Sivanmalai Subramaniaswamy Devasthanam vs S. Muthusamy Gounder

NON-REPORTABLE 2025 INSC 1407 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1926/2010

SIVANMALAI SUBRAMANIASWAMY DEVASTHANAM REP. BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

S. MUTHUSAMY GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 03.08.2009 passed by

the High Court in Second Appeal No.732/1996, the defendants in

O.S. No.84/1990 have preferred this appeal.

2. Briefly stated the facts are that there were certain

proceedings which were initiated under the provisions of the

Tamil Nadu Inam (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari), Act,

1963 which resulted in orders in favour of the appellant

herein. However, liberty was reserved to the respondents herein

to file a suit seeking appropriate reliefs by the High

Court, as an Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated 22.09.1989.

3. On the strength of the said liberty, the respondents

Signature Not Verified herein preferred O.S. No.84/1990 before the sub-court Digitally signed by RADHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.10 11:20:01 IST Reason: 1 Dharapuram and sought the reliefs of declaration of title as

well as permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed by

the Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 11.01.1994.

4. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the

respondents/plaintiffs preferred a First Appeal before the

learned District Judge at Erode and the said First Appeal was

also dismissed. Hence, the Second Appeal No.732 of 1996 was

preferred by the respondents/plaintiffs before the High Court

by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section

100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”). The

Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial

questions of law:

“9. At the time of admission of the second appeal the following substantial questions of law were framed.

i) Whether the Court below has misinterpreted the provisions of section 8(1) and 8(2) of Minor Inams Abolition Act, 1963?

ii) Whether the Court below ought to have sent that provisions of Section 8 (2) of the Abolition Act would apply only when there is a grant of both warams to the religious institutions?”

Further, after hearing the learned senior counsel for the

appellant(s), another additional question of law was framed,

which reads as under:

“Whether the claim of the appellants is barred by res- judicata under Section 43 of the Minor Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1963?

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5. On considering the aforesaid substantial question of law,

the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial

Court as well as of the First Appellate Court and allowed the

Second Appeal. Consequently, the suit filed by the

respondents/plaintiffs was decreed. Hence, this appeal.

6. We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant

and learned senior counsel for the respondents. We have perused

the impugned judgment and the material on record.

7. During the course of submissions, Sri V. Prabhakar,

learned senior counsel for the appellant pointed out that the

High Court was not right in formulating the aforesaid

substantial questions of law. It was contended that the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC is

unique and to be exercised only on correct and appropriate

substantial questions of law to be formulated at the time of

admission of the Second Appeal. In other words, in the absence

of there being any substantial questions of law which arise in

the Second Appeal, the same ought to be simply dismissed at the

time of admission itself. But here is a case where the High

Court admitted the Second Appeal but the appropriate questions

of law were not at all raised inasmuch as according to the

learned senior counsel for the appellant, the aforesaid

questions did not arise at all. This is because once there is a

culmination of the proceedings under the provisions of the

3 Act, no further controversy on those proceedings could be

raised by way of filing of a civil suit, therefore, the High

Court in exercise of its appellate statutory jurisdiction while

granting the patta in favour of the appellant herein reserved

liberty to the respondents/ plaintiffs to seek reliefs

otherwise than arising under the provisions of the Act.

However, the High Court has raised substantial questions of law

only under the provisions of the Act, which are wholly

inappropriate. It was the submission of the learned senior

counsel for the appellant that the Second Appeal ought to have

been dismissed at the stage of admission. However, the

aforesaid substantial questions of law which are erroneously

raised has resulted in an erroneous judgment and decree in the

Second Appeal. Hence, the impugned judgment and decree may be

set aside and the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs may

be dismissed as there is no substantial question of law that

would arise in the case.

8. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondents supported the impugned judgment and decree and

contended that the High Court had rightly raised the aforesaid

substantial questions of law which have been answered correctly

and there is no merit in this appeal. It was contended that

both the Trial Court as well as the First

Appellate Court were not right in dismissing the suit filed by

4 the respondents/ plaintiffs and not granting the reliefs of

declaration of title and permanent injunction although the

respondents/plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit land

for several decades. Therefore, the findings on fact arrived at

by the Courts below were not just and proper and the dismissal

of the suit was incorrect. Therefore, the High Court was

justified in answering the substantial questions of law in

favour of the respondents and thereby decreeing the suit. It

was contended that there is no merit in this appeal.

9. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned

senior counsel for the respective parties and we have

considered the same in a juxtaposition with the impugned

judgment and decree. In paragraph 9 as already noted, the

substantial questions of law have been raised. It is necessary

to mention that the High Court in exercise of its statutory

appellate jurisdiction had reserved liberty to the

respondents/plaintiffs to seek appropriate reliefs by filing a

suit only after granting a patta and holding in favour of the

appellant herein. Therefore, the question of reconsideration of

those issues in the suit did not arise at all. No doubt,

liberty was reserved by the High Court to the

respondents/Plaintiffs to seek appropriate reliefs but de hors

the orders which were passed by the High Court while granting

the patta to the appellant herein.

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10. We find that the High Court was not right in raising the

aforesaid substantial questions of law besides under the

provisions of the Act. They were not on the basis of what would

have emerged on a reading of the judgment of the Trial Court

which was upheld by the First Appellate Court. In the

circumstances, we find that the High Court was not right in

raising the aforesaid substantial questions of law. If that is

so, we find that the impugned judgment and decree ought to be

set aside and the matter ought to be remanded to the High Court

so as to enable the High Court to raise the appropriate

substantial questions of law by restoring the Second Appeal

No.732 of 1996 on the file of the High Court. On such

restoration being made, the High Court shall now consider the

case of the respondents/plaintiffs for admission and if it so

finds, raise appropriate substantial questions of law and

dispose of the Second Appeal in accordance with law.

11. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is allowed

and disposed of without any order as to costs.

12. Since the Second Appeal is of the year 1996, we direct

the parties who are represented by their respective counsel to

appear before the High Court on 17.12.2025 without expecting

any separate notices from the said High Court.

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13. It is needless to observe that the Registry of the High

Court shall list the Second Appeal before the appropriate

Roster Bench on the said date and the matter shall be disposed

of as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period

of four months from 17.12.2025.

14. Since we have restored the Second Appeal No.732/1996 on

the file of Madras High Court, consequently interim order, if

any, in the said Second Appeal shall revive and continue

pending disposal of the appeal.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………………………………………………J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

………………………………………………………J. (R. MAHADEVAN) NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 26, 2025.

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ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.4 SECTION XII-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1926/2010

SIVANMALAI SUBRAMANISWAMY DEVASTHANAM REP BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER Appellant(s)

VERSUS

S. MUTHUSAMY GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 26-11-2025 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN

For Appellant(s) Mr. V. Prabhakar, Sr. Adv.

Ms. Jyoti Parashar, Adv.

Mr. N.j. Ramchandar, Adv.

Mr. R. Chandrachud, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR Mr. S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Om Prakash, Sr. Adv.

Mr. C. Prakasam, Adv.

Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Adv.

Ms. A. Rithikha, Adv.

Ms. Kanimozhi J, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

1. The appeal is allowed and disposed of in terms of the

signed non-reportable judgment.

2. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

(RADHA SHARMA) (DIVYA BABBAR) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)

(Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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