Sri Dattatraya vs Sharanappa

2024 INSC 586 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3257 OF 2024 (@ SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 13179 OF 2023)

SRI DATTATRAYA … APPELLANT VERSUS SHARANAPPA … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The instant appeal was originally preferred as a petition

before this Court, which is moved against the impugned

Judgment dated 03.03.2023 in Criminal Appeal No.

200139 of 2019 by the High Court of Karnataka at

Kalaburagi whereby the learned Single Judge affirmed

the acquittal of the Respondent in Complaint Case No.

468 of 2014 moved for the offence punishable under

Signature Not Verified Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Digitally signed by ASHISH KONDLE Date: 2024.08.07

(hereinafter referred to as “NI Act 1881”). 16:40:11 IST Reason:

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3. The factual backdrop giving rise to the present challenge

is that the Appellant is the original complainant who

claims to know the sole Respondent for the last six years

and that he had borrowed INR 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two

Lakhs only) from the Appellant on account of family

necessities and accommodation. Against the said loan

the Respondent issued a cheque bearing No. 015639

which was drawn on the Bank of India, as a guarantee

against repayment. He was to repay the said loan

amount within a period of six months thereof. An

agreement to this effect was also signed between the

parties.

4. However, since the Respondent failed to repay the loan

despite repeated requests, the Appellant presented the

concerned cheque for encashment on 22.10.2013, but

nevertheless, as per the Bank Memo dated 24.10.2013,

the cheque was dishonoured on account of “insufficient

funds”.

5. Aggrieved from the said dishonour of cheque, a Demand

Notice dated 31.10.2013 was sent by the Appellant to

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 2 of 28 the Respondent, whereby, the Counsel on behalf of the

Appellant alleged that the Respondent had intentionally

cheated him and had not made any efforts to discharge

his liability. Accordingly, the Respondent was said to

have committed offences punishable under Section 138

of the NI Act 1881 and Section 420 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC 1860”).

6. Thereupon, the Respondent moved a Reply Notice dated

11.11.2013 whereby he claimed that the accusations

made by the Appellant are false and bereft of pertinent

details of the loan transaction, inter alia, the date and

time of advancement of the said debt, which as claimed,

was never advanced.

7. Unsatisfied with the response of the Respondent

through the said Reply Notice, Appellant moved a Private

Complaint No. 991 of 2013 under Section 200 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred

to as “CrPC 1973”). The said complaint came to be

registered as CC/468/2014 before Judicial Magistrate

First Class at Gulbarga. As part of the proceedings

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 3 of 28 before the Trial Court, the Appellant examined himself

as PW-01, while the Respondent examined himself as

DW-01. However, the latter did not mark any documents

from his side. It was the Respondent’s plea that the

concerned cheque was issued in favour of one Mr

Mallikarjun in the year 2012 for security purposes,

however, he did not return the same to the Respondent,

and instead had left the village. While dealing with the

said contention, the Trial Court observed that the

Respondent had failed to explain as to how the cheque

landed in the hands of the Appellant, and for what

purpose was the cheque issued to Mr Mallikarjun.

8. It was also revealed as part of the statement during

cross-examination of the Appellant that the cheque was

originally, not given to the Appellant as security cheque.

Instead, the same was allegedly given to the Appellant

after the Respondent had thereby failed to repay his

liability as existing against the Appellant after a period

of six months. The Court further observed that the

Agreement marked by the Appellant to assist his case

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 4 of 28 does not include signature of the Respondent as against

the terms of the agreement, but a signature is made by

the Respondent on the stamp paper itself, and the same

is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The Court also went

on to scrutinize the Income Tax Returns of the Appellant,

from where it was revealed that the Appellant failed to

declare the alleged loan transaction as part of his

returns to the Income Tax Department. Accordingly, vide

its Judgment dated 18.10.2019, the Trial Court

adjudicated in favour of the Respondent, resultantly

dismissing the complaint moved by the Appellant and

acquitting the Respondent.

9. Aggrieved by the decision of Trial Court, the Appellant

moved the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal

No. 200139 of 2019, which went on to observe that,

admittedly, there was a contradiction in the statement

of the Appellant as to when the cheque was issued in his

favour. Furthermore, as was laid down in the decision

of this Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan1, the

1 (2010) 11 SCC 441.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 5 of 28 presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act 1881 is a

rebuttable one. The contention of the Respondent as to

the financial capacity of the Appellant to grant a loan in

his favour was to be discharged by him, and being

unable to do so, it shall be presumed that a loan

transaction had not taken place. Accordingly, the

findings of the Trial Court were affirmed in the impugned

Judgment dated 03.03.2023.

10. The Appellant has thereupon moved this Court in

challenge to the said impugned judgment on the

grounds that as the signature on the concerned cheque

was admitted by the Respondent, the Appellant was able

to successfully raise a presumption under Section 139

of the NI Act 1881 and as per the submissions of the

Respondent, he had failed to rebut the said

presumption. He also put forth that the reliance on the

decision in Rangappa (supra) by the High Court was

misplaced, and even going by the standard of

preponderance of probabilities, the Respondent failed to

discharge his onus.

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11. Having heard the learned Senior Advocate for the

Appellant as well as the learned Counsel on behalf of the

Respondent, it is imperative to deliberate over the

position of law apropos the applicable provisions of the

NI Act 1881, and others, if any.

12. Earlier, a case of dishonour of a cheque was dealt

through provisions of Section 420 read with Section 415

of the IPC 1860. To enhance the acceptability of cheques

as well as to provide for adequate safeguards to prevent

harassment of honest drawers through painting the

liability arising out of dishonour of a cheque with a

punitive brush, an amendment to the NI Act 1881 was

brought about by introducing Chapter VIII. Thence,

seeking to promote credibility in transactions through

the medium of banking channels and operations as well

as their efficacy. Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 is

reproduced below as:

“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid,

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 7 of 28 either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years’, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”

13. This Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer and

Another2, has held that proceedings under Section 138

of the NI Act 1881 can be initiated even if the cheque

2 (2002) 6 SCC 426.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 8 of 28 was originally issued as security and was subsequently

dishonoured owing to insufficient funds. The failure to

honour the concerned cheque is per se deemed as a

commission of an offence under Section 138 of the NI

Act 1881.

14. The NI Act 1881 enlists three essential conditions that

ought to be fulfilled before the said provision of law can

be invoked. Firstly, the cheque ought to have been

presented within the period of its validity. Secondly, a

demand of payment ought to have been made by the

presenter of the cheque to the issuer, and lastly, the

drawer ought to have had failed to pay the amount

within a period of 15 days of the receipt of the demand.

These principles and pre-requisites stand well

established through Judgment of this Court in

Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar3.

There is an explicit limitation of 30 days, beginning from

period when the cause of action arose, prescribed by the

3 (1998) 6 SCC 514.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 9 of 28 statute vide Section 142(b) of the NI Act 1881 to initiate

proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881.

15. Furthermore, this Court expounded that the issuance of

cheque towards a liability, the presentation of the

cheque within the prescribed period, its return on

account of dishonour, notice to the accused, and failure

to pay within 15 days thereof, stand as sine qua non for

an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 as per

the decision in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan

Balan and Another4. The same was subsequently

reiterated in numerous judgments of this Court as well

as that of the High Courts.

16. While referring to the period of limitation of one month

of filing a complaint for the purpose of Section 138 of the

NI Act 1881, the same is to begin after the drawer of the

cheque has failed to discharge his liability to the

presenter within the prescribed period of 15 days as per

the Proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act 1881. A co-

joint reading of Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act 1881

4 (1999) 7 SCC 510.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 10 of 28 makes it clear that the cause of action only arises after

the failure of the drawer to pay, subsequent to the

receipt of the notice, and the complainant is restricted

from initiating multiple complaints against the

concerned drawer at different stages contemplated prior.

17. Furthermore, in light of such object encapsulated in the

Amendment to Chapter VIII, the Parliament by virtue of

Section 143 of the NI Act 1881 prescribed procedure of

summary trial enlisted in provisions of Sections 260 to

265 of the CrPC 1973 to be adopted during proceedings

under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881. Therefore, it can

be observed that the court shall adopt a liberal approach

with regard to attendance of an accused person and

until an accused’s presence is indispensable, a court can

allow for an exemption, in case of existence of any

exceptional circumstances. Moreover, issuance of a non-

bailable warrant in case of absence of the accused, at

the first instance, shall, due to any circumstance, be

avoided.

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18. As the presumption contemplated by virtue of Section

118 of the NI Act 1881 entails, Section 139 was similarly

introduced to provide for a presumption that the holder

of cheque had received the concerned issued cheque

towards discharging of the liability of the drawer, either

in whole or in part. Therefore, at this juncture, it is ideal

to make a reference to Section 118 of the NI Act 1881,

which is reproduced as:

“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:—

(a) of consideration:—that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;

(b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date;

(c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;

(d) as to time of transfer: —that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity;

(e) as to order of indorsements:—that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear then on;

(f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped;

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 12 of 28

(g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.”

Chapter XIII of the NI Act 1881, of which Section 118 is

a part, lays down special rules for evidence to be

adduced within the scheme of the Act herein. As the text

of the said provision showcases, it raises a rebuttable

presumption as against the drawer to the extent that the

concerned negotiable instrument was drawn and

subsequently accepted, indorsed, negotiated, or

transferred for an existing consideration, and the date

so designated on such an instrument is the date when

the concerned negotiable instrument was drawn. It is

also further presumed that the same was transferred

before its maturity and that the order in which multiple

indorsements appear on such an instrument, that is the

deemed order thereon. Lastly, the holder of a negotiable

instrument is one in its due course, subject to a

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 13 of 28 situation where the concerned instrument while being

obtained from a lawful owner and from his or her lawful

custody thereof through undertaking of an offence as

contemplated under any statute or through the means

of fraud, the burden to prove him or her being a holder

in due course, instead, lies upon such a holder.

19. Accordingly, to begin with, the bare provision of Section

139 of the NI Act 1881 is reproduced herein below:

“139. Presumption in favour of holder—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”

The aforesaid presumption entails an obligation on the

court conducting the trial for an offence under Section

138 of the NI Act 1881 to presume that the cheque in

question was issued by the drawer or accused for the

discharge of a particular liability. The use of expression

“shall presume” ameliorates the conundrum pertaining

to the right of the accused to present evidence for the

purpose of rebutting the said presumption.

Furthermore, the effect of such presumption is that,

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 14 of 28 upon filing of the complaint along with relevant

documents, thereby prima facie establishing the case

against the drawer, the onus of proof shifts on the

drawer or accused to adduce cogent material and

evidence for rebutting the said presumption, and as

established in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat and

Others5, based on preponderance of probabilities.

20. While describing the offence envisaged under Section

138 of the NI Act 1881 as a regulatory offence for largely

being in the nature of a civil wrong with its impact

confined to private parties within commercial

transactions, the 3-Judge Bench in the decision of

Rangappa (supra) highlighted Section 139 of the NI Act

1881 to be an example of a reverse onus clause. This is

done so, as the Court expounds, in the light of

Parliament’s intent, which can be culled out from the

peculiar placing of act of dishonour of cheque in a

statute having criminal overtones. The underlying object

of such deliberate placement is to inject and enhance

5 (2012) 13 SCC 375.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 15 of 28 credibility of negotiable instruments. Additionally, the

reverse onus clause serves as an indispensable “device

to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation”. While

acknowledging the test of proportionality and having laid

the interpretation of Section 139 of the NI Act 1881

hereof, it was further held that an accused cannot be

obligated to rebut the said presumption through an

unduly high standard of proof. This is in light of the

observations laid down by a co-ordinate Bench in Hiten

P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee6, whereby it was

clarified that the rebuttal ought not to be undertaken

conclusively by an accused, which is reiterated as

follows:

“23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, ‘after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’ [Section 3, Evidence Act].

6 (2001) 6 SCC 16.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 16 of 28 Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the ‘prudent man’.”

Therefore, it may be said that the liability of the defence

in cases under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881 is not that

of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.

21. In light of the aforesaid discussion, and as underscored

by this Court recently in the decision of Rajesh Jain v.

Ajay Singh7, an accused may establish non-existence of

a debt or liability either through conclusive evidence that

the concerned cheque was not issued towards the

presumed debt or liability, or through adduction of

circumstantial evidence vide standard of preponderance

of probabilities.

22. Since a presumption only enables the holder to show a

prima facie case, it can only survive before a court of law

subject to contrary not having been proved to the effect

that a cheque or negotiable instrument was not issued

for a consideration or for discharge of any existing or

7 (2023) 10 SCC 148.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 17 of 28 future debt or liability. In this backdrop, it is pertinent

to make a reference to a decision of 3-Judge Bench in

Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar8, which went on to hold

that if a signature on a blank cheque stands admitted to

having been inscribed voluntarily, it is sufficient to

trigger a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act

1881, even if there is no admission to the effect of

execution of entire contents in the cheque.

23. It is therefore apposite to make a reference to the

provision of Section 140 of the NI Act 1881, which

ruminates mens rea to be immaterial while dealing with

proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act 1881. The

said legislative wisdom of the Parliament which is

imbibed in the bare text of the provision is reproduced

as below:

“140. Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under section 138—It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in that section.”

8 (2019) 4 SCC 197.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 18 of 28

24. Through this legal fiction adopted by the legislature vide

Amendment Act of 1988 to the NI Act 1881 it has barred

the drawer of a cheque, which was dishonoured, to take

a defence that at the time of issuance of the cheque in

question he or she had no reason to believe that the

same will be dishonoured upon being presented by the

holder of such a cheque, especially and specifically for

the reasons underlined in Section 138 of the NI Act

1881.

25. A comprehensive reference to the Sections 118, 139 and

140 of the NI Act 1881 gives birth to a deemed fiction

which was also articulated by this Court in K.N. Beena

v. Muniyappan and Another9 as follows:

“Under section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the negotiable instrument (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. Under section 139 the court has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. Thus, in complaints under section 138, the court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debtor’s liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that a cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. The Supreme Court in the

9 (2001) 8 SCC 458.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 19 of 28

case of Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee has also taken an identical view.”

26. Furthermore, on the aspect of adducing evidence for

rebuttal of the aforesaid statutory presumption, it is

pertinent to cumulatively read the decisions of this

Court in Rangappa (supra) and Rajesh Jain (supra)

which would go on to clarify that accused can

undoubtedly place reliance on the materials adduced by

the complainant, which would include not only the

complainant’s version in the original complaint, but also

the case in the legal or demand notice, complainant’s

case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the

reply notice, his Section 313 CrPC 1973 statement or at

the trial as to the circumstances under which the

promissory note or cheque was executed. The accused

ought not to adduce any further or new evidence from

his end in said circumstances to rebut the concerned

statutory presumption.

27. Applying the aforementioned legal position to the

present factual matrix, it is apparent that there existed

a contradiction in the complaint moved by the Appellant

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 20 of 28 as against his cross-examination relatable to the time of

presentation of the cheque by the Respondent as per the

statements of the Appellant. This is to the effect that

while the Appellant claimed the cheque to have been

issued at the time of advancing of the loan as a security,

however, as per his statement during the cross-

examination it was revealed that the same was

presented when an alleged demand for repayment of

alleged loan amount was raised before the Respondent,

after a period of six months of advancement.

Furthermore, there was no financial capacity or

acknowledgement in his Income Tax Returns by the

Appellant to the effect of having advanced a loan to the

Respondent. Even further the Appellant has not been

able to showcase as to when the said loan was advanced

in favour of the Respondent nor has he been able to

explain as to how a cheque issued by the Respondent

allegedly in favour of Mr Mallikarjun landed in the hands

of the instant holder, that is, the Appellant.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 21 of 28

28. Admittedly, the Appellant was able to establish that the

signature on the cheque in question was of the

Respondent and in regard to the decision of this Court

in Bir Singh (supra), a presumption is to ideally arise.

However, in the above referred context of the factual

matrix, the inability of the Appellant to put forth the

details of the loan advanced, and his contradictory

statements, the ratio therein would not impact the

present case to the effect of giving rise to the statutory

presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act 1881. The

Respondent has been able to shift the weight of the

scales of justice in his favour through the preponderance

of probabilities.

29. The Trial Court had rightly observed that the Appellant

was not able to plead even a valid existence of a legally

recoverable debt as the very issuance of cheque is

dubious based on the fallacies and contradictions in the

evidence adduced by the parties. Furthermore, the fact

that the Respondent had inscribed his signature on the

agreement drawn on a white paper and not on a stamp

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 22 of 28 paper as presented by the Appellant, creates another set

of doubt in the case. Since the accused has been able to

cast a shadow of doubt on the case presented by the

Appellant, he has therefore successfully rebutted the

presumption stipulated by Section 139 of the NI Act

1881.

30. Moreover, affirming the findings of the Trial Court, the

High Court observed that while the signature of the

Respondent on the cheque drawn by him as well as on

the agreement between the parties herein stands

admitted, in case where the concern of financial capacity

of the creditor is raised on behalf of an accused, the

same is to be discharged by the complainant through

leading of cogent evidence.

31. The instant case pertains to challenge against

concurrent findings of fact favouring the acquittal of the

respondent, it would be cogent to delve into an analysis

of the principles underlining the exercise of power to

adjudicate a challenge against acquittal bolstered by

concurrent findings. The following broad principles can

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 23 of 28 be culled out after a comprehensive analysis of judicial

pronouncements:

i) Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the

fundamental essence of liberty and presumption of

innocence unless proven guilty. This presumption

gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of

acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-

cautious while dealing with a challenge against

acquittal as the said presumption gets reinforced by

virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome.

Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side

becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said

double presumption.

ii) In case of concurrent findings of acquittal, this

Court would ordinarily not interfere with such view

considering the principle of liberty enshrined in

Article 21 of the Constitution of India 1950, unless

perversity is blatantly forthcoming and there are

compelling reasons.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 24 of 28

iii) Where two views are possible, then this Court would

not ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent

findings of acquittal. However, where the situation

is such that the only conclusion which could be

arrived at from a comprehensive appraisal of

evidence, shows that there has been a grave

miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such

concurrent view, this Court would not restrict itself

to adopt an oppugnant view. [Vide State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Dan Singh10]

iv) To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of

acquittal are ‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there

has been failure of justice. This Court in Babu v.

State of Kerala11 clarified the ambit of the term

‘perversity’ as

“if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.”

10 (1997) 3 SCC 747.

11 (2010) 9 SCC 189.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 25 of 28

v) In situations of concurrent findings favoring

accused, interference is required where the trial

court adopted an incorrect approach in framing of

an issue of fact and the appellate court whilst

affirming the view of the trial court, lacked in

appreciating the evidence produced by the accused

in rebutting a legal presumption. [Vide Rajesh Jain

v. Ajay Singh12]

vi) Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to

safeguard interests of justice when the acquittal is

based on some irrelevant grounds or fallacies in re-

appreciation of any fundamental evidentiary

material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non-

adherence to the principles of natural justice or the

decision is manifestly unjust or where an acquittal

which is fundamentally based on an exaggerated

adherence to the principle of granting benefit of

doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in

cases where the court severed the connection

12 (2023) 10 SCC 148.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 26 of 28 between accused and criminality committed by him

upon a cursory examination of evidences. [Vide

State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh and Others13

and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar14]

32. Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and

applying them to the facts and circumstances of the

present matter, it is evident that there is no perversity

and lack of evidence in the case of the respondent-

accused. The concurrent findings have backing of

detailed appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do

not warrant interference in light of above enlisted

principles. In a similar set of facts as in the present case,

involving criminal liability arising out of dishonour of

cheque, this Court in M/s Rajco Steel Enterprises v.

Kavita Saraff and Another15 dejected from reversing

the concurrent findings of acquittal of accused therein

and underscored the principle of non-interference,

13 (2024) 4 SCC 469.

14 (2022) 3 SCC 471.

15 2024 SCC OnLine SC 518.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 27 of 28 unless such findings are perverse or bereft of evidentiary

corroboration or lacks question of law.

33. In furtherance of the aforesaid principles and the

reasons ascribed thereof, the present challenge to the

aforesaid impugned judgment dated 03.03.2023 by the

High Court of Karnataka at Kalaburagi is bereft of any

merits and does not call for any interference of this

court.

34. The instant appeal is dismissed and the findings of the

High Court in the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2023

are affirmed.

35. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

……………………………………………J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

……………………………………………J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 07, 2024.

Criminal Appeal No.3257 of 2024 @ SLP (Crl.) No.13179 of 2023 Page 28 of 28