Smt. Tandra Das vs Sri Rajib Lochan Das & Ors
- Citation2018 SCC OnLine Cal 3959
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where an applicant submits an application within an extended deadline set by a corrigendum, but the original advertisement required maintenance of a specified closing balance on the deadline, the eligibility condition requires the applicant to maintain that closing balance as of the extended deadline set by the corrigendum, not the original deadline. The conjunction "or" in the eligibility requirement, when read with both the original advertisement and the corrigendum, means the applicant must satisfy the balance requirement as of the deadline applicable to when they submitted their application. An essential eligibility condition in a statutory advertisement cannot be relaxed or altered by a government functionary who has no role to play in the award process, even if that functionary issues a letter of policy clarification; such action at the behest of a person without authority over the matter is ultra vires and vitiates the award decision. The implementing authority must properly ascertain the facts before acting on such directive, and must not mechanically proceed without bringing material factual inaccuracies to the attention of the directing authority. A statutory authority must scrupulously observe the procedural requirements and eligibility conditions it has itself published, and cannot depart from them without rational justification; relaxation of an essential eligibility condition that was initially the basis for rejection of an applicant's candidature would constitute denial of equal opportunity to other applicants and is against public interest.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
For the appellants : Mr. Milan Chandra Bhattacharya,
Mr. Dilip Kumar Chatterjee,
Ms. Sulagna Bhattacharya,
Mr. Mrinmoy Bhattacharya.
For the respondent no.1 : Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee,
Mr. Ayan Banerjee,
Ms. Debasree Dhamali.
For the respondent no.2 : Mr. M.S. Yadav.
Hearing concluded on : June 12, 2018
Judgment on : June 25, 2018 SHAMPA SARKAR, J. :
1. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated April 30, 2018 in WP No. 11363
(W) of 2016 (Rajib Lochan Das vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Ors.),
filed by the respondent no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the writ petitioner),
the appellant (respondent no.6 in the writ petition), has filed this intra-court
writ appeal.
2. By the said judgment and order, the learned Judge was pleased to quash the
Letter of Intent dated April 27, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the letter of
intent) issued in favour of the appellant, and the Indian Oil Corporation
Limited (hereinafter referred to as the oil company) was directed to proceed
with holding a re-draw, as was informed to the writ petitioner, by letter
dated January 20, 2015, with a further direction that the said re-draw must
be held within a period of four weeks from the date of communication
thereof.
3. While hearing an application for stay of the judgment and order impugned in
this appeal, we decided to take up the appeal for final hearing on consent of
the parties.
4. The case of the writ petitioner is as follows:
a. Pursuant to a notice by advertisement published in the "Ananda Bazar
Patrika" on January 21, 2014, inviting applications under Rajiv Gandhi
Gramin LPG Vitrak (RGGLV) Scheme, the writ petitioner had applied for
award of LPG distributorship under the OBC category for Singhee area in the district of Birbhum. As per the said notice, amongst other
stipulations, the applicants were required to have a minimum closing
balance of Rs. 4 lakh in their bank accounts on the last date of
submission of their applications.
b. Originally, as per the advertisement dated January 21, 2014, the last
date for submission of the applications, alongwith all relevant
documents and information, was February 24, 2014. A corrigendum
was subsequently published in the newspaper on February 23, 2014,
extending the last date for submission of the applications to March 24,
2014.
c. The oil company informed the writ petitioner that he had qualified for
the draw and he was asked to send proof of having maintained a sum of
Rs. 4 lakh, till March 24, 2014 (extended date as per the corrigendum),
in the bank account mentioned by him in his application.
d. The writ petitioner was further informed by the oil company, after the
first draw, that there would be a re-draw, consequent to the
cancellation of the candidature of the selected applicant in the first
draw, during Field Verification of Credentials (hereinafter referred to as
the FVC). The writ petitioner was asked to be personally present for the
re-draw at 11:00 am on February 12, 2015, at the office of the oil
company. The re-draw was to be held amongst the remaining eligible
candidates. Finally, by a letter dated February 9, 2015, the writ
petitioner was informed that due to some administrative reasons, the
re-draw had been kept in abeyance.
e. Thereafter, on enquiry, the writ petitioner came to know that the
candidature of the appellant, who had been selected in the first draw,
stood cancelled subsequently due to disclosure of some incorrect
information by her.
f. The writ petitioner, in the meanwhile, had also lodged objections
before various authorities of the oil company pointing out the
ineligibility of the appellant, for award of the LPG distributorship. As
the authorities of the oil company did not dispose of the objections
raised by him, the writ petitioner made an application under the Right
to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the RTI Act), asking
for copies of the documents filed by all the applicants and for
information regarding the reasons for the postponement of the re-draw,
as also the reasons for cancellation of the candidature of the appellant.
By a memo dated April 29, 2015, the oil company partially supplied to
the writ petitioner the information sought, as well as the documents
furnished by the appellant. The writ petitioner was informed that
during field verification, the information supplied by the appellant, in
respect to the availability of adequate fund of Rs. 4 lakh was found
inconsistent with the actual available funds. However, the reason for
postponement of the re-draw was not made available.
g. The writ petitioner, once again, made an application under the RTI Act,
asking for the reason for postponement of the second draw.
h. It was at this stage that the authorities of the oil company, without
informing the writ petitioner the reason for postponement of the re-
draw, issued the letter of intent in favour of the appellant on April 27,
2016, although, the appellant had, on an earlier occasion, found to be
ineligible during the FVC.
5. Aggrieved by the issuance of the letter of intent under the RGGLV Scheme in
favour of the appellant, the writ petitioner filed the application under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for cancellation of the
letter of intent impugned therein.
6. In the affidavit-in-opposition of the oil company used in the proceedings
before the learned Judge, it was, inter alia, stated that in course of the FVC,
the relevant committee found that though the appellant had a balance of Rs.
4 lakh in her bank account on the last date indicated in the original
advertisement for submission of applications, that is, February 24, 2014,
she did not have a closing balance of Rs. 4 lakh on the last date mentioned
in the corrigendum dated February 23, 2014 for such submission, that is,
March 24, 2014. The committee came to a conclusion that the appellant had
failed to fulfil the said eligibility condition and recommended for rejection of
her candidature. It was further stated by the oil company that the appellant
was informed by a letter dated November 20, 2014, that she was not found
eligible for the LPG distributorship. The oil company also stated that it
subsequently came to know that the appellant had written a letter dated
December 1, 2014 to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas,
Government of New Delhi. By a letter dated July 13, 2015, the Directors of
Marketing of all the oil marketing companies, including the oil company
herein, were informed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, that the eligibility of a candidate
should be considered with reference to both the dates, namely, the last date
for submitting applications as per the original advertisement, as also the last
date as extended by the corrigendum. The said letter also stated that if a
candidate had the requisite fund on the last date, as originally advertised,
and had submitted the application before the said date, but had failed to
maintain the balance in his/her bank account on the extended last date,
rejection of his/her candidature would not be in consonance with the
principles of natural justice.
7. The oil company stated that on receipt of the letter dated July 13, 2015, its
Deputy General Manager was nominated to conduct a further FVC of the
eligibility of the appellant and pursuant to the recommendation thereafter,
the letter of intent dated April 27, 2016, was issued in favour of the
appellant.
8. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the appellant, it was stated that the
writ petitioner was not a permanent resident of Singhee Gram Panchayat,
although the advertisement was restricted to applicants of the said locality;
that the balance of Rs. 4 lakh on February 24, 2014 in the bank account
was sufficient fulfilment of the eligibility condition by the appellant and, as
such, cancellation of her candidature was subsequently recalled by the oil
company; that the Ministry had taken a decision to regularise the deposit of
Rs. 4 lakh on February 24, 2014 and to review its earlier order, as there
was substantial compliance with the condition as per the date mentioned in
the original advertisement; as such, the question of re-draw, as stated in the letter dated January 20, 2015 and as prayed for by the writ petitioner, did
not arise. It was also contended by the appellant that writ petitioner had not
acquired any vested or legal right in respect of the award of the LPG
distributorship and thus, could not challenge the decision of the oil
company to award the distributorship to the appellant.
9. It was argued on behalf of the writ petitioner by Mr Sakti Nath Mukherjee,
learned senior advocate before the learned Judge that as per the
corrigendum, the last date for submission of the applications was extended
till March 24, 2014, but the stipulation in the advertisement that all the
applicants had to maintain the requisite balance of Rs. 4 lakh in their bank
accounts on March 24, 2014 (extended last date), was never diluted. Any
alteration of the said condition by interference of a member of the
parliament or a government functionary, would amount to change in the
rules of the game after the game had started, which was illegal. The writ
petitioner relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Monarch
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation,
reported in (2000) 5 SCC 287, and Bahadursinh Lakhubai Gohil Vs.
Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 65, in order to emphasise
that it was a well-settled principle that if any decision is taken by a statutory
authority at the behest of a person who did not have a role to play, the same
would be ultra vires.
10. Mr Yadav, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the oil company argued
that the appellant had submitted her application on February 28, 2014, that
is, within the period extended by the corrigendum. He also produced the original records to demonstrate the same to the court. He further submitted
that the relevant committee after the FVC recommended that the
candidature of the appellant should be cancelled as she did not have the
requisite bank balance up to March 24, 2014 which amounted to non-
compliance of the condition stipulated in the corrigendum. Later, on the
instruction of the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas, the letter of intent was issued in favour of the
appellant.
11. Appearing before the learned Judge on behalf of the respondent no.6, that
is, the appellant herein, Mr. Milan Bhattacharyya, learned senior advocate
argued that the letter dated July 13, 2015 contained the communication of
the government policy with regard to awarding of LPG distributorship and as
such the decision in Bahadursinh Lakhubai Gohil (supra) had no
application. It was also argued that the writ petitioner had not averred that
he himself had maintained the balance of Rs. 4 lakh. Further, according to
Mr Bhattacharyya, the said condition in the advertisement was a collateral
condition and it was up to the oil company to decide the fate of the
applications in its wisdom. In support of this contention, Mr. Bhattacharya
relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Punjab Financial
Corporation Vs. Garg Steel, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 546, Union of India
Vs. R. Bhusal, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 36, Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs.
International Airport Authority of India, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628, and
Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal Vs. Union of India, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 315. He
also relied on the following decisions, namely, G.J. Fernandez Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 488, IRCTC Vs. Doshion Veolia Water
Solutions (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 13 SCC 364, and Michigan Rubber
(India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216.
12. The learned Judge on detailed consideration of the letter of cancellation of
the oil company and the letter dated July 13, 2015 issued by the Under
Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Gas, held that the action of the oil company in issuing the letter of intent in
favour of the appellant, acting upon the instruction of the government
authority contained in the letter July 13, 2015, was wrong because of the
relevant fact that the appellant had submitted her application, within the
extended period which was received by the oil company on February 28,
2014, and not within the last date as originally advertised.
13. According to the learned judge, the decisions in Punjab Financial
Corporation (supra) and R. Bhusal (supra), did not come to the aid of the
appellant, as from the pleadings in the writ petition and the disclosure made
in the affidavit filed by the oil company, the entire facts of the case could be
ascertained and it would not be difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the
action of the oil company was wrong. While discussing Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal
(supra) and the explanation in G.J. Fernandez (supra), the learned Judge
came to a finding that the condition of availability of balance of Rs. 4 lakh,
was an essential term of the advertisement and not a collateral one. The
learned Judge held that when the oil company, being a public authority, had
set a condition of eligibility, it was not entitled to depart therefrom without
rational justification. Admittedly, according to the learned Judge, the appellant had not fulfilled that eligibility condition, and as such, the award
of the letter of intent to the appellant, was against public interest.
14. For the reasons aforesaid, the letter of intent dated April 27, 2016, was
quashed by the learned Judge and the oil company was directed to proceed
with a re-draw, as envisaged in the letter dated January 20, 2015.
15. Such judgment and order has been challenged before us on various
grounds, inter alia, that the learned Judge ought to have decided the
eligibility of the writ petitioner without directing the re-draw on the basis of
misplaced sympathy; that the learned judge failed to take into account that
the writ petitioner himself suffered from a disqualification with regard to his
residential status; that the learned Judge erroneously held that the action of
the oil company in awarding the letter of intent to the appellant on the basis
of the communication dated July 13, 2015, was wrong; and that the learned
Judge erred in not holding that the appellant had fulfilled the eligibility
conditions as envisaged in the original advertisement.
16. More or less the same arguments, as noted above, were repeated by Mr.
Mukherjee, Mr. Yadav and Mr. Bhattacharya before us on behalf of the
respective parties.
17. We need to place on record, at this stage, two other contentions raised
before us, one by Mr. Bhattacharya and the other by Mr. Yadav.
18. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, the appellant had been to the office of the oil
company on February 24, 2014 with her application and other relevant
documents required in terms of the advertisement. On that day, Rs. 4 lakh was admittedly available in the appellant's bank account. However, the
application was not accepted on the ground that residential status of the
appellant had been certified by the Block Development Officer of the block
where she resides but such status had to be certified by the relevant Sub-
Divisional Officer. The appellant was asked to return on February 28, 2014
with the certificate of the Sub-Divisional Officer certifying her residential
status. Although the advertisement did not require the residential status of
an applicant to be certified by the Sub-Divisional Officer of the sub-division
where he/she resides, the appellant without entering into any quarrel and
bona fide believing what was told to her to be correct duly obtained the Sub-
Divisional Officer's certificate on February 27, 2014 and submitted the
application and the supporting documents on February 28, 2014. In view of
such facts, Mr. Bhattacharya urged that the candidature of the appellant
ought to be considered treating February 24, 2014 as the date of submission
of her application.
19. Mr. Yadav referred to a letter dated July 14, 2016 issued by the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India and contended on the basis thereof
that the Competent Authority having approved cancellation of advertisement
of all locations of RGGLVs where draw/re-draw is yet to be conducted, it is
now a purely academic issue as to whether the appellant could have been
considered eligible or not.
20. We consider it appropriate to deal with the aforesaid contentions, first.
21. During the course of hearing, we had enquired from Mr. Yadav as to the
truthfulness of the incident of February 24, 2014, narrated by Mr. Bhattacharya. The same was categorically denied and our attention was
invited to a portion of the prescribed application form where the date of
receipt of the application had to be inserted by the office of the oil company.
The date inserted in the application form submitted by the appellant reads
"28-02-2014". Relying thereon, Mr. Yadav contested the contention of Mr.
Bhattacharya and asserted that February 28, 2014 should be treated to be
the date on which she submitted her application.
22. By an order dated June 6, 2018, Mr. Yadav was directed to produce the
relevant records pertaining to the dispute. Pursuant thereto, he produced
the original records of the case before us on June 12, 2016.
23. It appears from the original records as produced before us that although the
appellant signed the application on February 24, 2014, the original envelope
in which the application and the supporting documents of the appellant had
been submitted to the oil company bears its seal with a receipt date of
February 28, 2014.
24. We also found such records to include a statement of accounts issued by the
Bolpur branch of Bank of Baroda (where the appellant maintained her bank
account) bearing the seal of the Branch Manager, dated February 28, 2014
indicating that on February 24, 2014, the appellant had a balance of Rs. 4
lakh. There is, however, no document in the official records that the
appellant did maintain the requisite closing balance of Rs. 4 lakh as on
March 24, 2014, that is, the last date for submission of applications, as
extended by the corrigendum.
25. We are not inclined to accept Mr. Bhattacharya's contention that there was a
real attempt on the part of the appellant to submit her application together
with the supporting documents on February 24, 2018, for more reasons
than one.
26. First, there is no pleading to that effect either in the affidavit-in-opposition
filed before the trial court by the appellant or in the stay application filed in
the appeal. A statement from the bar on a factual aspect, unsupported by an
affidavit, cannot be accepted.
27. Secondly, there is no contemporaneous document at the end of the
appellant whereby she apprised the oil company of the alleged incident of
February 24, 2014. Even in her letter dated December 1, 2014 addressed to
the Hon'ble Petroleum Minister, Government of India, which ultimately led to
issuance of the letter of the Under Secretary dated July 13, 2015, she did
not complain that despite her best intention to submit the application on
February 24, 2014, she could not do so and was compelled to submit the
same on February 28, 2014. Her version in the letter dated December 1,
2014 is that she was not aware that the money in her bank account was not
"withdrawable". If indeed the appellant had been to the office of the oil
company on February 24, 2014, there ought to have been some reflection of
her attempt in some document. That is of course not the case here.
28. Thirdly, copy of the statement of accounts, duly signed by the Manager of
Bolpur branch of Bank of Baroda on February 28, 2014, has been found in
the original records as part of the documents that the appellant had
submitted with her application. If indeed the appellant intended submission of her application on February 24, 2014, it defies logic as to how and why
the statement of accounts signed on February 28, 2014 could form part of
the documents received by the oil company. Although the appellant did have
Rs. 4 lakh in her bank account on February 24, 2014, the statement of
accounts was not signed by the branch manager on February 24, 2014.
Assuming that the statement of accounts was not required to accompany
the application in the prescribed form, as argued by Mr. Bhattacharya, but
on due consideration of the factual position that such statement dated
February 28, 2014 is found in the official records, it can be presumed that
the appellant's application was submitted on the same day. The contra-
submission that the appellant had attempted to submit it on February 24,
2014, in the circumstances, appears to us to be an after-thought.
29. Finally, we are of the view that the appellant cannot feign ignorance of
extension of the last date for submission of applications. She was aware that
initially February 24, 2014 was the last date. She must also have been
aware of the terms and conditions of the advertisement. If the oil company
had refused to accept her application on February 24, 2014 and she was
also not aware of extension of time till March 24, 2014 for submission of
applications as per the corrigendum dated February 23, 2014, the reaction
of the appellant that one would normally expect is raising of strong objection
to the effect that February 24, 2014 itself being the last date, she would be
losing the opportunity to submit the application. We have reasons to believe,
based on our appreciation of the materials on record, that the appellant was conscious of the fact that the last date had been extended till March 24,
2014 and, accordingly, had submitted her application on February 28, 2014.
30.The plea raised before us by Mr. Bhattacharya to treat February 24, 2014 as
the date of submission of application by the appellant, therefore, does not
impress us at all.
31.Turning our attention to the letter dated July 14, 2016 issued by the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India, we are of the clear view that the same
does not stand in the way of proceeding ahead with the re-draw directed by
the learned Judge. Mr. Yadav may be right in his submission that the
Government has taken a policy decision to continue RGGLV where draw or
redraw, as the case may be, is yet to be held, the letter reflects a clear
exception, that is, the policy will not apply to "advertised locations which are
under litigation". This is a case in respect of an advertised location which is
under litigation and, therefore, it is excepted.
32.Let us now consider whether the learned Judge was justified in returning the
findings he did.
33.Serial no. 10 of the prescribed application format required an applicant to give
particulars of the name of the bank where he/she maintains a savings bank
account. A particular column therein required mentioning of the "AMOUNT
IN SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNT in Bank/Post Office" in the name of the
applicant and member(s) of 'Family Unit'. A notarised affidavit as per the
format given in Appendix-B was also required. What is relevant in paragraph
10 is the note appended thereto reading as follows:
"Note: The amount declared above in each case must be available as closing balance on the last date for submission of application as specified in the advertisement or corrigendum (if any) and the same will be verified during Field Verification."
34.The language of the note corresponds to the term in the advertisement,
which is in vernacular, regarding the requirement of minimum closing
balance of Rs. 4 lakh as on the last date for submission of application as
specified in the advertisement or corrigendum (if any).
35.It would be evident from the discussions made by us above, while dealing with
Mr. Bhattacharya's submission in paragraph 18 supra, that the appellant
had indeed submitted her application on February 28, 2014, that is, beyond
the last date as per the advertisement but within the extended last date, as
per the corrigendum. Our reading of the note appended to paragraph 10 of
the application format together with the advertisement leads us to the
unmistakable conclusion that the eligibility condition of maintaining balance
of Rs. 4 lakh in the savings account of a bank/post office, in view of the
insertion of the conjunction 'or', and not 'and', between the words
'advertisement' and 'corrigendum', must be considered with reference to
both the dates. It could be possible for an applicant not to notice the
advertisement inviting applications when it is published, but to notice the
corrigendum. If thereafter he looks into the advertisement and submits an
application within the extended last date, his eligibility has to be considered
with reference to the last date of submission of applications as per the
corrigendum. Certainly, it cannot be considered with reference to the
original last date, because the application had not been filed within the last
date mentioned in the advertisement. That being so, he must have requisite balance in his savings account, be it in a bank or a post office, on the last
date for submitting applications as per the corrigendum. However, if an
applicant had submitted his application prior to issuance of the
corrigendum, say February 20, 2014, he was required to maintain the
balance as on February 24, 2014, that is, the last date as per the
advertisement. This was exactly the view of the Hon'ble Minister, expressed
by the Under Secretary in the letter, when he observed that "(E)ligibility
should be considered with reference to both the dates". We are of the opinion
that the relevant term as regards maintaining a balance of Rs. 4 lakh was
correctly interpreted by the Hon'ble Minister, although we cannot but
disagree with whatever appears therein in regard to the factual aspect. We
have no hesitation to hold that there was a serious error in understanding
the facts, as have transpired, which rendered the appellant's selection and
consequent issuance of the letter of intent in her favour, vitiated.
36. It would be apt at this stage to read the letter dated July 13, 2015. It is
reproduced below:
"Subject - Issues pertaining to Smt. Tandra Das for RGGLV in district Birbhum, West Bengal.
Sir,
It has been observed by Hon'ble MOS(I/C), PNG that the candidature of the successful candidates have been rejected on account of lack of requisite fund in the bank account on the extended date of submission of application. One such case of Smt. Tandra Das for RGGLV in Dist. Birbhum, West Bengal has come to the notice of Hon'ble Minister wherein the applicant had the requisite fund on the last date of submission of application as was originally advertised. However, by way of corrigendum, the last date of submission of application was extended by one more month. Probably the applicant did not have any knowledge about the notice of the revised last date of submission. The candidature of Smt. Das was rejected on the ground of non-availability of requisite fund on the last date of application as extended by the corrigendum, though the candidate had requisite funds on the last date as originally mentioned in the advertisement.
2. Hon'ble Minister feels that stand taken by OMCs is erroneous and not in public interest. In this case, there are two dates and both the dates need to be considered as originally advertised and as extended by the corrigendum. Eligibility should be considered with reference to both the dates. Therefore, if a candidate has requisites fund on the last date of application, as originally advertised and has submitted his/her application before the said date, his/her application should not be rejected. The act of rejecting such application by the OMCs is strictly not within the purview of natural justice. Similar provisions already exist in respect of selection of RO dealerships. Hence extending similar benefits to be LPG distributorships guidelines should not be an issue.
3. Hon'ble Minister has desired to issue necessary clarifications in the particular case.
4. An action taken report may be sent to this Ministry as the earliest so that the case may be submitted for the perusal of Hon'ble MOS(I/C), PNG."
(underlining by us for emphasis)
37.On the factual score, as would be evident from the portion underlined in the
aforesaid extract, we feel that the Hon'ble Minister was not properly briefed or
else, the findings would have been entirely different. The oil company, however,
without bringing it to the notice of the Hon'ble Minister that proper
representation of the factual aspect had not been made before him, proceeded
to act mechanically and issued the letter of intent in favour of the appellant.
Nothing could be more grossly wrong.
38.One of the points that Mr. Bhattacharya raised before us was that the
condition that required the applicants to maintain closing balance of Rs. 4 lakh
is not an essential condition.
39.We are afraid, we cannot agree with him. The oil company issued the
advertisement, in respect of diverse locations, expressing interest to enter into
business relations with individuals. Those selected would become distributors
of LPG in due course. Obviously, having regard to the responsibilities that are
to be shouldered by an LPG distributor, the oil company would not enter into
business relations with any individual who is either financially unstable or
weak. It is for the purpose of ascertaining the financial status of the applicants
that they were asked to indicate the closing balance in their savings accounts
on two specified dates and it was made clear to them that they should have at
least Rs. 4 lakh as closing balance on either of those, depending on the dates
when the applications are submitted. Bearing in mind the object that was
sought to be achieved by such condition, we wonder how the term could be
regarded as non-essential.
40.The learned Judge, in our considered view, was thus justified in interpreting
the contents of the corrigendum to mean that if the application with all the
documents was submitted within February 24, 2014, then, the balance of Rs. 4
lakh on February 24, 2014 was sufficient compliance, but if the application
was submitted beyond February 24, 2014, then the balance should be Rs. 4
lakh, on the date of submission of application, as extended by the
corrigendum, that is, March 24, 2014.
41.Admittedly, in the instant case, the appellant had submitted her application on
February 28, 2014, which was beyond the date fixed by the original
advertisement and as such, the appellant ought to have maintained the
balance of Rs.4 lakh at least on March 24, 2014.
42.The decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police Vs. Gordhandas
Bhanji, reported in AIR 1952 SC 16, supports the contention of Mr. Mukherjee
that any decision taken by a statutory authority at the behest of any other
person who has no role to play in the matter would be ultra vires. We are of the
view that the letter of intent was issued at the suggestion of and/or on the
advice of the Hon'ble Minister, as communicated by the Under Secretary, who
did not have any role to play in the matter, and the same (letter of intent) was
rightly quashed by the learned Judge.
43. Mr. Mukherjee relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra), with special
emphasis on paragraph 10, which is reproduced below:-
"10.....This rule was enunciated by Mr Justice Frankfurter in Viteralli v. Seaton, where the learned Judge said:
'An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. ....Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirement that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. .... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword'."
44. The decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab Financial Corporation (supra)
relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharya does not come to his aid, as in the instant
case, the averments made in the writ petition and in the affidavits-in-
opposition filed by the respondent, indicate that a writ of mandamus can be
issued on the basis of the pleadings and materials disclosed. R. Bhusal
(supra) also does not support the appellant's case, as the learned Judge has
not gone beyond the pleadings and has not acted on materials which were
not part of the record.
45. The ratio in Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) does not favour the case of the
appellant, because the oil company in the instant case had not altered the
conditions of eligibility by the subsequent corrigendum. Moreover, any
relaxation of the condition of maintaining a minimum bank balance of Rs. 4
lakh as on March 24, 2014, which the appellant did not maintain, would
amount to denial of equal opportunity to many other applicants.
46. Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal (supra) does not help the appellant, inasmuch as,
whether a condition in a notice inviting tender was an essential term or a
collateral term could only be ascertained by reference to the consequences of
non-compliance thereto. If non-fulfilment of the requirement resulted in
rejection of the tender, then it would be an essential condition of the tender;
otherwise, it would be a collateral term. The appellant appears to have
signed a declaration that if any information furnished in the application
format is later on found to be false or incorrect, her candidature would be
liable to be cancelled. The information that she furnished against serial no.
10 that she had a balance of Rs. 4 lakh was found to be incorrect with
reference to the last date for receiving applications, that is, March 24, 2014
which was the applicable date for her and, therefore, the oil company was
right in rejecting her candidature initially. The consequence of furnishing
false or incorrect information having been provided for in the application
format and the appellant having signed the declaration cannot now turn
around and take a contrary stand.
47.In this case, non-compliance of maintenance of minimum balance in the bank
account by the appellant initially resulted in the cancellation of the appellant's candidature. This goes to show that the condition cannot be termed as a
collateral one, as argued by Mr. Bhattacharya.
48.G.J. Fernandez (supra) also reiterates a similar view of the Supreme Court, as
expressed in Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal (supra). V. Punnen Thomas Vs. State of
Kerala, reported in AIR 1969 Ker 81 (FB) also does not apply to the facts and
circumstances of the case. In Michigan Rubber (Ltd.) (supra), the scope of
judicial interference in tender matters has been discussed. It has been held
that, court should not interfere unless the action of the authority was mala fide
or a misuse of statutory powers. In this case, the action of the oil company, in
issuing the letter of intent, on the dictates of the Hon'ble Minister/Under
Secretary, who was not connected with the process of grant of award of LPG
distributorship, was arbitrary, against public interest and unsustainable in
law, and, as such, warranted interference by this court in judicial review. The
decision in Doshion Veolia Water Solutions (supra) too does not have any
application at all since we have held the term in the advertisement requiring
closing balance of Rs. 4 lakh in the savings account as an essential.
49.We are of the further opinion that, it was within the domain of the oil company
to decide on the eligibility of the applicants and the oil company acted illegally
by issuing the letter of intent to the appellant on the dictates of the Hon'ble
Minister/Under Secretary, who had no role to play in the matter.
50.We also cannot accept the contention of the appellant that the learned Judge
ought to have considered whether the writ petitioner satisfied the eligibility
criteria regarding residential status, that is, whether he was a resident of
Singhee Gram Panchayat or not. As per the usual procedure, verification of the truthfulness of the disclosures made by the applicants are done after the
lottery/draw and if the writ petitioner succeeds in the re-draw, the oil company
would be bound to verify his documents thereafter.
51.Having perused the original records and having considered the arguments that
were advanced, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned judgment and
order dated April 30, 2018 does not suffer from any infirmity.
52.The oil company is directed to proceed with the re-draw, as proposed in its
letter dated January 20, 2015, within a period of four weeks from the date of
communication of this judgment and order.
53.We, however, make it clear that if the appellant has commenced business
pursuant to the letter of intent, she shall be at liberty to carry on with the same
for a period of two months from date, but not beyond. Within such time, the oil
company shall complete the process of selection. This breathing time is granted
bearing in mind the interests of the consumers of LPG of the location in
question. If, however, business pursuant to the letter of intent has not
commenced, law shall take its own course.
54.The appeal is, thus, dismissed without order for costs. The connected
application too stands dismissed.
55.Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order may be made available to
the parties on urgent basis, if an approach therefor is made.
(SHAMPA SARKAR, J.) (DIPANKAR DATTA, J.)
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