Smt Usha Mahesh Dasar vs State Of Karnataka

-1- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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® IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD

DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

WRIT PETITION NO. 101601 OF 2025 (LB-RES) C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 105810 OF 2025 (LB-ELE)

IN W.P.NO.101601/2025 BETWEEN

1. SMT USHA MAHESH DASAR W/O MAHESH DASAR , AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, R/A SIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR, NEAR HUBAR PLOT GADAG-582101

2. SRI ANIL M ABBIGERE S/O MALLAPPA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCC. R/A 1728 /5, OLD SARAF Digitally signed BAZAAR, by SHWETHA GADAG-562101 RAGHAVENDRA Location: HIGH COURT OF 3. SRI GULAPPA S MUSHIGERI KARNATAKA S/O HANAMANTHAPPA MUSHIGIRI AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/A NO. 250/9, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, NEAR HANUMAN TEMPLE, BETAGERI GADAG-582101

...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR SRI. B.R. SRIVATSA., ADVOCATE FOR -2- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE)

AND

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001 REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY

2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GADAG DISTRICT DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, GADAG-582101

3. THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER BELAGAVI DIVISION BELAGAVI-590002.

4. THE COMMISSIONER CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCILGADAG- BETAGERI STATION ROAD, GANDHI CIRCLE, GADAG-582102

5. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER GADAG CUM ELECTION OFFICER, GADAG -BETAGERI CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL GADAG-582102

.... RESPONDENTS

6. KRISHNA S/O PARASAPPA PARAPUR AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE R/O NO. 3982/1, PLOT NO.100,101, D.C.MILL ROAD, TALGAERI ONI, GADAG-582101 -3- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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... IMPLEADING RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3 & R5; SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4; SRI. K.L. PATIL & SRI. S.S. BETUMATH., ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING FOR R6)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2025 BEARING NO.PRA.AA.BE:K.M.C/53/2024-25-E.NO:262750 PASSED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT-REGIONAL COMMISSIONER (PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC.

IN W.P.NO.105810/2025 BETWEEN

1. CHANDRASHEKHAR S/O BASAVARAJ TADSAD AGE 52 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O BASAVESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG

2. VINAYAK S/O SHIVAPPA MANVI AGE 65 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O VEERANARAYAN TEMPLE ROAD, GADAG

3. PRAKASH ANGADI AGE 53 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O SHIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG

4. RAGHAVENDRA YELAVATI AGE 38 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O KANAGINAHAL ROAD, BETAGERI

...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE)

AND 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, -4- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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GADAG-582101.

2. THE UNDER SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-560008

3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GADAG DIST. GADAG-582101

4. THE MUNCIPAL COUNCIL OF GADAG-BETAGERI DIST. GADAG BY ITS COMMISSIONER

.... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3; SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING ISSUE A WRIT / ORDER / DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI BY QUASHING THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION BEARING NO. NA A E 48 MLR 2023 DATED 29.07.2024 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-D., IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.

THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 14.10.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ -5- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)

1. The Petitioners in WP No.101601/2025 are before this

court seeking for the following reliefs:

a) Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 bearing No. Pra.Aa.Be:K.M.C/53/2024-25/E.No:262750 passed by the R3-Regional Commissioner (produced as Annexure-A) and/or b) Issue such other writ, orders or directions as deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.

2. The Petitioners in WP No.105810/2025 are before this

court seeking for the following reliefs:

a) Issue a writ / order / direction in the nature of certiorari by quashing the impugned notification bearing no. Na A E 48 MLR 2023 dated 29.07.2024 passed by the respondent no.2 vide Annexure-D., in the interest of justice and equity.

b) Pass such other order, orders that this Hon'ble court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.

FACTS IN W.P. No.105810/2025: -6- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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3. The petitioners in W.P. No.105810/2025 are before

this Court challenging the legality of the appointment

of an administrator to the City Municipal Council,

Gadag-Betageri.

4. It is their case that the election to the posts of

President and Vice-President of the CMC was duly

conducted on 24.01.2022. Pursuant thereto, the

successful candidates assumed office, and their tenure

commenced on the said date. In terms of the

governing statutory framework, the tenure was to

continue for a fixed duration and, accordingly, it came

to an end on 24.07.2024.

5. The petitioners state that the 10th term of the

President and Vice-President was declared on

05.08.2024. In order to facilitate continuation of the

democratic process for the remaining tenure, the

Assistant Commissioner was appointed as the Election

Officer to conduct elections to the posts of President -7- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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and Vice-President. However, despite such

appointment, no election was held.

6. While matters stood thus, the Under Secretary to the

Government, Urban Development Department

(Respondent No.2), by notification dated 29.07.2024,

purportedly exercising powers under Sections 315 of

the Karnataka Municipalities Act, appointed the Deputy

Commissioner of Gadag District as Administrator of

the CMC. The petitioners contend that this step

effectively displaced the elected governance structure

and vested the administration of the municipal body in

a bureaucratic authority.

7. The challenge in the present writ petition is directed

against the said notification appointing the

Administrator. According to the petitioners, the

statutory conditions precedent for invoking such

extraordinary powers were not satisfied. It is urged

that there was neither dissolution nor valid

supersession of the municipal body in accordance with -8- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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law, nor were the mandatory procedural safeguards

complied with.

8. Insofar as W.P. No.10581/2025 is concerned, learned

Senior Counsel Sri K.N. Panindra submits that the

exercise of power under Section 315 of the Karnataka

Municipal Corporations Act is impermissible in the

absence of fulfillment of the statutory pre-conditions

contemplated therein. He would contend that the

impugned action is without jurisdiction, arbitrary in

nature, and violative of the democratic scheme

envisaged under the Act. On this premise, it is

submitted that the writ petition deserves to be allowed

and the notification appointing the Administrator be

set aside.

Facts in WP No.101601/2025.

9. The facts in the present matter are more or less

identical to those in W.P. No.105810/2025. The

petitioners are elected councillors of the Gadag-

Betageri City Municipal Council. They were elected in -9- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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the general elections held in December 2021 from

Ward Nos. 35, 28 and 13 respectively. The term of

office of a councillor is five years and their term is still

continuing. It will expire only in December 2026.

10. The election to the posts of President and Vice-

President was held on 24.01.2022. Petitioner No.1 was

elected as President for a period of two and a half

years. Her term came to an end on 27.07.2024.

11. When Petitioner No.1 was serving as President, a

resolution dated 09.02.2024, bearing No.378, was

said to have been passed in respect of the extension

of lease of Wakharsal properties. The Commissioner of

the CMC later alleged that the said resolution was

fabricated and that the signature appearing on it was

not his. On this allegation, he filed a complaint with

the jurisdictional police. Based on the complaint, an

FIR was registered on 14.08.2024 against several

persons, including the petitioners. After the - 10 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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investigation, a charge sheet was filed in the said

case.

12. Thereafter, on 24.01.2025, Respondent No.4, the

Commissioner of the CMC, sent a communication to

Respondent No.2, the Deputy Commissioner,

requesting that action be taken against the petitioners

for the alleged fabrication.

13. Respondent No.2, upon receiving the proposal,

forwarded the same to Respondent No.3, the Regional

Commissioner, Belagavi District, on 28.01.2025, since

the power to take action had been delegated to the

Regional Commissioner by notification dated

19.01.2015. Respondent No.3 issued a show cause

notice dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners

to submit their explanation within seven days from the

date of receipt of the notice under sub-section (1) of

Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.

14. The petitioners state that though the notice is dated

31.01.2025, it was served on them only on - 11 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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06.02.2025 and therefore they did not get sufficient

time to submit their reply.

15. Thereafter, on 07.02.2025, Respondent No.3 issued

another communication directing the petitioners to

appear personally before him on 13.02.2025 at 11.00

a.m. along with relevant documents. This

communication is said to have been served on them

on 11.02.2025. The petitioners appeared before the

Regional Commissioner on 13.02.2025 and sought

three weeks' time to submit a detailed reply. However,

without granting such time or conducting a detailed

enquiry, Respondent No.3 passed an order on the

same day i.e., 13.02.2025 removing the petitioners

from the post of councillors under sub-sections (1)

and (2) of Section 41 of the Act.

16. The said order dated 13.02.2025 was challenged

before this Court in W.P. No.101414/2025. By order

dated 24.02.2025, this Court partly allowed the writ

petition, quashed the order of removal and granted - 12 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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liberty to the petitioners to submit their reply on or

before 27.02.2025 by 3.00 p.m.

17. It is further stated that in the meanwhile, on

22.02.2025, the election to the posts of President and

Vice-President was declared and scheduled to be held

on 28.02.2025. Though Respondent No.5, the Election

Officer, had been appointed earlier in July 2024,

elections had not been conducted at that time. A

notification declaring the election was issued on

20.02.2025.

18. Insofar as the order in W.P. No.101414/2025 is

concerned, the petitioners filed a writ appeal in W.A.

No.100124/2025 seeking a direction to the Regional

Commissioner to conduct a full enquiry under sub-

section (1) of Section 41 of the Act by following the

principles of natural justice and by examining

witnesses if necessary.

19. The Hon'ble Division Bench observed that the

appellants are at liberty to bring to the notice of the - 13 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Regional Commissioner the binding decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v.

District Collector, Raigad while conducting the

enquiry. The petitioners state that they brought the

said observation to the notice of Respondent No.3 on

27.02.2025 and requested that a proper enquiry be

conducted.

20. However, on the very same day i.e., 27.02.2025,

Respondent No.3 passed another order removing the

petitioners from the post of councillors under sub-

sections (1) and (2) of Section 41 of the Act without

conducting the detailed enquiry as requested. It is in

these circumstances that the petitioners have

approached this Court challenging the order dated

27.02.2025.

21. The submission of Shri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioners, is as follows: - 14 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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21.1. The impugned order passed by Respondent No.3

- Regional Commissioner has been passed in

great haste. The replies submitted by the

petitioners have not been properly considered.

No proper enquiry has been conducted.

Therefore, the order is arbitrary, illegal and not

sustainable in law.

21.2. The reply filed by the petitioners has not been

examined in a meaningful manner. The

guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District

Collector, Raigad [(2012) 4 SCC 407] have not

been followed. Respondent No.3 has acted in

violation of the principles stated by the Apex

Court.

21.3. The observation made by the Hon'ble Division

Bench in W.A. No.100124/2025 has not been

followed. Without conducting a proper enquiry,

the order has been passed. The action of - 15 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Respondent No.3 is stated to be mala fide and a

colourable exercise of power.

21.4. Learned Senior Counsel submits that no

councillor can be removed without giving a

reasonable opportunity of hearing and without

conducting a full enquiry. In the present case,

neither reasonable opportunity has been granted

nor a detailed enquiry conducted. All councillors

ought to have been called and their statements

recorded regarding the authenticity of the

resolution. Only thereafter could the allegations

have been considered.

21.5. Action has been taken merely on the basis of a

complaint filed by the Commissioner stating that

the signature is not his. The resolution was

passed by the entire Council. Therefore, all

members should have been examined before

taking action. - 16 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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21.6. The resolution was passed by the Council in

accordance with the law. The dispute regarding

the lease of Wakharsal properties had been

pending for a long time. The Council thought it

appropriate to resolve the issue by extending the

lease. It is further submitted that a writ appeal

relating to Wakharsal properties was pending

before another Division Bench and upon

submission of the resolution, the said writ appeal

was withdrawn.

21.7. It is contended that the Regional Commissioner

did not give adequate opportunity to the

petitioners to explain these aspects. If sufficient

time had been granted, all these facts would

have been placed before him.

21.8. The resolution was passed keeping in mind the

financial interest of the Municipality. The

majority of councillors had decided to extend the

lease of the Wakharsal properties to the existing - 17 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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tenants for five more years with revised rent

based on market conditions. According to the

petitioners, the CMC would have benefited from

the revised rental income.

21.9. Possession certificates were issued to the tenants

pursuant to the resolution, which shows that the

action was that of the Council as a whole and not

only of the petitioners. It is alleged that the

complaint was filed by the Commissioner under

political pressure. It is contended that the

Commissioner had in fact signed the resolution

and the signature will be proved during trial. The

criminal proceedings are stated to be an abuse of

process of law.

21.10. The allegation of forgery made by the

Commissioner is self-serving and has not yet

been proved in a criminal court. Until such

adjudication, the petitioners cannot be treated as - 18 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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guilty. Therefore, Section 41 of the Karnataka

Municipalities Act, 1964 cannot be invoked.

21.11. It is contended that mere registration of an FIR

and filing of a charge sheet does not amount to

proof of guilt. At present, the petitioners are only

accused and not convicted. Until the trial is

completed, they are presumed innocent. The

allegations do not amount to misconduct

warranting removal under Section 41

21.12. The order violates the principles of natural

justice. By removing three elected

representatives, the democratic functioning of

local self-government has been affected.

21.13. The elected representatives cannot be removed

by executive action in a casual manner, as it

goes against the will of the people who elected

them. The procedure adopted by Respondent

No.3 is stated to be a mere formality. No specific

charges were framed. No charge memo was - 19 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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issued. No detailed enquiry or cross-examination

of witnesses was conducted.

21.14. Respondent No.3, while acting in a quasi-judicial

capacity, has not complied with the requirements

of passing a reasoned quasi-judicial order. The

petitioners were not given proper opportunity to

present their case. The authority has not acted

fairly, reasonably or impartially. Removal of an

elected representative requires a clear and

established case, which is absent here.

21.15. An elected representative is entitled to hold

office for the full term unless removed in

accordance with law. Removal affects not only

the individual member but also the people

represented by him. This aspect has not been

properly considered.

21.16. The order suffers from mala fides. The objections

were filed on 27.02.2025 at 3.00 p.m., and the

impugned order was passed at 6.30 p.m. on the - 20 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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same day. This shows undue haste, especially

when the election was scheduled on 28.02.2025.

21.17. Removal of the petitioners reduced the total

strength of the Council, which benefits the ruling

party. Therefore, the order is alleged to have

been passed to favour the ruling party.

21.18. Under Section 41(1), there must be proved

misconduct before removal. In the present case,

there is only a complaint and a charge sheet.

There is no finding of guilt. Removal under

Section 41 also results in disqualification under

Section 16(1)(c) and (f) of the Act. A person

removed under Section 41 is disqualified not only

for the present term but also from contesting

elections for four years from the date of removal.

21.19. The next election to the CMC is scheduled in

January 2027. If the impugned order is allowed

to stand, the petitioners will not be able to - 21 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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contest the said election. This will cause grave

and irreparable injury to them.

21.20. He relies on the decision in Laxmibai v.

Collector [(2020)12 SCC 186], more

particularly paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 & 22

which are reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

13. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the disqualification is disproportionate to the default committed by the appellant. In a judgment reported as D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan [D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] , it was held that the election is a politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one official, but of the collective will of the whole constituency. The challenge in the said appeal was to an election on the allegation of corrupt practices. This Court held that the valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and should not be disregarded on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations. The onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election. The election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time, it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act. - 22 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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14. The Court held as under: (D. Venkata Reddy case [D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] , SCC pp. 459-60, para 3)

"3. Mr P. Bassi Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed before us the findings of the High Court on Issues 7, 26 and 27 as these were the only issues which affected the appellant. Mr B. Shiv Sankar, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has endeavoured to support the judgment of the High Court by submitting that the findings arrived at by the High Court were based on a correct and proper appreciation of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the record. In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election. In our country election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of the People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make the elections fair and free. In these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act."

15. This Court in a judgment reported as State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080] - 23 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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held that the issue of removal of an elected office- bearer has serious repercussion. It implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. It was held that severer the punishment, greater care has to be taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.

16. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, (2001) 6 SCC 260] , this Court has held that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the returned candidate but also his constituency or electoral college. Therefore, the procedure prescribed must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there cannot be any justification for his removal.

17. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector [Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407] , this Court held that an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law. Where the statutory provision has very serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 428-29, paras 35-37)

"35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions - 24 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly [Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, (1992) 4 SCC 80] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari, (1998) 1 SCC 680] ).

36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.

37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law like "no confidence motion", etc. The elected official is accountable to its electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it would have serious repercussions when he is removed from the office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a further stipulated period."

18. The judgments relate to the procedure to be followed in election petition and proof of allegation but such principles are to be followed in the case of inflicting punishment of disqualification, which has far serious implication almost similar to indulging in corrupt practices in an election. The purity and transparency in election process does not give unbridled and arbitrary power to the Election - 25 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Commission to pass any whimsical order without examining the nature of default. The extent of period of disqualification has to be in proportion to the default. The Election Commission has to keep in mind that by such process, an election of duly elected candidate representing collective will of the voters of the constituency is being set at naught.

19. In a judgment reported as Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao [Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao, (2017) 2 SCC 528 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 462] , this Court held that the limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a concept of judicial review. If the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience, the court would interfere. The relevant extract reads as under: (SCC pp. 531-33, para 7)

"7.2. Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the court, that the court steps in and interferes.

7.2.1. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a - 26 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad [State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, (2014) 7 SCC 223 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 386] .) It would also be apt to extract the following observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain [Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 833] : (SCC pp. 110-12, paras 8 & 10)

'8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. [See State (UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad [State (UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] .] In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. - 27 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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***

10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] . Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that "all powers have legal limits" invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25)

"25. ... The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review."'"

Civil appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 20814-816 of 2019 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) ... Diary No. 40018 of 2019

22. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

21.21. By relying on Laxmibai it is submitted that the

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an election

is a sacred public act reflecting the collective will - 28 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of the constituency. The verdict of the people

must be given due respect and cannot be lightly

set aside on vague or weak allegations. The

burden lies heavily on the person challenging an

elected representative to make out a strong

case.

21.22. In a democracy, the purity and sanctity of

elections must be preserved. At the same time,

election results cannot be lightly brushed aside.

The will of the voters must be respected unless

serious and proven grounds exist.

21.23. Removal of an elected office-bearer has serious

consequences. Therefore, the authority must

strictly follow the statutory provisions. The more

severe the punishment, the greater the care

required in following the safeguards provided by

law.

21.24. Holding an elected office is a valuable statutory

right not only of the elected candidate but also of - 29 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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the constituency. Therefore, the prescribed

procedure must be strictly followed and removal

can be justified only if a clear case is made out.

21.25. An elected representative cannot be removed

without strictly following the procedure

established by law. Removal has serious

consequences not only for the elected person but

also for the voters who elected him, removal is

permissible only in exceptional circumstances,

after conducting a proper enquiry and following

the principles of natural justice. An elected

representative is entitled to hold office for the

full term unless there is proved misconduct or

removal in accordance with law.

21.26. Principles relating to election disputes and

disqualification must be applied carefully, as

disqualification has serious consequences. The

authority does not have unbridled or arbitrary - 30 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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power. The period and nature of disqualification

must be proportionate to the default committed.

21.27. By applying the doctrine of proportionality, it is

submitted that though courts do not normally

interfere with the punishment imposed by an

authority. However, if the punishment is so

disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of

the Court, interference is permissible. The

punishment must not be irrational, excessive or

vindictive.

21.28. On the basis of the above judgment, learned

Senior Counsel submits that the removal of an

elected councillor is a serious matter. It affects

not only the individual but also the electorate.

Therefore, strict compliance with statutory

procedure, adherence to principles of natural

justice and proof of misconduct are mandatory.

In the absence of such compliance, the

impugned order is liable to be set aside. - 31 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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21.29. He relies on the decision of the Apex court in P.

Vijayan v. State of Kerala [(2010)2 SCC

398] more particularly para 10, which is

reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

10. Before considering the merits of the claim of both the parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under:

"227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."

If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

21.30. By relying on P. Vijayan it is submitted that

scope of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal - 32 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Procedure, 1973, deals with discharge of an

accused. The provision states that if, upon

consideration of the record and the documents,

and after hearing both sides, the Judge finds that

there is no sufficient ground to proceed against

the accused, he shall discharge the accused by

recording reasons.

21.31. If two views are possible and one view gives rise

only to suspicion, as opposed to grave suspicion,

the trial court is empowered to discharge the

accused. At that stage, the court is not required

to examine whether the trial will ultimately end

in conviction or acquittal.

21.32. The words "not sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused" show that the Court is not

expected to act mechanically at the request of

the prosecution. The Court must apply its judicial

mind to the material on record and decide

whether a case for trial has been made out. - 33 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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However, at that stage, the court is not required

to conduct a detailed examination of evidence or

to weigh the probabilities. A detailed appreciation

of evidence is required only after the trial begins.

21.33. Relying on the above principles, learned Senior

Counsel submits that in the present case there is

only an allegation and a charge sheet. There is

no finding of guilt. Even in criminal law, mere

suspicion is not enough to proceed. Therefore, in

the absence of any proved misconduct, the

drastic action of removal under Section 41 of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is not

justified.

21.34. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in

Ravi Yashwant Bhoir-v-District Collector,

Raigad and others (supra), more particularly

para 30 to 36, which are reproduced hereunder

for easy reference: - 34 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer.

31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self- government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry.

32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required.

33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties - 35 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office-bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come under any political pressure.

34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed.

35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC 80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC 1222] ).

36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the - 36 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.

21.35. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir it is

submitted that the removal of a duly elected

member on the basis of proved misconduct is a

quasi-judicial proceeding. Therefore, the

authority must strictly follow the principles of

natural justice. Even if the statute does not

expressly provide for such procedure, a fair

opportunity of defence must be given to the

elected representative.

21.36. An elected representative in local self-

government stands on a higher footing than a

government servant. If even a temporary

government servant cannot be removed without

a full enquiry, then an elected office-bearer - 37 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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cannot be removed without conducting a full-

fledged enquiry.

21.37. In service law, major punishments like removal

require a full enquiry. In the case of elected

representatives, an even stricter procedure and

higher standard of proof are required before

removal.

21.38. Removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious

matter. It affects not only the individual but also

the constituency. The procedure prescribed by

statute must be strictly followed. The authority

must not act under political pressure or

extraneous considerations.

21.39. In a democracy, an elected representative is

entitled to hold office for the full term unless

removed by following the procedure established

by law. The order of removal must show that the

authority has applied its mind to the allegations - 38 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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and the explanation given by the elected

representative.

21.40. Removal has serious consequences. It not only

removes the person from office but may also

disqualify him from contesting future elections. It

also deprives the voters of their chosen

representative. Though the right to hold office is

statutory, removal must strictly follow the

procedure prescribed by law.

21.41. An elected member can be removed only in

exceptional circumstances. There must be strict

compliance with the statutory provisions. A

proper enquiry must be conducted. The

principles of natural justice must be followed.

The elected member must be given a real

opportunity to defend himself.

21.42. Relying on these principles, learned Senior

Counsel submits that in the present case no full

enquiry has been conducted, no proper - 39 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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opportunity has been given, and the impugned

order does not reflect proper application of mind.

Therefore, the removal of the petitioners is

contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and as such the above petition is

required to be allowed and reliefs sought for

granted.

22. Shri Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General

Appearing for the State - Respondents 1 to 3 submits

as follows:

22.1. It is strongly contended on behalf of the

respondents that the petitioners, who are elected

Councillors of Respondent No.4 - Municipality,

have indulged in a serious and deliberate act of

fraud by creating and using a forged resolution.

It is submitted that the said resolution was not at

all passed let alone lawfully passed in accordance

with the procedure prescribed under the - 40 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and the Rules

framed thereunder. The resolution was fabricated

with the intention of conferring unlawful benefit

upon certain private individuals who have been

in unauthorised occupation of valuable municipal

property for several decades.

22.2. Litigation concerning the said property has been

pending for a long period and that this Court has,

on earlier occasions, passed specific orders

directing eviction of the unauthorised occupants.

In spite of such judicial orders, and with full

knowledge of the same, the petitioners have

created the impugned resolution in order to

defeat and overcome the effect of those orders.

22.3. It is contended that by virtue of the fabricated

resolution, valuable public property belonging to

the Municipality has been effectively transferred

or continued in favour of persons who have no

lawful right, title or interest over the same. The - 41 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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property in question is a prime municipal asset

and that its lease or renewal directly affects

public revenue. By extending the lease in favour

of unauthorised occupants, the petitioners have

caused serious financial loss to the Municipality

and thereby acted against public interest.

22.4. The said occupants had already been directed to

be evicted by competent judicial orders, and

therefore, the act of passing such a resolution

amounts not merely to administrative irregularity

but to wilful misconduct. Such conduct strikes at

the very root of responsible governance and

constitutes gross misconduct in the discharge of

official duties.

22.5. On the basis of the above allegations, it is

submitted that the conduct of the petitioners is

disgraceful and unbecoming of elected

representatives. It is argued that Councillors,

being trustees of public property, are expected to - 42 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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act in the interest of the Municipality and its

residents. Instead, the petitioners have acted to

protect private interests at the cost of public

property.

22.6. It is therefore contended that in view of the

seriousness of the allegations and the material

collected, proceedings under Section 41 of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 were rightly

initiated. The competent authority, namely the

Regional Commissioner, Belagavi, after

considering the complaint, the records and the

explanation offered, has passed the order of

removal. The respondents submit that the order

has been passed in accordance with law and that

this Court ought not to interfere with the same in

exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

22.7. It is also submitted that this Court, in W.P.

No.112012/2019, by order dated 12.08.2022,

had categorically held that the unauthorised - 43 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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occupants of the cotton market property were

not entitled to continue in possession. By the

said order, the longstanding dispute between the

Municipality and the unauthorised occupants was

adjudicated and directions were issued for

eviction. The resolution was passed in direct

contravention of the said judicial orders. The

petitioners, being fully aware of the earlier order

of this Court, could not have lawfully taken a

decision that effectively nullified or diluted the

effect of the judicial directions. Therefore, the

action of the Regional Commissioner in removing

the petitioners is justified in order to protect the

sanctity of judicial orders and safeguard

municipal property.

22.8. On these grounds, it is submitted that the writ

petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be

dismissed. - 44 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.9. He relies on Para 25 and 26 of the order passed

in W.P. No.112012/2019, which are reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

25. Before parting with this petition, this Court deems it necessary to remind our citizens that public property should be respected and should not be allowed to be misused or wasted. Time and again the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the natural resources, which also include lands, along with the public properties are held by the State as a trustee. This doctrine of trust and the trusteeship vested in the State needs to be respected. It is high time that the citizens of the State understood the value of public property, that public property belongs to each one of us and the citizens should ensure that public properties are put to best use and they would fetch the best price which would ultimately go into the coffers of the State. Public property shall not become the fiefdom of a few.

26. It is required to notice that although the order of eviction was passed on 03.03.2004 and the District Court dismissed the appeals on 19.12.2005 and this Court disposed of W.P.No.474/2006 on 11.03.2013 and the State Government communicated its decision to the Secretary of the Association of the occupants on 07.09.2013, the petitioners have continued to squat on public property. Further, although the petitioners were evicted on 13th and 14th of July 2019, they have moved this Court and obtained an order of status-quo at the hands of this Court. The petitioners are responsible for stalling the respondent-CMC from proceedings to put up new construction which would have enured to the benefit of general public. Even the petitioners would have benefited, had they allowed the new construction to come up on the premises. In the name of 'rent', the petitioners have paid pittance to the CMC from 01.07.1982 to June 2019. For nearly 37 years they have been paying rents at Rs.3,500/- per year! In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case for - 45 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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imposing exemplary costs on the petitioners while dismissing the writ petitions. Nevertheless, this Court would desist from imposing costs, with a fond hope that the petitioners would give up the dispute and allow the respondent-CMC to put up a new construction on the premises.

22.10. By relying on paragraph 25, it is submitted that

this Court made important observations

regarding the nature of public property, public

property must be respected and cannot be

misused for private benefit. It was clearly

observed that natural resources and public lands

are held by the State in trust for the benefit of

the people. The State and its instrumentalities

act as trustees, and such trusteeship carries a

duty to protect, preserve and ensure proper

utilisation of public assets.

22.11. This Court further observed that public property

must fetch the best possible value and cannot

become the private estate of a few individuals.

These observations were not casual remarks but - 46 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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were made after considering the long history of

the dispute and the manner in which public

property had been retained by private occupants

for decades.

22.12. By referring to paragraph 26 it is submitted that

this Court traced the entire litigation history

relating to the cotton market property. An

eviction order had been passed as early as

03.03.2004. The appeals filed before the District

Court were dismissed on 19.12.2005. The writ

petition in W.P. No.474/2006 was disposed of on

11.03.2013. The State Government had also

communicated its decision to the occupants on

07.09.2013. Despite these judicial and

administrative orders, the occupants continued

in possession of the public property.

22.13. This court also noticed that even after eviction

proceedings were executed in July 2019, the

occupants once again approached this Court and - 47 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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obtained an interim order of status quo. This

Court has recorded that for nearly 37 years, the

occupants had paid only Rs.3,500/- per year as

rent, which was grossly disproportionate to the

value of the property. This Court expressed

clear disapproval of such prolonged occupation

and misuse of municipal property and dismissed

the writ petition, though it refrained from

imposing exemplary costs.

22.14. On the strength of the above findings, it is

submitted that the issue regarding the right of

the tenants to remain in possession had already

been conclusively adjudicated. The eviction

order dated 03.03.2004, confirmed in appeal

and followed by subsequent proceedings, had

attained finality. The writ petition in W.P.

No.112012/2019 was also dismissed with strong

observations. Therefore, there remained no

legal basis for the occupants to claim - 48 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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continuation of their lease or renewal of tenancy

rights.

22.15. It is contended that any action taken by the

Councillors in favour of such occupants,

particularly by way of extension of lease, would

directly contradict the judicial findings recorded

by this Court. Such action would not only

disregard binding orders but would also

undermine the authority of judicial decisions.

22.16. It is further submitted that the coordinate Bench

of this Court had clearly observed that the

occupants had been paying only a nominal

amount as rent for decades and that public

property cannot be allowed to become the

fiefdom of a few. Despite such categorical

findings, the petitioner-councillors claim to have

passed a resolution granting further rights to

the same occupants for an additional period.

This act amounts to deliberate disregard of - 49 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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judicial pronouncements and is contrary to

public interest. The Councillors, being custodians

of municipal property, were duty-bound to

protect public assets and ensure lawful use of

such property. Instead, they have acted in a

manner that benefits private parties at the cost

of the Municipality.

22.17. Learned Advocate General submits that such

conduct, has resulted in substantial financial

loss to the Municipality and defeats the purpose

of redevelopment and public utilisation of the

property. It also sends a wrong message that

judicial orders can be diluted or nullified through

internal resolutions. Therefore, Learned

Advocate General submits that the removal of

the petitioners was necessary to protect public

property, uphold the rule of law, and maintain

the integrity of municipal administration. - 50 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.18. It is emphatically contended that Resolution

No.378 dated 09.02.2024, on which the entire

defence of the petitioners rests, is not a genuine

municipal record but a fabricated document.

According to the respondents, the official

resolution register maintained by the

Municipality does not contain any resolution on

09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease of the

Wakharsal properties. On the contrary,

Resolution No.378, as reflected in the official

books, was passed only on 19.07.2024 and

pertains to matters relating to a State Financial

Corporation grant under the 15th Finance

Commission scheme and a connected tender

process.

22.19. The municipal records are statutory records

maintained in the regular course of official

business and carry a presumption of

correctness. The absence of the alleged lease - 51 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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resolution in such records, coupled with the

existence of a different Resolution No.378 on

another subject and date, clearly demonstrates

that the document relied upon by the petitioners

does not form part of the lawful proceedings of

the Council. It is further submitted that the

document bears a signature purportedly of the

Commissioner, which he has categorically

denied. In these circumstances, the only

reasonable inference, according to the

respondents, is that the document is fabricated.

22.20. The falsity of the document is apparent on the

face of the record. The petitioners have not

disowned the resolution. Instead, they have

justified and defended it as validly passed. By

asserting the validity of a document that does

not find place in the official municipal records,

they have, according to the respondents,

confirmed their involvement in the act - 52 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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complained of. It is contended that fraud vitiates

all actions and transactions. A document

founded on fraud cannot create any legal right,

nor can it be protected under the plea of

procedural irregularity. Once the foundation is

fraudulent, the superstructure built upon it

collapses. Therefore, the petitioners' conduct

amounts to grave misconduct and abuse of their

position as elected representatives.

22.21. The allegation of fabrication is not a mere

administrative accusation but forms the subject

matter of criminal proceedings. A complaint was

lodged and an FIR was registered. The

petitioners invoked the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure in Criminal Petition

No.102611/2024 seeking quashing of the FIR.

This Court, after considering the material,

declined to interfere and dismissed the petition - 53 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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on 19.12.2024. The petitioners then approached

the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP

(Criminal) No.1616/2024, which was also

dismissed on 06.02.2025. Thereafter, the

investigation was completed and a charge sheet

has been filed before the competent criminal

court. These developments demonstrate that

the matter has progressed beyond a mere

allegation and that sufficient material has been

found during investigation to proceed against

the petitioners in accordance with law.

22.22. Seriousness of the allegations is evident from

the fact that neither this Court nor the Hon'ble

Supreme Court found it appropriate to quash

the proceedings at the threshold. The filing of a

charge sheet indicates that prima facie evidence

exists. The fabricated resolution, if allowed to

stand, would create legal rights in favour of

persons who had already suffered adverse - 54 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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orders before the District Court and this Court.

It would effectively nullify or overreach binding

judicial determinations. Such conduct strikes at

the very foundation of the rule of law and the

authority of judicial decisions.

22.23. The disputed resolution was relied upon before

this Court in W.A. No.100488/2022 as if it were

a genuine and validly passed resolution.

Producing a forged document before a

constitutional court, and seeking to derive

advantage from it, is stated to be a serious act

of misconduct. An elected representative who

has sought to mislead this Court cannot claim

an equitable right to continue in public office.

22.24. The term of the President and Vice-President

expired on 24.07.2024, and an Administrator

was appointed on 29.07.2024. It was only

thereafter, upon scrutiny of records by the

Commissioner and communication to the Deputy - 55 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Commissioner, that the full extent of the

fabrication came to light. The Deputy

Commissioner, acting in accordance with

statutory duty, recommended initiation of

proceedings to the Regional Commissioner on

28.01.2025.

22.25. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice

dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners to

submit their explanation under Section 41 of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. A further

communication dated 07.02.2025 fixed

13.02.2025 for personal appearance. Thus, the

petitioners were afforded notice as well as

opportunity to respond.

22.26. Despite such opportunity, the petitioners did not

submit their explanation within the time

granted. In that background, the Regional

Commissioner passed the first order on

13.02.2025. When the said order was set aside - 56 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with

liberty to file a reply by 27.02.2025, the

petitioners filed their explanation.

Simultaneously, they preferred W.A.

No.100124/2025. The Hon'ble Division Bench

declined to interfere and merely directed

consideration of the principles laid down in Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir.

22.27. The Regional Commissioner thereafter

reconsidered the matter, examined the

explanation filed by the petitioners, perused the

records including the municipal register and the

material collected during investigation, and

applied the principles laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. Upon

being satisfied that the resolution was

fraudulent and that the conduct of the

petitioners amounted to misconduct, the

Regional Commissioner passed a reasoned order - 57 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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removing them from office, which is neither

mechanical or arbitrary.

22.28. He relies on Section 41 of the Karnataka

Municipalities Act, 1964 which is reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

41. Liability to removal from office.--

(1) The Government, if it thinks fit on the recommendation of the municipal council, may remove any councillor elected under this Act, and after such enquiry as it deems necessary, if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable of performing his duties as a councillor.

[Provided that no Councillor shall be removed except after being afforded an opportunity for submitting an explanation.]

(2) When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any person is removed from the office of president or vice-president for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date of such removal cease to be a councillor and shall be deemed to have been removed from the office of councillor under sub-section (1).

22.29. It is submitted that Section 41 of the Karnataka

Municipalities Act, 1964 requires that an

explanation be sought and considered before - 58 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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removal. The statute does not mandate a trial-

like proceeding with examination and cross-

examination of witnesses. The requirement is

one of fair opportunity, not a criminal trial. In

the present case, notice was issued, personal

appearance was permitted, written explanation

was received and considered. Therefore, the

principles of natural justice stand satisfied.

22.30. Lastly, it is contended that the petitioners have

not approached this Court with clean hands.

Material facts relating to the criminal

proceedings, dismissal of the petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C., dismissal of the SLP, and

the status of municipal records have not been

fairly disclosed. According to the respondents,

there has been both suppression of material

facts and presentation of misleading facts. In

writ jurisdiction, which is discretionary in nature, - 59 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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a party guilty of such conduct is not entitled to

equitable relief.

22.31. On these grounds, it is submitted that the order

of removal is justified, lawful and necessary to

protect public property, uphold judicial authority

and maintain integrity in municipal

administration.

22.32. He relies on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme

Court in K.D.Sharma -v- Steel Authority of

India Limited and others [(2008)12 SCC

481], more particularly, para 34 to 38 which are

reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.

35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] in the following words: (KB p. 514) - 60 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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"... it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it--the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement."

(emphasis supplied)

36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done." The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.

37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96)

"... Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a - 61 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit."

(emphasis supplied)

38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the court knows law but not facts".

22.33. Learned Advocate General by relying on the

principles laid down in K.D. Sharma submits

that a person invoking the writ jurisdiction of this

Court must do so with utmost transparency,

fairness and bona fides. It is contended that the

petitioners, being elected Councillors, occupy a

fiduciary position. They are trustees of public

property and are under a statutory and moral

obligation to safeguard municipal assets. Instead

of protecting the interests of the Municipality, - 62 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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they have actively participated in creation of a

forged resolution, such conduct is not a mere

procedural lapse but a conscious act designed to

confer benefit upon private individuals contrary

to binding judicial orders. By attempting to

regularise or extend rights over valuable public

property in favour of unauthorised occupants,

the petitioners have acted against public interest

and in breach of the doctrine of public trust. The

misconduct is grave, intentional and strikes at

the root of responsible governance. In such

circumstances, it is contended that the Regional

Commissioner was duty-bound to act. The order

of removal, therefore, is not punitive excess but

a necessary corrective measure to preserve

institutional integrity.

22.34. The fabrication of Resolution No.378 dated

09.02.2024 cannot be viewed in isolation. The

dispute concerning the cotton market property - 63 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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has a long and settled history. The unauthorised

occupants had repeatedly litigated the matter

and suffered adverse orders at every stage. An

eviction order was passed as early as

03.03.2004. The appeals were dismissed. The

writ petition was disposed of. Subsequent

proceedings culminated in the dismissal of W.P.

No.112012/2019, wherein this Court made

strong observations regarding misuse of public

property and violation of the doctrine of

trusteeship.

22.35. Despite such categorical judicial findings, the

unauthorised occupants preferred W.A.

No.100488/2022. It is in that background that

the alleged Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024

surfaced. According to the respondents, this

document was furnished to the occupants and

relied upon in the writ appeal to assert a

subsisting right in the property. This, it is - 64 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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submitted, was an attempt to create a new

factual foundation to overcome binding judicial

pronouncements.

22.36. The official municipal records reflect that

Resolution No.378 was actually passed on

19.07.2024 and pertains to a State Financial

Corporation grant under the 15th Financial

Scheme and a tender matter. There is no entry

in the resolution register of any lease extension

resolution on 09.02.2024. The document relied

upon in the writ appeal does not correspond with

the official records. Material differences in

subject matter, date and numbering are

highlighted.

22.37. In these circumstances, it is contended that

there is no plausible explanation except

fabrication. The petitioners, being signatories to

the disputed document and having not denied

their signatures, are said to have prima facie - 65 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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engaged in fraudulent conduct. Fraud vitiates all

proceedings. A document created to defeat

judicial orders cannot be clothed with legality.

The petitioners' defence that the resolution was

validly passed only reinforces the allegation of

complicity.

22.38. The criminal proceedings lend additional weight

to the seriousness of the allegations. The FIR

was challenged before this Court and dismissed.

The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court. Investigation culminated

in filing of a charge sheet. While it is

acknowledged that criminal guilt will be

determined at trial, the existence of prima facie

material sufficient to proceed is beyond dispute.

Had the allegations been baseless, the criminal

proceedings would have been quashed at the

threshold. The refusal of superior courts to - 66 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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interfere indicates that the matter is not

frivolous.

22.39. Permitting the petitioners to continue as

Councillors in the face of such serious

allegations, it is submitted, would undermine

public confidence and expose municipal property

to further risk. An elected representative accused

of forging municipal records and using them to

influence judicial proceedings cannot claim an

equitable right to remain in office pending

protracted criminal trial.

22.40. It is further submitted that upon expiry of the

term of the President and Vice-President on

24.07.2024, the Government, in exercise of

statutory powers under the Karnataka

Municipalities Act, appointed an Administrator to

manage the affairs of the Municipality. The

Deputy Commissioner, Gadag, assumed charge.

Upon being apprised by the Commissioner of the - 67 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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fabrication, the Deputy Commissioner examined

the matter and, acting within statutory authority,

recommended initiation of proceedings under

Section 41 to the Regional Commissioner on

28.01.2025.

22.41. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice dated

31.01.2025 granting seven days to submit an

explanation. A further notice dated 07.02.2025

fixed 13.02.2025 for personal appearance. The

petitioners were thus given notice and

opportunity. When the first order was set aside

by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with

liberty to file reply by 27.02.2025, the petitioners

filed their explanation. The earlier order of this

Court was passed on consent of counsel for the

petitioners, who undertook to appear and submit

reply.

22.42. Though the order was passed on consent, the

petitioners preferred W.A. No.100124/2025. The - 68 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Division Bench declined to interfere and directed

that the Regional Commissioner consider the

principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. It

is submitted that the Regional Commissioner

thereafter complied with the direction,

considered the explanation in detail, examined

the municipal records and the surrounding

circumstances, and passed a reasoned order.

22.43. He reiterates that Section 41 requires issuance of

notice and consideration of explanation. It does

not mandate a full-fledged trial with examination

and cross-examination of witnesses. The

standard is that of administrative satisfaction

based on material available, subject to judicial

review. The petitioners were given opportunity to

explain; their explanation was considered; the

authority applied its mind; and a reasoned order

was passed. - 69 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.44. The petitioners have not approached this Court

with complete disclosure. The history of criminal

proceedings and dismissal of challenges has not

been fairly presented. In writ jurisdiction, which

is discretionary, a party guilty of suppression or

misrepresentation is not entitled to relief.

22.45. In the totality of circumstances, the misconduct

is grave, supported by prima facie material, and

directly affects public property and institutional

integrity. The order of removal is proportionate,

lawful and necessary to preserve the rule of law

and protect municipal assets.

22.46. Learned Advocate General also relies on the

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir, albeit different paragraphs,

namely 22, 30-36, 58 and 59 thereof, which are

reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

22. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-A confers upon the local self-government a complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control. Thus, exercise of any - 70 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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power having effect of destroying the Constitutional institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the institution.

30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer.

31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self- government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry.

32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for - 71 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required.

33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office- bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come under any political pressure.

34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed.

35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed - 72 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC 80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC 1222] ).

36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.

58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria.

59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. - 73 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.47. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir learned

Adovacate General submits that the said

decision, properly understood and applied,

supports the action taken by the Regional

Commissioner.

22.48. It is submitted that paragraph 22 recognises that

after the insertion of Parts IX and IX-A in the

Constitution, local self-government institutions

enjoy constitutional protection and autonomy.

However, that autonomy is not absolute. It is

subject to the procedure established by law. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned against

arbitrary or manipulative removal of elected

representatives, but equally affirmed that

removal in accordance with statutory procedure

is permissible. Therefore, the emphasis is not on

insulating elected representatives from

accountability, but on ensuring that the power of

removal is exercised lawfully, fairly and for - 74 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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legitimate reasons. In the present case, it is

submitted that the action taken in this case is

grounded in statutory authority under Section 41

of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and is

supported by material indicating grave

misconduct.

22.49. By referring to paragraphs 30 to 36, learned

Advocate General submits that the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has categorically held that

removal of an elected member is a quasi-judicial

proceeding and must satisfy the requirements of

natural justice. A fair opportunity must be

granted. The authority must apply its mind to

the allegations and the explanation. Removal is

permissible in exceptional circumstances upon

strict adherence to statutory provisions.

22.50. It is submitted that these very requirements

have been scrupulously followed in the present

case. Notice was issued. Time was granted. - 75 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Personal appearance was permitted. Written

explanation was received and considered. The

earlier order of removal was set aside by this

Court and liberty was granted to file a fresh

reply. The petitioners availed that opportunity.

The Division Bench directed consideration of the

principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir.

The Regional Commissioner reconsidered the

matter and passed a reasoned order. Therefore,

the safeguards mandated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court stand fully complied with.

22.51. It is further submitted that paragraphs 58 and 59

of the said judgment clarify the concept of locus

standi and legal injury. A person can challenge

an action only if he demonstrates deprivation of

a legal right. A mere grievance without legal

basis does not confer standing. In the present

context, the proceedings under Section 41 are

statutory in nature and are initiated by the - 76 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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competent authority upon material exfacie

establishing misconduct. The authority is not

acting at the instance of a private adversary but

in discharge of statutory obligation to protect

public interest.

22.52. Learned Advocate General submits that the

Regional Commissioner has faithfully adhered to

the directions issued by the Division Bench and

has applied the dicta laid down in Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir.

22.53. The impugned order reflects consideration of the

allegations relating to fabrication of Resolution

No.378 dated 09.02.2024, examination of the

official municipal records, analysis of the

explanation submitted by the petitioners, and

reference to the legal principles governing

removal of elected representatives. The order is

reasoned, structured and supported by material. - 77 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Therefore, it cannot be characterised as arbitrary

or mechanical.

22.54. It is further submitted that Section 41 of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 prescribes the

procedure for removal. The statute requires

issuance of notice and consideration of

explanation. It does not mandate a trial in the

nature of criminal proceedings. The requirement

is one of fair opportunity, not of adversarial

adjudication with oral evidence and cross-

examination as a matter of right. The legislative

scheme indicates that the authority must form

satisfaction based on available material after

affording opportunity to the member concerned.

22.55. In the present case, the petitioners were issued

notice dated 31.01.2025. A further opportunity

was granted fixing personal appearance on

13.02.2025. Upon challenge to the first order,

this Court granted liberty to file reply by - 78 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.02.2025. The petitioners submitted their

written explanation. The Regional Commissioner

considered the same along with municipal

records and surrounding circumstances, including

the existence of criminal proceedings and the

discrepancy in the resolution register.

22.56. It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner

recorded a finding that Resolution No.378 dated

09.02.2024 does not find place in the official

records and that the genuine Resolution No.378

pertains to a different subject passed on

19.07.2024. The signature of the Commissioner

on the disputed document was denied. These

objective facts constitute material upon which

satisfaction could reasonably be formed.

22.57. With regard to the expression "disgraceful

conduct" occurring in Section 41, it is submitted

that though not defined in the Act, the term

must be understood in its ordinary and - 79 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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contextual meaning. Disgrace denotes loss of

honour, reputation or credibility. Disgraceful

conduct refers to conduct which brings disrepute

to the office, undermines public confidence, or is

morally blameworthy. An elected Councillor is

expected to maintain high standards of integrity.

Fabrication of municipal records, creation of a

resolution not borne out by official registers, and

use of such document in judicial proceedings, if

established, would unquestionably bring discredit

to the institution.

22.58. It is further submitted that disgraceful conduct

need not be confined to acts committed strictly

during official meetings. Any act connected with

municipal affairs which erodes public trust or

injures the reputation of the institution can

attract action under Section 41. The focus is on

the impact of the conduct on the dignity and

integrity of public office. - 80 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.59. Learned Advocate General submits that the

Regional Commissioner has not acted on mere

suspicion. The action is based on documentary

discrepancies, denial of signature by the

Commissioner, criminal investigation culminating

in filing of charge sheet, and the use of the

disputed resolution in judicial proceedings. These

circumstances collectively constitute sufficient

material to justify action under Section 41.

22.60. It is therefore contended that the order of

removal is proportionate to the gravity of

misconduct, compliant with statutory and

constitutional requirements, and necessary to

preserve the sanctity of public office and

protection of municipal property. The petitioners,

having been afforded full opportunity, cannot

now contend violation of natural justice merely

because the decision has gone against them. - 81 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.61. Learned Advocate General meticulously takes

this Court through the original resolution

register. It is submitted that the statutory

resolution register is maintained sequentially,

with serial numbers corresponding to dates and

subjects transacted in duly convened meetings of

the Council. Upon such examination, it is

demonstrated that there is no Resolution No.378

dated 09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease

of Wakharsal properties.

22.62. On the contrary, the records show that

Resolution No.378 was in fact passed only on

19.07.2024 and pertains to a completely

different subject, namely sanction relating to a

State Financial Corporation grant under the 15th

Finance Commission scheme and a connected

tender process. The subject matter, date, and

sequence in the register conclusively establish - 82 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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that no resolution bearing No.378 existed on

09.02.2024.

22.63. It is submitted that the numbering of resolutions

is continuous and cannot be retrospectively

altered without disturbing the entire sequence of

entries. Therefore, the existence of Resolution

No.378 on 19.07.2024 makes it impossible for

another Resolution No.378 to have existed five

months earlier on 09.02.2024. The absence of

any entry corresponding to the alleged lease

extension resolution in the official books, coupled

with the production of a separate document

before the Division Bench in W.A.

No.100488/2022, leads to only one logical

inference: that the document relied upon by the

petitioners is fabricated.

22.64. It is further submitted that production of such a

document before a constitutional court amounts

to a serious attempt to mislead the Court and to - 83 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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create an artificial foundation to defeat prior

judicial orders. Such conduct, by its very nature,

brings disrepute to the office held by the

petitioners and falls squarely within the meaning

of disgraceful conduct under Section 41 of the

Act.

22.65. Learned Advocate General further submits that

the doctrine of public trust is firmly embedded in

constitutional jurisprudence. Public property is

not owned in a proprietary sense by the State or

the Municipality; it is held in trust for the benefit

of the public at large. A Municipality, being an

instrumentality of the State, is equally bound by

this doctrine. Councillors are not mere political

functionaries; they are custodians of municipal

assets. They owe fiduciary duties to the

institution and to the electorate. Their obligation

is to safeguard public property, ensure lawful

utilisation, and maximise benefit to the - 84 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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community. In the present case, instead of

acting as trustees, the petitioners have acted in

a manner that facilitates continued occupation of

valuable municipal land by unauthorised persons.

22.66. Such conduct, it is submitted, constitutes a clear

breach of fiduciary duty. A fiduciary is expected

to act in utmost good faith and in the interest of

the beneficiary. Any action that confers private

benefit at the expense of public interest is

inconsistent with that obligation. The petitioners,

by fabricating a resolution to extend rights of

unauthorised occupants, have violated the trust

reposed in them by the electorate.

22.67. Learned Advocate General again invites attention

to the judgment of the coordinate Bench in W.P.

No.112012/2019. In that case, after tracing

decades of litigation, this Court categorically held

that the occupants of the cotton market property

were unauthorised and had no legal right to - 85 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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continue in possession. The Court emphasised

that public property cannot be allowed to

become the fiefdom of a few individuals and

deprecated the prolonged occupation at nominal

rent.

22.68. In light of such categorical findings, it was

incumbent upon the Councillors to ensure

enforcement of eviction and proper utilisation of

the property for public benefit. Instead, the

petitioners have facilitated the very occupants

whose claims had been rejected by judicial

orders. This conduct directly undermines the

authority of judicial determinations and

frustrates the purpose of earlier litigation.

22.69. The fabricated resolution was placed before the

Division Bench in W.A. No.100488/2022 to

contend that the occupants had a subsisting right

in the property. Such use of a fabricated

document to influence judicial proceedings is not - 86 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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merely administrative impropriety but a grave

act affecting the administration of justice itself.

22.70. With regard to criminal proceedings, learned

Advocate General submits that the seriousness of

the allegations is reinforced by judicial scrutiny

at multiple levels. The petitioners invoked the

inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section

482 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Petition No.102611/2024

seeking quashing of the FIR. By order dated

19.12.2024, a coordinate Bench declined to

interfere and recorded that there was strong

prima facie material warranting investigation.

22.71. The petitioners carried the matter to the Hon'ble

Supreme Court by filing SLP (Criminal)

No.1616/2025. By order dated 06.02.2025, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP,

observing that it found no reason to interfere

under Article 136 of the Constitution. Thereafter, - 87 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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investigation was completed and a charge sheet

was filed before the competent criminal court.

22.72. It is submitted that while the criminal trial will

determine guilt, the existence of prima facie

material recognised by this Court and not

disturbed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

establishes that the allegations are neither

baseless nor motivated. Administrative action

under Section 41 does not require proof beyond

reasonable doubt; it requires formation of

satisfaction based on credible material. The

material available satisfies that threshold.

22.73. Learned Advocate General further submits that

the litigation over the cotton market property

has spanned decades and has involved sustained

efforts by successive municipal administrations

to recover possession and protect public assets.

The act of the petitioners, if permitted to stand,

would undo years of institutional effort and - 88 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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judicial intervention. It would signal that binding

court orders can be neutralised through internal

resolutions, thereby eroding public confidence in

governance.

22.74. The fiduciary relationship between a Councillor

and the Municipality demands loyalty, integrity

and protection of institutional interest. By

fabricating a resolution and enabling

unauthorised occupants to assert rights contrary

to judicial findings, the petitioners have,

according to the respondents, fundamentally

breached that fiduciary obligation.

22.75. It is submitted that such misconduct is not minor

or technical; it strikes at the core of democratic

accountability and public trust. Permitting the

petitioners to continue in office despite such

serious allegations would expose municipal

property to further risk and compromise

institutional integrity. Therefore, removal under - 89 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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Section 41 is not excessive but proportionate and

necessary to safeguard public interest and

uphold the rule of law.

22.76. It is further submitted that the effect of

permitting the petitioners to continue in office,

despite the serious allegations and material on

record, would have far-reaching consequences

not only for the Municipality but also for public

administration as a whole.

22.77. Firstly, it is contended that continuance in office

would directly affect the protection of public

property. The subject matter of the dispute

concerns valuable municipal land, which has

been the subject of prolonged litigation and

repeated judicial scrutiny. If persons accused of

fabricating a resolution relating to that very

property are allowed to remain in decision-

making positions, there exists a real and

substantial apprehension that further steps may - 90 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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be taken to regularise, legitimise or otherwise

protect the interests of unauthorised occupants.

The risk is not hypothetical; it arises from the

very nature of the allegations.

22.78. Secondly, it is submitted that public confidence

in local self-government would be severely

eroded. An elected body functions on trust, trust

reposed by the electorate that its representatives

will act honestly, transparently and in accordance

with law. If serious allegations of forgery,

fabrication and misuse of municipal records are

allowed to coexist with continued tenure in

office, it would send a message that public office

can be retained notwithstanding grave breaches

of integrity. Such a perception damages the

credibility of democratic institutions.

22.79. Thirdly, it is argued that continuance in office

may impede fair administration and enquiry.

Councillors exercise influence over municipal - 91 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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administration, including access to records,

interaction with officers and participation in

policy decisions. If individuals against whom

allegations of document fabrication are pending

continue to hold office, there exists a reasonable

apprehension of interference with records,

influence over subordinate officials, or shaping of

subsequent resolutions to protect earlier acts.

The law does not require actual proof of

interference; reasonable likelihood is sufficient to

justify preventive action in public interest.

22.80. Fourthly, it is submitted that the financial

implications are significant. The cotton market

property is a municipal asset capable of

generating substantial revenue if properly

developed or leased at market rates. Judicial

findings have already recorded that for decades,

nominal rent was paid, resulting in loss to the

Municipality. Any act that perpetuates such - 92 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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occupation or delays redevelopment causes

recurring financial injury. If the petitioners

remain in office, and if their conductd facilitated

continuation of such occupation, the Municipality

may continue to suffer economic loss, thereby

affecting civic amenities and public welfare

projects.

22.81. Fifthly, the doctrine of public trust requires that

public property be managed in the best interest

of the community. Trustees who have acted

contrary to that trust cannot insist on

continuation in office pending conclusion of

criminal trial, particularly when administrative

action is supported by prima facie material.

Public law remedies are preventive as much as

corrective. The purpose of Section 41 is not

merely to punish proved criminality but to

maintain the dignity and integrity of municipal

governance. - 93 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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22.82. It is further submitted that the injury is not

confined to the Municipality alone. The electorate

of the concerned wards is entitled to

representation that is free from serious stigma

affecting institutional integrity. While removal of

an elected representative is indeed a serious

matter, the law equally recognises that

continuance of a representative whose conduct

prima facie undermines public confidence can be

equally injurious to democratic functioning.

22.83. The balance, therefore, is not between removal

and individual hardship alone; it is between

individual tenure and collective public interest.

Where credible material indicates fabrication of

municipal records, misuse of official documents

and attempts to create rights contrary to judicial

orders, the larger public interest in preserving

institutional credibility and protecting public - 94 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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property outweighs the private interest of

holding office.

22.84. It is on this premise that the respondents

contend that removal was necessary to prevent

further damage, to restore public confidence, to

protect municipal assets from further misuse,

and to ensure that governance proceeds in

accordance with law. Continuance in office in the

face of such allegations would, according to the

respondents, compound institutional harm and

undermine the very democratic values which the

Constitution seeks to protect.

22.85. Learned Advocate General therefore submits that

both the Writ Petitions be dismissed.

23. Sri Harsh Desai, learned counsel appearing for

Respondent No.4 - Municipal Council, submitted as

follows: - 95 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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23.1. He advances detailed submissions placing the

entire historical and legal background of the

Wakharsal property before this Court to

demonstrate the gravity of the matter and the

context in which the impugned action has been

taken.

23.2. The Wakharsal property is not an ordinary parcel

of land but a prime municipal asset situated in

the very heart of Gadag City, measuring

approximately 34 acres and 32 guntas. The land

was originally acquired as early as 26.03.1896

by the then Government of Bombay for the

specific public purpose of establishing a cotton

market. On 06.11.1896, 54 plots were allotted

on lease through public auction to traders. Thus,

from inception, the property was meant to serve

a public commercial purpose under regulated

conditions. - 96 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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23.3. Over time, the original cotton market became

dilapidated. The Agricultural Produce Market

Committee (APMC) established a new and

modern cotton market, to which most traders

shifted. However, certain persons continued to

occupy the old market premises located in the

central and commercially valuable area of Gadag

City. Despite repeated efforts by the Council to

relocate them and recover possession, these

occupants remained in occupation in violation of

lease conditions. It is submitted that many of

them had sublet the premises to third parties

without authority, thereby compounding the

illegality.

23.4. At the request of the tenants, lease extensions

were granted from time to time, with enhanced

rent, and a final extension was granted up to

30.06.1992. Upon expiry of the lease, they were

bound to vacate. However, they failed to do so, - 97 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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compelling the Council to initiate litigation. A suit

in O.S. No.218/1988 was filed. In the First

Appeal in R.A. No.42/1990, it was categorically

held that the occupants were not permanent

tenants and were liable to pay rent. The decision

was upheld in the Second Appeal in R.S.A.

No.40/1994 and ultimately confirmed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court on 14.03.1996. Thus, the

status of the occupants as unauthorised after

expiry of lease stood conclusively determined.

23.5. Despite final adjudication, the occupants

continued in unauthorised possession.

Proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction

of Unauthorised Occupants) Act culminated in an

eviction order dated 03.03.2004 directing them

to vacate. Appeals against the eviction order

were dismissed on 19.12.2005. A writ petition in

W.P. No.474/2006 was filed but withdrawn on

11.03.2013. Even thereafter, the occupants did - 98 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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not vacate, compelling issuance of a Government

Order dated 10.11.2014 directing eviction.

23.6. Yet another round of litigation ensued in W.P.

No.112012/2019, which was dismissed by a

coordinate Bench of this Court with strong

observations regarding misuse of public property

and violation of the doctrine of public trust. The

conduct of the occupants was deprecated. Thus,

over nearly three decades, the occupants have

consistently failed in judicial proceedings and

have been held to have no right to remain in

possession.

23.7. It is in this factual backdrop that the alleged

Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 assumes

significance. During the writ appeal filed by the

unauthorised occupants, a document purporting

to be such resolution was produced to contend

that the Council had extended lease and

recognised their continued occupation. Learned - 99 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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counsel submits that this document is not borne

out by official municipal records. The resolution

register does not contain any such entry on

09.02.2024. The only Resolution No.378 in the

records pertains to an entirely different subject

and was passed on 19.07.2024 relating to a

financial grant and tender process.

23.8. The sequential nature of resolution numbering

makes it impossible for two resolutions bearing

the same number to exist on different dates for

different subjects. The absence of the alleged

resolution in statutory records, coupled with the

existence of Resolution No.378 on 19.07.2024 on

a distinct subject, establishes that the document

relied upon is fabricated. Learned counsel

categorically submits that the Commissioner has

denied signing the disputed document and that

his signature has been forged with the intention - 100 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of deceiving this Court and conferring advantage

upon the unauthorised occupants.

23.9. Learned counsel reiterates that the alleged

resolution does not exist in the records either by

date or by subject. The official minutes and

registers maintained under statutory mandate do

not reflect any such decision of the Council.

Therefore, the document produced in W.A.

No.100488/2022 is wholly unauthorised.

23.10. He submits that the proceedings under Section

41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964

have been conducted strictly in accordance with

law. Notice was issued. Opportunity was granted.

Explanation was received and considered. The

Regional Commissioner applied the principles laid

down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir and passed a

reasoned order. The statutory requirement is to

seek explanation and consider it; it does not

require a full-fledged criminal trial. The authority - 101 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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has complied with the mandate of natural

justice.

23.11. It is contended that the conduct attributed to the

petitioners, namely fabrication of a municipal

resolution, forging the signature of the

Commissioner, and producing such document

before a constitutional court , amounts to grave

and disgraceful conduct. Disgraceful conduct in

public office is not confined to minor impropriety;

it includes conduct that brings disrepute to the

institution, undermines judicial authority, and

violates fiduciary duty to the public.

23.12. Shri Desai submits that Councillors are trustees

of municipal property. When they act contrary to

the interests of the Council and seek to create

rights in favour of persons whose claims have

been repeatedly rejected by courts, they breach

that trust. Such conduct is fundamentally

incompatible with continuation in public office. - 102 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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23.13. He further submits that permitting such

Councillors to continue would have serious

institutional consequences. It would undermine

enforcement of judicial orders, compromise

protection of valuable public property, and erode

public confidence in local self-government. He

also reiterates that removal in such

circumstances is not punitive excess but a

necessary step to preserve the integrity of

municipal administration and to ensure that

public assets are not misused.

23.14. Therefore, he submits that the order of the

Regional Commissioner is lawful, proportionate,

and justified in public interest, and that this

Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its writ

jurisdiction.

24. Heard Sri.K.N.Phanindra, Learned Senior Counsel

appearing for Sri.Mrutyunjaya S.Hallikeri, learned

counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Shashi Kiran Shetty, - 103 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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learned Advocate General appearing for the State

along with Sri.Gangadhar.J.M., learned Addl. Advocate

General for respondents No.1 to 3 and Sri.Harsh

Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.4. Perused

papers.

25. The points that would arise for consideration are:

25.1. Whether the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional Commissioner under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is vitiated for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, including denial of reasonable opportunity and absence of a full-fledged enquiry as contemplated in law?

25.2. Whether removal of an elected Councillor under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 can be sustained solely on the basis of allegations, registration of FIR, and filing of charge- sheet, in the absence of a conviction or proved misconduct?

25.3. Whether the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners, relating to the passing and use of Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, constitute "misconduct" or "disgraceful - 104 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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conduct" within the meaning and scope of Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964?

25.4. Whether the Regional Commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial powers under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, was required to conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of specific charges, examination of witnesses, and consideration of defence evidence, in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court?

25.5. Whether the impugned order of removal suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable exercise of power, or extraneous considerations, particularly having regard to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the scheduled election to the posts of President and Vice-President of the City Municipal Council?

25.6. Whether the drastic consequence of removal and consequential disqualification of the petitioners is disproportionate and unsustainable in law, having regard to the constitutional mandate protecting democratic local self-government and the rights of the electorate?

25.7. Whether the notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an Administrator to the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri, is valid and in accordance with Sections 3 and 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964? - 105 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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25.8. What order?

26. I answer the above points as follows:

27. Answer to Point No.1: Whether the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional Commissioner under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is vitiated for non- compliance with the principles of natural justice, including denial of reasonable opportunity and absence of a full-fledged enquiry as contemplated in law?

27.1. Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,

1964, reads as under:

41. Liability to removal from office.--

(3) The Government, if it thinks fit on the recommendation of the municipal council, may remove any councillor elected under this Act, and after such enquiry as it deems necessary, if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable of performing his duties as a councillor.

[Provided that no Councillor shall be removed except after being afforded an opportunity for submitting an explanation.]

(4) When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any person is removed from the office of president or vice-president for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date of such removal cease to be a councillor and shall be deemed to have been removed from the office of councillor under sub-section (1). - 106 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.2. A persual of Section 41 indicates that it

prescribes two essential requirements: (1) an

enquiry; and (2) reasonable opportunity to show

cause. The statute does not prescribe the exact

procedure to be followed, including whether

witnesses must be examined, whether cross-

examination must be permitted, or whether

formal charges must be framed. The nature and

extent of the inquiry must be commensurate

with the facts and circumstances of each case.

27.3. The expression "reasonable opportunity" is

relative and contextual. It does not mean

unlimited opportunity or opportunity to prolong

proceedings indefinitely. What is reasonable

must be determined having regard to:

27.3.1. The nature and gravity of the allegations.

27.3.2. The evidence available on record.

27.3.3. The urgency of the situation. - 107 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.3.4. The conduct of the person proceeded

against.

27.3.5. The public interest is involved.

27.4. Reasonable opportunity must depend on the

facts and circumstances of each case. It is not

possible to lay down any rigid rule or principle of

universal application. Reasonable opportunity

does not mean an elaborate inquiry. It means

adequate opportunity having regard to the facts

and circumstances of the case.

27.5. The facts demonstrate that the petitioners were

afforded multiple opportunities:

- 31.01.2025: First notice was issued calling

upon the petitioners to show cause and

submit explanation regarding allegations of

forgery and misconduct; - 108 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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- Petitioners' allegation: Notice dated

31.01.2025 was served only on 06.02.2025,

hence insufficient time was given. However,

this delay was beyond the Regional

Commissioner's control as it was caused by

the notice delivery mechanism;

- 07.02.2025: A second notice was issued

fixing 13.02.2025 at 11:00 a.m. for personal

hearing. The petitioners were called to appear

with all documents;

- 13.02.2025: The petitioners appeared

personally before the Regional Commissioner.

An order was passed removing them. This

order was challenged in WP No. 101414/2025;

- 24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 was partly

allowed. The original order of 13.02.2025 was

quashed, and liberty was granted to the - 109 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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petitioners to submit their reply by

27.02.2025 by 3:00 p.m.;

- 12.02.2025: The Division Bench, while

disposing of WA No. 100124/2025, observed

that the appellants (petitioners herein) are at

liberty to impress upon the Regional

Commissioner about the binding nature of

Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the

enquiry;

- 27.02.2025: The petitioners submitted their

detailed written reply by 3:00 p.m. thereafter,

the Regional Commissioner considered all

materials and passed the impugned order.

27.6. This chronology demonstrates that far from

denying reasonable opportunity, the Regional

Commissioner afforded the petitioners not one,

but multiple opportunities. The petitioners - 110 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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appeared personally, made oral submissions, and

filed written submissions.

27.7. This case involves allegations of forgery, the

most serious form of misconduct. The evidence is

not based on oral testimony or matters of

interpretation, but on documentary evidence that

is virtually conclusive:

27.7.1. The Municipal Council's official records do

not contain Resolution No. 378 dated

09.02.2024 on the face of the resolution

register;

27.7.2. The Municipal Commissioner has

categorically and persistently stated that he

never signed the alleged resolution and

that his signature has been forged;

27.7.3. The resolution document produced by the

petitioners bears obvious irregularities on

its face, wrong format, suspicious

signatures, absence in official records; - 111 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.7.4. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had

passed clear orders regarding the

Wakharsal property directing eviction of

unauthorized occupants;

27.7.5. The alleged resolution directly violates

those court orders;

27.7.6. This court, vide order dated 19.12.2024 in

Cri. Petition No. 102611/2024, declined to

quash the criminal proceedings, observing

that there is "strong prima facie material to

proceed against the petitioners";

27.7.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated

06.02.2025 in SLP (Criminal) No.

1616/2025, dismissed the petitioners'

challenge to the criminal proceedings.

27.7.8. When evidence is of this nature,

documentary, objective, and virtually

conclusive, elaborate examination and

cross-examination of witnesses becomes - 112 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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unnecessary.

27.8. The principles of natural justice are flexible and

not rigid. They must be adapted to the context

and circumstances of each case. The rules of

natural justice are not embodied rules. What

particular rule of natural justice should apply to a

given case must depend to a great extent on the

facts and circumstances of that case, the

framework of the law under which the enquiry is

held and the constitution and rules of the body of

persons appointed for that purpose.

27.9. The aim of rules of natural justice is to secure

justice or to put it negatively, to prevent

miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate

only in areas not covered by any law validly

made. They do not supplant the law but

supplement it.

27.10. The petitioners contend that the Division Bench - 113 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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in WA No. 100124/2025 directed a "full-fledged

enquiry" which was not conducted. This

contention requires careful analysis.

27.11. The Division Bench merely observed that the

appellants are at liberty to impress upon the

Regional Commissioner about the binding nature

of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the

enquiry. The Division Bench did not prescribe

any specific procedure or mandate that witnesses

be examined on oath or that a mini-trial be

conducted.

27.12. The Regional Commissioner has complied with

the Division Bench's direction by:

27.12.1. Issuing notices to the petitioners;

27.12.2. Affording them opportunity to file written

submissions;

27.12.3. Hearing them personally;

27.12.4. Considering their explanations in light of - 114 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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the Principles laid down in Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir;

27.12.5. Examining the documentary evidence;

27.12.6. Passing a detailed reasoned order.

27.13. This constitutes substantial compliance with the

Division Bench's direction and the requirements

of natural justice.

27.14. The petitioners have relied on the argument that

the resolution was "validly passed by the

Council" and that "possession certificates were

issued by the council." However, this defence is

contradicted by:

27.14.1. The Council's official records which do not

show any such resolution dated

09.02.2024;

27.14.2. The categorical denial by the Municipal

Commissioner; - 115 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.14.3. The absence of any minutes of any

meeting where such resolution was

allegedly passed;

27.14.4. The obvious irregularities in the

document;

27.14.5. The fact that when other council members

were questioned, they denied that any

such resolution was passed.

27.15. When the defence is patently untenable and

contradicted by contemporaneous documentary

evidence, the need for elaborate cross-

examination is eliminated.

27.16. When the evidence is clear and unambiguous,

and the defence is untenable, the enquiry can be

brief without violating principles of natural

justice.

27.17. From the above, it is clear that: - 116 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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27.17.1. The petitioners were afforded a

reasonable opportunity to show cause

against their removal;

27.17.2. Multiple occasions were provided to the

petitioners to explain their conduct;

27.17.3. The enquiry was adequate and

appropriate, having regard to the

documentary nature of the evidence;

27.17.4. The principles of natural justice have been

substantially complied with;

27.17.5. The absence of elaborate procedural

safeguards (like examination of witnesses)

is not a violation of natural justice given

the nature of the evidence;

27.17.6. The impugned order is NOT vitiated for

non-compliance with principles of natural

justice.

27.18. I answer point No.1 by holding that the

impugned order is not vitiated for alleged - 117 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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non-compliance with the principles of

natural justice, infact the principles of

natural justice have been complied with by

the Regional Commissioner.

28. Answer to Point No. 2 -- Whether removal of an elected councillor under section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 can be sustained solely on the basis of allegations, registration of FIR, and filing of charge-sheet, in the absence of a conviction or proved misconduct?

28.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submitted that:

28.1.1. There is only a complaint filed, which

resulted in registration of FIR and filing of

charge-sheet. Until the criminal

proceedings are completed, it cannot be

said that there is any "proved

misconduct";

28.1.2. The petitioners cannot be said to be guilty

of any offence merely on the registration - 118 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of a FIR and filing of a charge-sheet. At

the most, they are "accused" and not

"convicts";

28.1.3. Until the trial is completed, the petitioners

are deemed to be innocent until proven

guilty. The allegation against them would

not amount to misconduct warranting

initiation of removal proceedings under

Section 41 of the KMA;

28.1.4. Under Section 41(1)(d), there has to be

"proved misconduct" for removal of an

elected member. At present, there is only

a complaint and charge-sheet;

28.1.5. Removal of membership of the

Municipality under Section 41 has long-

term effect, as under Clause (c) and (f) of

Subsection (1) of Section 16 of the KMA, a

person removed would suffer

disqualification not only for the present - 119 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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term but also for being chosen in the next

election until expiry of four years from the

date of such removal.

28.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:

28.2.1. Criminal conviction is not a prerequisite

for disciplinary action. The misconduct can

be proved by documentary evidence on

the preponderance of probabilities, which

is a lower standard than the criminal

standard of proof "beyond reasonable

doubt";

28.2.2. The allegations against the petitioners are

not merely allegations. They are

allegations supported by virtually

conclusive documentary evidence. The

resolution does not exist in official

records. The signature is forged. This is

not a matter of opinion but fact; - 120 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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28.2.3. The criminal proceedings and

administrative proceedings are

independent. The pendency of criminal

proceedings does not bar administrative

action;

28.2.4. The documentary evidence in the present

case establishes misconduct beyond

doubt. The criminal courts have not found

the allegations to be frivolous or

untenable, they have declined to quash

the proceedings;

28.2.5. In matters of public employment and

removal of elected representatives, the

administrative authority need not wait for

criminal conviction to act. In fact, waiting

would allow the person to continue in

office and cause further harm;

28.2.6. The petitioners' own conduct

demonstrates misconduct. They produced - 121 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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the forged document before this Court in

WA No. 100488/2022 in an attempt to

mislead the Court.

28.3. The petitioners' argument is based on a

fundamental confusion between criminal

proceedings and administrative proceedings.

These are two distinct types of proceedings with

different objectives, different standards of proof,

and different consequences.

28.4. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held that the principles applicable

to criminal prosecution are not identical to the

principles applicable to disciplinary proceedings.

The standard of proof in criminal cases is

'beyond reasonable doubt', whereas in

disciplinary cases it is 'preponderance of

probabilities'. Further, disciplinary action can be

taken based on evidence even if criminal - 122 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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prosecution fails.

28.5. Administrative action and criminal action are

independent streams. The pendency of criminal

proceedings does not bar administrative action.

In fact, it may be necessary to take

administrative action in the public interest even

while criminal proceedings are pending.

28.6. The petitioners argue that the misconduct is not

"proved" but merely "alleged". This argument is

factually incorrect. The misconduct is established

by the following evidence:

28.6.1. The official resolution register of the City

Municipal Council, produced before this

Court, does not contain any Resolution

No. 378 dated 09.02.2024 relating to

extension of Wakharsal property lease;

28.6.2. The Municipal Commissioner has

consistently and categorically stated that - 123 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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he never signed the alleged resolution and

that his signature has been forged;

28.6.3. No minutes of any council meeting on

09.02.2024 show passage of such

resolution;

28.6.4. The resolution document itself bears

obvious irregularities on its face, wrong

format, suspicious signatures, serial

number irregularities;

28.6.5. Resolution No. 378 that actually exists

was passed on 19.07.2024 (five months

later) relating to an entirely different

matter, SFC grant under 15th Financial

Scheme;

28.6.6. The petitioners themselves produced this

forged resolution before this Court in WA

No. 100488/2022, attempting to mislead

the Court regarding legal rights of the

unauthorised occupants; - 124 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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28.7. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had

categorically directed the eviction of

unauthorised occupants from Wakharsal

property. The alleged resolution directly violates

those orders.

28.8. This is not a case of allegation based on oral

testimony or circumstantial evidence. This is a

case where forgery is established by

documentary evidence. The term "proved"

means established by reliable evidence. The

evidence in the present case is reliable,

objective, and documentary.

28.9. In administrative law, the standard of proof is

the "balance of probabilities" or "preponderance

of probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt"

as in criminal law. Laxmibai v. Collector of

Belgaum, which was extensively cited by the

petitioners' counsel, makes this point clear. - 125 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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28.10. The preponderance of probabilities test requires

that the evidence in support of the allegation

must outweigh the evidence against it. In the

present case, the documentary evidence

overwhelmingly establishes the allegations of

forgery. The petitioners have not produced any

credible evidence to the contrary. In fact, they

have not even seriously disputed the core

allegations.

28.11. The petitioners argue that criminal proceedings

are pending, hence administrative action should

be deferred. This argument is unsustainable for

several reasons:

28.11.1. The investigation and trial of criminal

cases can take several years. If

administrative action had to be deferred

until criminal proceedings conclude, it

would mean allowing the wrongdoer to

continue in office for years despite proved - 126 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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misconduct;

28.11.2. The Municipal Commissioner's allegation

that the petitioners forged his signature is

a serious matter affecting the credibility

and integrity of municipal administration.

If the petitioners are allowed to continue

in office while the criminal proceedings

drag on, it would undermine public

confidence in municipal administration;

28.11.3. Criminal proceedings aim at punishing

crime. Administrative proceedings aim at

removing a person from public office if

found unfit to hold that office. These

objectives are independent;

28.12. Disciplinary action against an employee can be

taken based on evidence even if criminal

proceedings are pending or have failed. The

standard of proof is different, the objective is - 127 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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different, and the pendency of criminal

proceedings is not a bar to disciplinary action.

28.13. Taking administrative action (removal from

office) does not prejudice the criminal trial. The

petitioners will still have full opportunity to

defend themselves in the criminal case;

28.14. A Co-ordinate bench of this court, vide order

dated 19.12.2024, declined to quash the criminal

proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide

order dated 06.02.2025, dismissed the

petitioners' SLP against that order without any

disapproval of the Co-ordinate bench's finding.

28.15. The petitioners rely on the principle of

"presumption of innocence" to argue that they

should not be removed from office pending

criminal trial. This argument misunderstands the

scope of that principle.

28.16. The "presumption of innocence" is a principle of - 128 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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criminal jurisprudence. It means that in a

criminal trial, the burden is on the prosecution to

prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The

accused is presumed innocent until proved

guilty.

28.17. However, the presumption of innocence does not

mean:

28.17.1. That a person cannot be removed from

office based on allegations supported by

evidence;

28.17.2. That a person must be allowed to continue

in public office pending criminal trial;

28.17.3. That administrative proceedings must be

frozen pending criminal proceedings.

28.18. The circumstances of the present case

demonstrate why immediate administrative

action was necessary and justified:

28.19. The petitioners had forged a resolution in their - 129 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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capacity as elected representatives and used

their office to issue illegal possession certificates.

This is a serious abuse of office;

28.20. The petitioners' forged resolution and illegal

possession certificates have caused substantial

harm to the Municipality. Unauthorised

occupants have obtained documents that they

might try to use to claim rights over valuable

municipal property;

28.21. By forging a resolution contrary to this Court's

orders in WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners

have shown contempt for judicial authority;

28.22. If the petitioners were allowed to continue in

office pending criminal trial, there was danger

that they might forge further documents, issue

further illegal certificates, or cause further harm; - 130 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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28.23. Elected office is not an ordinary job. It is a trust

to represent the people and protect municipal

interests. Once that trust is broken, removal is

necessary;

28.24. Public confidence in municipal administration

requires that persons guilty of such serious

misconduct be removed immediately.

28.25. The petitioners correctly state that they are

"accused" but not "convicts" in the criminal case.

However, this does not shield them from

administrative action. For administrative

purposes and removal from public office, a

person need not be convicted. Evidence

supporting the charge is sufficient. The criminal

status of the person is not relevant for

administrative action.

28.26. Disciplinary action against a public servant or

statutory office-bearer is legally distinct and - 131 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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independent from criminal prosecution. The

two proceedings operate in different fields,

are governed by different standards, and

serve different purposes.

28.27. In criminal proceedings, the prosecution

must establish guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. The object is to determine criminal

liability and impose penal consequences. In

contrast, disciplinary or administrative

proceedings are concerned with the

suitability of a person to continue in public

office and with maintaining institutional

integrity. The standard of proof in such

proceedings is based on preponderance of

probabilities and formation of reasonable

satisfaction on available material.

28.28. It is well settled that even if a person is

acquitted in a criminal case, such acquittal - 132 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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does not automatically entitle him to

reinstatement or continuation in service or

office if disciplinary proceedings have already

resulted in a finding of misconduct. An

acquittal may occur for various reasons,

including benefit of doubt or failure to meet

the strict criminal standard of proof. That

does not erase the findings recorded in

administrative proceedings based on

independent assessment of material.

28.29. Therefore, the pendency of criminal

proceedings, or even a future acquittal,

would not render the action taken under

Section 41 invalid, provided that the

statutory authority has independently applied

its mind and reached a conclusion on the

basis of material available before it.

28.30. The removal under Section 41 is not founded - 133 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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solely on the existence of an FIR or charge

sheet. It is based on examination of

municipal records, discrepancy in the

resolution register, denial of signature by the

Commissioner, and overall conduct of the

petitioners. The criminal case and the

administrative action are parallel but

independent. The validity of one does not

automatically depend upon the outcome of

the other.

28.31. The petitioners raise the consequence of

disqualification under Section 16 of the KMA as a

reason why removal should not be allowed. The

Court appreciates the gravity of the

consequence. However, grave consequences do

not excuse grave misconduct. In fact, they

highlight the need to remove from office persons

guilty of serious misconduct. - 134 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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28.32. The disqualification that follows removal from

elected office is undoubtedly a serious

consequence. It affects not only the individual

concerned but also his future participation in the

democratic process. However, the seriousness of

the consequence cannot be used as a ground to

shield misconduct. On the contrary, when the

statutory scheme provides for removal and

consequential disqualification, it reflects the

legislative intent that only persons who maintain

the integrity and dignity of the office should be

permitted to hold it. The gravity of the

consequence, therefore, calls for careful scrutiny

of the allegations, not leniency towards proven

or prima facie established misconduct.

28.33. It is equally true that elections and public office

confer legitimacy through the mandate of the

people. But that mandate is not a licence for - 135 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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abuse. Democratic office is not an immunity

against accountability. If elected representatives

are found to have engaged in dishonest or

fraudulent conduct affecting public property or

institutional integrity, the law must respond

firmly. Otherwise, public office would become a

shield behind which misconduct could be

perpetuated.

28.34. The seriousness of disqualification thus cuts both

ways. It demands strict procedural fairness

before removal, but it also demands that serious

breaches of trust be dealt with decisively. To

hold otherwise would dilute the very purpose of

statutory safeguards designed to protect public

institutions and public confidence.

28.35. From the above it is clear that:

28.35.1. Removal of an elected councillor CAN be

sustained on the basis of proved - 136 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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misconduct without requiring a criminal

conviction;

28.35.2. The misconduct in the present case is

proved by documentary evidence on the

preponderance of probabilities;

28.35.3. The pendency of criminal proceedings is not

a bar to administrative action;

28.35.4. The standard of proof in administrative

proceedings is lower than in criminal

proceedings;

28.35.5. Public interest requires immediate

administrative action, not deferment

pending criminal trial;

28.35.6. The consequences of disqualification do not

excuse the misconduct but emphasise the

need for removal.

28.36. I answer Point No.2 by holding that the

removal of an elected Councillor can be - 137 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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sustained based on proved misconduct in

the absence of a criminal conviction. In the

present case, the misconduct is proved.

29. Answer to point No. 3 -- Whether the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners, relating to the passing and use of resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, constitute "misconduct" or "disgraceful conduct" within the meaning and scope of Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964?

29.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submits that:

29.1.1. The alleged acts do not constitute

"misconduct" or "disgraceful conduct". The

resolution was purportedly passed by the

entire Council. If any misconduct occurred,

it was collective, not individual;

29.1.2. The resolution relates to extension of lease

of Wakharsal properties. This is a

substantive policy matter on which - 138 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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reasonable people can differ. It is not

criminal conduct but merely a policy

decision;

29.1.3. The petitioners' conduct in passing the

resolution, if it occurred, was in accordance

with applicable law and procedure. The

Council has the power to extend leases.

The majority of the Council decided to

extend the lease with renewed rental terms

as per market conditions. This is not

misconduct;

29.1.4. The petitioners did not act for personal gain

but in the interest of the Municipality. The

extended lease would have brought

renewed rental income to the Municipality;

29.1.5. The allegation that the signature of the

Commissioner is forged is a matter that has

to be decided in the criminal court. In the - 139 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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absence of such decision, the petitioners

cannot be removed;

29.1.6. The petitioners' actions in relation to

Wakharsal property are not "in the

discharge of duties as councillors" in a

manner that warrants removal. The acts

are at most breaches of contract or civil

disputes, not criminal or disgraceful

conduct.

29.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:

29.2.1. The acts clearly constitute misconduct and

disgraceful conduct. Forgery of documents,

forging of signatures, and fabrication of

resolutions are among the gravest forms of

misconduct;

29.2.2. The petitioners cannot hide behind the

argument that it is "collective decision".

The resolution itself does not exist. If it - 140 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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does not exist, there is no collective

decision, only collective fraud;

29.2.3. The alleged resolution is not a matter of

policy difference. It is a forged document.

This is not a difference of opinion but

dishonesty;

29.2.4. The conduct of the petitioners, forging

documents, forging signatures, issuing

illegal possession certificates, is per se

disgraceful. It cannot be characterised as

an honest policy difference;

29.2.5. The conduct violates the trust reposed in

elected representatives. Elected

representatives are trustees of public

property. By forging documents to benefit

unauthorised occupants, the petitioners

have betrayed that trust.

29.2.6. The conduct violates court orders. This

Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had clearly - 141 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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directed the eviction of unauthorised

occupants. The forged resolution is a direct

affront to that court order;

29.2.7. The conduct is "in the discharge of duties

as councillors" because the alleged

resolution purports to be a council

resolution, and the possession certificates

were issued in an official capacity;

29.2.8. Forgery and fraud per se constitute

disgraceful conduct for any person, let

alone for an elected representative.

29.3. Black's Law Dictionary defines misconduct as:

"A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour."

29.4. It is well settled that even where the word

"misconduct" is not expressly defined in the

statute or rules, it carries a settled and judicially

recognised meaning. The absence of a definition - 142 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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does not render the expression vague or

uncertain.

29.5. The term "misconduct" ordinarily signifies a

transgression of an established and definite rule

of action. It refers to conduct that is contrary to

law, to prescribed procedure, or to the standards

expected of a person holding public office. It is

not confined merely to violation of an express

statutory provision; it extends to any unlawful or

improper behaviour by a person entrusted with

public responsibility.

29.6. Further, misconduct is not synonymous with

mere error. It implies a wrongful intention or a

conscious disregard of duty. It must be

something more than an innocent mistake, an

error of judgment, or a bona fide difference of

opinion. Where discretion is exercised honestly

within the bounds of law, even if the decision

later proves to be incorrect, it may not amount - 143 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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to misconduct. However, where an act is

deliberate, dishonest, or undertaken in disregard

of binding legal norms, it crosses the threshold

into misconduct.

29.7. Misconduct also includes any dishonest or

improper conduct, breach of a prescribed code of

conduct, or behaviour that brings disrepute to

the office held. In the context of elected

representatives, it encompasses conduct that

undermines public confidence, violates fiduciary

obligations, or is inconsistent with the dignity

and integrity expected of public office.

29.8. Thus, misconduct is not limited to criminal

conviction. It includes actions that are unlawful,

dishonest, improper, or unbecoming of the

position held, particularly where such actions

affect public property, institutional integrity, or

the administration of justice. - 144 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.9. The acts of the Petitioners if not considered, in

my considered opinion would clearly constitute

misconduct:

29.10. The resolution does not exist in the Council's

official records. The petitioners have fabricated a

document, falsely claiming that the Council

passed a resolution;

29.11. The Municipal Commissioner categorically states

that he never signed the alleged resolution. His

signature has been forged. Forging a signature is

a criminal act that goes to the root of honesty;

29.12. Based on the forged resolution, the petitioners

issued possession certificates to unauthorised

occupants, thereby trying to create legal rights

that do not exist;

29.13. As elected representatives, the petitioners were

entrusted with the care of municipal property

and interests. By forging documents to benefit

unauthorised occupants (this aspect having been - 145 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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decided by this court on several occasions) they

betrayed that trust;

29.14. The Rules of Procedure of the City Municipal

Council require that all resolutions be properly

recorded, properly signed, and properly

maintained. The petitioners violated these rules

by creating a forged document.

29.15. The expression "disgraceful conduct" must be

understood in its ordinary and contextual sense.

Though not specifically defined in the statute, it

denotes conduct that brings dishonour, shame,

or discredit upon the individual and, more

importantly, upon the office held by him. It

refers to behaviour that is unbecoming of a

person occupying public office and that

undermines the dignity of the institution.

29.16. Conduct is disgraceful if it would be regarded by

honest, reasonable and right-thinking members

of the public as disreputable or shameful. The - 146 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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test is objective. It is not whether the person

concerned believes his conduct to be justified,

but whether such conduct lowers public

confidence in the office and the institution.

29.17. It is equally necessary to recognise that the

standard of conduct expected from an ordinary

individual is not the same as that expected from

an elected representative or a person holding

high public office. A private individual acts in his

personal capacity. His conduct, unless unlawful,

may not carry institutional consequences.

However, an elected representative acts in a

fiduciary capacity. He is a trustee of public

confidence. His actions reflect not merely upon

himself but upon the democratic body he

represents.

29.18. Therefore, conduct which may not amount to

disgrace in the case of an ordinary person may

assume a far more serious character when - 147 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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committed by a public office-holder. The office

carries heightened expectations of integrity,

honesty, and accountability. The higher the

office, the higher the standard of probity

required.

29.19. Disgraceful conduct thus includes any act that

violates basic principles of honesty and integrity,

any conduct that is dishonest, deceptive, or

improper, and any behaviour that brings

disrepute to the institution. For elected

representatives, who derive authority from the

mandate of the people, the threshold is

necessarily higher. An act that undermines public

trust, erodes institutional credibility, or reflects

disregard for fiduciary obligations may

legitimately be characterised as disgraceful

conduct within the meaning of the statute.

29.20. In short, public office magnifies responsibility.

What may be tolerated as a personal lapse in - 148 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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private life may become unacceptable and

disqualifying when it affects public trust,

institutional dignity, and the confidence of the

electorate.

29.21. Measured against these definitions, the

petitioners' conduct is undoubtedly disgraceful:

29.22. Forging documents is inherently shameful and

disgraceful. It is conduct that would be

condemned by any honest person in the

community;

29.23. Elected representatives are elected to serve the

public. Using their office to forge documents and

benefit unauthorised occupants is a betrayal of

public trust that brings shame on the institution;

29.24. Forging a document to circumvent a clear court

order directing eviction of unauthorised

occupants is particularly disgraceful. It shows

contempt for judicial authority; - 149 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.25. The forged resolution was produced before this

Court in WA No. 100488/2022. Using forged

documents to mislead the Court is conduct of the

highest degree of disgrace;

29.26. The petitioners' conduct has caused harm to the

Municipality by creating documents that might be

used to claim rights over valuable municipal

property. This harm to public property is

disgraceful;

29.27. The core of disgraceful conduct is dishonesty.

The petitioners' conduct involves deliberate

dishonesty, forging of documents, and deception.

No conduct can be more disgraceful than this.

29.28. Section 41(1)(d) provides that a councillor can

be removed if he is guilty of misconduct "in the

discharge of his duties as such councillor". The

petitioners argue that the acts were not in

discharge of duties but constitute breaches of

contract or civil disputes. - 150 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.29. This argument is without merit because:

29.29.1. The alleged resolution purports to be a

resolution of the City Municipal Council,

passed in an official capacity. If such a

resolution had been validly passed, it would

have been an exercise of Council powers;

29.29.2. The possession certificates were issued in

the official capacity of the petitioners as

councillors. The documents themselves

reference the CMC and the authority of the

Council;

29.29.3. The forged resolution bore the seal and

insignia of the CMC, suggesting that the

petitioners used their official positions to

create these documents;

29.29.4. The forged resolution was used in official

proceedings before this Court in WA No.

100488/2022 to assert rights of

unauthorised occupants; - 151 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.29.5. The petitioners' conduct, if successful,

would have affected the official function of

the Council to manage and control

municipal property.

29.29.6. Therefore, the acts were clearly "in the

discharge of (attempted) duties as

councillors", and the misconduct/disgraceful

conduct occurred in that context.

29.30. The petitioners argue that since the resolution

was supposedly a collective decision, individual

councillors cannot be held responsible.

29.31. The fundamental point is that the resolution was

never validly passed by the Council. Therefore,

there is no collective decision. What exists is

collective fraud or individual fraud by the

petitioners;

29.32. Even if a collective decision were involved,

individual liability can be fixed if the individuals

acted dishonestly. - 152 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.33. Participation in a collective decision does not

automatically shield an individual from

accountability. Even where a decision is taken

collectively by a body or committee, individual

liability can still be fixed if it is shown that a

particular member acted dishonestly, mala fide,

or with improper intent. Collective functioning

cannot be used as a protective cover for acts

tainted by fraud or bad faith.

29.34. If a member consciously supports, signs, or

facilitates an action that is illegal or dishonest,

he cannot later avoid responsibility by

contending that the decision was that of the

entire body. The doctrine of collective

responsibility does not obliterate individual

accountability where there is material to

establish personal involvement, knowledge, or

participation in wrongful conduct. - 153 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.35. Thus, if dishonesty or mala fides is prima facie

established against specific members, individual

consequences may follow notwithstanding that

the decision was recorded as a resolution of the

Council.

29.36. The evidence suggests that the petitioners were

the main movers behind the forged resolution.

They were not passive participants in a collective

decision but active participants in a dishonest

scheme, they have signed the forged resolution

and still contend that the same is a valid one,

therefore, individual liability is clearly

established.

29.37. The petitioners contend that extension of lease is

a matter of policy on which reasonable persons

can differ. This case is not about whether the

policy of extending the lease was right or wrong.

This case is about whether the resolution - 154 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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extending the lease existed or was forged. The

resolution is forged. This is not a matter of

opinion; it is a matter of fact established by

documentary evidence.

29.38. Extension of lease might be a matter of policy,

but forging a resolution about extension of lease

is not a matter of policy, it is fraud. There is a

fundamental difference between:

29.38.1. When two councillors disagree about

whether to extend a lease, that is an

honest policy difference;

29.38.2. When a councillor forges a resolution to

make it appear as if the lease was

extended when it was not, that is dishonest

conduct.

29.39. The present case falls into the second category.

The petitioners did not attempt to persuade the

Council to extend the lease through proper - 155 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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procedures. They forged a resolution to achieve

their objective.

29.40. The law is well-settled that elected

representatives are trustees of public property

and public interest. Laxmibai v. Collector of

Belgaum, which was extensively relied upon by

the petitioners' counsel, itself establishes the

principle of breach of trust:

"An elected representative is a trustee of public property and public interest. When that representative betrays the trust, removal is not merely justified but imperative."

29.41. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised

occupants and against the directions of this

Court, the petitioners have breached the

fiduciary duty they owed to the Municipality and

the public.

29.42. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019 (judgment

dated 12.08.2022), passed clear orders directing - 156 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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that unauthorised occupants of the Wakharsal

property be evicted and that the property be

utilised for public purposes. The alleged forged

resolution directly violates those orders by trying

to create rights in favour of the very occupants

whom the Court had ordered to be evicted.

29.43. Violation of binding court orders, in itself,

constitutes misconduct and, in appropriate cases,

amounts to disgraceful conduct within the

meaning of the statute.

29.44. A court order is not a mere advisory direction; it

is a mandate issued under authority of law. All

authorities, including elected representatives and

statutory bodies, are constitutionally bound to

comply with judicial orders. Any deliberate act

that defeats, circumvents, or overreaches such

orders strikes at the rule of law. - 157 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.45. When an elected representative, in the discharge

of official duties, acts in a manner contrary to

binding judicial directions, the misconduct

assumes a heightened gravity. Such conduct

does not merely involve a breach of

administrative discipline; it undermines the

authority of courts and erodes constitutional

governance. In a democratic system founded

upon separation of powers, obedience to judicial

orders is a fundamental obligation.

29.46. Therefore, where there is material to show that

an elected representative has consciously acted

in violation of court orders, or has attempted to

nullify their effect through improper means, such

conduct would amount to serious misconduct.

Given the fiduciary nature of public office and the

higher standard expected of elected

representatives, such behaviour may legitimately - 158 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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be characterised as disgraceful conduct,

warranting statutory consequences.

29.47. From the above it is clear that

29.47.1. The acts attributed to the petitioners--

forgery of Resolution No. 378, forging of

the Municipal Commissioner's signature,

and issuance of illegal possession

certificates--clearly constitute "misconduct"

within the meaning of Section 41(1)(d);

29.47.2. These acts also constitute "disgraceful

conduct" as they are inherently dishonest,

bring disrepute to the office, violate public

trust, and violate court orders;

29.47.3. The acts were done "in the discharge of

duties as councillors" as they involved the

use of official capacity and official

documents; - 159 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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29.47.4. Individual liability is established despite any

collective aspect since the Petitioners have

admittedly signed the forged resolution;

29.47.5. The misconduct is among the gravest kinds

and warrants the most serious punishment,

which is removal from office.

29.48. I answer Point no.3 by holding that, the

alleged acts constitute both "misconduct"

and "disgraceful conduct" within the

meaning of Section 41(1)(d) of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.

30. Answer to Point No. 4 -- Whether the regional commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial powers under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, was required to conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of specific charges, examination of witnesses, and consideration of defence evidence, in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court?

30.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submitted that: - 160 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.1.1. The power under Section 41 is quasi-judicial

in nature. Therefore, all procedural

safeguards applicable to quasi-judicial

proceedings must be followed;

30.1.2. Specific charges must be framed in writing.

Charge memo must be issued to the

petitioners;

30.1.3. All allegations must be detailed and clearly

communicated to the petitioners;

30.1.4. Witnesses, if any, must be examined and

cross-examined in the presence of the

petitioners;

30.1.5. The petitioners must be given full opportunity

to examine and cross-examine witnesses;

30.1.6. A full-fledged inquiry is mandated by Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector,

Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407, particularly paras

30-36 extracted hereinabove; - 161 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.1.7. The Division Bench in WA No. 100124/2025

directed a "full-fledged enquiry", which has

not been conducted;

30.1.8. The petitioners were not given opportunity to

cross-examine the Municipal Commissioner or

to hear his oral testimony;

30.1.9. The Regional Commissioner has not complied

with the requirement of quasi-judicial

proceedings.

30.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that:

30.2.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasi-

judicial, the statutory language does not

prescribe the exact procedure to be

followed;

30.2.2. The statute only requires "an enquiry at

which he has had a reasonable opportunity

of showing cause". It does not mandate

framing of formal charges, examination of

witnesses, or cross-examination; - 162 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.2.3. The nature and extent of enquiry depends

on the nature of evidence. When the

evidence is documentary and virtually

conclusive, elaborate examination of

witnesses is not necessary;

30.2.4. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir case does not

mandate a full-fledged trial-like inquiry with

examination of witnesses. It only requires

compliance with principles of natural justice;

30.2.5. The Division Bench did not specifically

mandate examination of witnesses. It only

directed consideration of Ravi Yashwant

Bhoir principles;

30.2.6. The petitioners have been given ample

opportunity to explain their conduct. They

appeared personally before the Regional

Commissioner and filed detailed written

submissions; - 163 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.2.7. The procedure followed by the Regional

Commissioner is adequate and in

compliance with principles of natural justice;

30.2.8. The allegations are based on documentary

evidence that is conclusive. Examination of

witnesses would not add anything to this

evidence.

30.3. It is well-established that the power to remove a

councillor under Section 41 is quasi-judicial in

nature.

30.4. However, the quasi-judicial nature of the power

does not necessarily mean that all procedural

safeguards applicable to court trials must be

followed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has

consistently held that the procedures applicable

to quasi-judicial proceedings are flexible and

context-dependent.

30.5. The proviso to Section 41(1)(d) states: - 164 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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"Provided that no councillor shall be removed under clause (d) except after an inquiry at which he has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal."

30.6. The statute prescribes two things:

30.6.1. An inquiry;

30.6.2. Reasonable opportunity to show cause.

30.7. The statute does NOT prescribe:

30.7.1. Framing of formal charges;

30.7.2. Issuance of charge memo;

30.7.3. Appointment of an inquiry officer separate

from the removing authority;

30.7.4. Examination of witnesses on oath;

30.7.5. Cross-examination of witnesses;

30.7.6. Any other specific procedural step.

30.8. When the statute does not prescribe a

procedure, the removing authority has discretion

to adopt a suitable procedure consistent with

natural justice and the principles laid down by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court. - 165 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.9. It is a settled principle of administrative law that

the requirements of natural justice are not rigid,

mechanical, or of universal application in

identical form. The content and extent of natural

justice vary with the context in which the power

is exercised, the statutory framework governing

such exercise, the nature of the rights affected,

and the consequences that follow.

30.10. The core requirement is that the procedure

adopted must be "reasonable, fair and just."

Fairness, however, is not synonymous with an

elaborate or trial-like process in every case. The

law does not mandate that all proceedings must

replicate the safeguards of a criminal trial. What

is required is that the person affected must be

given adequate notice of the case against him

and a meaningful opportunity to respond.

30.11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held

that natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands - 166 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of courts. It is not an inflexible formula to be

mechanically applied irrespective of statutory

context. The rules of natural justice are not

embodied rules; they are principles evolved to

secure justice and prevent arbitrariness. Their

application depends to a great extent on:

30.11.1. the facts and circumstances of the

particular case,

30.11.2. the nature of the enquiry,

30.11.3. the statutory scheme under which action is

taken,

30.11.4. the character and composition of the

authority exercising power, and

30.11.5. the degree of civil or statutory

consequences that may ensue.

30.12. In proceedings under a statute such as Section

41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the

legislature has prescribed issuance of notice and

consideration of explanation. The statute does - 167 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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not contemplate a formal adversarial trial with

framing of charges, examination and cross-

examination of witnesses as a matter of right.

Therefore, importing the procedural model of

criminal jurisprudence into such proceedings

would amount to rewriting the statute.

30.13. Where the affected party is informed of the

allegations, supplied with relevant material,

granted time to submit explanation, and afforded

opportunity of hearing and where the authority

applies its mind to the explanation and records

reasons the essential requirements of natural

justice stand satisfied. The emphasis is on

substance over form. What is impermissible is

arbitrariness, pre-determination, or denial of

meaningful opportunity; what is not required is

procedural excess beyond the statutory

mandate. - 168 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.14. It is equally well settled that natural justice

cannot be stretched to a point where it paralyses

administrative functioning or defeats statutory

purpose. The doctrine exists to secure fairness,

not to provide a tactical shield against legitimate

statutory action.

30.15. Therefore, the test that must be applied is

whether, in the totality of circumstances, the

procedure adopted was fair, reasonable and

proportionate to the nature of the allegations and

the statutory framework. If that test is satisfied,

the action cannot be invalidated merely because

more elaborate safeguards were not provided.

30.16. The petitioners heavily rely on Ravi Yashwant

Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad. A careful

reading of that judgment shows that it does NOT

mandate a trial-like inquiry with examination and

cross-examination of witnesses. What it

mandates is: - 169 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.16.1. Strict Adherence to Statutory

Provisions: The authority must strictly

follow the statutory procedure;

30.16.2. Principles of Natural Justice: Principles

of natural justice must be given "full play";

30.16.3. Full-Fledged Inquiry: There must be an

enquiry that is not cursory or perfunctory.

The exact words are:

"If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office- bearer can be removed without holding a full- fledged inquiry."

30.16.4. However, "full-fledged inquiry" does not

mean a trial-like inquiry. It means a proper,

thorough, and fair inquiry. This can be

conducted through examination of

documentary evidence, hearing of the

person proposed to be removed, and

consideration of the explanation offered. - 170 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.16.5. Reasonable Opportunity: The person

must be given "a fair opportunity of

defence";

30.16.6. Application of Mind: "The decision must

show that the authority has applied its

mind to the allegations made and the

explanation furnished by the elected office-

bearer sought to be removed."

30.16.7. Proved Misconduct: "A duly elected

person is entitled to hold office for the term

for which he has been elected and he can

be removed only on a proved misconduct or

any other procedure established under

law."

30.16.8. None of these requirements mandate

framing of formal charges or examination - 171 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of witnesses. They only mandate fairness,

thoroughness, and application of mind.

30.17. A critical distinction must be drawn between:

30.17.1. "Full-Fledged Inquiry": A proper,

thorough inquiry where all relevant facts

are examined, all relevant evidence is

considered, and the authority applies its

mind to reach a decision. This is what Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir mandates.

30.17.2. "Trial-Like Inquiry": A procedure that

mirrors the procedures of a court, including

examination of witnesses on oath, cross-

examination, and application of rules of

evidence.

30.17.3. The statute and the Supreme Court require

the former, not the latter. - 172 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.18. The expression "full-fledged inquiry" must be

interpreted in a manner consistent with the

statutory framework, the nature of the power

exercised, and the object sought to be achieved.

It cannot be equated mechanically with a judicial

trial or criminal prosecution.

30.19. A full-fledged inquiry does not mean a judicial

inquiry in the strict sense, nor does it require

replication of trial-like procedures such as formal

framing of charges in the manner of a criminal

court, examination and cross-examination of

witnesses in every case, adherence to strict rules

of evidence, or proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Those safeguards are characteristic of criminal

adjudication, where personal liberty is at stake.

Administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings,

particularly under statutory provisions governing

removal from office, operate within a different - 173 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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legal framework and are governed by different

standards.

30.20. The requirement of a "full enquiry" signifies that

the authority must not act in a casual, summary,

or perfunctory manner. It must undertake a

serious, structured, and fair examination of the

allegations. The authority is required to:

30.20.1. Clearly inform the person concerned of the

allegations and the material relied upon.

30.20.2. Afford reasonable opportunity to submit

explanation and place relevant material in

defence.

30.20.3. Consider the explanation objectively and in

good faith.

30.20.4. Examine the relevant records and

surrounding circumstances.

30.20.5. Apply independent mind to the material on

record. - 174 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.20.6. Record reasons demonstrating that the

decision is based on relevant considerations

and not on extraneous factors.

30.21. The inquiry must be real and meaningful, not

illusory. The authority must reach its conclusion

on the basis of relevant material and logical

reasoning, and the order must disclose

application of mind. That is what renders the

proceeding legally sustainable.

30.22. Importantly, the content of a full enquiry must

be understood in the context of the statute under

which action is taken. Where the statute requires

issuance of notice and consideration of

explanation, compliance with those requirements

in a substantive manner satisfies the mandate of

a full enquiry. Courts have consistently held that

principles of natural justice are flexible and their

application depends upon the nature of the

proceeding and the statutory scheme. - 175 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.23. A contrary interpretation equating "full enquiry"

with a full-fledged judicial trial in every case

would amount to judicial legislation and would

frustrate the legislative intent behind conferring

administrative powers upon designated

authorities. It would also render statutory

provisions unworkable by importing procedural

requirements not contemplated by the

legislature.

30.24. Therefore, a full enquiry means a

comprehensive, fair, and reasoned examination

appropriate to the nature of the proceeding. It

ensures substantive fairness, transparency, and

accountability in decision-making, without

unnecessarily importing formalities that belong

exclusively to criminal trials. Such an

understanding is consistent with established

principles of administrative law and would

withstand appellate scrutiny. - 176 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.25. In the present case, examination of witnesses

was not necessary for the following reasons:

30.25.1. Documentary Evidence is Conclusive:

The evidence is not based on oral

testimony or matters of interpretation. The

evidence consists of:

30.25.1.1. Official records of the City Municipal

Council showing absence of the alleged

resolution;

30.25.1.2. Categorical denial by the Municipal

Commissioner that he signed the

resolution;

30.25.1.3. Obvious irregularities in the document

itself;

30.25.1.4. Expert opinion regarding forged

signature.

When documentary evidence is

conclusive, examination of witnesses

adds nothing. - 177 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.25.2. The Defence is Self-Evidently

Untenable: The petitioners' defence is that

"the resolution was validly passed by the

Council". However, this defence is

contradicted by the Council's own records.

No amount of oral testimony can overcome

this documentary contradiction.

30.26. The requirement of fairness under natural justice

does not mandate unnecessarily prolonged

proceedings in every case. The essence of

natural justice lies in affording a meaningful

opportunity to be heard and ensuring that the

authority applies its mind to the material placed

before it. It does not insist upon length for its

own sake.

30.27. Where the material on record is clear,

documentary in nature, and unambiguous, and

where the defence offered is either admitted, - 178 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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unsupported, or untenable on the face of the

record, the enquiry need not be elaborate. In

such circumstances, the authority is not required

to conduct an extended or ritualistic proceeding

merely to demonstrate procedural formality.

30.28. If:

30.28.1. The relevant documents are

undisputed or verifiable from official

records,

30.28.2. The allegations are specific and

supported by documentary material,

30.28.3. The person concerned has been

given notice and opportunity to

respond, and

30.28.4. The explanation does not displace or

rebut the core material relied upon,

then a brief but reasoned decision would

satisfy the requirements of natural justice. - 179 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.29. The law does not require empty formalities. It

requires fairness in substance. Where the facts

speak for themselves and the defence fails to

raise any genuine or triable issue, insisting on

elaborate procedures would amount to elevating

form over substance.

30.30. Thus, when evidence is clear and unambiguous,

and the defence is legally untenable, an enquiry

that is concise yet reasoned does not violate

principles of natural justice, provided the

affected party has been given a real opportunity

to present his case and the authority has

objectively considered it.

30.31. The Regional Commissioner conducted a "full-

fledged inquiry" in the proper sense:

30.31.1. Notices Issued: The petitioners were

issued notices calling for explanation, with

specific allegations mentioned; - 180 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.31.2. Opportunity to Respond: The petitioners

were given not one, but multiple

opportunities to respond, first by submitting

written explanation, then by appearing

personally, then by submitting detailed

written submissions after the Division Bench

order;

30.31.3. Examination of Materials: The Regional

Commissioner carefully examined all

materials on record, including:

30.31.3.1. Official records of the City Municipal

Council;

30.31.3.2. The forged resolution document;

30.31.3.3. The resolution register;

30.31.3.4. The original resolution (No. 378)

relating to SFC grant;

30.31.3.5. The order of the criminal court

declining to quash proceedings; - 181 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.31.3.6. The dismissal order of the Supreme

Court regarding SLP;

30.31.4. Consideration of Explanation: The

explanation offered by the petitioners was

carefully considered. The Court has no

reason to believe that the Regional

Commissioner ignored or dismissed the

explanation without consideration, nor has it

been brought to the notice of this court as

to which of the explanation/s offered by the

petitioners was not considered;

30.31.5. Reasoned Decision: The Regional

Commissioner passed a detailed reasoned

order explaining why the explanation was

not acceptable and why removal was

warranted;

30.31.6. Application of Mind: The order shows

clear application of mind to the specific

allegations and the explanation offered. - 182 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.31.7. This constitutes a "full-fledged inquiry" in

the proper sense.

30.32. The petitioners argue that the Municipal

Commissioner should have been examined as a

witness so that the petitioners could cross-

examine him. This argument is without merit

because:

30.32.1. His Statement was on Record: The

Municipal Commissioner's denial of signing

the resolution is on record and was before

the Regional Commissioner. The petitioners

had full knowledge of this denial and

opportunity to rebut it;

30.32.2. Documentary Evidence Speaks Louder:

The fact that the resolution does not appear

in the Council's official records is more

conclusive than any oral testimony. Even if

the Municipal Commissioner admitted that - 183 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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he signed the resolution (which he does

not), the absence from official records

would speak volumes;

30.32.3. The Petitioners Did Not Deny: The

petitioners did not formally deny that the

signature is forged. They merely contended

that the issue should be decided in the

criminal court. This is not a cross-

examination of the Municipal Commissioner

but avoidance of the issue;

30.32.4. Examination Would Serve No Purpose:

Even if the Regional Commissioner had

examined the Municipal Commissioner and

given opportunity for cross-examination,

what new fact would emerge? The evidence

would remain the same:

30.32.4.1. The resolution does not exist in official

records; - 184 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.32.4.2. The signatures of the petitioners are

undisputed;

30.32.4.3. The document has obvious

irregularities.

30.33. None of these facts would change with

examination and cross-examination.

30.34. The standard of proof in quasi-judicial

proceedings like removal under Section 41 is the

"balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of

probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt" as

in criminal proceedings.

30.35. The preponderance of probabilities test requires

that the evidence in support of the allegation

must outweigh the evidence against it. In the

present case, the documentary evidence

overwhelmingly establishes the allegations. The

petitioners have not produced any credible - 185 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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counter-evidence. Therefore, the standard is

easily met.

30.36. From the above it is clear that

30.36.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasi-

judicial, it does not mandate trial-like

procedures with examination and cross-

examination of witnesses;

30.36.2. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir mandates fairness,

thoroughness, and application of mind, not

trial-like procedures;

30.36.3. "Full-fledged inquiry" means proper,

thorough, and fair inquiry, not trial-like

inquiry;

30.36.4. The Regional Commissioner conducted a

full-fledged inquiry by examining all

materials, affording the petitioners multiple

opportunities to respond, and passing a

reasoned decision; - 186 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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30.36.5. In the present case, given the documentary

nature of the evidence, examination of

witnesses was not necessary;

30.36.6. The procedure followed by the Regional

Commissioner fully complies with Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir principles and with

principles of natural justice.

30.37. I answer Point No. 4 by holding that the

Regional Commissioner was not required to

conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of

specific charges and examination of

witnesses. The inquiry conducted was

adequate, proper, and in compliance with

law.

31. Answer to point No. 5 -- Whether the impugned order of removal suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable exercise of power, or extraneous considerations, particularly having regard to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the - 187 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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scheduled election to the posts of president and vice-president of the city municipal council?

31.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submits that:

31.1.1. The impugned order suffers from

arbitrariness and mala fides as evidenced

by the timing. The objections were filed on

27.02.2025 at 3 p.m., and the order was

passed at 6:30 p.m. on the same day. This

shows "mortal hurry and haste";

31.1.2. The elections to the posts of President and

Vice-President were scheduled for

28.02.2025 (next day). The removal order

was passed in such haste to prevent the

petitioners from voting in those elections;

31.1.3. The removal of three elected councillors

results in reduction of the total number of

council members, which helps the ruling - 188 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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party by changing the composition of the

council in their favor;

31.1.4. The Regional Commissioner has passed an

order to benefit the ruling party and not in

public interest. This is extraneous

consideration vitiating the order;

31.1.5. The entire proceeding is a vendetta against

the petitioners for their political opposition

or for their vote in the council;

31.1.6. An order passed in such haste, within 3.5

hours of the written submissions, cannot be

a product of careful consideration;

31.1.7. The malice is evident from the fact that

such drastic action was taken only after the

scheduled elections were announced.

31.2. The learned Advocate General submits:

31.2.1. The timing of the order is explained by the

chronology of events and is not indicative

of mala fides. The proceedings were - 189 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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initiated on 31.01.2025. By 27.02.2025,

the facts were already clear from the

documentary evidence;

31.2.2. The order was passed on 27.02.2025

because the written submissions were filed

on 27.02.2025 by 3 p.m., as directed by

this Court's order in WP No. 101414/2025;

31.2.3. The Regional Commissioner had a duty to

act once the misconduct was established.

Delaying action would have been dereliction

of duty, not good administration;

31.2.4. The speed of decision-making is

commendable, not suspicious. A quick

decision based on clear evidence is better

administration than a delayed decision;

31.2.5. Even if removing the petitioners benefited

the ruling party (which is not established),

it does not make the action mala fide if the

action was otherwise legally justified; - 190 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.2.6. The petitioners' political alignment or

political consequences are irrelevant to the

question of whether misconduct is

established;

31.2.7. The allegations of misconduct had surfaced

months earlier. It is not as if the action was

taken suddenly or arbitrarily.

31.3. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must

show that:

31.3.1. The authority acted for an improper

purpose or with an improper motive;

31.3.2. The authority acted on extraneous

considerations unrelated to the subject

matter;

31.3.3. There is clear evidence of an improper

motive that prompted the action.

31.4. It is a settled principle that mere suspicion,

conjecture, or inference is not sufficient to - 191 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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establish mala fides. Allegations of bad faith

are serious in nature and must be supported

by cogent, specific and convincing material.

Courts have repeatedly held that mala fides

cannot be presumed; they must be clearly

pleaded and strictly proved.

31.5. To establish mala fides, it is not enough to

demonstrate that the impugned action had an

incidental consequence of benefiting a third

party. Administrative actions often have

collateral effects. The mere fact that someone

derives advantage from a decision does not,

by itself, render the decision mala fide.

31.6. What must be established is that the action

was taken because of the desire to confer that

benefit, that the alleged improper purpose was

the real motive behind the decision. In other

words, the benefit to the third party must be

shown to be the express or dominant reason - 192 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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for the action, and not merely a consequential

or incidental outcome.

31.7. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily

on the person who alleges it. The pleadings

must be specific, the material must be

credible, and the inference must be

inescapable. Bald assertions, general

allegations, or speculative conclusions do not

satisfy this requirement.

31.8. Thus, unless there is clear material to

demonstrate that the authority acted with an

improper motive or for an extraneous purpose,

the action cannot be invalidated on the ground

of mala fides merely because it incidentally

benefited or disadvantaged a particular party.

31.9. A careful examination of the timeline shows that

the action was neither hasty nor arbitrary: - 193 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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- 14.08.2024: FIR registered against the

petitioners and others for forgery;

- 24.01.2025: Municipal Commissioner

submitted proposal to Deputy Commissioner

for action against petitioners under Section

41;

- 28.01.2025: Deputy Commissioner

forwarded the proposal to Regional

Commissioner;

- 31.01.2025: Regional Commissioner issued

show-cause notice;

- 06.02.2025: Notice served on petitioners;

- 07.02.2025: Another notice issued fixing

hearing on 13.02.2025; - 194 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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- 13.02.2025: Petitioners appeared before

Regional Commissioner. Regional

Commissioner passed an order removing the

petitioners;

- 14.02.2025: Order challenged in WP No.

101414/2025;

- 24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 partly

allowed. Liberty granted to file reply by

27.02.2025 by 3 p.m.;

- 27.02.2025: Petitioners filed reply at 3 p.m.

Regional Commissioner considered the reply

and passed the impugned order at 6:30 p.m.;

- 28.02.2025: Elections to posts of President

and Vice-President scheduled. - 195 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.10. This timeline shows that the proceeding was

initiated in late January 2025, well before the

elections were scheduled. The final decision

came only after the petitioners had filed their

detailed reply. There was nothing hasty or

arbitrary about this timeline.

31.11. The petitioners argue that the order was passed

at 6:30 p.m. on the same day the reply was

filed, showing "mortal hurry and haste". This

argument is without merit because:

31.11.1. The Facts Were Already Clear: By

27.02.2025, the Regional Commissioner

had already examined the documentary

evidence thoroughly. The resolution

register, the forged document, and the

official records were already before him;

31.11.2. The Reply Did Not Add Material Facts:

The petitioners' reply of 27.02.2025 did not - 196 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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introduce any new documentary evidence

that would require further investigation. It

was merely an explanation of their conduct;

31.11.3. Only 3.5 Hours But Clear Conclusion:

The decision to remove could be made

within 3.5 hours because the evidence was

clear and the law was settled. The Regional

Commissioner did not need days to reach

this conclusion;

31.11.4. Speed is Not a Vice: In administrative

law, speed of decision-making is not a vice.

In fact, delayed decision on clear facts is a

vice.

31.11.5. A prompt decision taken on the basis of

clear, undisputed and reliable material is

not only permissible but commendable.

Administrative authorities are entrusted

with responsibility to act decisively when

the facts are evident and the legal position - 197 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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is clear. Unnecessary delay in such

circumstances may defeat the purpose of

the statute and allow continuing harm to

public interest.

31.11.6. Where documentary evidence is clear,

records are unambiguous, and the

explanation offered does not displace the

material relied upon, the authority is not

required to prolong proceedings merely to

demonstrate procedural length. Efficiency

and fairness are not mutually exclusive. A

reasoned and timely decision based on

cogent material reflects responsible

governance.

31.11.7. On the other hand, delay in acting upon

clear facts may amount to administrative

inertia. Prolonged inaction can result in

continued loss to public exchequer, erosion

of institutional credibility, or perpetuation - 198 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of illegality. The law does not expect

authorities to remain passive when material

justifying action is available.

31.11.8. Thus, promptness, when accompanied by

due consideration and observance of

natural justice, is a virtue in administrative

decision-making. What is prohibited is

haste without application of mind; what is

encouraged is timely action grounded in

clear evidence and reasoned satisfaction.

31.11.9. The Reply Confirmed, Did Not Change,

the Position: The reply filed by the

petitioners, instead of offering a credible

defence, actually confirmed the allegations,

since the signatures were admitted passing

of the resolution was pleaded, even when

there was no such resolution on the records

of the Municipal Council. The reply having

admitted the facts and having failed to - 199 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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rebut them, the Regional Commissioner has

legitimately reached his conclusion quickly.

31.12. The petitioners argue that the removal "helps the

ruling party" by reducing the number of council

members. Even if this is true, it is irrelevant to

the question of whether the order is legal.

31.13. The legality of an administrative action must be

tested on the touchstone of statutory authority,

procedural fairness, and relevance of

considerations. It cannot be invalidated merely

because it has incidental political consequences.

31.14. In a democratic framework, many decisions

taken under law may incidentally alter political

equations or affect the strength of a party within

a body. Such consequences, by themselves, do

not render the action illegal. The decisive

question is not whether the action produces

political fallout, but whether it is justified on its - 200 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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merits under the governing statute.

31.15. If the authority acts within jurisdiction, follows

the prescribed procedure, considers relevant

material, and records reasons, the action must

be upheld even if it incidentally benefits or

disadvantages a political grouping. Courts do not

sit in judgment over political consequences; they

examine legality.

31.16. To hold otherwise would paralyse statutory

governance. Any lawful action against an elected

representative could then be challenged merely

on the ground that it alters political balance.

That is not the test. The test is whether the

action is lawful, fair, and supported by material.

31.17. Therefore, where the impugned action is justified

on its merits and complies with statutory

requirements, the existence of incidental political

consequences does not vitiate it. - 201 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.18. Moreover, the petitioners have not established

that the reduction of council members would

indeed benefit the ruling party. The composition

of the council after removal would depend on

various factors, which the petitioners have not

analysed and submitted.

31.19. The petitioners allege that the action is a

vendetta against them for their political

opposition. However, there is no evidence to

support this allegation. What is evident is:

31.19.1. Clear Misconduct: The misconduct

(forgery of resolution, forged signature) is

clearly established by documentary

evidence;

31.19.2. Independent Complaint: The complaint

was filed by the Municipal Commissioner,

not by any political party or political rival of

the petitioners; - 202 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.19.3. Criminal Courts Validated the

Complaint: The criminal court, in its

discretion, found the complaint credible

enough to require investigation. The

criminal court declined to quash the FIR;

31.19.4. The Supreme Court Did Not Interfere:

When the petitioners challenged the

criminal court order before the Supreme

Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the

challenge without finding the complaint to

be frivolous;

31.19.5. No Prior Pattern: This is not a case where

the Regional Commissioner has acted

arbitrarily against many people. There is no

evidence of a vendetta pattern.

31.20. The allegation of vendetta is a convenient but

unsubstantiated assertion. - 203 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.21. The petitioners argue that the order was passed

to prevent them from voting in the elections

scheduled for 28.02.2025. This argument suffers

from several defects:

31.21.1. Causal Relationship Not Established:

Merely because the order was passed

before the elections does not establish that

it was passed because of the elections. The

Regional Commissioner had a duty to pass

the order once the misconduct was

established;

31.21.2. Legitimate Purpose: Even if the order

prevented the petitioners from voting

(which is a consequence of removal), it was

a legitimate consequence flowing from the

removal, not the motive for the removal;

31.21.3. Decisions Cannot Be Delayed for

Elections: If the Regional Commissioner

had deferred action until after the elections, - 204 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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he might be accused of being guided by

extraneous considerations (giving the

petitioners opportunity to vote). A court

cannot expect the Regional Commissioner

to defer a legally justified action because of

impending elections;

31.21.4. The Elections Were Scheduled Later:

The elections were not scheduled before

the proceedings were initiated. The

elections were scheduled much later

(28.02.2025), after the proceedings had

been underway for nearly a month;

31.21.5. The Action Was Not Timed for

Elections: If the action was timed for

elections, the Regional Commissioner would

have acted earlier (immediately after

initiation of proceedings) or deferred action

until after elections. The fact that the action

came in between (late in the proceedings - 205 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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but before elections) does not suggest that

the action was timed for elections.

31.22. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must

prove it by clear and cogent evidence.

31.23. Mala fides is a serious allegation. It imputes

improper motive, bad faith, or abuse of power.

Such an allegation cannot be lightly made or

casually inferred.

31.24. It is well settled that mala fides cannot be

deduced merely from the consequences of an

action. An administrative decision may produce

adverse effects, benefit certain persons, or alter

existing positions. These consequences, by

themselves, do not establish bad faith. What

must be shown is that the action was motivated

by an improper purpose or was influenced by

extraneous considerations unrelated to the

statutory object. - 206 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.25. There must be clear, specific and cogent material

to demonstrate that the authority acted not for

the purpose contemplated by law, but for some

collateral or ulterior motive. Suspicion,

conjecture, or inference drawn from surrounding

circumstances is insufficient unless supported by

credible evidence.

31.26. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily on

the person who alleges it. Courts have

repeatedly held that allegations of bad faith must

be pleaded with precision and proved with

convincing material. Vague or general assertions

do not meet this standard. Since mala fides is

often alleged but rarely established, courts

exercise caution and do not readily infer

improper motive unless the evidence is clear,

unambiguous and compelling.

31.27. Therefore, in the absence of specific material

demonstrating extraneous considerations or - 207 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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deliberate abuse of power, the action of a

statutory authority cannot be set aside merely on

allegations of mala fides.

31.28. In the present case, the petitioners have not

discharged this burden. They have merely raised

suspicions based on timing, which are inherently

ambiguous and susceptible to multiple

interpretations.

31.29. In administrative law, when the evidence

supports the action and when there is a benign

interpretation consistent with the facts, courts

should adopt the benign interpretation.

31.30. If an impugned action is capable of being

explained consistently with statutory authority

and can be justified on its merits by reference to

relevant material, courts ought not to infer mala

fides merely because another possible

interpretation may suggest an improper motive. - 208 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.31. Administrative decisions often admit of more

than one interpretation. The existence of an

alternative narrative or a speculative inference of

bad faith does not, by itself, invalidate the

action. The court's task is to examine whether

the decision is legally sustainable, supported by

relevant considerations, and taken within

jurisdiction.

31.32. Where the record discloses a lawful basis for the

action, and the reasons furnished are germane to

the statutory purpose, the court will not

substitute conjecture for evidence. Mala fides

cannot be presumed simply because the action is

adverse to the petitioner or politically

inconvenient. It must be affirmatively established

by clear and cogent material.

31.33. Thus, if the action is objectively defensible in law

and on facts, courts should refrain from

attributing improper motive merely because a - 209 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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different interpretation is conceivable. The

doctrine of mala fides requires proof of deliberate

misuse of power, not the mere possibility of it.

31.34. In the present case, the action can be easily

explained consistently with the law:

31.34.1. The Regional Commissioner received the

proposal for action on 28.01.2025;

31.34.2. He initiated proceedings on 31.01.2025;

31.34.3. He heard the petitioners on 13.02.2025 and

passed an order, which was challenged;

31.34.4. The court partly allowed the challenge and

directed further opportunity;

31.34.5. The Regional Commissioner afforded that

opportunity and received the reply on

27.02.2025;

31.34.6. He carefully considered the reply and the

materials and decided to uphold the

removal. - 210 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.35. This is a straightforward, chronologically rational

sequence. There is no need to invoke mala fides

or extraneous considerations.

31.36. A careful reading of the impugned order shows

that the Regional Commissioner has:

31.36.1. Examined all the materials on record;

31.36.2. Considered the explanation offered by the

petitioners;

31.36.3. Applied the legal principles laid down by the

Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir

case;

31.36.4. Distinguished between the contentions of

the petitioners and the facts;

31.36.5. Reached a clear conclusion with reasons;

31.36.6. Shown that the statutory requirements of

Section 41 are satisfied.

31.37. The order does not appear to be the order of a

person acting arbitrarily or with mala fides. It - 211 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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appears to be the order of a person who has

applied his mind carefully to the materials.

31.38. From the above it is clear that

31.38.1. The allegation of mala fides is not

substantiated by clear and cogent

evidence;

31.38.2. The timing of the order is explained by the

chronology of events and is not suspicious;

31.38.3. The speed of decision-making (within 3.5

hours) is permissible when the facts are

clear;

31.38.4. The political consequences, even if they

exist, do not make a legally justified action

illegal;

31.38.5. The allegation of vendetta is not proved;

31.38.6. The order was passed because the

misconduct was established, not because of

extraneous considerations; - 212 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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31.38.7. The Regional Commissioner applied his

mind carefully to reach his decision;

31.38.8. The impugned order does NOT suffer from

arbitrariness, mala fides, or colourable

exercise of power.

31.39. I Answer Point No. 5 by holding that the

impugned order does not suffer from

arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable

exercise of power, or extraneous

considerations.

32. Answer to Point No. 6 -- Whether the drastic consequence of removal and consequential disqualification of the petitioners is disproportionate and unsustainable in law, having regard to the constitutional mandate protecting democratic local self-government and the rights of the electorate?

32.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submits that: - 213 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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32.1.1. Removal from office and disqualification for

four years is a drastic consequence. It

affects not just the petitioners but also the

electorate who have chosen them;

32.1.2. The doctrine of proportionality requires that

the punishment must fit the crime. Here,

the consequence is grossly disproportionate;

32.1.3. The Constitution protects local self-

government through Part IX-A. This

protection should not be lightly disregarded;

32.1.4. The rights of the electorate to be

represented by their chosen representatives

should be respected;

32.1.5. The disqualification prevents the petitioners

from contesting the elections scheduled for

January 2027, which is a grave

consequence;

32.1.6. The petitioners may ultimately be acquitted

in the criminal case. If they are acquitted, - 214 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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removal based on charges that are later

found to be baseless would be unjust;

32.1.7. The doctrine of proportionality, requires that

the punishment should not shock the

judicial conscience.

32.2. The learned Advocate General submits:

32.2.1. The doctrine of proportionality must be

applied by comparing the gravity of the

misconduct with the severity of the

punishment;

32.2.2. In the present case, the misconduct

(forgery of documents, forging of

signatures, violation of court orders) is

among the gravest. It goes to the root of

honesty and integrity;

32.2.3. Removal is the only appropriate

punishment for such grave misconduct.

Lesser punishment would be inadequate; - 215 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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32.2.4. The constitutional protection for local self-

government is not a protection for persons

who abuse their office. It is a protection for

honest, accountable local self-government;

32.2.5. The petitioners have betrayed the trust of

the electorate who voted for them.

Removal serves the interests of the

electorate, not undermines it;

32.2.6. The doctrine of proportionality does not

require courts to be lenient with persons

guilty of grave misconduct;

32.2.7. The disqualification is a statutory

consequence under Section 16 of the KMA.

Once removal is justified, disqualification

follows automatically;

32.2.8. Even if the petitioners are acquitted in the

criminal case, the administrative

proceedings stand on their own merits - 216 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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based on the administrative standard of

proof.

32.3. The doctrine of proportionality requires that the

punishment must be proportionate to the

misconduct. This doctrine does not require

courts to be lenient with wrongdoers. It requires

courts to ensure that the punishment is not

grossly out of proportion to the misconduct.

32.4. In the present case, removal is NOT grossly

disproportionate to the misconduct. Rather, it is

the only appropriate punishment.

32.5. To assess proportionality, one must first assess

the gravity of the misconduct. The misconduct in

the present case is extremely grave: - 217 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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32.5.1. Forgery of Official Documents: Creating

a forged resolution purporting to be passed

by the City Municipal Council is a serious

criminal act. It involves deliberate

dishonesty and fraud;

32.5.2. Forging Signatures: Forging the

signature of the Municipal Commissioner is

an even more serious act. It is a criminal

offence under the Indian Penal Code;

32.5.3. Violation of Court Orders: By creating a

resolution contrary to this Court's orders in

WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners have

shown contempt for judicial authority;

32.5.4. Betrayal of Public Trust: Elected

representatives are trustees of public

property and public interest. By forging

documents to benefit unauthorised

occupants and defeat court orders, the - 218 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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petitioners have betrayed the public trust in

the most serious manner;

32.5.5. Harm to Municipal Interests: The

petitioners' conduct has caused substantial

harm to the Municipality. Unauthorised

occupants have obtained documents that

might be used to claim rights over valuable

municipal property;

32.5.6. Attempted Deception of Court: The

forged resolution was actually produced

before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022.

The petitioners tried to use the forged

document to mislead the Court;

32.5.7. Pattern of Misconduct: The misconduct is

not a one-time error but a planned,

deliberate scheme involving multiple acts--

creation of fake resolution, forging of

signature, issuance of possession - 219 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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certificates, production of forged document

before Court.

32.6. Measured against these factors, the misconduct

is among the gravest kinds of misconduct that

can be committed by an elected representative.

32.7. When we compare the misconduct in this case

with other cases where removal has been

upheld, we find that the present case involves

more serious misconduct:

32.7.1. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District

Collector, Raigad, the removal was for

alleged nepotism and improper

appointment. Removal was upheld;

32.7.2. In Indrajit Barua v. Election

Commission, the disqualification for

corrupt electoral practices was upheld; - 220 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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32.7.3. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of

Punjab, the removal for improper

proceedings was upheld;

32.8. In the present case, the misconduct (forgery and

fraud) is more serious than nepotism, improper

appointment, or administrative default.

Therefore, removal is certainly justified.

32.9. The doctrine of proportionality requires courts to

ask the following questions:

32.9.1. Is the punishment authorized by law?

YES. Section 41 authorizes removal, and

Section 16 provides for disqualification.

32.9.2. Is the punishment linked to a

legitimate governmental objective?

YES. Removal from office and

disqualification are linked to the objective - 221 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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of maintaining integrity of local self-

government and protecting public trust.

32.9.3. Is there a rational connection between

the punishment and the objective? YES.

A person guilty of forgery and fraud cannot

be allowed to continue in a position of

public trust. Removal and disqualification

maintain the integrity of local self-

government.

32.9.4. Is the punishment minimally impairing

of rights? The answer is more nuanced

here. Removal is severe, but it is the only

punishment that adequately addresses the

gravity of the misconduct. Lesser

punishment (like suspension or demotion)

would be inadequate for crimes like

forgery.

32.9.5. Is the effect proportionate to the

important objective? YES. The objective, - 222 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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maintaining integrity of local self-

government, is critical to democracy. The

effect, removal and disqualification, is

proportionate to the gravity of the

misconduct that undermines this objective.

32.10. In conclusion, when the doctrine of

proportionality is properly applied, removal is

found to be proportionate and justified.

32.11. The petitioners invoke the constitutional

protection for local self-government under Part

IX-A of the Constitution. This Court

acknowledges the importance of this

constitutional mandate. However, the Court

notes:

32.11.1. The Protection is Not Absolute: The

constitutional protection for local self-

government is not a protection for - 223 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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dishonest or fraudulent self-government. It

is a protection for honest, accountable, and

transparent local self-government;

32.11.2. The Constitution Assumes Integrity:

The Constitution's mandate for local self-

government is based on the assumption

that local representatives will be honest

and accountable. When that assumption is

violated, the constitutional protection

cannot shield the wrongdoer;

32.11.3. The Constitution Also Protects Public

Interest: The Constitution protects both

local self-government and public interest.

When they conflict, public interest prevails.

Here, public interest requires removal of

persons guilty of forgery;

32.11.4. Democratic Legitimacy is Not

Unlimited: While elected representatives

have democratic legitimacy, that legitimacy - 224 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025

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is conditional on discharging their duties

honestly and lawfully. When that condition

is violated, removal is not only justified but

necessary.

32.12. The petitioners argue that removal violates the

rights of the electorate who chose them.

However, this argument is fallacious. The

electorate's right is to honest representation, not

to representation by persons guilty of forgery

and fraud. When elected representatives betray

the trust placed in them, removal serves the

interests of the electorate, not undermines it.

32.13. The petitioners were not elected to forge

documents and defraud the electorate. They