney in favour of K.K.Byadagi, in

respect of Sy.No.103, who had formed eighty sites and sold

them to different individuals.

(i) It is averred that the vendors of the petitioners

namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, had separately filed

writ petitions, which were allowed by this Court. Thereafter,

BDA had preferred writ appeals against the said orders,

which were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court.

Subsequently, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the special

leave petitions filed by petitioners' vendors had been

- 23 -

dismissed and those petitions filed by the petitioners herein

were withdrawn. It is contended by BDA that these

petitioners cannot seek any relief at the hands of this Court

by once again preferring these writ petitions.

(j) It is also averred in the statement of objections filed

by the BDA that infact, pursuant to preliminary notification

dated 15/07/1982 and final notification dated 16/08/1985

issued in respect of the land in question, Muniveerappa -

father of the vendors of the petitioners had infact, filed

W.P.No.17707/1986 assailing the acquisition notification

which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on

08/03/1991. Thereafter, W.P.No.13042/1986 filed by

Chennarayappa the other land owner, was also dismissed on

23/08/1987. There were several other writ petitions and

suits which were filed by various persons in respect of the

land in question which have not been successful and details

of the same are given at Paragraph No.19 of the statement

of objections filed by the BDA.

(k) It is further averred that since the notified khatedar

and others did not file claim petitions before the Land

Acquisition Officer, the compensation determined was

- 24 -

deposited before the Civil Court as per Annexure "R-7" and

possession of the land in question was taken after drawing

up of a mahazar as per Annexure "R-8".

(l) It is also highlighted in the statement of objections

that petitioners' vendors had filed W.P.No.19532/2005, which

was dismissed by order dated 03/08/2006, which order has

attained finality as no appeal was filed against the said order.

It is also stated that according to the vendors of the

petitioners, certain portion of Sy.No.103 has been regularized

for the purpose of formation of ring road. In the

circumstances, BDA contended that petitioners are not

entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act as well

as Section 27 of the BDA Act.

(m) BDA has further averred that paper publication was

issued by it inviting tenders for the construction of three

Bedroom-Hall-Kitchen (3 BHK) housing project as per

Annexure "R-12". Thereafter, one more tender notification

was issued on 11/07/2016 for the very same purpose as per

Annexure "R-13". That the BDA has issued work order dated

10/03/2017 in favour of one K.Gowda & Company. That this

- 25 -

Court has passed an interim order of status quo in

W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 filed by the very same petitioners

by arraying K.Gowda & Company as sixth respondent and the

said writ petition is also not maintainable. In the

circumstances, BDA has sought for dismissal of these writ

petitions.

(ii) W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017:

(a) Petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 have also

filed these petitions assailing the work order issued by the

BDA dated 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") in favour of sixth

respondent and to restrain second to sixth respondents or

any person claiming under them or through them from

entering the petition schedule land (37.08 guntas/43,544.82

sq.ft) and altering its nature in any manner. It is not

necessary to once again narrate the facts leading up to filing

of these petitions as the very same petitioners have adverted

to the facts narrated above to seek the relief of quashing of

work order dated 10/03/2017.

(b) Statement of objections has been filed by the

BDA as well as sixth respondent to these petitions. BDA has

reiterated its averments and contentions as per its statement

- 26 -

of objections filed in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017, which is

adverted to above. However, it is further contended that

petitioners herein have never been in possession of the land

in question. That they have also filed W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017 before this court wherein, they have sought an

order of restraint against respondent - BDA and the

contractor from interfering with the possession of their

property. At that stage, in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, this

Court issued an order of status quo, which order still

continues to be in operation. In the circumstances, BDA has

sought for dismissal of these writ petitions.

(c) The sixth respondent in its statement of objections,

at the outset, has contended that the petitioners have no

locus standi to challenge the work order issued by the BDA in

its favour and that the writ petition is not maintainable under

Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. That on 05/01/2016,

BDA invited tender for construction of 3 BHK apartments in

Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi and that notification was published

in Times of India and other daily news papers as per

Annexure "R-1" on 14/07/2016 as per Annexure "R-2".

Earlier correspondence was made on 06/05/2016 by the

Assistant Executing Engineer, BDA along with the sketch

- 27 -

produced at Annexures "R-3" and "R-4" with the statement of

objections. The sixth respondent participated in the tender

process and they being the lowest bidder has been awarded

the contract. That sixth respondent has submitted a Bank

guarantee of Rs.2,37,85,000/- to respondent - BDA, which is

valid up to 07/03/2019 only. On 10/03/2017, work order was

issued in favour of sixth respondent for a tender amount of

Rs.47,57,00,000/- on accepting the bid made by sixth

respondent, which is time-bound project and the work had to

commence on 10/03/2017 and to be completed on

09/09/2018. Annexures "R-5" and "R-6" is a copy of the

bank guarantee dated 08/03/2017 and letter dated

09/03/2017 has been addressed to the Executive Engineer,

Housing Project Division-I of the BDA. Copy of the work

order on the tender dated 10/03/2017 is produced at

Annexure "R-7".

(d) According to sixth respondent, it commenced the

construction activity as per the work order on 03/04/2017

and it continued the work as per photographs at Annexures

"R-8(a) to (r)". When the matter stood thus, petitioners

herein filed W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 referred to above on

12/04/2017 virtually challenging the acquisition proceedings

- 28 -

of the years 1982-85 and thereafter, these writ petitions

have been filed. That in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017, by

interim order dated 30/04/2017, respondents were directed

not to dispossess the petitioners if they were not already

dispossessed. It is stated that sixth respondent herein was

not a party to those writ petitions. Thereafter, some time

during the summer vacation, these writ petitions were filed

arraying sixth respondent as a party and interim order of

status-quo has been operating against sixth respondent in

which, it has filed an application seeking vacating of the

interim order. BDA has also filed an application seeking

vacating of the interim order passed by this Court in both the

aforesaid batches of writ petitions. Reiterating the facts

which have been stated by the BDA in their statement of

objections, sixth respondent has also sought for dismissal of

these writ petitions.

(iii) W.P.No.21196 of 2017:

(a) Petitioner herein is stated to be limited liability

partnership dealing in housing projects, purchaser of land

measuring 33.34 guntas or 36,308.68 sq.ft. out of 2.30 acres

in Survey No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village, vide sale deed

dated 10/09/2014 registered as document No.3105/2014-15

- 29 -

in the Office of the senior Sub-Registrar, Sreeramapuram,

Bengaluru. It has sought a declaration that Preliminary

Notification dated 15/07/1982 (Annexure "C") and Final

Notification dated 16/08/1985 (Annexure "D") are deemed to

have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. A similar

declaration is also sought under Section 27 of the BDA Act.

Petitioner has sought an order restraining second to fifth

respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession

and enjoyment of the schedule property. The details of the

schedule property are appended to the memorandum of writ

petition. The extent is 33.342 guntas or 36,308.68 sq.ft.

Making similar averments and taking up similar contentions

as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 in so far as

the acquisition proceedings are concerned, petitioners herein

have averred that their vendors are the land owners, who

had also filed writ petitions before this court and they have

also relied upon the endorsement issued by the BDA to one

of the vendors of the petitioner on 11/06/2014, who had filed

W.P.No.214/2014, during the course of arguments.

(b) Petitioners have also referred to writ petitions

filed by their vendors and the father of their vendors and

have narrated about the orders passed in those writ petitions

- 30 -

as well as the writ appeals before this Court. In fact,

petitioners herein had preferred S.L.P.Nos.19774-

19776/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court assailing

judgment dated 16/07/2015 passed in W.A.No.1024/2014

and connected writ appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme

Court. On 20/11/2015, petitioners herein sought permission

to withdraw their special leave petitions with liberty to move

the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again, if so required. After

withdrawal of the special leave petitions, the petitioners have

filed this writ petition seeking the aforesaid prayers. In the

interregnum, petitioner herein had preferred

R.P.No.197/2016 before this court which was dismissed by

order dated 10/03/2017 after observing that the petitioner

herein was not a party to the writ appeal proceeding and

therefore, the judgment passed in the writ appeals was not

binding on it. Copy of the said order is at Annexure "Q",

while copy of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the case of the petitioners herein is at Annexure "N". It is

averred that the petitioner purchased their extent of land

from their vendors on the basis of endorsement dated

11/06/2014 issued by the BDA. However, it is relevant to

note at this stage itself that the petitioners have neither

- 31 -

sought any specific relief on the basis of the said

endorsement nor on the withdrawal of the said endorsement

subsequently by the BDA on 04/12/2014. It is clarified at

this stage itself that the endorsement issued by the BDA to

one of the vendors of the petitioners herein, namely,

Gangadhar is not in respect of the portion of the land sold to

the petitioners herein but, it is in respect of the portion of

survey number sold to the petitioner in W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017. Therefore, whether they could rely upon

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 issued by the BDA would be

considered.

(c) The second respondent - BDA has filed statement of

objections contending that this writ petition is liable to be

dismissed in as much as the petitioner herein cannot claim to

be the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi

Village to an extent of 32.32 guntas. That the sale deed on

the basis of which the petitioners are claiming right, does not

have any validity in the eye of Law. That the father of

vendors of the petitioner had in fact sold an extent of land in

the year 1980 itself to different individuals.

(d) That the petitioner has not disclosed the earlier

litigation filed by its vendors on the basis of Section 27 of

- 32 -

BDA Act. That the prayer sought for by the petitioner under

Section 27 of the BDA Act and Section 24(2) of 2013 Act,

cannot be granted for various reasons. That the acquisition

process was initiated over three decades ago and has been

completed; that BDA has allotted sites to different

beneficiaries, who are in possession of their respective

extent. That the vendors of the petitioner have not been

successful in any of the proceedings with regard to

Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village. That even otherwise

physical possession of the land in question has been taken

over by the State and handed over to the Engineering

Division of the BDA, which has in turn allotted various

extents to several persons, who are in possession of the

same. That the petitioner cannot claim to be in physical

possession of 32.342 guntas of land pursuant to

determination of the compensation and the award amount

has been deposited before the Civil Court. Therefore,

petitioners cannot invoke Section 24(2) of 2013 Act so as to

seek any declaration in their favour as a subsequent

purchaser.

(e) BDA has further averred that in Sy.No.103 of

Nagarbhavi Village, in respect of land over which this

- 33 -

petitioner has made a claim was the subject matter of earlier

transactions when the father of the vendors of the petitioner

in fact, had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour

of Byadgi. That the latter formed revenue sites and sold the

same to different individuals by registered sale deeds, that

15 sites were sold in the year 1980-81 itself by the said

General Power of Attorney Holder; that the vendors of

petitioner herein having lost their right, title and interest

even prior to the acquisition process being initiated, could

not have, subsequent to the completion of the acquisition

proceedings, alienated 33.342 guntas in favour of petitioner

herein; that BDA having taken possession of land, has

allotted it to the third parties and they are in possession of

their respective sites.

(f) Further, W.P.No.46953/2013 filed by one of the

vendors of the petitioner was allowed and same was

challenged by the BDA in W.A.No.1024/2014 and the said

appeal was allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge

was set aside; that the petitioner challenged the said order

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and withdrew the special

leave petition with liberty to approach the other forums.

They have not succeeded even in the review petition filed by

- 34 -

them. That pursuant to the liberty reserved by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court the present writ petition is one more attempt

by the second petitioner to frustrate the acquisition

proceedings. In the circumstances, the BDA has sought for

dismissal of the writ petition by adverting to as many as

twenty seven cases that have been filed in respect of

Sy.No.103 in the statement of objections.

(g) It is further contended by BDA that Section 24(2)

of 2013 Act does not apply to the acquisition initiated under

provisions of BDA Act and assuming that the said provision

is applicable, BDA has contended that conditions of Section

24(2) of 2013 Act do not exist in the present case.

Therefore, BDA has sought for dismissal of writ petition.

(h) The sixth respondent, being a society registered

under the provisions of Societies Registration Act 1960, has

been impleaded by order dated 23/01/2018.

(iv) W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016:

(a) This writ petition is filed in respect of remaining two

acres of land (after excluding a portion of land acquired for

formation of Ring Road by second respondent - BDA) situated

at Sy.No.103, Nagarabhavi Village. The petitioners herein

have averred that fourth petitioner - G.Chennarayappa had

- 35 -

purchased the said two acres of land in Sy.No.103 from its

previous owner -Muniveerappa i.e., father of Muniramaiah

and Gangadhar, (vendors of the petitioner in connected

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017) under a registered sale deed

dated 09/10/1979 registered in the Office of the Sub-

Registrar, Bengaluru North Taluk.

(b) It is averred that pursuant to the purchase of the

land in question on 09/10/1979, the revenue records were

mutated in the name of fourth petitioner vide M.R.No.13/78-

79 and that fourth petitioner remained in exclusive

possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. That

fourth petitioner executed a Gift Deed dated 20/06/2006 in

favour of his three sons, namely, first to third petitioners

gifting the land in question in favour of his sons. The said

gift deed was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar,

Bangalore North Taluk dated 20/06/2006. Thereafter the

revenue entries were mutated in the names of first to third

petitioners vide M.R.No.1/2006-07 dated 06/10/2006. That

preliminary notification bearing No. dated 15/07/1982 was

issued for a vast extent of land measuring about 1210 acres

and 35 guntas situated in Nagarabhavi and Malagala Villages

under Section 17 of the BDA Act. The State Government

- 36 -

issued final notification bearing No.HUD 249 MNX 85, dated

16/08/1985 under Section 19 of the BDA Act, for the purpose

of a housing Scheme. Thereafter fourth petitioner filed

O.S.No.5824/1989 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore

seeking the relief of permanent injunction against BDA.

There was an order of temporary injunction granted on

31/10/1989 which remained in force till the dismissal of the

suit for non prosecution on 09/01/1996.

(c) According to the petitioners subsequent to the

Final Notification dated 16/08/1985 no further steps were

taken by the first respondent i.e., the State under the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LA Act, 1894'

for short) and though first respondent claims that an Award

in L.A.C.No.51/85-86 has been passed on 16/05/2002, which

is after an inordinate delay of seventeen years, petitioners

have averred that they are in actual and physical possession

of their land as even as on date possession of the land has

not been taken by second respondent. That although

mahazar has been relied upon by second respondent, which

is dated 30/04/2003, there has been no notification issued

under Section 16(2) of the LA Act, 1894 (Karnataka

Amendment).

- 37 -

(d) It is further averred that fourth petitioner had filed

W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed by

learned Single Judge dated 20/03/2009. Being aggrieved by

that order, BDA preferred W.A.No.1490/2009 and the same

was allowed by the Division Bench by its Judgment dated

16/07/2015. The petitioners herein preferred

S.L.P.Nos.31353-31354/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme

Court which were dismissed on 27/11/2015. The aforesaid

proceedings related to relief under Section 27 of the BDA Act,

1976 but present writ petition is based on a different cause

of action which is under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act.

Petitioners have contended that physical possession of the

land has not been taken by the state nor compensation has

been paid by the State. Hence, there is deemed lapse of

acquisition under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. It is further

stated that second respondent has issued Work Order dated

16/03/2016 for allegedly providing asphalting and

construction of RCC structure, drain and culvert on the

schedule land. The same is contrary to the pleadings and

submission made by the BDA dated 16/07/2015 in

W.A.No.1490/2009. On the aforesaid pleadings, petitioners

- 38 -

have sought for a declaration that the acquisition is deemed

to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

(e) Statement of objections has been filed by the BDA

seeking dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of

suppression of material facts as well as on the ground of

delay and laches and on account of non-joinder of necessary

parties. It is contended that there have been repeated

litigations in respect of Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village and

that the present litigation is one such although petitioners

have admitted in the earlier rounds of litigation that BDA has

taken possession of the land and layout has been formed.

According to BDA, further, petitioners have claimed sites

under Incentive Scheme on the ground that they have

handed over their extent of land voluntarily to the State

Government. They have admitted that compensation amount

has been deposited in the City Civil Court in respect of their

extent of land. In the circumstances, BDA has contended

that, any declaration under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,

without reference to the earlier litigation in respect of the

land in question would only nullify the acquisition of the land

in question.

- 39 -

(f) BDA has further averred that the petitioners have

also suppressed the fact that GPA was executed in favour of

one Byadagi and the latter had formed revenue sites and

sold the same to different individuals. Therefore, petitioners

cannot claim to be the owners in possession to an extent of

two acres of land involved in this writ petition. It is also

averred that the gift deed on which reliance is placed by the

first to third petitioners has no validity in the eye of law as

the same has come into existence after the land has vested

with the BDA after possession of the same has been taken by

the State Government.

(g) BDA has further averred that subsequent to the

preliminary and final notifications issued for the acquisition of

the extent of land, Muniveerappa had filed

W.P.No.17707/1986 challenging the acquisition proceedings

which was dismissed by this Court on 08/03/1991; that

Muniveerappa is the vendor of fourth petitioner. In fact

fourth petitioner had also filed W.P.No.13042/1986 which

was dismissed on 23/11/1987. One Smt.Prema had filed

O.S.No.5549/1989 against the BDA claiming to be purchaser

from the fourth petitioner. The said suit was dismissed. BDA

has adverted to as many as twentyfour proceedings in

- 40 -

respect of the land in question and has contended that on

account of several legal proceedings process of acquisition

have been stalled and that the petitioners have once again

filed the present writ petition only for the same purpose.

(h) It is also averred that subsequent to the

determination of compensation by passing of an award, the

same has been deposited before the Civil Court, after notice

under Section 12(2) of LA Act, 1894 was issued to the

petitioners. Thereafter, possession of the land in question

was taken by drawing up of mahazar and the same was

thereafter handed over to the Engineering Section of BDA

and the land has stood vested in the BDA free from all

encumbrances. It is also submitted that BDA has allotted

sites to the allottees and the allottees have filed impleading

applications which have been allowed and they have been

impleaded as respondents in this writ petition. It is stated

that the impleading applicants are in possession of the

respective extents of land and they have been allotted their

extent by the BDA. That the petitioners are not entitled to

any declaration regarding lapse of acquisition under Section

24(2) of the 2013 Act, as the said provision does not apply to

acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act.

- 41 -

(i) It is also contended that petitioners herein had filed

an application Misc.W.No.619/2009 in W.P.No.13028/2007

seeking allotment of alternative land to an extent 40,000

sq.ft. in their favour. The same would clearly indicate that

petitioners have lost possession of the acquired land and

sought for alternative land. Hence, BDA sought for dismissal

of the writ petitions.

(j) The third respondent has filed its statement of

objections contending that the writ petition is not

maintainable as it is misconceived and it is liable to be

dismissed. Contentions have been raised with regard to non

applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, to acquisitions

initiated under the provisions of BDA Act. The third

respondent has also contended that the writ petition is liable

to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material

facts on account of non disclosure of earlier transactions of

fourth respondent with regard to petition schedule land.

That petitioners have also not disclosed various litigations

that have been initiated in respect of the land, which has

been acquired; that petitioners have also not disclosed that

the fourth petitioner had sold the land to various third parties

way back in the year 1980-81. According to the third

- 42 -

respondent the aforesaid facts have not been disclosed in the

present writ petition. It is also contended that the State has

taken possession of the land and handed over to the

Engineering Department of the BDA after passing of the

award, as per mahazar dated 16/08/2002. That in fact,

portion of the Ring Road have been formed in the said survey

number, which is a clear indication of the fact that petitioners

are no longer in possession of their extent of land and their

contention that they continued to be in possession is

untenable and contrary to the records. Further, subsequent

to the passing of the award, compensation amount has been

deposited in the Civil Court on 30/05/2007 as per Annexure

"R5". Hence, the conditions laid under Section 24(2) of the

2013 Act do not apply to the case of the petitioners and

therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

According to respondent - BDA, the contention regarding

applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is barred by

principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata

on facts, assuming that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is

applicable.

(k) It is also contended that these petitioners have

also filed several rounds of litigations and despite being

- 43 -

unsuccessful even before the Supreme Court have ventured

to file present writ petition.

(l) That though fourth petitioner had filed

W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed by

a learned Single Judge of this Court, the same was set aside

by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1522/2009 and connected

matters. Thereafter the said judgment in the writ appeal has

been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

S.L.P.Nos.31353-354/2015.

(m) Just as the third respondent, fourth to fifteenth

respondents, who claim to be the allottees from the society

filed an application for impleadment and upon the same

being allowed by this Court, they have filed statement of

objections to the writ petition. Fourth to fifteenth

respondents have contended that filing of present writ

petition is an abuse of process of law and the same ought to

be rejected as the petitioners cannot seek relief under

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. That fourth respondent is a

Society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration

Act, and fifth to fifteenth respondents are its members. That

fourth respondent - Society owned a portion of Sy.No.48,

- 44 -

Nagarabhavi, I Stage, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore,

measuring 3 acres which was acquired by the BDA to form 18

plots and same has been allotted to third parties. The State

Government by Order No.NEE/96/2004 dated 11/08/2004

directed BDA to allot alternative land of an equal extent for

the Society. BDA executed a Deed of Conveyance dated

05/05/2006, conveying title over land measuring 2,007

sq.mtrs. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village 1st Stage in

favour of the Society. According to them, fifth to fifteenth

respondents are allottees from the Society, who are owners

in possession of their respective plots therein.

(n) Fourth respondent has stated that in fact

W.A.No.4970/2014 was filed by these respondents which

succeeded before the Division Bench, in as much as they had

also assailed very same order passed by the Single Judge

dated 13/12/2013 and the said order was set aside in

W.A.No.1024/2014 filed by BDA. That in fact these

petitioners had earlier filed W.P.No.13042/1986, but the said

writ petition was rejected on 23/11/1987. Reference has also

been made to the other two litigations filed by Muniveerappa

and his two sons, namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar

which have been unsuccessful. These respondents have

- 45 -

sought for dismissal of the writ petitions as they are bona

fide allottees from the BDA and that their allotment cannot

be disturbed at the instance of the petitioners who claim to

be erstwhile land owners. Hence, fourth to fifteenth

respondents have sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.

6. The contentions of the respective parties are

elucidated as under:-

(i) W.P.Nos.15967-969 of 2017:

(a) Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla, appearing

for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 as well as

W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017, has raised a threefold

contention: the first contention is with regard to Section

24(2) of 2013 Act. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners

drew my attention to the said provision to submit that, in the

instant case, despite the award having been made,

compensation amount not having been paid and physical

possession of the land in question not having been taken by

the State, the conditions stipulated under Section 24(2) of

2013 Act would squarely apply and therefore, petitioners are

entitled to relief under that provision inasmuch as this Court

may declare that the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed

- 46 -

and if at all the appropriate Government chooses, it could

initiate fresh acquisition proceedings. Therefore, according to

him, such a declaration may be made having regard to the

stipulations contained in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In

support of his submission, learned senior counsel placed

reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav

Dharam Trust and another [(2017) 6 SCC 751], (Manav

Dharam Trust). He further placed reliance on another

decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi

Development Authority vs. Raman Grover & others

[(2016)14 SCC 101] (Delhi Development Authority) to

contend that in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

opined that where possession had not been taken, though

the award had been passed, Section 24(2) of 2013 Act,

would squarely apply and relief was granted in the said

decision. It was contended by him that the aforesaid

declaration has been made in a case where acquisition has

been made under the provisions of Delhi Development Act,

and not under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 and

therefore, the said dictum may be applied in the instant case

to grant relief to the petitioners. He further submitted that in

- 47 -

Manav Dharam Trust, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined

that a subsequent purchaser is also entitled to seek a

declaration under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act and therefore,

there is no impediment for the petitioners herein who are

subsequent purchasers to seek such a declaration.

(b) On facts, in support of the aforesaid submission,

learned senior counsel contended that the acquisition

notifications are of the years 1982 and 1985 respectively that

the award is said to have been made in the year 2002 and

the mahazar relied upon by the respondents in support of

possession being taken by them would not in any way

support the case of the respondents. It was contended that a

cyclostyled mahazar has been drawn stating that possession

of entire extent of land in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi was

taken in the year 2002. That in the said mahazar, a copy of

which is produced as Annexure "F" to the writ petition,

neither the boundaries of the land are mentioned nor other

details are stated in the said mahazar. Therefore, mahazar

cannot be relied upon or accepted to prove that possession

has been taken from petitioners' vendors. He further

submitted that in the record of rights and in the RTCs, the

names of the owners of schedule land i.e., petitioners'

- 48 -

vendors continue to be reflected and therefore, the mahazar

cannot be believed at all. Learned senior counsel further

drew my attention to the fact that in the year 2012, BDA

took possession of 20 guntas of schedule land under an

exchange deed. That the said extent of 20 guntas of land

was surrendered by petitioners' vendors free of cost pursuant

to a resolution of BDA bearing No.102/2006, dated

04/07/2006. That the said extent of land was surrendered to

BDA for the purpose of utilizing the same for formation of

ring road in the land in question and in view of the same,

alternative land equivalent to 75% of the land cost was

allotted to petitioners' vendors in part of Sy.No.37/1 near Old

Madras Road, in Banaswadi Layout. Learned senior counsel,

therefore, submitted that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act may be

applied in the instant case and relief be granted to the

petitioners under the said provision.

(c) He next contended that under Section 27 of the

BDA Act, petitioners are entitled to a declaration that

Nagarabhavi Scheme not having been implemented

substantially within a period of five years, it must be declared

that the Scheme had lapsed and Section 36 of the BDA Act

has become inoperative. He contended that in the instant

- 49 -

case, the acquisition notifications being of the years 1982

and 1985 insofar as the land in question is concerned, there

has been no implementation of the Scheme by the

respondent/BDA. Therefore, a declaration under Section 27

of the BDA Act be granted.

(d) Learned senior counsel next elaborated his

submissions on endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure

"B"), issued by the third respondent/BDA and the withdrawal

of the said endorsement by another endorsement dated

04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") which is assailed. Drawing my

attention to endorsement dated 11/06/2014, learned senior

counsel contended that by the said endorsement, the BDA

had categorically informed one of the vendors of the

petitioners namely, Gangadhar that pursuant to the disposal

of W.P.No.214/2014 by learned Single Judge of this Court to

the effect that there has been lapse of acquisition with regard

to land in question, BDA had given up formation of layout or

implementation of the Scheme in respect of the land in

question. That BDA also stated in the endorsement dated

11/06/2014 that, having regard to Section 27 of the BDA

Act, the Scheme had not been implemented to an extent of

43,544.82 sq.ft. and hence, the acquisition with regard to the

- 50 -

said extent had lapsed. He further submitted that the

endorsement categorically stated that in view of the order

passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in

W.P.No.214/2014, the acquisition process in respect of

43,544.82 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village, had

been concluded and that the said extent of land was no

longer part of the acquisition process. In view of the

aforesaid three categorical statements made by the BDA in

its endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to one of the vendors of

the petitioners, and the petitioners having been informed

about the same and on being satisfied that the aforesaid

extent of land was no longer part of the acquisition process,

went ahead with the purchase of the said extent of land. But

the BDA, by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"),

has withdrawn the earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014,

which is impermissible in law.

(e) Learned senior counsel contended that the

petitioners have assailed the withdrawal of the said

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 on the principles of

promissory estoppel. In this regard, learned senior counsel

submitted that even though endorsement dated 11/06/2014

has not been issued to the petitioners, but only to one of the

- 51 -

vendors of the petitioners, the same is equally applicable to

the petitioners as the said endorsement was relied upon by

the vendors of the petitioners so as to enable the petitioners

to purchase the aforesaid extent of land. He contended that

even though the endorsement has not been issued directly to

the petitioners, nevertheless, they have acted on the

endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Subsequent to the purchase

of the aforesaid extent of land on 10/09/2014, BDA withdrew

the earlier endorsement 11/06/2014 by issuance of another

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"), which is

assailed in these writ petitions. Learned senior counsel

placed reliance on several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court to adumberate on the concept of promissory estoppel

and as to how the said doctrine squarely applies in the

instant case. He submitted that having regard to the

applicability of the said doctrine in the instant case, this

Court may quash the subsequent endorsement dated

04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") and thereby declare that BDA is

bound by its earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014

(Annexure "B"). The decisions relied upon by the learned

senior counsel shall be adverted to later.

- 52 -

(ii) W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017:

(a) Insofar as W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 are

concerned, learned senior counsel for the petitioners

submitted that the Work Order issued by the BDA to the sixth

respondent therein on 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") is illegal

and liable to be quashed insofar as it relates to the extent of

land involved in these petitions and second to sixth

respondents or any other person claiming through them be

restrained from entering petitioners' land or altering the

nature of the same. Learned senior counsel submitted that

when once this Court grants the reliefs sought for by the

petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, then

consequentially W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 would have to

be allowed as the work order dated 10/03/2017 would have

to be quashed.

(b) Per contra, learned counsel for respondent/BDA, Sri

Kannur, submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any

reliefs sought for by them. He contended that Section 24(2)

of 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under

the provisions of the BDA Act. The said Section applies only

when an acquisition is initiated under the provisions of LA

Act, 1894. He drew my attention to two decisions of the

- 53 -

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust

and Sukbhir Singh to contend that the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has categorically enunciated the conditions/stipulations

under which the declaration under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act

could be granted. The first and foremost condition is that

initiation of acquisition must be under the provisions of LA

Act, 1894, but in the instant case, acquisition proceedings

are initiated under the provisions of BDA Act and therefore,

the primary stipulation under Section 24(2) not having been

complied with in the instant case, this Court may not

consider the case under the said provision. He also, relied

upon a judgment of this Court dated on 14/12/2017, in the

case of M/s.Evershine Monuments vs. The State of

Karnataka [ILR 2018 Kar. 731], to draw my attention to

the fact that this Court has already taken a view in the

matter and has held that Section 24(2) does not apply to

acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the

BDA Act and by applying the said decision to the instant

case, the contention raised by the petitioners under Section

24(2) of 2013 Act may be repelled.

(c) Learned counsel for the BDA next contended that

the declaration sought for by the petitioners under Section

- 54 -

27 of the BDA Act cannot also be granted in the instant case

in view of the earlier orders passed by this Court as well as

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the very land in

question, wherein similar contentions have been rejected. He

contended that similar reliefs were sought for by petitioners'

vendors before this Court. That W.P.No.19532/2005 was

filed by the vendors of the petitioners, Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar and the same was dismissed by order dated

03/08/2006. The said order has attained finality as there

has been no challenge made to the same. But thereafter,

both Muniramaiah and Gangadhar once again filed writ

petitions separately in W.P.No.46953/2013 and

W.P.No.214/2014 seeking the relief of declaration that the

acquisition had lapsed on account of non-implementation of

the Scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Though the

said writ petitions were allowed, the Division Bench of this

Court has set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge

dated 09/10/2013 and 27/07/2014. That the common

judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1024/2014 filed

against the order passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 and

W.A.No.3124/2014 passed against W.P.No.214/2014 has

been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the special

- 55 -

leave petitions filed by the vendors of the petitioners have

been dismissed, therefore, petitioners cannot invoke Section

27 of the BDA Act in these writ petitions, is the submission.

(d) Learned counsel for BDA further submitted that

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was issued to petitioners'

vendors having regard to the situation as it obtained on the

said date. That in fact, the issuance of the said endorsement

was not authorized. As subsequently, BDA took a decision to

assail the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this

Court in W.P.No.214/2014 dated 27/01/2014. That in fact,

even on 11/06/2014, when the said endorsement was

issued, W.A.No.1024/2014 had already been filed and was

pending before the Division Bench. The said writ appeal was

filed against Muniramaiah, one of the vendors against order

passed in W.P.No.46913/2013, and subsequently, BDA

having taken a decision to assail order dated 27/01/2014

passed in W.P.No.214/2014 decided to withdraw

endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Learned counsel for the

BDA submitted that the withdrawal of the aforesaid

endorsement on 04/12/2014 by issuance of another

endorsement was just and proper. That the principles of

promissory estoppel would not apply in the instant case.

- 56 -

Learned counsel contended that if endorsement dated

11/06/2014 had been issued erroneously, then BDA was

justified in withdrawing such an endorsement. He further

submitted that it could also be construed that as the situation

as it existed on 11/06/2014, has been mentioned in the

endorsement, with regard to the land in question and that

petitioners did not acquire any right based on the

endorsement. That BDA cannot be estopped from

withdrawing endorsement dated 11/06/2014. That the

principle of promissory estoppel relied upon by the

petitioners' senior counsel does not apply to the instant case.

Learned counsel for BDA pointed that this Court may bear in

mind the fact that BDA, has succeeded in the writ appeals

filed by it as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court

has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That the

attempt made by the petitioners herein by filing these

petitions is only to seek annulment of the dictum of the

Division Bench of this Court as well as the order of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petitions, which is

impermissible.

(e) Learned counsel further elaborated that on

04/12/2014, W.A.No.3124/2014 was filed by the BDA

- 57 -

assailing order dated 27/01/2014 passed in

W.P.No.214/2014 against Gangadhar, one of the vendors of

the petitioners and therefore, on that date, BDA was justified

in withdrawing the earlier endorsement issued on

11/06/2014 to him. Learned counsel for the BDA further

pointed out that the vendors of the petitioners have been

unsuccessful before this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which

was disposed of on 03/08/2006. Thereafter, they entered

into agreement of sale with certain third parties on

03/09/2013, a copy of which is produced as Annexure "R-5".

It is, subsequent to the said agreement, petitioners' vendors

filed two independent writ petitions in W.P.No.46953/2013

and W.P.No.214/2014, once again invoking Section 27 of the

BDA Act and although the aforesaid writ petitions were not

maintainable, petitioners' vendors succeeded in those writ

petitions and on the basis of the orders passed by the

learned Single Judge in those writ petitions, petitioners

conveyed the aforesaid extent of land to the petitioners. That

agreement holders, with whom petitioners' vendors had

earlier entered into an agreement to sell dated 03/09/2013,

were consenting parties. He submitted that the attempt

made by petitioners' vendors to file writ petitions in the years

- 58 -

2013 and 2014 was in order to seek an order at the hands of

this Court as they had entered into an agreement and they

had intended to alienate the aforesaid land in question,

whereas they had no right to do so as the acquisition

proceedings had already concluded long ago and they were

also unsuccessful in the earlier writ petition filed by them in

the year 2005. That the main reason for filing writ petitions

once again was to some how legalise the alienation sought to

be made by them.

(f) Learned counsel for the BDA also submitted that

there was a delay of about 272 days in filing the writ

appeals. The delay was condoned. Neither of the vendors of

the petitioners brought to the notice of the Division Bench

that they had created third party interest in respect of the

land in question, although they were caveators in both the

writ appeals. The Division Bench was unaware of the fact

that petitioners' vendors had alienated the land in question to

the petitioners and neither were the petitioners impleaded in

the said writ appeals by their vendors. That the vendors of

the petitioners alienated the aforesaid extent of land between

the date of the order of learned Single Judge of this Court

passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 and the

- 59 -

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in writ

appeals arising from the aforesaid orders.

(g) Further learned counsel for the BDA submitted that

petitioners ought to have made enquiries before purchasing

the land in question by ascertaining whether it was a subject

matter of acquisition process as part of Nagarbhavi Scheme

as, by then, it was implemented and as to whether there were

any cases filed or pending in respect of the said extent of

land. Petitioners not having made the relevant enquiries,

cannot now pretend to be innocent purchasers before this

Court and seek relief at the hands of this Court on that

premise. He contended that the petitioners are not entitled

to any reliefs on the basis of doctrine of promissory estoppel

as the petitioners are not bona fide purchasers and they are

not innocent persons who have acted on the basis of the

endorsement dated 11/06/2014. That in fact, the said

endorsement has been issued only to one of the vendors of

the petitioners viz., Gangadhar and not to the other vendor

of the petitioners, his brother namely, Muniramaiah.

(h) Further, contention of learned counsel for BDA is

that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable in

- 60 -

the instant case. It is contended that the said doctrine

applies only when policy matters of the State are involved

and a representation is held out by the State. That

petitioners could not have purchased the land in question on

the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Learned

counsel for the petitioner contended that the BDA has rightly

withdrawn the said endorsement by issuance of another

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and the said endorsements

would now pale into insignificance on account of the

Judgments of the Division Bench of this Court in the writ

appeals filed by the BDA, which have been sustained by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court as against petitioners' vendors as

well as petitioners. He submitted that these petitioners who

are the purchasers of the aforesaid extent of land also filed

special leave petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and

realizing that they would be unsuccessful before the Hon'ble

Apex Court sought withdrawal of their special leave petitions

with liberty to seek appropriate remedy before an

appropriate forum. That the filing of these writ petitions is

not the appropriate remedy at all. He further submitted that,

in fact, these petitioners had earlier filed review petitions

before the Division Bench of this Court, which had allowed

- 61 -

the appeals filed by the BDA. That the said review petitions

were dismissed, although it was observed that the judgment

of the Division Bench was not applicable to the petitioners

herein as they were not parties to the writ appeals. Learned

counsel for the BDA also submitted that petitioners cannot

rely upon the doctrine of legitimate expectation or the

doctrine of promissory estoppel.

(i) In fact, even before making the aforesaid

submissions, learned counsel for the BDA prefaced his

submissions by contending that the vendors of the

petitioners had, as far back as in the year 1980-81 had

alienated the land in question in the form of revenue sites

through a power of attorney holder, K.K.Byadgi and in fact,

there have been a number of proceedings instituted by the

purchasers of the said sites both before this Court as well as

before the Civil Court. That the intentions of the vendors of

the petitioners are not bona fide and neither are the

petitioners bona fide purchasers. He submitted that having

regard to the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as

the facts that emerge in the instant case, the writ petitions

may be dismissed as the petitioners are not entitled to any

relief.

- 62 -

(j) Learned senior counsel appearing for sixth

respondent in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 contended that the

petitioners have no right to assail work order dated

10/03/2017, which has been issued by respondent - BDA in

favour of sixth respondent. That in fact, petitioners herein in

the first instance filed W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 seeking

certain reliefs. In those writ petitions, no challenge has been

made to the work order dated 10/03/2017 issued by the BDA

in favour of sixth respondent. Subsequently, present

petitions were filed in May 2017 arraying sixth respondent as

party to the writ petition and there is an interim order of

status quo regarding dispossession operating against sixth

respondent. He submitted that filing of two separate writ

petitions by the petitioners is an abuse of the process of this

Court. Further, the writ petitions are hit by the principles of

res judicata and constructive res judicata That the writ

petitions are hit by the principles of issue estoppel and that

the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply in the

present case.

(k) Elaborating on each of the aforesaid contentions,

learned senior counsel appearing for sixth respondent

- 63 -

contended that petitioners have no locus standi to invoke

either Section 24(2) of 2013 Act or Section 27 of the BDA

Act. He submitted that this Court has already opined that,

Section 24 of the 2013 Act would not apply to acquisition

initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, as held in case

of M/s.Evershine Monuments and therefore, on that ground

petitioners' contention regarding Section 24(2) of the 2013

Act may be rejected.

(l) As far as Section 27 of the BDA Act is concerned,

learned senior counsel contended that the said contention

would no longer be available to the petitioner to urge in view

of the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata

being applicable to the present case. He contended that

petitioners' vendors had earlier filed writ petitions jointly as

well as independently. That in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by

both the vendors of the petitioners, they were unsuccessful

and that the said order has attained finality. The reason as

to why the said writ petition had been dismissed was on

account of the finding given by the learned Single Judge of

this Court to the effect that the Scheme in respect of

Nagarabhavi had been implemented substantially and

therefore, Section 27 of the BDA Act was not applicable.

- 64 -

Challenge made to the acquisition notifications was also

repelled. When the order passed by the learned Single Judge

on 03/08/2006 in W.P.No.19532/2005 had attained finality,

vendors of the petitioner could not have once again filed

separate writ petitions in W.P.No.46953/2013 and

W.P.No.214/2014 respectively. Although, learned Single

Judge of this Court allowed both the writ petitions, the

Division Bench of this Court set aside the orders passed by

the learned Single Judge in those writ petitions and held in

favour of the BDA and repelled the contentions raised by the

petitioners' vendors on the principle of res judicata. That the

petitioners herein did not seek impleadment in the said writ

appeals by stating that they had purchased the extent of land

in question. He further submitted that the petitioners herein

as well as their vendors have been unsuccessful before the

Hon'ble Supreme Court inasmuch as there has been no

interference in the judgment passed by the Division Bench of

this Court in the writ appeals filed by the BDA as against

orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the

aforementioned writ petitions. In fact, petitioners herein

withdrew their special leave petitions filed before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and sought liberty to seek appropriate

- 65 -

remedy, which is not by filing present writ petitions before

this Court. He further contended that review petitions filed

by the petitioners herein were also dismissed and there has

been no interference with the judgment passed by the

Division Bench of this Court. Learned senior counsel

appearing for sixth respondent submitted that by applying

principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, the

writ petitions filed by the petitioners herein seeking relief

under Section 27 of the BDA Act may be dismissed.

(m) Learned counsel further submitted that even if it

is to be assumed for the sake of arguments that Section

24(2) of the 2013 Act would be applicable to acquisition

initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, petitioners

have not been successful in establishing that compensation

has not been paid to their vendors or that possession has not

been taken from their vendors. He submitted that the

petitioners are not entitled to any relief under Section 24(2)

of 2013 Act as the said section is not applicable to acquisition

initiated under the provisions of BDA Act and having regard

to the findings arrived at by this Court on the aforesaid

aspects, which have been affirmed by the Apex Court, the

same cannot be sought to be reopened or reagitated and

- 66 -

hence, salutary doctrine of res judicata and constructive res

judicata may be applied in the instant case and the writ

petitions be dismissed.

(n) He further submitted that if W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017 do not succeed and the said writ petitions are

dismissed, then the petitioners have no locus standi to

question the action or steps taken by the BDA vis-à-vis the

land in question insofar as the issuance of the work order to

sixth respondent for the purpose of construction of

apartments in the land in question.

(o) On the validity of the endorsement dated

04/12/2014, which is assailed by the petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is concerned, learned counsel

for sixth respondent submitted that doctrine of promissory

estoppel would apply only when three essential postulates

exist. First, there should be an unequivocal expression of a

promise. The second is, action being taken or benefit being

denied to the promissee on the basis of the promise made by

the promissor. Thirdly, the promisor must have the

power/competence to make such a promise. That in the

instant case, the officer of the BDA had no authority to issue

- 67 -

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 as by then, the BDA had

already preferred W.A.No.1024/2014 assailing order dated

09/10/2013 passed in W.P.No.46953/2013. There was no

reason for the BDA to issue such an endorsement at all

having regard to the events that transpired prior to and

subsequent to the issuance of the aforesaid endorsement.

(p) Learned senior counsel for sixth respondent further

contended that even if for the sake of argument it is to be

assumed that endorsement dated 11/06/2014 would be the

basis for the applicability of the doctrine of promissory

estoppel, he submitted that on a reading of the said

endorsement, it does not appear that any promise was made

at all to petitioners' vendors. That the endorsement only

reiterated the position as it obtained on that date. That on

the basis of the said endorsement, petitioners' vendors did

not alter their position to their detriment. That the petitioners

herein could not have placed reliance on the endorsement

issued to one of the vendors of the petitioners, so as to alter

their position. That if the petitioners herein were investing

huge sums of money for the purchase of the aforesaid extent

of land, they ought to have been prudent and diligent in

ascertaining the status of the land from the point of view of

- 68 -

acquisition being made by BDA. Merely because petitioners

purchased the aforesaid extent of land in September 2014

between issuance of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 and

withdrawal of the same on 04/12/2014, no right flowed in

favour of the petitioners. That petitioners are not innocent

parties who could contend that they have been victimized at

the hands of either their vendors or respondent - BDA.

Further, petitioners cannot appear to be innocent victims

before this Court so as to seek relief on the basis of

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 being withdrawn on

04/12/2014. Learned senior counsel contended that

petitioners' vendors had no authority to alienate any bit of

the land notified by the BDA and petitioners cannot claim to

be victims to the attempts made by petitioners' vendors

seeking to alienate land to them. That petitioners also cannot

claim to have derived any benefit from endorsement dated

11/06/2014 in the face of completion of acquisition

proceedings initiated by respondent - BDA.

(q) Relying on certain judgments of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court on the aspect of doctrine of promissory

estoppel not being applicable to the present case, learned

senior counsel appering for sixth respondent sought dismissal

- 69 -

of W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 as against sixth respondent and

also that the interim order of status quo to be vacated.

(r) Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla, while

replying to the arguments of learned senior counsel for

respondents, submitted that respondents are not right in

contending that the Scheme had not lapsed insofar as the

land in question is concerned. He submitted that learned

Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 dismissed

the writ petitions filed by the petitioners' vendors on the

basis of the statement filed by the respondent - BDA to the

effect that BDA had implemented the Scheme substantially,

but that is not the correct position. He drew my attention to

Annexure "L", to contend that in W.A.No.1053/2007 BDA

had filed a statement to the effect that only an extent of

608.30 acres out of 1210.35 acres had been utilized for the

formation of Nagarbhavi layout (Annexure "L" to

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017). He further submitted that

having regard to the order passed by the Division Bench of

this Court in the review petitions filed by the petitioners, the

judgment of the Division Bench in the writ appeals filed by

the BDA is not applicable or binding on the petitioners. That

the petitioners have every right to seek relief by filing these

- 70 -

writ petitions as they are subsequent purchasers and their

right as subsequent purchasers have been recognized by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust.

(s) Learned senior counsel for petitioners further

submitted that petitioners having purchased the aforesaid

extent of land, have the protection of Article 300-A of the

Constitution and BDA cannot be permitted to approbate and

reprobate vis-à-vis issuance and withdrawal of the

endorsement and that BDA is bound by endorsement issued

on 11/06/2014 on the basis of which, petitioners have

purchased their extent of land in question. He further

reiterated that mahazar relied upon by the respondents to

contend that physical possession of the land in question has

been taken was not drawn in accordance with law and no

reliance could be placed on the said document. That as a

result there has been no vesting of the aforesaid extent of

land in the State. Therefore, BDA does not have any right,

title and interest in respect of the said land. That the only

extent of land that has been surrendered by petitioners'

vendors is 20 guntas for the formation of ring road in respect

of which an exchange deed has been executed. Apart from

the said extent, possession of the land in question continues

- 71 -

with the petitioners herein, who have purchased the same

from their vendors, the erstwhile land owners. He contended

that principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata do

not apply as actions of the respondent - BDA are fraudulent

in as much as having misled this Court so as to seek

dismissal of W.P.No.19532/2005 thereafter are seeking to

legalize their actions. That the principles of doctrine of

promissory estoppel would squarely apply in the present

case, as the petitioners have spent nearly rupees nine crores

for purchasing the aforesaid extent of land and therefore, the

writ petitions may be allowed.

(iii) W.P.No.21196 of 2017:

(a) Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset

submitted that the petitioner has adopted the arguments of

learned senior counsel who has appeared in W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017 with regard to the relief claimed under Section

24(2) of 2013 Act as well as Section 27 of the BDA Act.

(b) He submitted that the petitioner herein has

purchased land measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 in

Nagarbhavi Village under sale deed dated 10/09/2014

(Annexure "A"). That the said conveyance has been made by

- 72 -

both the brothers, namely Muniramaiah and Gangadhar and

one of the agreement holders is a confirming party. That the

petitioner is engaged in the business of real estate and more

particularly, in the construction of apartments and

development of properties in and around Bengaluru. Learned

counsel for petitioner, relied upon orders passed by this

Court in favour of the vendors of the petitioner who are the

very same vendors who sold certain extent of land in favour

of petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017. He further

submitted that petitioner's vendors did not disclose to the

petitioner about the pendency of the writ appeals when they

conveyed the land to the petitioner on 10/09/2014.

Petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner was not a

party in the writ appeals preferred by the BDA and being

aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of this

Court in those writ appeals dated 16/07/2015, petitioner

preferred S.L.P.Nos.19774-776/2015 before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. The said special leave petitions were

withdrawn with liberty to approach any other forum as may

be available in law. He further submitted that the petitioners

herein preferred R.P.No.197/2016 before this Court and the

Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 10/03/2017,

- 73 -

dismissed the review petition by observing that the petitioner

was not a party to the proceedings in writ appeal and

therefore, the judgment passed in writ appeal was not

binding on him. Thereafter, these writ petitions have been

filed on a fresh ground.

(c) Learned counsel also submitted that though the

issuance of an endorsement is not a subject matter of

controversy in this writ petition, the order that may be made

in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 may be made applicable to

this writ petition also, on the withdrawal of the endorsement

issued by the BDA after the same having been issued by the

BDA to one of the vendors of the petitioner.

(d) In response, learned counsel for BDA, reiterated

his submissions made with regard to W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017 and contended that the petitioner herein is not

entitled to any relief just as the petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 are not entitled. That in the

instant case also, Section 24(2) cannot be invoked by the

petitioner, as the land in question in this writ petition has

also been taken possession of by the respondent/BDA and in

fact, 10,137 sq.mtrs. has been allotted to sixth

- 74 -

respondent/House Building Society by way of bulk allotment

on 10/05/2006 and subsequently, a sale deed has been

executed by the BDA in favour of sixth respondent/society.

Therefore, petitioner herein could not have purchased the

land in question in this writ petition on 10/09/2014. In the

circumstances, learned counsel for the BDA sought dismissal

of this writ petition.

(e) Learned counsel for sixth respondent Sri Ajit Shetty

submitted that sixth respondent is a Society registered

under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1960.

That the Society owned a portion of Sy.No.48 in Nagarabhavi

village which was comprised in 18 plots which was acquired

by the BDA and allotted to third parties. Under the

circumstances, the State Government decided to allot

alternative land to the Society and Government order dated

11/08/2004 was issued to that effect, pursuant to which, on

05/05/2006, the BDA executed Deed of Conveyance in

favour of the sixth respondent Society agreeing to allot

10137 sq.mtrs. in favour of the Society. Relying on the order

passed by this Court in the writ petition filed by petitioner's

vendors and also the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

learned counsel contended that the possession of the land

- 75 -

in question in this writ petition having been taken by the first

respondent - State Government and having handed over the

same to BDA, the latter has in turn conveyed possession to

the sixth respondent - Society, pursuant to Government

Order dated 11/08/2004 by execution conveyance deed on

05/05/2006. In the circumstance, petitioner cannot contend

that they are in physical possession of the land in question.

In fact, the sixth respondent has carried out certain

development works on the said land and completed building

a compound wall around the land. Therefore, learned counsel

for sixth respondent sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

(iv) W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016:

(a) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted

that in this writ petition also, petitioners have sought for a

declaration that there is deemed lapse of acquisition under

Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. That the fourth petitioner herein

is the father of first to third petitioners herein. That fourth

petitioner had purchased land to an extent of 2 acres in

Sy.No.103 from Muniveerappa, father of Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar. In fact, petitioners herein had preferred

W.P.No.13028/07 before this Court. The said writ petition

was allowed by order dated 20/03/2009. Against the said

- 76 -

order, BDA preferred W.A.No.1490/2009 and one of the

allottees of BDA M/s.Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd., had

preferred W.A.No.1522/2009. The said writ appeals were

allowed by the Division Bench of this Court by judgment

dated 16/07/2015. However, it is noted that special leave

petition filed by the petitioners herein before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court was dismissed on 27/11/2015. Nevertheless,

learned counsel for petitioners submitted that Section 24(2)

of 2013 Act gives a new right to the petitioners and

therefore, they are empowered to seek declaration under the

said provision by filing this writ petition.

(b) Learned counsel for the petitioner herein

contended that he adopts the arguments of learned senior

counsel in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 in so far as the reliefs

sought for under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is concerned

and that the writ petition may be allowed.

(c) Per contra, the learned counsel for the

respondent - BDA while reiterating the submissions made in

other writ petitions, brought to my notice the fact that Site

Nos.169, 170, 171, 189, 190, and 198 measuring an extent

of two acres of land in question in this writ petition have

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been allotted to third respondent, M/s.Lakshmi Malleables

Pvt. Ltd. That having regard to the dismissal of the special

leave petitions filed by the petitioners herein, they are not

entitled to seek any relief under Section 24(2) of the Act, as

dismissal of the special leave petitions would clearly indicate

that the petitioners are not in possession of the said extent

of land (2 acres). That W.P.No.13028/2007 filed by the

petitioners earlier was allowed by this Court, but the said

order was reversed in W.A.No.1490/2009 by judgment of the

Division Bench dated 16/07/2015 which has been affirmed by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petition filed

by the petitioners herein. In the circumstances, the writ

petitions may be dismissed. Further, the orders passed in

W.P.Nos.13042/1986, W.P.No.17707/1986 and W.A.

No.2361/1990 have a bearing on these writ petitions.

(d) It is contended that in the instant case, physical

possession of the land in question has been taken by the

State and handed over to BDA. He submitted that

preliminary notification was issued on 15/07/1982 and final

notification was issued on 16/08/1985 and the award in

respect of entire survey number was passed on 20/05/2002.

Thereafter, on 16/08/2002, physical possession of the land

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was taken by the State and the same was handed over to the

Engineering Section of BDA for the purpose of development

on 30/04/2003.

(e) Learned counsel for third respondent Sri Vachan,

placed reliance on Annexure "G" to contend that physical

possession of the land had been taken and the said question

cannot be re-opened once again in this writ petition, having

regard to the findings arrived at by this Court in the earlier

writ petitions pertaining to Sy.No.103 which includes two

acres of land which is the subject matter of this writ petition.

(f) Learned counsel further submitted that the

Division Bench of this Court (Dharwad Bench) in the case of

Anil and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Another

[2017 (3) KCCR 2698 (DB)], while considering a case

acquisition initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka

High ways Act has categorically held that the provision of

2013 Act, more particularly Section 24 thereof, would not

apply to any acquisition initiated under the said Act.

Therefore, by way of analogy, the Court may hold in this

case also that Section 24(2) of the Act, is not available to the

petitioners to seek such reliefs in this writ petition, as has

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been held by this Court in the case of M/s.Evershine

Monuments.

(g) Learned counsel for third respondent further

submitted that in W.P.No.13028/07 filed by the petitioners

herein, initially there was an ex parte order of status quo to

be maintained for a period of four weeks. The third

respondent herein sought for impleadment in the writ

petition and filed application for vacating of the said order.

But the interim order of status quo was modified and this

Court held that third respondent herein (fourth respondent in

this writ petition), who was in possession of plot Nos.169,

170, 171, 189, 190, 191 and 198 and had put up

construction on the said sites, the construction and

development would be subject to the result of the said writ

petition. Thereafter, petitioners in that writ petition, sought

for quashing of possession certificates issued by respondent

- BDA in favour of third respondent. Although the said writ

petition was allowed thereafter, the judgment of the learned

Single Judge in the said writ petition was set aside in

W.A.No.1490/2009 on 16/07/2015. He contended that when

there is a clear finding of fact that the third respondent is in

possession aforesaid sites, at this point of time, the

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petitioners cannot assail the said finding of fact in this writ

petition. He therefore, submitted that the petitioners herein

had preferred special leave petition against the judgment

dated 16/07/2015 passed in W.P.No.1490/2009. But the said

special leave petitions have been dismissed. Learned counsel

for the third respondent, submitted that there is no merit in

the writ petition and the same may be dismissed.

(h) Learned counsel for fourth to fifteenth

respondents submitted that fourth respondent is a society

registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration

Act, 1960 and fifth to fifteenth respondents are the members

and allottees of the society, that the fourth respondent -

Society has allotted plots to its members who are fifth to

fifteenth respondents. The same have been allotted by the

BDA to the fourth respondent - Society by way of bulk

allotment. That the bulk allotment was made by BDA in

favour of fourth respondent - Society. That a portion of the

land in question (measuring two acres) has been utilized by

BDA for formation of road for the layout which is being

utilized as ingress and egress to their respective sites by fifth

to fifteenth respondents. In the circumstance, learned

counsel for fourth to fifteenth respondents submitted that

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there is no merit in this writ petition and the same may be

dismissed.

(i) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the

State in all these writ petitions has, at the outset, contended

that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisition

initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act. In this regard,

he placed reliance on the recent decision of this Court in the

case of M/s.Evershine Monuments. He submitted that in the

instant case, acquisition having been initiated under the

provisions of the BDA Act, the said section cannot be invoked

by the petitioners to seek a declaration that there is deemed

lapse of acquisition. He further contended that Section 27 of

the BDA Act also, cannot be invoked by the petitioners in all

these writ petitions. He submitted that such a declaration

was sought for by petitioners' vendors in W.P.No.19532/2005

and the said writ petition was dismissed by holding that the

Scheme had been substantially implemented and that the

said order is binding on the petitioners, who are none other

than the purchasers from the land owners themselves. That

as in the case of W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016,

petitioners herein and their vendors have been repeatedly

approaching this Court, which is an instance of abuse of

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the process of law and also this Court. He contended that

the purchasers, who are the petitioners in these cases are

not bona fide purchasers and therefore, they cannot be

granted any relief in these writ petitions.

(j) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate further submitted

that by issuance of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, no

promise was held out to the petitioners and relying on the

endorsement, petitioners could not have purchased the land

in question. He further contended that if this Court is to

grant any relief to the petitioners, it would be indirectly

reviewing the judgment of the Division Bench, which has

been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by dismissing

the special leave petitions, which is impermissible. That the

petitioners herein have either withdrawn the special leave

petitions or their special leave petitions were dismissed, so as

to seek other remedies but not to seek a remedy under

Section 24(2) of 2013 Act or under Section 27 of the BDA

Act. He further submitted that having regard to the award

passed on 16/05/2002, physical possession of the land in

question was taken on 03/04/2003 by the State and handed

over to the Engineering Section of the BDA. That the land

stood vested with the State Government in 2002 itself and on

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the same being handed over to the BDA, the latter has taken

steps for allotting certain portions of the lands in question to

certain allottees. That petitioners cannot submit that there is

deemed lapse of acquisition of the land in question when

Nagarbhavi Scheme has been implemented. He submitted

that there may be no developmental activity in the land in

question although certain portions of the same has been

allotted to various persons. But it is on account of petitioners'

vendors repeatedly approaching either this Court or the Civil

Court wherein, interim orders have been made leading to a

status quo position with regard to developmental activities on

the land in question. He submitted that the State or

respondent - BDA cannot be blamed for the same. That the

petitioners cannot contend at this point of time that

compensation has not been paid nor physical possession of

the land has been taken by the respondent - State. Learned

Addl. Govt. Advocate contended that there is no merit in the

writ petitions and therefore, writ petitions may be dismissed.

(k) That in the writ appeals filed by the BDA, before

the Division Bench, the vendors of the petitioners, who have

purchased the land in question, did not disclose the fact that

they had purchased the land. It is only thereafter, that

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vendors brought to the notice of the Division Bench that they

had alienated the land in question from the petitioners

herein. That petitioners' vendors have not come forward to

assail endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and hence, they are

bound by subsequent endorsement. Therefore, petitioners

cannot seek to assail the same by filing writ petitions before

this Court. That the effect of endorsement dated 11/06/2014

cannot be construed to imply that the acquired land would

revert to the land owners so as to enable them to deal with

the same as owners. That there is no reversion of the land in

favour of the land owners on the basis of the endorsement

dated 11/06/2014, but it continues to vest with BDA or its

allottees. Therefore, the alienation made by petitioners

vendors in favour of the petitioners is null and void and

inoperative.

(l) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate further contended

that even if for a moment it is held that Nagarbhavi Scheme

has lapsed, the acquisition of land cannot lapse. For this

proposition, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate relied on

Paragraph No.38 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs.

BDA [(2011) 3 SCC 139) (Offshore Holdings).

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(m) He further contended that the writ petition would

have to be dismissed by applying the principles of res

judicata in view of the orders/judgments passed by this Court

as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

(n) By way of reply, learned counsel for petitioners in

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 submitted that

although BDA has formed ring road which is portion of the

land in question (2 acres) nevertheless in so far as the rest of

the land is concerned, possession of the same has not been

taken by BDA and it continues to remain with the petitioner

and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to seek relief under

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

(o) By way of reply, learned counsel for the

petitioners in W.P.No.21196/2017 submitted that no sites

have been formed and the petitioner continues to be in

possession of the extent of land measuring 33.34 guntas.

Points for consideration:-

7. Having heard learned senior counsel and counsel

for the petitioners, learned senior counsel and counsel for

respondents and learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for

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the State, the following points would arise for my

consideration:-

1) Whether petitioners are entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act? In other words, whether Section 24 applies to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act as held in the case of Chikkathayamma or whether the dictum of this Court in case of M/s.Evershine Monuments would apply?

2) Keeping aside Point No.1 and assuming that the said Section applies to even acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act, whether petitioners are entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

3) Whether petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed as envisaged under Section 27 of the BDA Act?

4) Whether the withdrawal of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") (impugned in this writ petition) by the BDA is just and proper?

If not, whether the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.15967-15969/2017 are entitled to relief on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B")?

5) Whether the principles/doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply in the instant case and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 would succeed on the basis of the said doctrine?

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6) Whether petitioners in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 are entitled to any relief in those writ petitions?

7) Whether these writ petitions are hit by the principles of res judicata?

8) What order?

The aforesaid points shall be considered in seriatim.

8. Before that the undisputed facts may be taken

note of.

(a) The Land in question, totally measures four acres

thirty guntas is situated at Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village,

Bangalore North Taluk. Originally, the said land belonged to

Muniveerappa. He sold two acres of land in favour of

G.Chennarayappa who is petitioner No.4 in

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 under a

registered sale deed dated 09/07/1978. Remaining two

acres thirty guntas of land was retained by Muniveerappa

and on his demise, it was succeeded to, by his sons,

M.Muniramaiah and Gangadhar. Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar have sold an extent of 37.08 guntas or 43,544.82

sq.ft. in favour of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017. Further, they have sold 33.34 guntas or

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36,307.68 sq.ft. in favour of the petitioners in

W.P.No.21196/2017. The subject matter of

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 is two acres,

purchased by G. Channarayappa excluding a portion, in

which ring road has been formed.

(b) In respect of entire extent of 4 acres 30 guntas

of land in Sy.No.103 preliminary and final notifications dated

15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 were issued along with other

lands under Secions 17 and 19 of BDA Act for the purpose of

acquiring the same for formation of Nagarbhavi Layout. That

both Muniveerappa and Chennarayappa had preferred writ

petitions before this Court assailing the acquisition of their

respective lands, but they were unsuccessful in those writ

petitions. That the alienation made by Muniveerappa's sons

Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, in favour of petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 under a registered sale deed

dated 10/09/2014 was long after the acquisition notifications

had been issued. Similarly, the petitioner in

W.P.No.21196/2017 has purchased specific extent of land in

the said survey number under registered sale deed dated

10/09/2014.

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(c) It is not in dispute that the BDA issued two

endorsements dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") and

4/12/2014 (Annexure "M") respectively and the latter has

been assailed in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017. It is also not

in dispute that the BDA has issued work order dated

10/03/2017 to sixth respondent in W.P.Nos.21193-

21195/2017. Assailing the said work order, the said writ

petitions have been filed.

(d) It is also an undisputed fact that in the land in

question there have been several litigations before the City

Civil Court, Bengaluru and this Court as well as the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, which shall be discussed later.

Re. Point No.1:

"(1) Whether petitioners are entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act? In other words, whether Section 24 applies to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act as held in the case of Chikkathayamma or whether the dictum of this Court in case of M/s.Evershine Monuments would apply?"

9. Petitioners have sought a declaration that the

acquisition of Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village, is deemed to

have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013

Act.

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10. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla

appearing for petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017,

contended that although this Court has rendered the

judgment in M/s.Evershine Munoments by following the

dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the

applicability of Section 24 to an acquisition initiated under

the provisions of BDA Act and it has held that Section 24 is

not applicable, nevertheless, the dictum of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust could be

considered, wherein the provisions of Delhi Development

Authority Act, 1957 ("DDA Act" for short) was considered.

Learned counsel for petitioners in other connected writ

petitions, Sri Lohitaswa Banakar, relied upon the decision of

this Court in the case of K.M.Chikkathayamma and Others

vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in ILR 2016

KAR 1603, (Chikkathayamma), in support of his

submissions on Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. On the other

hand, learned Additional Government Advocate drew my

attention to a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court

(Dharwad Bench) to submit that in the case of acquisition of

land under the State Highways Act, the Division Bench has

held that Section 24 of 2013 Act is not applicable.

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11. In my view, the observations of the Hon'ble

Supreme court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust in relation

to DDA Act cannot be applied to the present case, which is a

case of acquisition under the provisions of the BDA Act in

view of several dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the

said Act and the clear distinction made between LA Act, 1894

and BDA Act, which shall be discussed later. Further, DDA

Act was enacted by the Parliament for the Union Territory of

Delhi as it then was, whereas, BDA Act has been enacted by

Karnataka Legislature for Metropolitan City of Bengaluru. In

light of the above discussion, Point No.1 is accordingly

considered.

12. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is extracted for

immediate reference as under:

"24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

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(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-

section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

The title or preamble to Section 24 reads as "Land

acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894" shall be deemed

to have lapsed in certain cases. It is explicit, restricted in its

scope and not expansive in nature. It is only where the

acquisition process has been initiated under LA Act, 1894

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that the acquisition would lapse, on the existence of

conditions as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 24. Same

is the case with regard to Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section

(1) of Section 24.

13. The said Section has been interpreted by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development

Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh and others [(2016) 16 SCC

258] (Sukbhir Singh). In said case the acquisition was under

the provisions of LA Act, 1894 and not under any other

Central or State enactment. Further, it has been held as

under:

"11. Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause and covers situations where either no award has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, or where an award has been made under Section 11, land acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed.

12. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows:

(a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping sub-section (1) out of harm's way;

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(b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;

(c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act;

(d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;

(e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again."

(underlining by me)

14. Further, in the case of Government (NCT of

Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another [(2017) 6

SCC 751], (Manav Dharam Trust) referring to Sukhbir Singh,

it has been observed as under:

"24. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the 1894 Act was under Section 11-A where what would lapse is the ... "entire proceedings for the acquisition of land"

whereas under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in

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passing of an award under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or compensation was not paid within five years prior to 1-1-2014. In other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and taking of possession within the five year period prior to 1-1- 2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in DDA v. Sukbhir Singh: (SCC p.283, para 26)

"26. ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression "deemed to have lapsed" because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have been ended."

Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an impediment for the transfer. Once the

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acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments cease to exist."

(underlining by me)

15. The aforesaid observations have been made by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question

whether subsequent purchasers/assignees/ power of attorney

holders etc. have locus standi to file a petition seeking

declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under sub-

section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which, even according

to the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the only issue arising in

that case. But, nevertheless, the aforesaid observations have

been made in the context of land acquisition proceedings

initiated under LA Act, 1894.

16. Further, in the case of Aligarh Development

Authority vs. Meghsingh (AIR 2016 SC 2912), which is

also a case arising under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, at

paragraph 6 and 7, it has been held as under;

"6. Section 24 of the 2013 Act envisages mainly two situations; i) where the land acquisition proceedings had already been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force. (ii) where the Award has been passed but neither the owner has been dispossessed nor has he been paid the compensation. Under the first, where the award had not been passed, the acquisition

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proceedings could continue; but the compensation will have to be determined under the Scheme of 2013 Act. Under the second category, there is a statutory lapse of the proceedings. There is also an incidental third situation, where award under the 1894 Act had already been passed prior to coming into force of the 2013 Act, but payment is yet to be made and possession is yet to be taken. In that case, the further proceedings after the award could continue under the old Act of 1894; but if either payment or possession has not taken effect in five years prior to the 2013 Act, then proceedings will lapse.

7. In the case before us, since admittedly the award has not been passed, there arises no question of lapse. The land acquisition proceedings would continue but with the rider that the award will have to be passed and compensation determined under the provisions of 2013 Act."

17. Thus, by following the observations and

interpretation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it

becomes clear that Section 24 of the 2013 Act, [whether it is

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)] applies only when

acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the

provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, on that short

ground alone, it could be held that Section 24 of the 2013

Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the BDA

Act. In this regard, it would be relevant to cite another

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decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnail Kaur vs.

State of Punjab [(2015) 3 SCC 206], wherein sub-section

(2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act was applied to a case arising

under the provisions of Punjab Regional Town Planning And

Development Act, 1995 and declared that the acquisition had

lapsed as the conditions under that provision was satisfied,

but without touching upon the controversy as it emanates in

the present case and having regard to the subsequent

judgments referred to above, the said judgment would not be

applicable to the instant cases.

18. But having regard to further submissions made

by learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the

petitioners that, any acquisition made under the provisions of

the BDA Act, is akin to an acquisition made under the

provisions of the LA Act, 1894, it is necessary to delve

further on the question despite the use of the expression "in

any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated

under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" in both sub-

section(1) as well as sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the

2013 Act. In this regard, it will be useful to compare the

provisions of the LA Act, 1894, with the provisions of the BDA

Act.

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19. The LA Act, 1894, though a pre-constitution

legislation and since repealed, could be traced to Entry-42,

List-III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the

Constitution, whereas the BDA Act has been enacted by the

State Legislature on the strength of Entry-5, List-II (State

List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The said

entries are extracted for immediate reference as under:

"Seventh Schedule, List III-Concurrent List, Entry 42 - Acquisition and requisitioning of property."

"Seventh Schedule, List II- State List, Entry-5 - Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self- government or village administration."

Thus, both the Acts have been enacted under two

different Entries of two distinct Lists of the Seventh Schedule.

Moreover, the object and purpose of the two Acts are

distinct.

20. The object and purpose of the LA Act, 1894, is

for acquisition of the land for public purposes and for

companies. The expression public purpose is defined in

Section 3(f) of the said Act. It is an inclusive definition and

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not an exhaustive one. Section 3(f) is substituted by the

Karnataka Amendment with effect from 24.08.1961. On the

other hand, the object of the BDA Act, which has substituted

City Improvement Trust Board Act, is to provide for the

establishment of a Development Authority for the

development of the city of Bangalore, now Bengaluru, and

areas adjacent thereto and matters connected therewith.

Whereas, the provisions of LA Act, 1894, is to acquire land

for public purposes, determination of compensation and

matters connected therewith and is a general enactment, the

object and purpose of the BDA Act is for planned

development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area and acquisition

of land under Sections 17 and 19 of the BDA Act by issuance

of Preliminary and Final Notifications is incidental which is for

the purpose of development Schemes, as enunciated in

Chapter III of the BDA Act, for Bangalore Metropolitan Area.

For that purpose, the BDA has authority to acquire land by

agreement with the land owners as per Section 35 of the said

Act or the State Government could transfer land to the BDA

belonging to it or to Corporation or a local authority as per

Section 37 or, BDA could directly acquire land from land

owners under Chapters III and IV of the said BDA Act.

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21. The object and purpose of the BDA Act has been

considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore

Development Authority and others [(2010) 7 SCC 129]

(Bondu Ramaswamy), which was a case concerning challenge

to acquisition made by BDA for the purpose of formation of

Arkavathi Layout, at Paragraph No.47, by holding that, the

purpose and object of the BDA is to act as a development

authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and

areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble of the BDA Act

describes it as "an Act to provide for the establishment of a

Development Authority for the development of the city of

Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters

connected therewith". The development contemplated by the

BDA Act is "carrying out of building, engineering or other

operations in or over or under land or the making of any

material change in any building or land and includes

redevelopment" (vide Section 2(j) of BDA Act). Therefore,

the purpose of BDA Act is to make lay outs, construct

buildings or carry out other operations in regard to land."

22. By contrast, the Scheme of the LA Act, 1894,

which is since repealed by 2013 Act was an expropriatory

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legislation to provide for acquisition of land for public

purposes and for companies. Section 4 of the said Act dealt

with publication of Preliminary Notification while Section 5-A

provided for hearing objections with regard to the proposed

acquisitions. Section 6 dealt with the issuance of a

declaration and Final Notification that the land was required

for a public purpose. The said declaration was conclusive

evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose or for

a Company, as the case may be. After making such a

declaration, the appropriate government could acquire the

land in accordance with the Act. In fact, Part II of the LA

Act, 1894, dealt with acquisition which contemplated

procedure for the passing of an award; notifying persons

interested and taking possession of the land. Part II of the

said Act, dealt with the provisions dealing with enhancement

of compensation by the reference Court by the land owner

seeking a reference for a higher compensation. Part IV dealt

with apportionment of compensation, while Part V of the said

Act concerned with payment. Acquisition of land for

companies was dealt with in Part VII of the said Act and a

special procedure was prescribed. Part VIII pertained to

miscellaneous provisions. Thus, the whole object and Scheme

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of LA Act, 1894, was to acquire land for a public purpose or

for the benefit of companies, whereas the object and Scheme

of the BDA Act is to have planned development of Bangalore

Metropolitan Area and in that regard acquisition of land under

the BDA Act read with the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 is

only incidental to and not the primary object of BDA Act.

23. More specifically, the controversy as to, whether,

Sections 6 and 11-A of the LA Act, 1894, were applicable to

provisions of the BDA Act or not were considered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Munithimmaiah vs.

State of Karnataka and others [(2002) 4 SCC 326]

(Munithimmaiah); Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs.

Bangaore Development Authority [(2011) 3 SCC 139)

(Offshore Holdings), and Bondu Ramaswamy and others

vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others

[(2010) 7 SCC 129) (Bondu Ramaswarmy), the latter two

cases have been referred to above.

a) In Munithimmaiah, while referring to the

decisions of this Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd., vs.

State of Karnataka [ILR 1997 Kar. 1419], in the context

of whether Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894, was applicable to

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Section 19 of the BDA Act (both dealing with declaration and

final notification), Hon'ble Supreme Court has at Paragraph

No.15, categorically observed as under:

"15. So far as the BDA Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate and ensure a planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under, and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and not a law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Enactment of 1894, as amended from time to time. If at all, the BDA Act, so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities are concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the special purposes of the BDA and the same was not also considered to be part of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It could not also be legitimately stated, on a reading of Section 36 of the BDA Act that the Karnataka legislature intended thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or amendments, which might be made by altogether a different legislature, be it the Parliament, to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition

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under the BDA Act vis-à-vis the Central Act has been analysed elaborately by the Division Bench, as noticed supra, in our view, very rightly too, considered to constitute a special and self-contained code of its own and the BDA Act and Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each other, or pari materia legislations. That apart, the BDA Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the BDA Act. When the BDA Act, expressly provides by specifically enacting the circumstances under which and the period of time on the expiry of which alone the proceedings initiated thereunder shall lapse due to any default, the different circumstances and period of limitation envisaged under the Central Act, 1894, as amended by the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of BDA Act without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provisions in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature. A Scheme formulated, sanctioned and set for implementation under the BDA Act, cannot be

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stultified or rendered ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act, particularly of the nature of Sections 6 and 11-A, which cannot also on its own force have any application to actions taken under the BDA Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11- A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to proceedings under the BDA Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant has no merit whatsoever and do not commend for our acceptance."

(underlining by me)

b) The object and purpose of the BDA Act has been

considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore

Development Authority and others [(2010) 7 SCC 129]

(Bondu Ramaswamy), which was a case concerning challenge

to acquisition made by BDA for the purpose of formation of

Arkavathi Layout, at Paragraph No.47, by holding that, the

purpose and object of the BDA is to act as a development

authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and

areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble of the BDA Act

describes it as "an Act to provide for the establishment of a

Development Authority for the development of the city of

Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters

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connected therewith". The development contemplated by the

BDA Act is "carrying out of building, engineering or other

operations in or over or under land or the making of any

material change in any building or land and includes

redevelopment" (vide Section 2(j) of BDA Act). Therefore,

the purpose of BDA Act is to make lay outs, construct

buildings or carry out other operations in regard to land."

Further, on comparing the provisions of LA Act, 1894,

with BDA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"79. This question arises from the contention raised by one of the appellants that the provisions of section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the LA Act", for short) will apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act and consequently if the final declaration under section 19(1) is not issued within one year from the date of publication of the notification under sections 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act, such final declaration will be invalid. The appellants' submissions are as under: the notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of the Act was issued and gazetted on 3-2- 2003 and the declaration under Section 19(1) was issued and published on 23-2-2004. Section 36 of the Act provides that the acquisition of land under the BDA Act within or outside the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, shall be regulated by the provisions of the LA Act, so far as they are applicable. Section 6 of LA Act requires that no declaration shall be made, in respect of any

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land covered by a notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of such notification under section 4 of LA Act. As the provisions of LA Act have been made applicable to acquisitions under the BDA Act, it is necessary that the declaration under Section 19(1) of BDA Act (which is equivalent to the final declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act) should also be made before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of BDA Act (which is equivalent to Section 4(1) of LA Act).

80. The BDA Act contains provisions relating to acquisition of properties, up to the stage of publication of final declaration. The BDA Act does not contain the subsequent provisions relating to completion of the acquisition, that is, issue of notices, enquiry and award, vesting of land, payment of compensation, principles relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36 of the BDA Act does not make the LA Act applicable in its entirety, but states that the acquisition under BDA Act, shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of LA Act. Therefore it follows that where there are already provisions in the BDA Act regulating certain aspects or stages of acquisition or the proceedings relating thereto, the corresponding provisions of LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. Only those provisions of LA Act, relating to the stages of acquisition, for which there is no provision in the BDA Act, are applied to the acquisitions under BDA Act.

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81. The BDA Act contains specific provisions relating to preliminary notification and final declaration. In fact the procedure up to final declaration under the BDA Act is different from the procedure under the LA Act relating to acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for acquisition under Sections 15 to 19 of the BDA Act and the limited application of the LA Act in terms of Section 36 of the BDA Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. If Section 6 of LA Act is not made applicable, the question of amendment to Section 6 of the LA Act providing a time-limit for issue of final declaration, will also not apply."

(underlining by me)

c) While considering the question as to whether

Section 11-A of the LA Act, 1894, applies to acquisitions

made under the BDA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Offshore Holdings Private Limited, has emphatically held that

Section 11-A does not apply to acquisitions made under the

BDA Act, by observing as follows:

"33. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, which provide for time-frame for compliance and the consequences of default thereof, are not applicable to acquisition under the BDA Act. They are Sections 6 and 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. As per Section 11-A, if the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6,

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the acquisition proceedings will lapse. Similarly, where declaration under Section 6 of this Act is not issued within three years from the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act [such notification being issued after the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement of Central Act 68 of 1984] or within one year where Section 4 notification was published subsequent to the passing of Central Act 68 of 1984, no such declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued in any of these cases.

34. A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority while dealing with the contention that notification issued in terms of Section 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act appears to be equivalent to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and the declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act appears to be equivalent to the final declaration under Section 6 of the Land acquisition Act, held that all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act will not apply to the acquisition under the BDA Act and only those provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, relating to stages of acquisition, for which there is no corresponding provision in the BDA Act, are applicable to an acquisition under the BDA Act. The provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act would not be attracted to the BDA Act as the Act itself provides for such mechanism.

35. Be that as it may, it is clear that the BDA Act is a self-contained code which provides for all the

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situations that may arise in planned development of an area including acquisition of land for that purpose. The Scheme of the Act does not admit any necessity for reading the provisions of Sections 6 and 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, as part and parcel of the BDA Act for attainment of its object. The primary object of the State Act is to carry out planned development and acquisition is a mere incident of such planned development. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, where the land is to be acquired for a specific public purpose and acquisition is the sum and substance of that Act, all matters in relation to the acquisition of land will be regulated by the provisions of that Act. The State Act has provided its own Scheme and provisions for acquisition of land.

36. The co-relation between the two enactments is a very limited one. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be attracted only in so far as they are applicable to the State law. Where there are specific provisions under the State Act the provisions of Central Act will not be attracted. Furthermore, reading the provisions of default and consequences thereof, as stated under the Central Act into the State Act, is bound to frustrate the very Scheme formulated under the State Act. Only because some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are attracted, it does not necessarily contemplate that all the provisions of the Central Act would per se be applicable to the provisions of the State Act irrespective of the Scheme and object contained therein. The Authority under the BDA Act is vested with complete powers to prepare and execute the

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development plans of which acquisition may or may not be a part. The provisions of the State Act can be implemented completely and effectively on their own and reading the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the State Act, which may result in frustrating its object, is not called for. We would be dealing with various facets which would support this view shortly.

37. The provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act mandate the Authority to execute the Scheme, substantially, within five years from the date of publication of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19. If the Authority fails to do so, then the Scheme shall lapse and provisions of Section 36 of the BDA Act will become inoperative. The provisions of Section 27 have a direct nexus with the provisions of Section 36 which provide that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, so far as they are applicable to the State Act, shall govern the cases of acquisition otherwise than by agreement. Acquisition stands on a completely distinct footing from the Scheme formulated which is the subject-matter of execution under the provisions of the BDA Act.

38. On a conjunctive reading of the provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of the State Act, it is clear that where a Scheme lapses, the acquisition may not. This, of course, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where, upon completion of the acquisition proceedings, the land has vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition would not lapse or terminate as a result of lapsing of the Scheme

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under Section 27 of the BDA Act. An argument to the contrary cannot be accepted for the reason that on vesting, the land stands transferred and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances and such status of the property is incapable of being altered by fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act. Both these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which property, once and absolutely, vested in the State can be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State. However, this may not be true in cases where acquisition proceedings are still pending and land has not been vested in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act.

39. What is meant by the language of Section 27 of the BDA Act, i.e. "provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative", is that if the acquisition proceedings are pending and where the Scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act, i.e. with reference to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act shall become inoperative. Once the land which, upon its acquisition, has vested in the State and thereafter vested in the Authority in terms of Section 36(3); such vesting is incapable of being disturbed except in the case where the Government issues a notification for re-vesting the land in itself, or a Corporation, or a local Authority in cases where the land is not required by the Authority under the provisions of Section 37(3) of the BDA Act.

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40. This being the Scheme of the acquisition within the framework of the State Act, read with the relevant provisions of the Central Act, it will not be permissible to bring the concept of "lapsing of acquisition" as stated in the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter IV of the BDA Act.

44. One of the apparent and unavoidable consequences of reading the provisions of Section 11- A of the Central Act into the State Act would be that it is bound to adversely affect the "development Scheme" under the State Act and may even frustrate the same. It is a self-defeating argument that the Government can always issue fresh declaration and the acquisition in all cases should lapse in terms of Section 11-A of the Central Act."

(underlining by me)

d) Further, in the case of Girnar Traders (3) vs.

State of Maharashtra and others [(2011) 3 SCC 1],

(Girnar Traders), the Hon'ble Supreme Court on comparing

the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning

Act, 1966, (MRTP Act) which is an Act similar to BDA Act with

the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, has observed as under:

"130. While referring to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the State Legislature has not adopted, specifically or otherwise, the period mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the contrary, different time-frames have been postulated under different provisions of the MRTP Act.

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If those limitations of time are not adhered to by the authorities concerned, the consequences have also been provided therefor. From the stage of initiation of steps for preparation of draft plans to the finalization of the Scheme, it takes considerable time. Furthermore, its implementation at the ground level, takes still much more time. If this entire planned development which is a massive project is permitted to lapse on the application of Section 11-A of the Central Act, it will have the effect of rendering every project of planned development frustrated. It can hardly be an argument that the Government can always issue fresh declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and take further proceedings. Recommencement of acquisition proceedings at different levels of the hierarchy of the State and Planning Authority itself takes considerable time and, thus, it will be difficult to achieve the target of planned development.

131. This clearly demonstrates that all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act introduced by later amendments would not, per se, become applicable and be deemed to be part and parcel of the MRTP Act. The intent of the legislature to make the State Act a self-contained Code with definite reference to required provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is clear."

xxx xxx xxx

134. However, if the provisions of section 11-A of the Central Act were permitted to punctuate a Scheme of the State Act and the award is not made

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within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Central Act, the acquisition proceedings will lapse which will frustrate the rights of the State as well as the Scheme contemplated under Section 126 as well as Section 127 of the State Act and that would not be permissible in law. This being legislation by incorporation, the general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand excluded.

xxx xxx xxx

137. The Court cannot lose sight of one very important fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating to planned development and acquisition is an incidental aspect thereof. Planned development is quite different from merely "achieving a public purpose" for which the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Development plan, Regional Plan and town planning Scheme are major events in the development of a State. They are controlled and guided by different financial, architectural and public interest for the development including macro and micro planning of the entire State.

138. The provisions relating to planned development of the State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different time-frames are required for initiation, finalization and complete execution of such development plans. The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act,

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with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire Scheme and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section 11-A of the Central Act, every development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end to the entire development process.

xxx xxx xxx

140. Thus, in our view, reading of Section 11- A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act will render the substantive provisions of the State Act ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the object of the Act materially."

(underlining by me)

d) Recently, in Special Land Acquisition Officer,

KIADB, Mysore and another vs. Anasuya Bai (D) by

LRs. and others (AIR 2017 SC 904) (Anasuya Bai), the

question under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme

Court was, as to, whether relief under Section 24 of the 2013

Act could be granted to landowners when acquisition was

made under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas

Development Act, (KIAD Act). After referring to the judgment

of this Court which was appealed against before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in light of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, Hon'ble

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Supreme Court noted the observations made by the Division

Bench of this Court in the following words:

"24. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment, however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the New LA Act in the following manner:

"13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIADB Act. But there is no provisions under the KIADB Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under LA Act, whether the new act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years u/S 11. If the award is passed under LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11-A contemplates if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2011) 3 SCC 408: (AIR 2011 SC 1113) has held that Section 11-A of the Act is no

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application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the New Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and non- passing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from non-payment of compensation to the land owners.

14. The New Act does not say whether the Act is applicable to the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act 1894. What Section 24 says that if the award is not passed u/S.11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid within 5 years or more prior to new act, if the physical possession of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. In the instant case, it is not case of the respondent that award is not required to be passed under the provisions of LA Act. When the award is required to be passed under LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of New Act cannot be made applicable on account of non payment of compensation within a period of five years.

25. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, matter is

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not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 24 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the Old LA Act is not rightly understood."

24. Next, it is necessary to discuss Smt. K.M.

Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of

Karnataka and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603], which is a

recent judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this

Court and which is the sheet-anchor of learned counsel for

the petitioners herein.

a) The points for determination in the aforesaid case

are culled out for immediate reference as under:

"a) Whether the petitions in WP 38868-70 and WP Nos.38871-74/2015 are maintainable in view of the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KUDA Act having been quashed and the same being the subject matter of an appeal before a Division bench of this Court.

b) Whether the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or the LA Act, 2013, should be applied to acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KUDA Act and the BDA Act, if the proceedings are not completed as on the date of coming into force of the LA Act, 2013.

c) What order should follow in each of these petitions."

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Learned Single Judge has culled out the ingredients of

the said sub-section which is extracted later.

b) It is necessary to delineate on this case in detail as

heavy reliance has been placed on the said decision by

learned counsel for the petitioners. The primary contention

canvassed in the aforesaid case was, as to, whether 2013 Act

would be applicable to acquisitions initiated under the

provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities

Act, 1987 (KUDA Act) and BDA Act. If the answer to the

same was in the affirmative, then the acquisition proceeding

in the aforesaid case which concerned BDA Act also was

deemed to have lapsed.

c) In that case, the contention of learned senior

counsel and learned Counsel for the petitioners was, where a

statute is cited by a reference (the cited statute) (LA Act,

1894) into an another statute (the referring statute) (BDA

Act/KUDA Act) any repeal or amendment of the cited statute

is automatically carried over or reflected in the referring

statute. This was in contrast, to a case of legislation by

incorporation wherein the repeal or amendment of the

incorporated statute does not automatically affect the

incorporating statute. It was further contended in the said

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case that in Offshore Holdings Private Limited, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held, Section 36 of the BDA Act (a provision

in pari materia with Section 36 of KUDA Act) to be a case of

legislation by incorporation. But, the repeal of LA Act, 1894

and substitution of 2013 Act created an exception and when

the exception applied, the effect would be one of legislation

by reference. It was contended that, if LA Act, 1894, was to

be applied to acquisitions made under the KUDA Act post

01/01/2014, the quantum of compensation to the land

owners in relation to acquisitions under the KUDA Act would

be lesser than the compensation vis-à-vis acquisition made

under 2013 Act, even though the purpose of the acquisition

is same (urban or town planning and allotment of house

sites). Similarly, the additional benefits in relation to

rehabilitation and resettlement of affected families would also

not be available to the land owners even though the purpose

of the acquisition remains the same. It was emphasized in

that case that the provisions of 2013 Act are more beneficial

to the land owners and affected families in land acquisition

proceedings. The discriminatory effect as regards

compensation and other benefits would occur because there

is a complete change in the legislative approach in relation to

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land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement under 2013

Act which is more beneficial to the land owners. It was

further contended in the said case that the land owners

would thus be entitled to different rates of compensation and

other resettlement and rehabilitation benefits, depending

upon which Act the acquisition is made, whether under the

BDA Act or KUDA Act or the central land acquisition

enactments resulting in a discriminatory effect being in

violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

d) Per contra, the State through learned Advocate

General submitted in the said case that the intention of

Section 24 in 2013 Act is different and distinct in that the

said section has specific reference to acquisition proceedings

initiated under LA Act, 1894. That the object and purpose of

Section 24 is not only to save acquisition initiated under LA

Act, 1894, but also to declare lapse of acquisition under sub-

section (2) of Section 24 and to also give the benefit of the

2013 Act under certain circumstances. It was further

contended that Section 27 of KUDA Act as well as BDA Act

provide for lapse of Scheme of development and consequent

inoperation of Section 36 of the Act. That BDA Act being a

complete code by itself, lapse of acquisition has to be

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considered under that Act only. It was further contended that

Section 24 is more in the nature of a transitory provision and

an exception and operates as a link between LA Act, 1894

and 2013 Act.

e) While considering point No.2 extracted above,

learned Single Judge in the said case held with regard to

interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013

Act as under:-

"Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013 provides for lapse of acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, on the satisfaction of certain conditions, which are as follows:

a. The award of compensation should have been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the LA Act, 2013. In that, it should have been passed prior to 01.01.2009;

AND b. Physical possession of the land has not been taken;

OR c. Compensation has not been paid.

The Apex Court has interpreted the requirement of possession being taken under Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, to mean that actual physical possession has to be taken and mere symbolic possession would not suffice."

(emphasis by me)

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Although learned Single Judge has noticed that sub-

section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies to

acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894,

nevertheless has also held that the "answer to the second

point for consideration is that it is the LA Act, 2013 that shall

be applied to acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act and

KUDA Act, that have remained without being completed in all

respects as on 1/1/2014, and proceedings that have been

initiated thereafter".

f) Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Section

24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to

acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as

well as KUDA Act. Learned Single Judge however noted that

sub-section (2) of Section 24 is a substantive provision of law

which saves acquisition as well as affords the prospect of

land sought to be acquired reverting to the land owner under

certain conditions.

The said decision was rendered on 10/03/2016. It is

stated at the Bar that the said decision has been appealed

against by the BDA and a Division Bench of this Court has

stayed the order passed in the said case.

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25. The order in the case of Chikkathayamma's case

has been considered in M/s.Evershine Monuments and it has

been held as under:

"37. In my humble opinion, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case as well as similar judgments in other cases, in the context of KUDA, 1987 and BDA Act have been rendered without making an analysis of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, with regard to its applicability to acquisitions initiated under those Acts as opposed to acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894. Further, judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard have not been considered and followed and without bearing in mind the distinction in the object and Scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, as well as the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard. Learned Single Judge by his order has granted relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. While a reference has been made to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy, Munithimmaiah, and Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd., the said reference is not in depth, as a detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgments, which have been rendered on a detailed comparison of LA Act, 1894 with BDA Act, would have thrown light on the object and scope of Section 24 of 2013 Act.

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38. Reliance placed on the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions referred to above in detail would clearly indicate that the object and Scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, being distinct and meant for different purposes, it cannot be construed that acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, is an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case does not take into consideration the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh and the subsequent decision in the case of Manav Dharam Trust, which are directly on the issue of applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act to only acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894.

39. With respect, the judgment in the case of Chikkathayamma and other judgments which are similar in nature cannot be considered to be binding precedent as they are contrary to the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above as well as the provision of Section 24 of the 2013 Act and hence cannot be applied to the present cases which deal with acquisition under BDA Act. There are also additional reasons for holding so.

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40. Revisiting the words of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, what is significant to note is the fact that the said Section expressly refers to land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894. The said Section does not incorporate the words "or proceedings initiated under any other enactment".

Therefore, the expression "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894"

are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. In this regard, the rules of interpretation of a statute would become relevant and reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some

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absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in light of their own views as to policy" unless it is shown to adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case.

41. In this context, Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India reported in AIR 2002 SC 1351 could be relied upon wherein, Cross on "Statutory Interpretation" (Third Edition, 1995) has been relied upon as follows:-

"Thus, an 'ordinary meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used."

42. The aforesaid principles being squarely applicable to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the same must be interpreted having regard to the

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intention of the Parliament. In this regard, one cannot lose sight of the fact that 2013 Act repeals only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central or State enactment dealing with acquisition. Therefore, what are sought to be saved under Section 24 of the 2013 Act, are those acquisitions initiated only under LA Act, 1894 and not any acquisition initiated under any other Central or State enactment. Therefore, the words "acquisition proceedings initiated under any other enactment"

cannot be added or supplemented by the Court after the expression "in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" under both sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Further, the short title of Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as "Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases." This is another indication that Section 24 applies only to those acquisition "initiated" under the provisions of LA Act, 1894.

43. Further, Section 24 creates a new right in favour of land owners in as much as they are entitled to relief under certain circumstances as stipulated in Section 24 of the Act. One such relief is under sub- section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned therein exist. One overbearing condition is that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply.

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44. The reasons as to why Parliament has incorporated Section 24 in the 2013 Act are evident and not far to see. The said section creates a new right in favour of land owners whose lands have been acquired under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, which has been repealed and substituted by 2013 Act. The 2013 Act is not a substitution for other Central enactments pertaining to acquisition of land or for that matter any other State enactment. Therefore, Section 24 uses the expression that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. But while creating a new right in favour of land owners under Section 24, Parliament at the same time has intended two further aspects: first, saving acquisition under LA Act, 1894 and second, not encroaching upon other Central or State enactments. As far as State enactments dealing with acquisitions are concerned, Parliament intentionally has not touched upon any State enactment. The reason being that several State enactments have been made drawing sustenance from Entry 5, List II or State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, whereas LA Act, 1894 as well as 2013 Act could be traced to Entry 42 List III (Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Moreover, as has been explained above, the object and scope of the BDA Act made under Entry 5 List II (State List) are distinct from LA Act, 1894 substituted by 2013 Act.

45. Further, the State enactments have their own provisions concerning lapse of acquisition such as Section 27 of BDA Act or KUDA Act and Section 24 of 2013 Act cannot trammel upon those provisions of the State Acts such as BDA Act or KUDA Act. The State

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enactments may have referred to certain provisions of LA Act, 1894, particularly with regard to determination of compensation and such other matters.

Reference to LA Act, 1894 in the State enactments for certain purposes does not imply that the acquisition is initiated under LA Act, 1894. What is of prime importance for Section 24 of 2013 Act to apply is that acquisition proceedings must have been initiated under LA Act, 1894 and not any other law. Losing sight of this aspect would create confusion in the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act. If the said provision is to apply to acquisitions initiated under a State enactment, such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, then Section 27 of the said Acts which also deal with lapse of acquisition under certain circumstances will be rendered nugatory, otiose or redundant on prevailing of circumstances mentioned in Section 24 of the 2013 Act. In this regard, it is also observed that when State Acts such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, have specific provisions in the form of Section 27 concerning lapse of acquisition, Section 24 of the Parliamentary enactment i.e., 2013 Act, cannot be applied, when acquisitions are under State enactments. This is because, the State or Central Laws concerning acquisition are enacted under different entries and in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and therefore, they operate in different fields. This is so, although, the State enactments may refer to the provisions of LA Act, 1894 for certain purposes.

xxx

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47. Thus, 2013 Act has not only repealed the LA Act, 1894, but has substituted the said Act. The 2013 Act is a totally distinct enactment and a complete code by itself. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, initiation of acquisition under State enactments such as BDA Act is not the same as initiation of acquisition under LA Act, 1894.

48. Further, it is noted that 2013 Act has, by virtue of Section 114 thereof, repealed LA Act, 1894. Section 114 reads as under:

"114. Repeal and Saving: (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."

Therefore, what is saved under Section 114 of 2013 Act are only those acts and actions initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, which ought to be saved having regard to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under:

"6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be

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made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."

However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a saving clause as per sub- section 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under LA Act, 1894. Sub-section (1), lays down the

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conditions when the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, would be amenable to the provisions of 2013 Act or, continued under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, on certain conditions or circumstances prevailing. Under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the Parliament has, by a deeming provision, intended that if certain conditions are satisfied, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed.

XXX

50. Therefore, for a declaration of lapse of acquisition, the pre-conditions or conditions precedent mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act must apply. Most importantly the said conditions must prevail in an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, and not with regard to acquisition initiated under any other enactment be it Central or State enactment. Therefore, before land owners could seek relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which is a right created in their favour, the basic postulate that must be borne in mind is to ascertain, in the first instance, as to under which law, acquisition has been initiated; whether under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or any other law. If it is under any other law, then in my view Section 24 would not be applicable to such acquisitions. The dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited clearly enunciate that an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act being distinct from an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act,

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1894, it cannot be held that acquisition process initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, would also encompass acquisition proceedings initiated under any other law such as, the BDA Act. As already noted, the two enactments being distinct having a different object and scope and acquisition of lands being only incidental to the main object and scope under the BDA Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the two Acts cannot be considered on par, so as to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act is "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894."

51. As already observed, Section 24 of the 2013 Act creates a new right in the land owners. For the exercise of said right, certain conditions have to exist, the most significant of them being, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of land owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the BDA Act or KUDA Act. In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:

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"105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.

(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.

(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.

(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days

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which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament."

The enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 105 consists of the following thirteen Parliamentary enactments, namely:

"THE FOURTH SCHEDULE [See section 105] LIST OF ENACTMENTS REGULATING LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT

1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958).

2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962).

3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (14 of 1948).

4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886).

5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 (18 of 1885).

6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (33 of 1978).

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7. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956).

8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962).

9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 1952).

10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (60 of 1948).

11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (20 of 1957).

12. The Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003).

13. The Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)."

52. Therefore, Parliament itself has listed the Central enactments to which 2013 Act does not apply. This is because Parliament was conscious of the fact that LA Act, 1894 was substituted by the 2013 Act, which is distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments.

53. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming

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provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise.

54. In the result, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as the acquisitions in these cases were initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act and not under the LA Act, 1894. It is further held, with respect, that Chikkathayamma's and other similar decisions, having regard to the dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited, are not applicable as binding precedent in the present case. Further, most of the decisions referred to above have granted relief on the basis of factual determination as per sub-section 2 of Section 24 and without considering the question of law which arises in these cases. Further, in some cases, the petitioners have themselves not pressed sub- section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Even then, relief has been granted on a determination made on facts and by holding that there has been abandonment of acquisition/lapse of acquisition.

55. Hence, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed, as the petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as the said section does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act."

26. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Delhi Development Authority vs. Raman Grover and

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Others [(2016) 14 SCC 101] does not apply, as the same

turns on its own facts and in that case, possession had not

been taken by Delhi Development Authority though the

award had been passed as far back as in 1996. Hence,

Section 24(2) of 2013 Act was applied and it was held that

acquisition proceedings was deemed to have lapsed in

respect of 1,100 sq.yrds. of land involved in that case.

Further, as pointed out by learned Addl. Government

Advocate, a Division Bench of this Court (Dharwad Bench) in

the case of Anil and others vs. State of Karnataka and

others [W.A.Nos.100221-225/2017 and connected

matters, disposed off on 19/04/2017] has held that the

provisions of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act would not be

applicable to Karnataka Highways Act, 1964, which is a State

enactment, which squarely applies to this case.

27. In view of the aforesaid dictum, which is squarely

applicable to the present case, the petitioners herein are not

entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013

Act as the said Section does not apply to acquisition initiated

under the provisions of the BDA Act, but in applies only to

acquisitions initiated under the provisions of LA Act 1894.

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28. But these matters do not end here. Learned

senior counsel and other counsel for the respective

petitioners have also made submissions on the premise that

Section 24 of 2013 Act applies and therefore, writ petitions

would now be considered separately and independently of

the answer given to Point No.1. Therefore, assuming that

Section 24 applies to acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act

also, whether petitioners are entitled to relief under that

provision, is considered on the basis of the emerging facts in

each of the writ petitions as Point No.2.

Re. Point No.2:

"(2) Keeping aside Point No.1 and assuming that the said Section applies to even acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act, whether petitioners are entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?"

29. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act begins

with a non-obstante clause and it states that notwithstanding

anything contained in sub-section (1) in case of land

acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894,

where an award under the said Section has not been made

five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act

and physical possession of the land has not been taken or

compensation has not been paid, then the proceedings shall

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be deemed to have lapsed. The relief sought for by the

petitioners herein is on the premise that the compensation

has not been paid and further, physical possession of the land

in question has not been taken and therefore, the acquisition

proceedings is deemed to have lapsed.

30. Admittedly, the award was passed in respect of

the land in question on 16/05/2002. Annexure "E" is a copy

of the award produced by the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-

15969/2017. It was approved on 20/05/2002. The award

reads as under:

________________________ "AWARD UNDER SECTION - 11 OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT.

________________________

GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER BANGALORE DISTRICT

1. Land Acquisition Case No.51/85-86

2. Name of the Project - Nagarabhavi Layout I Stage

3. Preliminary Notification No.A6/PR/S.L.A.O./S/201/ 82-83 Dated : 15.7.82 published in pages 55 to 65 part-III (3) Karnataka Gazette Dtd: 12.8.1982

4. Authority for the acquisition Declaration No.HUD 249

- MNX-85/Dt.16.8.1985 Dtd: published at pages 467 to 474

5. Name of the Taluk - North Village Nagarabhavi

6. The Structures, extent and other description of the land with particulars of trees, buildings and standing crops thereon.

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_____________________________________________ Name of the Remai- Amount Area required Khatedar/ Sy.No. Class Total Kharab ning ___________ Anubhavdar. extent Land Extent Extent Amount

A-G A-G A-G Rs. Ps. A-G Rs. Ps.

Muniveerappa 103 Dry 4-30 0-30 4-00 4.64 4-30 4.64 Bin Pusalaiah G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah

7. Name of the interested persons and the nature of their respective interests.

Muniveerappa bin Pussalaiah, G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah.

8. Schedule of notices served statements filed by interested persons and documents etc., referred to.

Notices under section 9 and 10 of the L.A. Act have been issued and served on the notified khatedars as per the provisions of the L.A. Act on 13.12.1985.

9. Amount of the compensation claimed and the apportionment applied for :-

No one has claimed compensation. All are requesting for De-notification and Re-conveyance of the land.

10. A W A R D :-

The land in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi village measuring 4A-30G including 00-30 gts., Un-reserved kharab land was notified for acquisition under Preliminary Notification No.A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 Dtd.15.7.1982 for layout called Nagarabhavi. I stage and the same is published in the Karnataka Gazette Dtd.12.8.82, in pages 55 to 65, part-III under section 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act, 1976.

Final notification was approved by the Government vide No.HUD-249-MNX-85 Dtd.16.8.1985

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and published in the Karnataka Gazette Dtd.7.11.1985 under section 19(1) of the BDA act.

The true area of the land is 4A-30 Gts., which includes 0-30 Gts., of Un-reserved kharab land. The land is bounded as follows :-

East : Gangondanahalli Gadi North - Sy.No.48 West : Sy.No.48 South-Sy.No.59 and 102.

CLAIMS : The notified khatedars are Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah. Notices under section 9, 10, 11 & 14 of L.A. Act have been served as per the provisions of the L.A. Act. But, no one has given any claim statement, except one petition dtd.25-9-86 by Sri.G.Chennarayappa, the notified khatedar requesting for de-notification of the land to an extent of 2A-00 gts., for his share. In the remaining extent, one Sri.Byadgi, the GPA holder of Sri.Muniveerappa has formed Revenue sites and sold to different individuals prior to the Preliminary Notification dated 12-8-82.

Further, the khatedars have filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka in W.P.13042/86, 17707/86 and W.A.2361/90 challenging the notification. But the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka have dismissed these petitions on 8.3.1991 and 18.7.91 respectively.

VALUATION :

In determining the valuation to be fixed, the most important factor to be considered is the market value of the land as on the date of Preliminary notification under section 17(1) & (3) of the BDA Act 1976. The Preliminary notification was published on 26.8.82. One of the method as per the provisions of the L.A. Act is adopted in fixing the compensation is on the basis of price within a reasonable time from the date of

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notification in a bonafide transaction in the same village or in the adjoining villages. Considering lands having similar advantages of land under acquisition for this purpose I have verified all the transactions that have taken place in the two villages during the year 1982 - 1985. As seen from the sale statistics that is made available by the Sub-Registrar Office, Bangalore North Taluk, there are more transactions in respect of small fragments, Naturally, these fragments would have been sold for a fancy price, the land under acquisition measures 4-30 Gts., Therefore, the land under acquisition cannot be compared with fragments in respect of which the transactions are available.

Village Period Extent Value paid

------------------------------------------------------------

Nagarabhavi 29.01.82 02-10 46,000.00 " 28.05.82 40' x 40' 17,462.30 " 29.05.82 30' x 50' 10,912-30 " 31.05.82 60' x 40' 10,827.90 " 04.06.82 80x45x40 ________ 2 22,322.90 " 08.06.82 66+84 70+60 44,343.50 _____x _____ 2 2 " 11.10.82 4 acres 33,000.00 " 27.12.82 60' x 40' 17,280.00 Malagala 10.11.83 2 acres 46,000-00

------------------------------------------------------------

However as seen from these transactions there are few transitions in respect of bigger extent also, these transactions having taken place in the year 1982 itself. The Preliminary Notification in respect of this land under acquisition was published in the year 1982 under section 17 of the BDA Act. Therefore the transaction

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which are available for bigger extents could be definitely considered in arriving at the market value of the land under acquisition. As seen from the sale statistics, the maximum amount that was paid in any single transaction is Rs.23,000/- per acre. However as verified from the Court decrees for the lands acquired in the near by areas of the land under acquisition, the learned Civil Judge Bangalore has fixed the compensation amount at the rate of Rs.65,000/- per acre for the lands in Gangondanahally village and Rs.73,000/- per acre for the lands in Devatigereramanahally village, Kempapura Agrahara Village in pursuance of the reference made under section 18 of the L.A. Act for the lands in Chandra Layout. This compensation amount was confirmed by the Hon'ble Court of Karnataka in MFA.284/83. This compensation amount was awarded by the learned Civil Judge, on the judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka for certain lands acquired in which market value of the lands was fixed at Rs.50,000/- per acre during 1971.

Here the points to be considered are whether the land under acquisition could be directly compared with the land which have been acquired for Chandra Layout. The distance factor shall also be considered which govern the potential of the lands.

The lands which have been acquired for Chandra Layout are definitely having more advantages as the village D.R.Hally, K.P.Agrahara, are just touching the Bangalore Mysore Highway and the road which connects Vijayanagar extension with Bangalore Mysore Highway extension with Bangalore Mysore highway respectively. Whereas the land under acquisition along with the other lands in Nagarabhavi and Malagala village are located in

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such a way wherein the communication/transportation was not fully developed at the time of Notification. The land under acquisition along with other lands of Malagala and Nagarabhavi are located at a distance of 3 to 4 kms. away from the Chandra Layout.

Considering these factors - I am satisfied that an amount of Rs35,000/- per acre for dry and Rs.10,000/- per acre for kharab land is just and reasonable and that would reflect the true market value of the land under acquisition as on the date of Preliminary Notification.

INSPECTION :

My Predecessor has inspected the land along with the Revenue Inspector and Revenue Surveyor on 21-1- 92 and verified the mahazar and sketch drawn by the Executive Staff, that the land is vacant except four existing sheds, and I have also inspected the land 29.4.2002 and verified the mahazar dated 19.1.92, the mahazar drawn earlier found to be correct. I do not allow the compensation for these structures as the constructions have un-authorisedly come up after the publication of the Preliminary Notification in the Official Gazette dated 12.8.82.

Sri. G.Chennarayappa and Sri. Muniveerappa :

Rs. Ps. 1. Value of 4-00 acres of dry land at 1,40,000-00 Rs.35,000/- per acre.

2. Value of 30 gts., of un-reserved 7,500-00 kharab land for Rs.10,000/-

3. S.A. at 30% 44,250-00

4. Addl. value at 12% on item 2,03,623-00 No.1 & 2 from the date of P.N. to the date of Award i.e., 12.8.82 to 10.5.2002 total 7203 days, Less stay period by the High Court of Karnataka and Civil Court in W.P.No.17707/86, - 149 -

13046/86 and O.S.No.5824/89 and 5825/89 i.e., 1.10.86 to 25.2.95 total 3004 days (7203 days (-) 3004 days) = 4199 days) __________ TOTAL : 3,95,373-00 ========

(Rupees Three Lakhs Ninety Five Thousand Three Hundred And Seventy Three Only)

TITLE AND APPORTIONMENT :-

The land to be acquired is 4A-30 gts., which includes 0-30 gts, of/unreserved kharab land. The notified khatedars are Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah and G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah as per the Gazette Notification. Notices under section 9, 10, 11 and 14 of L.A. Act have been issued and served as per the provision of the L.A. Act.

In response to statutory notices and also paper publication in the daily news paper like Deccan Herald and Prajavani Dtd., 1.8.87 and 3.8.87. Some of the Revenue site holder have filed the petitions to this office and requested for regularisation/Re-con-veyance as they have purchased (Revenue) Sites formed by Sri. Muniveerappa, and some of them have obtained Interim/Injunction Orders from the City Civil Court, B'lore in O.S.5825/89, O.S.5549/89 and O.S.5824/89 restraining the BDA as from demolishing the structures, and these suits also been dismissed. The writ petitions i.e., 13046/86, 17707/86, W.A.2361/90 have been dismissed by the High Court of Karnataka.

As per the extracts of Index of lands and Records of Rights the khata stands in the name of Sri. Muniveerappa S/o. Pusalaiah, and G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah. As verified from the pahani the name of Sri. Muniveerappa and G.Chennarayappa

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appear in the column No.9. As extent of 2A-00 of land stands in favour of Sri. Chennarayappa s/o. Late Gummaiah, 0-30 gts., of land is unreserved kharab and the remaining 2A-00 was held by Muniveerappa S/o.Pusalaiah. The khatedar have not produced necessary documents regarding their holdings.

In the circumstances I hereby order that the award amount of Rs.3,95,373-00 be paid to the notified khatedars/Anubhavadars, subject to the production of title deeds and other necessary document as noted hereunder according to their respective shares.

1. Up-to-date Encumbrance Certificate

2. Up-to-date of R.T.C.

3. Index of land and Records of Rights.

4. A certificate from the Tahsildar B'lore North Taluk under section 48(A) of K.L.R. Act.

5. Original Sale Deed.

6. Exemption certificate from the Special D.C. for U.L.C.R.

7. No due certificate from the Tahsildar.

8. Indemnity Bond and Affidavit.

Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah, G.Chennarayappa S/o.Late Gummaiah I further order that the land shall vests with the BDA free from all encumbrances and the BDA is exempted form the payment of conversion fine. The land revenue will abate from the date of taking possession of the land.

Typed to my dictation and the typed script corrected by me.

Bangalore.

Dated : 16.5.2002. (H.R.JAGADEESH) Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore Development Authority Bangalore.

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No.BDA/DC(LA)/AWARD/85/2002-03 dated 20/05/2002

ORDER

Award for Rs.03,95,373-00 (RUPEES THREE LAKH NINTY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THREE ONLY) in respect of the land measuring 04 acres 30 gts. in Survey No.103 OF NAGARABHAVI VILLAGE, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk is APPROVED.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, Bangalore is to verify and make sure that there are no stay orders from any Court and parallel acquisition before taking possession of the land. Further the Special Land Acquisition Officer should take all necessary steps to see that compensation be paid to real owner of the land.

Deputy Commissioner (LA) BDA., Bangalore.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer."

(underlining by me)

A reading of the same would indicate that the notified

khatedars were shown as Muniveerappa and

G.Chennarayappa in respect of 2 acres 30 guntas and 2 acres

respectively (totally 4 acres 30 guntas). It is noted in the

award that notices under Sections 9, 10, 11 and 14 of LA Act,

1894 had been served on the notified khatedars, but no claim

statement had been submitted, except G.Chennarayappa had

requested for denotification of land in respect of his 2 acres.

In the remaining extent, Byadgi, the GPA holder of

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Muniveerappa had formed revenue sites and sold to different

individuals prior to preliminary notification dated 12/08/1982.

That the khatedars had filed W.P.Nos.13042/1986, 17707/86

and W.A.No.2361/1990 challenging the notification, but this

Court on 08/03/1991 and 18/07/1991 had dismissed those

petitions. The award further notes that some of the revenue

site holders had filed petitions to the BDA seeking

regularization/ reconveyance of revenue sites purchased by

them and that some of them had obtained interim

injunction/orders issued by the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, in

several suits and the suits had also been dismissed. In the

circumstances, compensation was determined at

Rs.3,95,373/- to be paid to the khatedars/anubhavadars

namely, Muniveerappa and G.Chennarayappa, subject to the

production of title deeds etc. After approval of the award, an

order was made by the Deputy Commissioner (LA), BDA,

Bangalore, dated 20/5/2002 to take possession of the land

and to take steps for payment of compensation to the real

owner of the land. As Muniveerappa and Chennarayappa did

not appear before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA,

steps were taken to deposit the amount before the City Civil

Court, Bengaluru. Thereafter, as per mahazar (Annexure "F"),

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possession of 4 acres 30 guntas of land was taken on

30/04/2003 by the Revenue Inspector and subsequently,

possession was handed over to the Engineering Section of

BDA.

31. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla has

controverted the said mahazar at Annexure "F" to contend

that it is a mahazar, which was not drawn in accordance with

law, the names and addresses of the persons in whose

presence the mahazar was drawn were not noted next to

their signatures and therefore, physical possession of the

land has not been taken in accordance with law and neither

has compensation had been paid to the notified khatedars.

Thus, petitioners are entitled to relief under Section 24(2) of

2013 Act.

32. Before considering the aforesaid aspects, it is

necessary to refer to the orders passed by this Court as well

as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

(a) The father of the vendors of the petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and connected writ petitions,

W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 namely, Muniveerappa, had filed

W.P.No.17707/1986 before this Court. In the said writ

petition, Preliminary Notification and Final Notification dated

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15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 respectively were assailed. The

said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this

Court, by order dated 7-08/03/1991, which is reported as

Muniveerappa vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1991 KAR

3362]. The Division Bench by following the dictum in

Venkataramaiah vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1987 KAR

2995] dismissed the writ petition as in the aforesaid case,

this Court had upheld the acquisition notifications by

negativing the very contentions raised. Following the said

decision, Muniveerappa's petition was also dismissed. The

Division Bench while dismissing the writ petition opined that

unless review of a decision is sought for, as it is always open

to the person affected by a decision to seek review of that

decision or it is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it

would not be just and proper to go into that aspect of the

matter once again. That the findings recorded on a question

of fact cannot be gone into in a subsequent proceeding

pertaining to the same matter even at the instance of a

different party unless that party seeks review of that finding

by way of another writ petition making the parties to the

earlier writ petition in which such a finding is recorded, as

parties to the subsequent writ petition. Otherwise such a

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course would lead to incongruous results. It will result in

shaking the confidence of the public in the judicial

proceedings. This order of the Division Bench was not

assailed by any of the parties therein before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and it has attained finality.

(b) After fifteen years, petitioners' vendors namely,

Muniramaiah and Gangadhar together preferred

W.P.No.19532/2005 before this Court seeking a declaration

under Section 27 of BDA Act to the effect that the acquisition

proceedings had lapsed in respect of land bearing Sy.No.103

to an extent of 2 acres 30 guntas. In that writ petition it was

recorded in paragraph Nos.5 and 6 as under:

"5. It is brought to the notice of this Court by the Advocate appearing on behalf of the BDA that totally 1210 acres land is acquired for formation of "Nagarabhavi Layout" and the BDA has already utilized more than 1200 acres of land for formation of layout. The said fact is also clear from the Order passed by this Court in W.P.No.27671/2000 (vide paragraphs-17 and 18). Thus it is clear from the aforesaid fact that the Scheme is substantially implemented by the BDA and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Scheme is lapsed cannot be accepted.

6. The statement of objections filed by the BDA, on facts, further makes it clear that the petitioner and

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his father were the instrumental in delaying the proceedings relating to taking possession of the property. The land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi village totally measures 4 acres 30 guntas including 0.30 guntas Kharab land and the said land is owned by two persons namey, Muniveerappa S/o Pulasaiah (father of petitioner) and G.Channararasappa S/o Gummaiah. The Channarasappa prayed for de- notification of his portion of land i.e. 2 acres of land by filing his statement of objection in the acquisition proceedings. After considering his statement of objections, final notification was issued. Said Channarasappa filed writ petition No.13042/1985 questioning the acquisition notification and obtained interim order, which came to be dismissed on 23/11/1987. The father of petitioner, namely, Muniveerappa also filed W.P.17707/1986 challenging the acquisition notification relating to 4 acres 30 guntas and obtained interim order, which ultimately came to be dismissed on 08/03/1991. Thereafter, father of petitioner filed civil suit in O.S.No.5825/1989 which came to be dismissed on 25/02/1995. Likewise, several persons who have purchased the sites from the petitioner also filed writ petitions and original suits in W.P.Nos.21563/1989, 22906-910/1999, O.S.Nos.5753/1989, 5549/1989, 5824/1089, 5825/1989, 3226/1996, 1570/1997. All these cases are dismissed on various dates. After dismissal of the aforesaid matters, the possession of the land is taken by the BDA. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, the dictum laid down by this Court in

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D.Narayanappa's case cited supra is not applicable to the case on hand."

(underlining by me)

His Lordship Mohan Shantanagoudar J., then as a

Hon'ble Judge of this Court, found that the Nagarbhavi

Scheme was substantially implemented by the BDA and as

the process relating to taking possession of some portion of

land was obstructed because of interim orders granted by

various Courts including this Court, BDA could be blamed for

the same. In the circumstances, the writ petition was

dismissed. Admittedly there was no appeal filed against the

aforesaid order dated 03/08/2006, which has attained

finality.

(c) Despite the aforesaid order, seven years later,

W.P.No.46953/2013 was filed by only Muniramaiah, one of

the vendors of the petitioners before this Court. As already

noted, in the interregnum after order dated 03/08/2006 and

the filing of the aforesaid writ petition, the vendors of the

petitioners had entered into an agreement to sell dated

03/09/2013 with certain persons, who were agreement

holders and confirming parties to the sale deed executed by

the vendors of the petitioners in favour of the petitioners

herein on 10/09/2014.

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(d) In the aforesaid writ petition, filed by

Muniramaiah, the prayer sought was that the acquisition had

lapsed on account of non implementation of Nagarbhavi

Scheme and therefore, the Scheme had become inoperative

in so far as the land measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft., in

Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village. By order dated

13/12/2013, writ petition was allowed and it was declared by

the learned Single Judge that the Scheme insofar as the

aforesaid extent of petitioner's land was concerned had

lapsed having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act.

(e) Thereafter, the other vendor namely, Gangadhar

filed W.P.No.214/2014 before this Court seeking a similar

relief. By order dated 27/01/2014, this Court, by applying

the reasoning given in W.P.No.46953/2013, allowed the said

writ petition also holding that the said Scheme had lapsed

insofar as 43,544.82 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 was concerned.

(f) At this stage itself, it may be reiterated that

subsequent to the said writ petition being allowed, BDA

issued "no objection" in the form of endorsement dated

11/06/2014 on the request made by Gangadhar, a copy of

which is at Annexure "B". However, on the day when the

said endorsement was issued, W.A.No.1024/2014 had

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already been filed by the BDA against Muniramaiah, which

was pending before the Division Bench of this Court. It is

noted that the said writ appeal was filed on 15/04/2014.

Thereafter, BDA by another endorsement dated 04/12/2014,

withdrew endorsement dated 11/06/2014 and on the very

same day preferred W.A.No.3124/2014 against Gangadhar,

assailing order dated 27/01/2014, passed in

W.P.No.214/2014. The Division Bench of this Court, by order

dated 24/02/2015 condoned the delay in filing the aforesaid

appeals.

(g) At this stage itself, it may be noted that the

petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and connected

matters were not parties to the writ appeals. The writ

appeals filed by the BDA were allowed by judgment dated

16/07/2015. The relevant portion of the said judgment in

W.A.No.1024/2014 and W.A.No.3124/2014 read as under:

"W.A.No.1024/2014

"13. This appeal is filed by the BDA assailing order dated December 13, 2013 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013.

14. By that order, Hon'ble Single Judge has held that insofar as the land belonging to respondent

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No.2 herein was concerned, the Scheme has lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act.

15. Learned counsel for the BDA has submitted that the impugned judgment would have to be set aside in view of the fact that respondent No.2 (M.Muniramaiah) herein had earlier filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 along with his brother M. Gangadhar and by order dated August 3, 2006 that writ petition was dismissed.

16. In that writ petition, also, the very same declaration to the effect that the acquisition had lapsed was sought and the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court had dismissed that writ petition, which order has attained finality.

17. The writ petition filed by the second respondent herein, in our view, has to be dismissed for the simple reason that the second respondent had filed a second writ petition on the same cause of action, which was not maintainable. The writ petition filed by the second respondent was hit by the principles of res judicata. Therefore, the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated December 13, 2013 passed in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013 is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

W.A.No.3124/2014:

18. This writ appeal is filed by the BDA assailing order dated January 27, 2014 passed in Writ Petition No.214 of 2014. By that order, Hon'ble Single Judge has followed order passed in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013 disposed of on December

- 161 -

13, 2013 and allowed the writ petition by holding that the Scheme insofar as the land of respondent No.2 herein is concerned had lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act.

19. Learned counsel for the BDA has brought to our notice that respondent No.2 herein along with his brother Muniramaiah M., had filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 before this court and by order dated August 3, 2006, the Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. That order has attained finality. He, therefore, contended that the second respondent could not have filed one more writ petition seeking the very same relief, which he had sought in Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 along with his brother.

20. We are of the opinion that the Hon'ble Single Judge ought not to have entertained the said writ petition inasmuch as those petitioners earlier filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005, and upon a contested hearing, the said writ petition, on the selfsame issue, was dismissed on August 3, 2006.

21. We are of the opinion that the filing of second writ petition was an abuse of the process of the Court to stall the Scheme. Therefore, both the orders as aforesaid are set aside.

22. In view of the order passed in Writ Appeal No.1024/2014, we dismiss Writ Petition No.214 of 14 and set aside the order passed therein by allowing this appeal."

(underlining by me)

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(h) Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Division

Bench of this Court in the aforesaid appeals, the petitioners

herein filed special leave petitions i.e., S.L.P.Nos.19849-

19850/2015 and their vendors preferred S.L.P.Nos.31100-

31101/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The special

leave petitions filed by petitioners' vendors were dismissed

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that there was no

legal and valid ground for interference, but the special leave

petitions filed by the petitioners herein were withdrawn with

liberty to approach other forums as may be available in law.

Petitioners were also granted liberty to move the Hon'ble

Supreme Court once again, if so required.

(i) Thereafter, petitioners herein preferred Review

Petition No.59/2016 before the Division Bench of this Court

in the judgment passed in W.A.No.3124/2014 which arose

from W.P.No.214/2014. The Division Bench by order dated

10/3/2017, dismissed the review petition by observing that

when the review petitioners were not parties to the writ

appeals, the judgment passed in those writ appeals was not

binding on them. There has been no challenge to the said

order. Thereafter these writ petitions have been preferred by

the petitioners.

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(j) From order dated 03/08/2006 in

W.P.No.19532/2005, it is noted that petitioners vendors' father

- Muniveerappa had also filed O.S.No.5825/1989 before the City

Civil Court, which was dismissed on 25/02/1995, which

judgment has attained finality. Likewise, several persons who

purchased sites from the petitioners' vendors' father had also

filed writ petitions and original suits. W.P.Nos.21563/1989,

22906-910/1999, O.S.Nos.5753/1989, 5549/1989, 5824/1089,

5825/1989, 3226/1996 and 1570/1997 were dismissed on

various dates.

(k) Similar is the case in the case of petitioners in

W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 as is evident

from the narration above.

(l) Further, petitioner No.4 in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 &

18948-18950/2016 had also filed W.P.13028/2007 before

this Court. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated

20/03/2009. Against the said order, BDA preferred

W.A.No.1430/2009 and connected matters and one of the

allottees of the BDA, M/s.Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd.

(respondent No.3 in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-

18950/2016) had also preferred W.P.No.1522/2009. The said

writ appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court

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by setting aside order dated 20/03/2009, passed in

W.P.No.13028/2007, vide judgment dated 16/07/2015 and

special leave petition filed by petitioner No.4 before the

Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed on 07/11/2015.

33. Before answering the said contention, it would be

useful to infer on the orders passed by this Court and the

Supreme Court in various cases filed by Muniveerappa and

his two sons Muniramaiah and Gangadhar as well as

Chennarayappa. On a reading of the order passed by the

learned Single Judge in W.P.No.19532/2005, filed by

Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, vendors of the petitioners in

W.P.No.15967-15969/2017, it becomes crystal clear about

the dismissal of the writ petitions and the suits referred to

therein and that the award was passed and possession of the

land was taken by the BDA. In fact, a categorical finding has

been given by this Court that possession of the entire land in

question (4 acres 30 guntas) had been taken by the BDA

after dismissal of the suits and writ petitions on passing of

the award. This finding has attained finality inasmuch as

there has been no appeal filed against the order passed in

W.P.No.19532/2005. Hence, it is impermissible for the

petitioners to contend that physical possession of the land

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has not been taken or that compensation has not been paid.

Also, no contention to the effect that the mahazar is a

concocted or got up document can be urged at this point of

time, as this Court has categorically held in

W.P.No.19532/2005 that possession of the land has been

taken by the BDA, which finding has attained finality.

Therefore, all contentions with regard to the veracity of the

mahazar at Annexure "F" cannot be considered at this point

of time.

34. Further, the surrender of 20 guntas of land by

petitioners' vendors for the formation of ring road was during

the pendency of W.P.No.19532/2005, by way of exchange for

75% of 20 guntas in Banaswadi and has no nexus to merits

of the case.

35. In W.P.No.13028/2007, the petitioners, who in

fact, sought for allotment of alternative land by way of sites

as per their representation dated 28/08/2008, also

challenged allotment of seven sites bearing Nos.169, 170,

189, 190, 191 and 198 formed in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi

Village, in favour of the fourth respondent therein (M/s.

Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd.) and to declare the allotment

and issuance of possession certificate in respect of the above

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seven sites and also the seven sale deeds dated 07/11/2007

in favour of the said entity as null and void. Therefore, the

petitioners, in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016

and connected writ petitions, have themselves admitted that

the aforesaid sites were allotted to the fourth respondent

therein (third respondent herein), which could have been

allotted only after taking possession from the petitioners and

handing over the same to BDA. Further, petitioners also

sought for allotment of sites under BDA (Incentive Scheme

for Voluntary Surrender of Land) Rules, 1989, which has

been enforced from 01/04/1989, which is another indication

of the fact that possession has been taken from the

petitioners as these Rules apply when possession is

surrendered voluntarily.

36. In view of the dismissal of the successive writ

petitions filed by the notified khatadars and their children and

the finding given on possession of the entire extent of 4 acres

30 guntas being taken over by the BDA having attained

finality, at this length of time, petitioners are estopped from

reopening the said question so as to contend that physical

possession of the total extent of land has not been taken over

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and therefore, they are entitled to relief under Section 24(2)

of 2013 Act.

37. Similarly, on the question of payment of

compensation, a reading of the said order would indicate that

the notified khatedars, namely Muniveerappa and

Chennarayappa did not make any claim seeking

compensation despite service of notices on them. They did

not appear before the Special Land Acquisition Officer.

Thereafter, they have not sought for payment of

compensation by producing the relevant documents before

the BDA. In the circumstances, on approval of the award

dated 16/05/2002, on 20/05/2002, an order was made by

the Deputy Commissioner (LA), BDA, Bengaluru, which is in

continuation of the award that an amount of Rs.2,75,269/-

be deposited before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru. In the

circumstances, it cannot be held that the notified khatedars

have not paid the compensation to them as they did not even

participate in the proceedings for determination of the award

by not filing a claim statement, nor appeared before the

Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA. In the circumstances,

the BDA had no other option, but to deposit the

compensation amount before the reference Court i.e., the

- 168 -

City Civil Court, Bengaluru. Hence, it cannot be held that

compensation has not been paid to the notified khatedars in

respect of the land in question.

38. Hence, assuming that Section 24(2) is applicable

even in the case of acquisition initiated under the provisions

of the BDA Act, petitioners herein are not entitled to any

relief under the said provision as the conditions/stipulations

stated in Section 24(2) do not apply or exist, in the instant

cases. Point No.2 is accordingly answered against the

petitioners and in favour of the respondents.

Re. Point No.3:

"3) Whether petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed as envisaged under Section 27 of the BDA Act?"

39. Before answering this point, it would be useful to

extract Section 27 of the BDA Act, which reads as under:

"27. Authority to execute the Scheme within five years: Where within a period of five years from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of section 19, the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially, the Scheme shall lapse and the provisions of section 36 shall become inoperative."

- 169 -

40. In the instant case, the preliminary notification is

dated 15/07/1982, and declaration and final notification is

dated 16/08/1985. Learned senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioners has contended that the acquisition of land in

question i.e., land bearing Sy.No.103, measuring 4 acres 30

guntas, has lapsed on account of there being no substantial

execution of the Scheme. The said contention is controverted

by learned counsel for BDA by contending that Nagarbhavi

Layout is a full fledged layout and that it cannot be said that

there is no substantial execution of the Scheme. On the other

hand, the Scheme is nearing completion. In fact, in

W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, it

has been observed that 1,200 acres of land was acquired for

formation of Nagarbhavi Layout and that 608 acres of land

had been utilized for the said purpose. Placing reliance on

order passed in W.P.No.27671/2000 (paragraph Nos.17 and

18), this Court held that the Scheme has been substantially

implemented by the BDA and therefore, the contention of the

petitioner that the Scheme had lapsed cannot be accepted

and hence, dismissed the said writ petition.

41. Learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 sought to contend

- 170 -

that the said submission by the BDA in the said writ petition

was wholly incorrect as in another proceeding

(W.A.1053/2007) before this Court, it was stated by the BDA

that out of 1,210 acres acquired in Nagarbhavi Village, 85

acres 36 guntas had been deleted from the notifications and

that layout has been formed in 608 acres 30 guntas. In fact,

even as per Annexure "L" appended to W.P.No.15967-

1569/2017, it is evident that 1,210 acres 35 guntas was

notified under the preliminary notification, but in the final

notification 1,124 acres were notified, 85 acres 36 guntas

were deleted from preliminary and final notification and there

was denotification even after the final notification.

Possession of 680 acres 07 guntas was taken and handed

over to the engineering section of the BDA and layout has

been formed in 608 acres 30 guntas. Thus, having regard to

the extent of land notified in the final notification being 1,124

acres 23 guntas and the layout being formed in 608 acres 30

guntas, it is held that there is substantial implementation of

the Scheme. In fact, that is what has been held by this

Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which order has attained

finality as there has been no challenge to the same.

Therefore, the controversy ought to end.

- 171 -

42. However, learned senior counsel for the

petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 has placed reliance

on orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.46953/2013 and

W.P.No.214/2014, wherein learned Single Judge of this Court

while allowing the writ petitions declared that Nagarbhavi

Scheme insofar as petitioners' land is concerned had lapsed

and under Section 27 of the BDA Act relief was granted.

That although the Division Bench of this Court set aside

those orders and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the

judgment of this Court, nevertheless, in review petitions filed

before this Court while dismissing the same, it is observed by

the Division Bench that the judgment passed in the writ

appeals is not binding on the petitioners herein as they were

not parties in the writ appeals and hence, this Court ought to

consider the question of lapse of acquisition under Section 27

of the Act afresh. Of course, the aforesaid contentions are

rebutted by the learned counsel for the respondents in the

writ petitions.

43. There are two aspects of the matter: the first, is

with regard to the observation of this Court in the review

petition to the effect that as petitioners herein were not

parties to the writ appeals the judgment in the writ appeals is

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not binding on them. The second aspect is whether, indeed,

there has been lapse of acquisition under Section 27 of the

Act vis-à-vis the land in question i.e., Sy.No.103, Nagabhavi

Village, totally measuring 4 acres 30 guntas. The answer to

the aforesaid aspects is readily found in the order of the

learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005. In

that case, the petitioners therein i.e., the vendors of the

petitioners herein had sought a similar declaration under

Section 27 of the BDA Act. The said writ petition was

dismissed and the order passed in the said writ petition has

attained finality. Therefore, despite the observation made by

the Division Bench of this Court in the review petitions to the

effect that the judgment passed in the writ appeals are not

binding on the petitioners herein, nevertheless, the dismissal

of W.P.No.19532/2005 is a binding precedent on not only to

the parties to the said writ petition, namely, Muniramaiah

and Gangadhar, but all those who are claiming right, title and

interest under the petitioners therein who are none other

than petitioners herein, who have purchased their extents

from them. Hence, the observations made by the Division

Bench of this Court in review petitions, do not assist the

petitioners herein in any manner as they are bound by the

- 173 -

decision of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which has

attained finality. This is despite the Division Bench's

observations that in the judgment passed in the writ appeals,

dated 16/07/2015 are not binding on the review petitioners

as they were not parties to the writ appeals. But petitioners'

vendors were parties to the writ appeals and the said

judgment of the Division Bench is binding on them. Their

challenge to the said judgment was also turned down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the observation of the

Division Bench in judgment dated 16/07/2015 to the effect

that the writ petitions filed separately in the years 2013 and

2014 by petitioners' vendors were not maintainable binds the

vendors of the petitioners herein. To reiterate this is,

because they had already suffered an order at the hands of

this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which was not appealed

against and therefore, had attained finality. Therefore, their

subsequent writ petitions once again seeking a declaration on

the basis of Section 27 of the BDA Act was not maintainable.

Thus, the order in W.P.No.19532/2005 was also applicable to

petitioners herein as they are subsequent purchasers, who

are claiming title under their vendors against whom order

passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is operating till date and now

- 174 -

is applicable to the petitioners herein. In fact, petitioners'

vendors' writ petitions filed separately in the years 2013 and

2014 were dismissed as not maintainable as having been hit

by the principles of res judicata would clearly imply that the

order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is binding and operating

on petitioners' vendors. When petitioners herein are claiming

right, title and interest under their vendors, against whom

the order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is operating till date,

the same would as a natural corollary operate on the

petitioners herein. Therefore, if petitioners herein seek to

wriggle out of the judgment of the Division Bench, which has

been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, they are,

nevertheless, bound by the judgment of the learned Single

Judge in W.P.No.19532/2005 as the same is binding on

petitioners' vendors, who had filed the said writ petition

unsuccessfully and under whom petitioners herein claim

right, title and interest as their alienees.

44. The same reasoning applies to the petitioner in

W.P.No.21196/2017, which is a company, which has

purchased a portion of the land in 2 acres 30 guntas of

Sy.No.103 from the very same vendors.

- 175 -

45. As far as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016

& 18948-18950/2016 are concerned, petitioner No.4 had

filed W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was

allowed. But in the writ appeal filed by the BDA against the

said order, the Division Bench of this Court had set aside the

order passed in the writ petition by the common judgment

dated 16/07/2015. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed

the special leave petitions filed against the judgment of the

Division Bench and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 &

18948-18950/2016 did not seek liberty to file any review

petition, but instead have filed this fresh writ petition

invoking Section 24(2) of the Act by contending that this writ

petition is based on a different cause of action. In the

circumstances, petitioners in this writ petition cannot be

permitted to raise any argument on the basis of Section 27 of

the BDA Act.

46. It is reiterated that the award having been made

on 20/05/2002, the same has been deposited before Civil

Court. Possession of the land in question was taken on

13/04/2003. The said aspects have been found to be so in

the proceedings referred to above. Further, Nagarbhavi

layout is a full fledged layout which has been formed by a

- 176 -

substantial implementation or execution of the Scheme. In

the circumstances, petitioners herein cannot once again

contend that there is lapse of acquisition insofar as land

bearing Sy.No.103, measuring 2 acres is concerned under

Section 27 of the BDA Act.

47. It is also relevant to refer to a decision of a

learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.27671/2000,

disposed off on 16/01/2004 [Smt. Huchamma since

deceased by her Legal Representatives vs. State of

Karnataka and others] (Smt. Huchamma), wherein in

respect of Sy.No.78 of Nagarbhavi Village, measuring 10

acres 8 guntas of land, which was also notified under the

very same notifications under consideration, writ petition was

filed seeking a declaration that insofar as acquisition of the

aforesaid extent of land was concerned, it had lapsed. In the

said decision, it has been held that the question whether the

Scheme has been substantially implemented or not would

arise for consideration only if it is not implemented by

dereliction of duty on the part of the officials without

justification. Once it is demonstrated, the BDA was prevented

from implementing the Scheme because of interim orders by

this Court coupled with the fact of continuous Court

- 177 -

proceedings, BDA could not take steps for developing the

land, nothing more is required to negative the claim under

Section 27 of the Act.

48. In this regard, reliance could also be placed on a

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of

Krishnamurthy vs. Bangalore Development Authority

[ILR 1996 Karnataka 1258], wherein this Court has laid

down conditions to be fulfilled before the application of

Section 27 of the BDA Act. Two conditions to be fulfilled to

attract Section 27 are: firstly, there must be failure to

execute the Scheme i.e., there must be dereliction of

statutory duties without justification and not a mere delay in

execution of the Scheme. Secondly, substantial execution in

each case depends upon the magnitude of the Scheme and

the nature of the work to be executed. Though the burden is

on the BDA to furnish materials to the Court to demonstrate

substantial execution of the Scheme, it is for the petitioner to

place material before the Court to show that there has been

dereliction of statutory duties and not mere delay in

implementing the Scheme.

49. In the instant case, no such foundation has been

laid except invoking Section 27 of the Act. On the other

- 178 -

hand, the filing of successive writ petition before this Court

has been the cause for the delay in developing the land in

question and taking advantage of the said fact, petitioners'

vendors, who are the sons of the notified khatedar have

alienated the land.

50. Another decision of the Division Bench of this

Court could also be relied upon in this case, which is in the

case of Bangalore Development Authority vs. Dr. H.S.

Hanumanthappa [ILR 1996 Karnataka 642], wherein it

has been observed as under:

"The Section provides that in case the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially within a period of 5 years from the date of publication of the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, then the Scheme shall lapse. The plain reading of the Section makes it clear that the Scheme can lapse provided the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially. The expression "fails to execute the Scheme" clearly indicates that the Section will attract only in cases where the Authority is in a position to implement the Scheme and then fails to do so. It was pointed out on behalf of the Authority that several Writ Petitions were filed in this court to challenge the publication of the Notifications and the acquisition proceedings and in view of the Interim orders granted in those petitions restraining the Authority from proceeding further with the Scheme and the

- 179 -

acquisition, it was impossible for the Authority to execute the same within the stipulated period of five years prescribed under Section 27 of the Act. In these circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate how it can ever be suggested that the Scheme has lapsed because the Authority had failed to execute the Scheme. It must also be noted that the provisions of Section 27 prescribed that the failure of the Authority to execute the Scheme must be in respect of the substantial part of the Scheme."

51. Therefore, the first and foremost condition to be

fulfilled for the applicability of Section 27 of the BDA Act is

that the petitioner must establish proper plea and evidence

that there was dereliction of statutory duties without

justification by the authority in implementation of the

Scheme and the second condition is that necessary material

must be placed to the effect that the Scheme has not been

substantially implemented. Section 27 cannot be invoked if

the Scheme has not been implemented when hurdles have

been placed by the petitioners themselves in the acquisition

proceedings or on account of interim orders passed by Courts

which have prevented the BDA from implementing the

Scheme. It is only when the BDA has on account of

dereliction of duty, not utilised the land for the purpose for

which it was acquired, Section 27 would attract. It is in this

- 180 -

background, that the conduct of the petitioners who

approached the Court for declaration that the acquisition has

lapsed under Section 27 assumes importance.

52. In the instant case, reference made to the orders

passed by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the

petitioners herein and by the father of the petitioners'

vendors in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is the main cause for

there being no development in respect of the land in question

and the same has prevented the BDA as well as its allottees

from forming the layout on the land in question. Therefore,

it is held that there is no dereliction of statutory duties of the

officials of the BDA. On the other hand, it is on account of

the cases filed by petitioners' vendors before this Court as

well as the Civil Court which have come in the way of

implementation of the Scheme insofar as the land in question

is concerned. Hence, Section 27 of the Act is not at all

attracted in the present case.

53. With regard to the contention of learned senior

Cousnel, Sri Udaya Holla, that the BDA misled this Court in

W.P.No.19532/2005 by contending that the Scheme had

been implemented substantially, whereas as per Annexure

"L", it was not so, reference could be made to the order of

- 181 -

this Court in Smt. Huchamma's case, wherein it has been

categorically recorded that out of 1,210 acres of land, only

518 acres were notified for formation of Nagarbhavi first

stage and 682 acres were left out. That even in 518 acres,

only 28 acres of land was utilized for formation of layout.

Thus, by another notification dated 16/08/1985, an extent of

518 acres of land out of 1,210 acres was notified for

acquisition and another notification was issued on

05/08/1986 notifying 604 acres of land out of 682 acres and

a layout had been formed, sites had been allotted to the

allottees and possession certificates have been issued and

the allottees had put up construction and living with their

families. Therefore, in Huchamma's case also, this Court has

categorically held that Nagarbhavi Scheme has been

implemented substantially and that Section 27 would not

apply, which finding is squarely applicable in the present

case.

Hence, point No.3 is answered against the petitioners.

Re. Point Nos. 4 & 5:

"4) Whether the withdrawal of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") (impugned in this writ petition) by the BDA is just and proper?

- 182 -

If not, whether the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.15967-15969/2017 are entitled to relief on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B")?

5) Whether the principles/doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply in the instant case and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 would succeed on the basis of the said doctrine?"

54. The aforesaid points shall be considered together

as they are interlinked.

One of the vendors of the petitioners Gangadhar, made

a representation to the BDA on 27/05/2014 seeking "no

objection certificate" in respect of land to an extent of

43,544.828 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village. The

said representation was made subsequent to the disposal of

W.P.No.214/2014 filed by him, which was allowed on

27/01/2014, declaring that the Scheme had lapsed insofar as

the aforesaid extent of land in Sy.No.103 was concerned.

The said declaration was made by following the order passed

by this Court in W.P.No.46953/2013, dated 13/12/2013,

which was filed by Muniramaiah, brother of Gangadhar. In

response to the said representation, endorsement at

Annexure "B" was issued. At this stage itself, it may be

noted that when the said endorsement was issued,

- 183 -

W.A.No.1024/2014 was pending before the Division Bench,

which was filed against the order passed in

W.P.No.46953/2013 against Muniramaiah.

55. The contention of learned senior counsel for the

petitioners is that on the basis of the endorsement dated

11/06/2014, the vendors of the petitioners sold their

respective portions to the petitioners therein on 10/09/2014.

Thereafter, endorsement at Annexure "M" has been issued

withdrawing the endorsement at Annexure "B" dated

11/06/2014. In the circumstances, Annexure "M" has been

assailed by the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 as it

is illegal and being contrary to Annexure "B" and that the

principles of estoppel applies and BDA must be directed to be

bound by Annexure "B" endorsement dated 11/06/2014.

56. A reading of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 at

Annexure "B" would highlight on three aspects namely, (i)

that, the acquisition of the land in respect of Sy.No.103,

measuring 4 acres 30 guntas had been completed; (ii) that,

the award dated 16/05/2002 had been approved on

20/05/2002 and that the acquisition proceeding has been

completed by dispatching the compensation amount to the

City Civil Court, Bengaluru, under Sections 30 and 31(2) of

- 184 -

LA Act, 1894 by cheque dated 25/05/2007 possession being

handed over to BDA on 30/04/2003 and (iii) that, in

W.P.No.214/2014 filed by Gangadhar, this Court had

declared that under Section 27 of the BDA Act, the Scheme

had lapsed insofar as 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103

was concerned. That in view of the said declaration, the said

extent of land has been set apart from the acquisition

process. While reiterating the aforesaid points, in last

phargraph of endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure

"M"), it has been stated that the "no objection" issued in

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 has been quashed

(withdrawn) and that against order dated 27/01/2014 passed

in W.P.214/2014, BDA has decided to file writ appeal before

the Division Bench of this Court.

57. The point that arises for consideration is, as to

whether Annexure "B" was in fact, a "no objection certificate"

in respect of land measuring 43,544.82 sq.ft. on the basis of

which the vendors of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-

15969/2017 could have sold the land to the petitioners.

Further, whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel would

apply in the instant case. Significantly, no such endorsement

was sought nor issued in respect of the portion falling to the

- 185 -

share of Muniramaiah i.e., 36,308.68 sq.ft., after W.P.

No.46953/2013 filed by him was allowed in December 2013.

58. The contents of endorsements dated 11/06/2014

and 04/12/2014 have been highlighted above as the

endorsements are in Kannada language. Nevertheless, for

immediate reference, the aforesaid of endorsements are

extracted as under:

"¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ Bangalore Development Authority

¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/G¥À(¨sÆ À ¸Áé)/761/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 »A§gÀºÀ «µÀAiÀÄB ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸ÀªðÉ £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«ÄäUÉ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥ÀvÀæ PÉÆÃjgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ. G¯ÉèÃRB vÀªÀÄä CfðAiÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀB 27.05.2014 ****** ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ G¯ÉÃè RPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°è 04 JPÀgÉ 30 UÀÄAmÉ ¥ÁægA À ©üPÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 dated 15.07.1982 gÀAzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ CAwªÀÄ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB HUD/249/MNX/85 dated 16.08.1988 gÀAzÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸ÀzÀj d«ÄäUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ 16.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ LwÃ¥ÀÄð gÀa¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀ 20.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé) gÀªÀjAzÀ LwÃ¥ÀÄð C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVzÉ.

¢£ÁAPÀ 03.06.2002 gÀAzÀÄ 12(2) £ÉÆÃnÃ¸ï ¤ÃrzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ 30.04.2003 gÀAzÀÄ C©üAiÀÄAvÀgÀ ±ÁSÉUÉ ºÀ¸ÁÛAvÀj¸À¯ÁVzÉ.

- 186 -

¢£ÁAPÀ 25.05.2007 gÀAzÀÄ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®A 30, 31(2) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ¨sÀÆ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ºÀtzÀ ZÉPï£ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£Àå ¹n ¹«¯ï £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉÄAiÀÄÄ ¥ÀÆtðUÉÆArgÀÄvÀÛz.É

¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsÀgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è jmï ¦nµÀ£ï £ÀA.214/2014 £ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÁÛg.É ¸Àzj À ¥ÀPæ Àgt À ªÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÉ £Àq¹ É zÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ AiÉÆÃd£Á C£ÀĵÁ×£ª À £ À ÀÄß ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JA§ CA±Àª£ À ÀÄß ªÀÄ£ÀUA À qÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ F ¥ÀPæ ÀgÀt «²µÀÖ «zÀÄå£Áä£ÀU¼ À £ À ÀÄß DzsÁj¹ ©rJ PÁAiÉÄÝ ¸ÉPÀ£ ë ï 27 gÀrAiÀÄ°è AiÉÆÃd£Á ªÉÊ¥s® À åªÁVzÉ JA§ PÁgÀt ¤Ãr CfðzÁgÀjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«Ää£À ¨sÀƸÁé¢Ãü £À C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£A É iÀÄ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¹ DzÉò¹zÉ.

ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀ »£À߯ÉAiÀÄ°è CfðzÁgÀgÀ PÉÆÃjPÉAiÀÄAvÉ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉĬÄAzÀ ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ JAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ w½¸À¯ÁVzÉ.

¸À»/-

(PÀgq À ÀÄ »A§gÀºÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û ÄÀ (¨sÆ À ¸Áé) DAiÀÄÄPÀgÛ ª À j À AzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆâ¸À®ànz Ö )É ¨ÉA.C.¥Áæ., ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ.

EªÀjUÉ,

²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsg À ï ©£ï ¯ÉÃmï ªÀÄĤ«ÃgÀ¥Àà, £ÀA.182, ¥ÀAxÀgª À Á¼Àå, ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ gÀ¸ÉÛ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 039."

* * *

"¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ Bangalore Development Authority

- 187 -

¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û ÄÀ /580/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB 04/12/2014 »A§gÀºÀ «µÀAiÀÄB ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«ÄäUÉ ¤ÃrzÀÝ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥Àvª Àæ À£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¸ÀĪÀ §UÉÎ. G¯ÉèÃRB ¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/G¥À(¨sÀƸÁé)/761/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB 11/06/2014. ****** ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ G¯ÉÃè RPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ,

¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°è 04 JPÀgÉ 30 UÀÄAmÉ ¥ÁægA À ©üPÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 dated 15.07.1982 gÀAzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ CAwªÀÄ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB HUD/249/MNX/85 dated 16.08.1988 gÀAzÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀB 16.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ LwÃ¥ÀÄð gÀa¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀB 20.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé) gÀªÀjAzÀ LwÃ¥ÀÄð C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVzÉ.

¢£ÁAPÀB 03.06.2002 gÀAzÀÄ 12(2) £ÉÆÃnÃ¸ï ¤ÃrzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀB 30.04.2003 gÀAzÀÄ C©üAiÀÄAvÀgÀ ±ÁSÉUÉ ºÀ¸ÁÛAvÀj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀB 25.05.2007 gÀAzÀÄ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®A 30, 31(2) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ¨sÀÆ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ºÀtzÀ ZÉPï£ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£Àå ¹n ¹«¯ï £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉÄAiÀÄÄ ¥ÀÆtðUÉÆArgÀÄvÀÛz.É

¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsÀgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è jmï ¦nµÀ£ï £ÀA.214/2014 £ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÁÛg.É ¸Àzj À ¥ÀPæ Àgt À ªÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÉ £Àq¹ É zÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ AiÉÆÃd£Á

- 188 -

C£ÀĵÁ×£ª À £ À ÀÄß ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JA§ CA±Àª£ À ÀÄß ªÀÄ£ÀUA À qÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ F ¥ÀPæ ÀgÀt «²µÀÖ «zÀÄå£Áä£ÀU¼ À £ À ÀÄß DzsÁj¹ ©rJ PÁAiÉÄÝ ¸ÉPÀ£ ë ï 27 gÀrAiÀÄ°è AiÉÆÃd£Á ªÉÊ¥s® À åªÁVzÉ JA§ PÁgÀt ¤Ãr CfðzÁgÀjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«Ää£À ¨sÀƸÁé¢Ãü £À C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£A É iÀÄ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¹ DzÉò¹zÉ.

ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀª£ À ÀÄß C£ÀĵÁ×£U À Éƽ¸À®Ä ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 gÀAzÀÄ £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀzg À À Cr d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉĬÄAzÀ ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ JAzÀÄ ªÀÄ£À«zÁgÀjUÉ w½¸À¯ÁVvÀÄ.Û

ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ qÀ§Æèöå.¦. £ÀA.214/2014gÀ DzÉñÀzA À vÉ F PÀbÉÃj¬ÄAzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 gÀAzÀÄ 43,544.82 ZÀzÀÄgÀrUÀ½UÉ ºÉÆgÀr¹zÀÝ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥Àvª æÀ £ À ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ºÁUÀÆ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ªÉÄî䣫 À ¸À°¸ è ® À Ä ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀªÀÅ ¤tð¬Ä¸À¯ÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ w½¸À¯ÁVzÉ.

(PÀgÀÄqÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæªÀÅ ªÀiÁ£Àå DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û Àªj À AzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ) ¸À»/-

G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û ÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé), ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ.

EªÀjUÉ, ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsg À ï ©£ï ¯ÉÃmï ªÀÄĤ«ÃgÀ¥Àà, £ÀA.182, ¥ÀAxÀgª À Á¼Àå, ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ gÀ¸ÉÛ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 039."

Whether endorsement dated 11/06/2014 authorized

the vendors of the petitioners to alienate 43,544.82 sq.ft. of

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land to the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is the

question. If so, whether doctrine of promissory estoppel

against BDA would apply? On a plain reading of the

endorsement, the contents of which are succinctly stated

above, it becomes clear that nowhere BDA has stated that

petitioners' vendors had the authority or the right to alienate

43,544.82 sq.ft. of land to the petitioners. Even if

endorsement dated 11/06/2017 stated that the aforesaid

extent of land had been excluded from the acquisition

proceedings pursuant to the declaration issued by this Court

in W.P.No.214/2014, the endorsement did not imply that the

declaration granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court

in W.P.No.214/2014 had attained finality or for that matter

BDA had accepted the said decision. On the other hand, it

would be relevant to note that BDA had already preferred

W.A.No.1024/2014 against the order passed in

W.P.No.46953/2013 by none other than the brother of

Gangadhar namely, Muniramaiah who is the other vendor of

the petitioners. That declaration was in respect of land

measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft. in Survey No.103 of Nagarabhavi

Village, which has been purchased by the petitioners in

W.P.No.21196/2017. In view of the aforesaid facts, BDA

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decided to file an appeal against the order passed in

W.P.No.214/2014, in W.A.No.3124/2014 and on the day the

said writ appeal was filed, endorsement dated 04/12/2014

was issued vide Annexure "M". That endorsement merely

withdrew the "no objection" issued to Gangadhar, but in the

interregnum, on 10/09/2014 Muniramaiah and Gangadhar,

the two brothers had alienated their respective extents of

land to the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and

petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017.

59. The declaration regarding lapse of acquisition

under Section 27 of BDA Act was sought by Muniramaiah and

Gangadhar by filing separate and independent writ petitions,

but "no objection" certificate was sought only by Gangadhar

in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land and not by

Muniramaiah. Even then Muniramaiah also sold his share to

petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017. Endorsement dated

11/06/2014 was issued only in respect of aforesaid extent of

land to Gangadhar in a form which is construed to be a "no

objection certificate" by the petitioners herein and not to

Muniramaiah the other vendor. Writ appeals were filed by the

BDA against both Muniramaiah and Gangadhar against the

order of learned Single Judge in which BDA succeeded before

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the Division Bench which judgment has been affirmed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court.

60. In view of filing of writ appeal against order

dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, which was

filed by Gangadhar, endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was

withdrawn. The same cannot be termed as illegal or in

violation of the rights of the petitioners herein. The reasons

for saying so are not far to see: firstly, endorsement dated

11/06/2014 was issued on the request made by Gangadhar,

who was the petitioner in W.P.No.214/2014 by seeking a "no

objection certificate". If no such request was made, such an

endorsement would not have been issued by the BDA. It was

not a case of concession made by the BDA suo moto, but on

the basis of the order dated 27/01/2014 issued by this Court.

Secondly, the endorsement was issued on the basis of the

situation as it obtained on 11/06/2014, namely, declaration

granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court to the

effect that acquisition of land measuring 43,544.82 sq.ft. in

Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village had lapsed. But the

declaration granted by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.No.214/2014 was not ultimate or final. In fact, in

respect of a similar declaration granted by this Court in

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W.P.No.46953/2013, by order dated 13/12/2013, which was

filed by Muniramaiah, the other vendor of petitioners herein

BDA had already appealed against it in W.A.No.1024/2014

and was pending consideration on 11/06/2014. It was,

therefore, a natural corollary that BDA decided to challenge

order dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, by

filing an appeal on 04/12/2014 on which date the

endorsement at Annexure "M" was issued, otherwise the two

would have been incongruous; particularly, when no such "no

objection" certificate in the form of endorsement had been

issued in respect of Muniramaiah the other vendor. Thirdly,

petitioners, placing reliance on endorsement dated

11/06/2014 issued to one of the vendors ought to have

become aware of the following aspects with regard to the

land in question: (a) that, 4 acres 30 guntas in Sy.No.103

including 43,544.828 sq.ft. (subject matter of endorsement)

was subject to acquisition; (b) that, the petitioners ought to

ascertain whether any challenge to the acquisition was made

by the vendors of the petitioners or their father who was the

notified khathedar of the land in question before this Court

and if so, the result of such proceedings and (c) that

petitioners ought to have ascertained as to whether order

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dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, following

order dated 13/12/2013 passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 had

attained finality or not. Instead, petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, simply purchased 43,544.82

sq.ft. of land under registered sale deed dated 10/09/2014.

61. In fact, in the deed of absolute sale at Annexure

"A", the recitals categorically refer to preliminary notification

dated 15/07/1982 and final notification dated 16/08/1985,

pertaining to 4 acres 30 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 of

Nagarbhavi Village. It is also stated therein that

W.P.Nos.46953/2013 and 214/2014 had been filed by the

vendors and reference has been made to endorsement dated

11/06/2014. Therefore, the petitioners had actual notice of

all these facts and they were aware of the aforesaid

significant facts which ought to have triggered further

enquiry by the petitioners herein. But despite knowing such

facts, petitioners sought to purchase their extent of land

under registered sale deed dated 10/04/2014 from their

vendors. Had petitioners made pertinent enquiries before

purchasing a portion of the land in question, the true facts

would have been known to them and possibly they would not

have ventured to get the sale deeds registered in their name.

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62. The next related point to be considered is as to

whether the issuance of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to

one of the vendors of the petitioners amounted to a promise

made by BDA from which BDA could not have resiled by

issuing impugned endorsement. In other words, whether the

doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in the instant case so

as to grant relief to the petitioners.

63. The contents of endorsement dated 11/06/2014

need not be reiterated as it has been extracted as well as

highlighted.

64. The contention of learned senior counsel, Sri

Udaya Holla is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel

applies in the instant case and the petitioners must be given

relief by holding that BDA was estopped from issuing

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and that on the basis of the

promise made in endorsement dated 11/06/2014,

petitioners' vendors were authorized and had the right to sell

portions of Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village, in favour of the

petitioners herein, who are the alienees.

65. Before answering the said point, it would be

useful to refer to some of the decisions on the doctrine of

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promissory estoppel rendered by this Court as well as the

Hon'ble Supreme Court cited at the Bar.

(i) Learned senior counsel for petitioners in

W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, 21193-21195/2017 has placed

reliance on the following judgments in support of his

contentions with regard to applicability of the doctrine of

promissory estoppel as an equitable doctrine in the instant

case.

(a) In Commissioner, Bangalore Development

Authority And Others vs. State Of Karnataka, By Its

Secretary [ILR 2006 KAR 318], the Division Bench of this

Court at paragraph-91 onwards discussed the case of

M/s.Tata Housing Development Company in the context of

the doctrine of promissory estoppel and after relying upon

State of Punjab vs. M/s. Nestle India Limited [2004 (6)

SCC 465] held that promissory estoppel is a doctrine in

equity found in a cause of action against the Government and

that it is to enforce a representation made by the

Government as a result of which a person would have

changed his position to his disadvantage and seeks to

enforce his right based on the said doctrine.

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(b) Reference has also been made by the Division

Bench to two other Judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of The Union of India and others vs. M/s.Anglo

Afghan Agencies etc., [AIR 1968 SC 718] and

M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., vs. State of

Uttar Pradesh and others [(1979) 2 SCC 409], to hold

that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable

doctrine it must yield if equity so desires. That the

Government should place adequate material before the Court

showing the overriding public interest, which compels them

not to honour the promise. It is further observed that it is

equally well-settled that no representation which is prohibited

by law can be enforced. However, the Government must

have the power to carry out the promise. If the statute

confers power on the Government to enforce the promise

made, and there is no prohibition in law, then the

Government is bound by such promise.

In the said case, the Division Bench noted that the

petitioner in W.P.No.25807/2004 (W.A. No.2757/2005) M/s.

Tata Housing Development Company had entered into an

agreement with the owners of agricultural lands for purchase

of 26 acre 12 guntas for the purpose of construction of

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buildings and structures. The said agreement was entered

into in pursuance of the Government New Housing Policy

encouraging investment by private sector/co-operative

inhousing projects. The case of the petitioners was that the

agreement was entered into because of the representation by

the Government. In the meanwhile acquisition notifications

were issued acquiring the very same lands for Arkavaty

Layout. The petitioners sought relief on the basis of the

doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Division Bench held

that the material on record was not sufficient to grant the

relief sought for on the basis of the said doctrine. But the

plea regarding promissory estoppel was upheld in the case of

petitioners in W.P.28087/2004 who had filed

W.A.No.2760/2005, who had intended to develop Software

I.T. Park, but not in the case of Tata Housing Development

Company in W.P.25807/2004.

(c) In the case of The Union of India and others

vs. M/s.Anglo Afghan Agencies etc., [AIR 1968 SC

718], it has been held that even if the case does not fall

within the limits of Section 115 of Evidence Act, it is open to

the party who acted on the representation of the

Government to claim that the Government should carry out

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the promise made by it in the formal contract as required by

the Constitution. In the same Judgment, it is further

observed that:

"Under our jurisprudence, the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."

(d) In the case of B.L.Sreedhar and others vs.

K.M.Munireddy (Dead) and others [(2003) 2 SCC 355],

after referring to a catena of decisions of both English and

Indian Courts and also treatises on the subject of estoppel,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 20 held as under:

"Estoppel though a branch of the law of evidence is also capable of being viewed as a substantive rule of law insofar as it helps to create or defeat rights which would not exist and be taken away but for that doctrine......."

It further observed that:

"Of course, an estoppel cannot have the effect of conferring upon a person a legal status expressly denied to him by a Statute. But where such is not the case a right may be claimed as having come into

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existence on the basis of estoppel and it is capable of being enforced or defended as against the person precluded from denying it".

(e) Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel appearing

for the petitioners has also relied upon a decision reported in

case of New Marine Coal Co., (Bengal) Private Ltd., vs.

The Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 152] (paragraphs 16

and 17), wherein it has been observed that:

"Just as estoppel can be pleaded on the ground of misrepresentation or act or omission, so can estoppel be pleaded on the ground of negligence; but before such a plea can succeed, negligence must be established in this technical sense i.e., duty to use due care towards the party misled, or towards the general public of which he is one."

(ii) Learned counsel appearing for respondent - BDA,

Sri Kannur, has relied upon the following citations on the

issue concerning promissory estoppel:-

(a) In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd., vs.

Commercial Tax Officer and others reported in (2005) 1

SCC 625, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the

doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of doctrine

of promissory estoppel in paragraphs 8, 14 and 15 by

observing as under:

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"8. A person may have a "legitimate expectation" of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that "legitimate expectation"' gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation in not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. (See Union of India and Others. v. Hindustan

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Development Corporation and Others, AIR (1994) SC

988).

x x x

14. As was observed in Punjab Communications Ltd.

v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1801, the change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on "Wednesbury reasonableness." The decision-maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of police is for the decision-maker and not the Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. A claim based on merely legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time; present, past and future. How significant is the statement that today is tomorrow's yesterday. The present is as we experience it, the past is a present memory and future is a present expectation. For legal purposes, expectation is not same as anticipation. Legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law.

15. As observed in Attorney General for New Southwales v. Quinn, [1990] 64 Australian LJR 327 to strike the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to

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set the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the negotiation of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well- known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is 'not the key which unlocks the treasure of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits,' particularly, when the elements of speculation and uncertainty are inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New Southwales' case the Courts should restrain

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themselves and respect such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well meant caution. Otherwise, a resourceful litigant having vested interest in contract, licences, etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directing principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario becomes all the more important."

(b) In Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of

India and another [(1995) 1 SCC 274], the Hon'ble

Supreme Court was dealing with the doctrine of promissory

estoppel or equitable estoppel as established in

administrative law in India and observed at paragraphs 11

and 12 as under:

"11. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take between the parties.

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12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the Government or the public authority "to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make." There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation."

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In the aforesaid judgment reference has also been

made to several dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court where the

ambit and scope or amplitude of doctrine of promissory

estoppel as evolved through successive decisions starting

from the case of M/s.Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. (supra).

(iii) Learned senior counsel Sri D.L.N. Rao, appearing

for sixth respondent in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 has also

placed reliance of certain dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court on

certain nuances of doctrine of promissory estoppel, which are

as follows:

(a) In M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.

Ltd., vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(1979) 2

SCC 409] it has been observed in paragraph 28 as under:

"28. No representation or promise made by an officer can preclude the Government from enforcing a statutory prohibition. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of the law. It is true that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as under:

"We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so desires; if it can be

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shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it."

(b) Further, reliance has been placed on Union of

India and others vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [(1985)

4 SCC 369], wherein reliance has been placed on the earlier

dictum in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills (supra)

and Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees

House Ltd., [(1956) 1 All ER 256], wherein the contours

of doctrine of promissory estoppel has been explained by the

House of Lords speaking through Lord Denning J.

(iv) The recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court on the doctrine of promissory estoppel could also be

usefully cited as under:

(a) In the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited

vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2011)3 SCC 193] (Shree

- 207 -

Sidhbali Steels) at paragraph Nos.32, 33, and 34 Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed that the rule of promissory

estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to

suit a particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule, but

an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between

the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them.

That the doctrine is a principle, which is neither in the realm

of contract nor in the realm of estoppel, but for the

application of doctrine of the promissory estoppel, the

promissee must establish that he suffered detriment or

altered his position by reliance on the promise. Further, at

paragraph No.33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed

as under:

"33. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled

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to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law."

(b) Further, in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. vs.

Sant Steels and Alloys (P) Ltd. [(2008) 2 SCC 777], the

Hon'ble Supreme Court after surveying a catena of cases

observed that whenever the State has made a representation

to the public and the public has acted on the representation

and suffered economically or otherwise, then in that case,

the State should be estopped from withdrawing such benefit

to the detriment of such people except in public interest or

against the statute.

(c) In State of Rajasthan vs. J.K.Udaipur Udyog

Ltd. [(2004) 7 SCC 673], while considering Rajasthan

Sales Tax/Central Sales Tax Exemption Scheme for

Industries, 1998, pursuant to the fourth new industrial policy

on grant of such an exemption and thereafter issuance of

corrigendum, which was assailed on the premise that the

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exemption granted was affected by the corrigendum, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"25. An exemption is by definition a freedom from an obligation which the exemptee is otherwise liable to discharge. It is a privilege granting an advantage not available to others. An exemption granted under a statutory provision in a fiscal statue has been held to be a concession granted by the State Government so that the beneficiaries of such concession are not required to pay the tax or duty they are otherwise liable to pay under such statute. The recipient of a concession has to legally enforceable right against the Government to grant of a concession except to enjoy the benefits of the concession during the period of its grant. This right to enjoy is a defeasible one in the sense that it may be taken away in exercise of the very power under which the exemption was granted. (See Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, Kasinka Trading v. Union of India and Shrijee sales Corpn. V. Union of India.)"

(d) In Mohd. Jamal vs. Union of India and

another [(2014) 1 SCC 201], while discussing the doctrine

of legitimate expectation, reference was made to Sethi Auto

Service Station vs. DDA [(2009) 1 SCC 180], wherein it was

observed that a person basing his claim on the doctrine of

legitimate expectation has to establish that he had relied on

the said representation and had altered his position and that

denial of such expectation worked to his detriment. The

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Courts can interfere only if the decision taken by the

authority is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross

abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice

and contrary to public interest. It also reiterated that the

concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where

said action is a matter of public policy or in public interest,

unless, of course, the action taken amounted to an abuse of

power. It was further emphasised that in order to establish a

claim of promissory estoppel, it must be proved that there

was such a definite promise and not any vague offer which

could not be enforced.

(e) In Devi Multiplex and another vs. State of

Gujarat and others [(2015) 9SCC 132], at paragraph

No.20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noticed development

of the doctrine of promissory estoppel through various

judgments.

(f) In Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited vs.

Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another [(2016)4 SCC

134], it has been observed that a recipient of a concession

has no legally enforceable right against Government to grant

or continue to grant a concession except to enjoy benefits of

concessions during period of its grant. This right to enjoy a

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benefit is defeasible one, in the sense, it may be taken away

in exercise of the very power under which the exemption was

granted.

(g) In Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited vs.

State of Kerala and others [(2016) 6 SCC 766], the

Hon'ble Supreme has retraced the history of the doctrine of

promissory estoppel through various cases in India, while at

the same time quoting the decision of the Australian High

Court in Commonwealth of Australia vs. Verwayen [(1990)

170 CLR 394 (Aust)] on the approach of Courts in such

matters.

After quoting the Australian decision, at paragraph

No.20, it is stated as under:

"20. The above statement, based on various earlier English authorities, correctly encapsulates the law of promissory estoppel with one difference-under our law, as has been seen hereinabove, promissory estoppel can be the basis of an independent cause of action in which detriment does not need to be proved. It is enough that a party has acted upon the representation made. The importance of the Australian case is only to reiterate two fundamental concepts relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel-one, that the central principle of the doctrine is that the law will not permit an unconscionable departure by one party from the

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subject matter of an assumption which has been adopted by the other party as the basis of a course of conduct which would affect the other party if the assumption be not adhered to. The assumption may be of fact or law, present or future. And two, that the relief that may be given on the facts of a given case is flexible enough to remedy injustice wherever it is found. And this would include the relief of acting on the basis that a future assumption either as to fact or law will be deemed to have taken place so as to afford relief to the wronged party."

66. Having regard to the aforesaid judicial dicta, it is

noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable

doctrine and that it applies when the Government makes a

promise, which would be acted upon by the promisee and

relying on the said promise alters his position, then the

Government would be bound by the promise and the same

would be enforceable against the Government at the instance

of the promisee. That if the Government is subject to the

rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of

the rule are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to

carry out the promise made by it. However, there are

recognized limitations to the principle. Firstly, the doctrine of

promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and it has to

yield when equity so requires. It is only when the Court is

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satisfied that Government ought not to be bound by the

promise and should be free to act unfettered by it that the

Court would not enforce the promise against the

Government. Secondly, no promise could be enforced, which

is prohibited by law and thirdly, the person or the authority

making the representation of the promise must have the

power to carry out the promise. Thus, if there is a clear and

unequivocal promise knowing that it would be acted upon by

the promisee, who has acted upon the promise, then it would

be inequitable to allow the promissor to go back on the

promise. Thus, if the doctrine is not to apply in a particular

fact situation, then Government should place proper and

adequate material before the Court showing the overriding

public interest, which compels it not to honour the promise.

Further, no representation or promise which is prohibited in

law can be enforced. Otherwise the Government is bound by

such promise.

67. It is also relevant to note that there is strong

judicial opinion to the effect that before invoking the doctrine

of promissory estoppel, sound and positive foundation must

be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine

and that bald expression without any supporting material to

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the effect that the doctrine is applicable because the party

invoking the doctrine has altered his position relying on the

assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press

the said doctrine.

68. On a consideration of aforecited cases on the law

of promissory estoppel, the same could be applied having

regard to the fact of the present case in light of the

contentions raised by respective counsel.

69. The contents of endorsement dated 11/06/2014

have already been referred to while considering point No.4.

The endorsement dated 11/06/2014 stated that the

acquisition of land in respect of Sy.No.103, measuring 4

acres 30 guntas, has been completed; that the award has

been passed and compensation amount has been deposited

before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, and possession has

been taken and that, in W.P.No.217/2014, filed by

Gangadhar before this Court, a declaration has been made to

the effect that acquisition has lapsed insofar as 43,544.82

sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 is concerned under Section 27 of

the BDA Act. The aforesaid endorsement also stated that the

aforesaid extent of land was excluded from acquisition

process, contrary to the law that, when possession of

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acquired land had been taken, it could not be excluded from

acquisition. Also, the said endorsement did not give any

authority to Gangadhar, to whom it was issued, or to his

brother, Muniramaiah, petitioners' vendors herein to sell the

land to a third party. Such a right was not created in

petitioners' vendors by the said endorsement. Therefore, on

the basis of the said endorsement, petitioners cannot

contend that their vendors had acquired a right to alienate

respective extents in Sy.No.103 to the petitioners herein.

Hence, it is held that there was no promise or representation

made to petitioners' vendors authorizing them to alienate

respective extents to third parties. The endorsement dated

11/06/2014 merely stated that in view of the declaration

granted by this Court in W.P.No.214/2014, the aforesaid

extent of land was excluded from acquisition. The

implication being, it no longer was part of the Nagarbhavi

Scheme as this Court had declared that the Scheme had

lapsed insofar as the aforesaid extent of land was concerned

in W.P.No.214/2014. But in law, even if the Scheme lapses

acquisition does not lapse, particularly when the land has

stood vested in the State Government or its beneficiary. This

proposition of law is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

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the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) at paragraph

No.38. It is, further held that when the lands transferred

and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances

such status of the property is incapable of being altered by

fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act

i.e., BDA Act or LA Act, 1894 as these Acts do not contain

any provision in terms of which property, once and

absolutely, vested in the State could be reverted to the

owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and

possession of the State once process of acquisition is

completed.

70. Further, the position as it existed on 11/06/2014,

vis-à-vis the aforesaid extent of land was not the ultimate, as

the said endorsement did not state that BDA had

communicated that it would not file any appeal against order

dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014. Reliance

placed on file notings of BDA by learned senior counsel

appearing for some of the petitioners, is of no assistance for

the simple reason that the file notings did not culminate into

a communication of the decision taken by BDA at that point

of time, not to file an appeal against the order passed in

W.P.No.214/2014, to one of petitioners' vendors, Gangadhar.

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In this context, reliance could be placed on Article 166 of the

Constitution of India, which relates to the expression of an

executive action and unless there is a communication of a

decision to the person concerned by giving formal expression

to the decision, it cannot be considered to be a crystallized

decision. Hence, merely because in the file notings of the

BDA, it was noted that there was no reason to file an appeal

at that point of time and subsequently, an appeal was filed

cannot be held against BDA. On the other hand, the said

endorsement issued by the BDA pursuant to the order dated

27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014 was contrary to the

order passed by this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 disposed

off on 03/08/2006, wherein it was categorically stated that

the Scheme had been substantially implemented and that

Section 27 was not applicable to the case and the writ

petition had been dismissed. The aforesaid writ petition was

filed by the very same vendors of petitioners herein who filed

the said writ petition as legal heirs of notified khatedar

Muniramaiah, their father, the earlier unsuccessful petitioner.

Therefore, BDA was justified in filing writ appeal against

order passed in W.P.No.217/2014.

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71. The issuance of the endorsement dated

11/06/2014 was not suo motu by BDA as Gangadhar, one of

the vendors of the petitioners herein, sought endorsement

dated 11/06/2014 from the BDA so as to acquire a

semblance of authority to sell the aforesaid extent of land in

question to petitioners herein. One cannot ignore the fact

that W.P.Nos.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 were filed

separately by petitioners' vendors after entering into an

agreement to sell on 03/09/2013 with certain parties.

However, as against the orders passed in the aforesaid writ

petitions, writ appeals were preferred by the BDA and the

Division Bench allowed the writ petitions and dismissed the

aforesaid writ petitions as having been hit by the principles of

res judicata which judgment has been affirmed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petitions filed by

the vendors. In fact, petitioners' vendors suppressed the

fact that they had alienated respective extents to petitioners

herein before the Division Bench, which disposed off the writ

appeals. Though the petitioners herein preferred review

petitions against the judgment of the Division Bench dated

16/11/2015 and in the review petitions the Division Bench

held that the said judgment was not binding on the

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petitioners herein as they were not parties to the same,

nevertheless, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the

petitioners herein who claim to be successors in interest are

bound by the judgment of the Division Bench, which has

been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

72. In this regard, it is reiterated as has been

discussed while answering Point No.3 that the petitioners

herein are not bona fide purchasers. Though the

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 has been issued to one of

the vendors of the petitioners herein and not to the

petitioners and the latter claim benefit under the said

endorsement and have set up their claim in these writ

petitions on the doctrine of promissory estoppel by assailing

the subsequent endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure

"M"), the fact remains that the petitioners herein not being

bona fide purchasers by not carrying a due diligence exercise

cannot plead innocence so as to seek shelter under the

doctrine of promissory estoppel. After reiterating what has

been stated in the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, Annexure

"M" endorsement dated 04/12/2014, states that the said

endorsement dated 11/06/2014 is quashed or withdrawn and

that against order dated 27/01/2014 passed in

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W.P.214/2014, BDA intends to file an appeal. The reason for

issuance of impugned endorsement dated 04/12/2014 is to

inform one of the vendors of the petitioners namely,

Gangadhar that earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was

being withdrawn as BDA had decided to file an appeal against

order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014.

73. Therefore, can it be said that endorsement dated

04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") is an unconscionable departure

from what has been stated in earlier endorsement dated

11/06/2014 so as to enforce the same against BDA? No

doubt, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a substantive

law and no person who has placed himself in a position of

disadvantage by acting on a promise made can remain

without a remedy and the promisor cannot be permitted to

resile from the promise. Nevertheless, there are certain

limitations on the application of the doctrine. In other words,

the promisor (Government or public authority) must be

compelled to carry out its promise or representation. But the

same cannot be so when the representation or promise is

made contrary to law or which was outside the authority or

power of the officer of the Government or of the public

authority to make. Further, the doctrine must yield when the

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equity so desires. If the Government or the public authority

demonstrates that having regard to the facts as having

transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or

the public authority to the representation made by it, then

Court would not raise any equity in favour of the person to

whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the

same on the Government or the public authority. Further, no

promise could be enforced, which is prohibited by law. Thus,

while examining the application of the doctrine of promissory

estoppel, the relevant facts, actions and position of the

parties must be noted in each case.

74. When endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was

issued, in my view, the same did not create any right or

authority in favour of the vendors of the petitioners to

alienate the land in question. Neither did the endorsement

state that order passed by this Court on 27/01/2014 in

W.P.No.214/2014 had been accepted by the BDA, but the

subsequent endorsement dated 04/12/2014 stated that the

earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was withdrawn as

BDA had decided to file a writ appeal against order dated

27/012014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014. The impugned

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 was not an unconscionable

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departure amounting to oppressive conduct by the BDA, for

the BDA never represented to petitioners' vendors by

endorsement dated 11/06/2014, that it had given up its right

to file a writ appeal against the order passed in

W.P.No.214/2014 by accepting the order passed in the said

case. Therefore, there was no representation or promise

made to the vendors of the petitioners by the BDA that, they

could treat their extents of land acquired by the BDA as

having reverted to them pursuant to the orders of this Court

passed in the two writ petitions filed by them. In the

absence of any such an indication in the endorsement dated

11/06/2014 there was no promise made to petitioners'

vendors to deal with their extents of land in any manner they

intended to, including alienating the same to third parties.

75. Further, petitioners cannot be permitted to rely

upon endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to contend that they

are innocent purchasers and on the basis of the said

endorsement, they went ahead to purchase their extents of

land. As already stated petitioners herein ought to have

carried out a due diligence exercised in respect of the extent

of land that they intended to purchase, either they failed to

do so or they ignored litigations before this Court including

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pendency of W.A.No.1024/2014 before this Court filed

against Muniramaiah, one of the vendors and at their own

risk, bought their respective extents of land. Therefore, in

view of the aforesaid discussion petitioners herein cannot

seek to enforce their right on the basis of the doctrine of

promissory estoppel as the said doctrine does not apply

having regard to the facts of this case.

76. Moreover, petitioners herein have not arrayed

their vendors as parties in this writ petition. Neither have

their vendors assailed endorsement dated 04/12/2014. In

fact, they are estopped from doing so as they have been

unsuccessful before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and further

suppressed the fact that they had alienated their respective

portions of the land to the petitioners herein before the

Division Bench in the writ appeal. Further,the discussion

made while considering Point No.4 is reiterated herein. In

the circumstances, the petitioners W.P.Nos.19567-

15969/2017 are not entitled to any relief on the basis of the

doctrine of promissory estoppel as the same does not apply

in the instant case. There is no challenge made to

endorsement dated 04/12/2014 by the petitioners in

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W.P.No.21196/2017. Point Nos.4 and 5 are accordingly

answered against the aforesaid petitioners.

Re. Point No.6:

"6) Whether petitioners in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 are entitled to any relief in those writ petitions?"

77. The petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017

have assailed work order issued by the BDA in favour of the

sixth respondent vide Annexure "P" dated 10/03/2017 and

have sought restraint on sixth respondent or any person

claiming under the sixth respondent or through them from

entering the petition schedule land i.e., 43,544.82 sq.ft.

Sixth respondent has contended that petitioners have no

locus standi to assail issuance of work order by the BDA.

That on 05/01/2016, BDA invited tenders for construction of

three BHK Apartments in a portion of Sy.No.103 of

Nagarbhavi. The sixth respondent being the lowest bidder

was awarded the contract. That the sixth respondent has

submitted bank guarantee of Rs.2,37,85,000/- to BDA which

is valid till 07/03/2018 only. That the contract work is for an

amount of Rs.47,57,00,000/-. It is a time-bound project and

has to be completed by 09/09/2018. According to the sixth

respondent, it commenced work, but there has been an order

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of status quo granted by this Court in these writ petitions and

an application for vacating the interim order has been filed.

78. This point ought not to detain me for long in view

of the answers given on the other points for consideration.

The petitioners herein having purchased their respective

extents of land from their vendors who had lost title to them

on account of the same being acquired and vested with the

BDA have no locus standi to assail the work order issued by

the BDA to the sixth respondent to construct apartments on

a portion of the said land. Once the land in question has