Silmo Devi vs State Of H.P
- Neutral2025:HHC:28511
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
In matrimonial disputes involving allegations of harassment or cruelty under Section 498-A IPC, the prosecution must establish specific allegations with particulars of date, time, and place of the alleged acts of cruelty; vague, general, and omnibus allegations lacking such specificity do not suffice to constitute the offence and may amount to an abuse of the process of law. Where testimony regarding alleged harassment is confined to general taunts without disclosure of their nature, content, frequency, or specific circumstances, such evidence is insufficient to establish cruelty as an ingredient of Section 498-A IPC. Material changes or shifts in the prosecution's case between the FIR and trial testimony—such as allegations against different persons or changed circumstances—cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case and make it suspect. The presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act that a suicide within seven years of marriage was abetted by the accused applies only where there is first proof of cruelty; the mere fact of suicide within seven years does not automatically trigger the presumption, and the discretion to raise it is exercised only on satisfactory evidence of cruelty. To establish the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC, the prosecution must prove the accused possessed the necessary mens rea and committed a positive proximate act of instigation that created circumstances leaving the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide; mere harassment, however sustained, is insufficient without evidence of such conscious deliberate intention on the part of the accused to drive another person to suicidal death. Where medical evidence establishes that the accused was suffering from a chronic incurable mental illness such as schizophrenia involving hallucinations and delusions, resulting in disorganisation of mental functions, the accused would not be in a rational state of mind to form the mens rea necessary for commission of the alleged offences.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
1 ( 2025:HHC:28511 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 276 of 2010 Reserved on: 30.07.2025
.
Decided on: 22.08.2025
Silmo Devi ........Appellant
Versus
State of H.P.
Coram r to .....Respondent
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant: Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the
judgment of conviction dated 31.07.2010 and order of
sentence dated 04.08.2010, passed by Learned Sessions
Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) vide
1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes
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which the appellant (accused) before the learned Trial
Court was convicted and sentenced as under:-
Sr. Offence Sentence Imposed
.
No.
1. 498-A To undergo simple imprisonment for a period IPC of three years, pay fine of ₹12,500/- and in
default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.
2. 306 IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period
of three years, pay fine of ₹12,500/- and in default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.
Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered
to run concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the
present appeal are that the police presented a challan
against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A
and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted
that the informant, Sudershan Singh (PW1), had three
daughters and one son. Meenu Kumari (since deceased)
was the eldest. She was married to Bhuvneshwar Singh on
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01.05.2005 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. One daughter
was born to her. No dowry was demanded at the time of
the marriage. However, the informant provided the gold
.
ornaments as per his capacity. Meenu told the informant
that her mother-in-law, Silmo Devi (present petitioner),
started taunting her that she had not brought anything at
the time of her marriage. The informant counselled
Meenu and told her that he would settle the matter. He
purchased a bed box, a Godrej almirah & bedding and
dropped all these articles in the matrimonial home of
Meenu. Silmo Devi told Meenu that instead of providing
the articles, the expenses of the delivery of the child
should have been provided. Meenu called her parental
home on 05.05.2007. The call was picked up by Poonam
(PW3). Meenu said that Silmo Devi was harassing and
taunting her by saying that she was good for nothing.
Charan Lal called the informant on 07.05.2007 at about
1:30 P.M. and informed him that Meenu had committed
suicide by hanging herself. The matter was reported to the
police. An entry No.35 (Ex. PW8/A) was recorded. ASI
Kamal Deep (PW10) went to the hospital for verification.
Sudershan(PW1) made a statement (Ex.PW1/A), which was
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sent to the police station where F.I.R. (Ex.PW9/A) was
registered. The photographs of the dead body (Ex.
PW10/A1 to Ex. PW10/A5) whose negatives are Ex.
.
PW10/A6 to Ex. PW10/A10 were taken. Kamal Deep (PW10)
conducted the inquest and prepared the report (Ex.
PW7/B). He filed an application (Ex.PW7/A) for
conducting the post-mortem examination of the dead
body. Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7) conducted the post-mortem
examination of the dead body and found that the cause of
death was asphyxia. He preserved the viscera and handed
them over to the police official accompanying the dead
body. He issued the report (Ex. PW7/C). ASI Kamal Deep
went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW10/B).
The photographs of the spot (Ex.PW10/A11 to
Ex.PW10/A14) whose negatives are Ex.PW10/A15 to
Ex.PW10/A18 were taken. The telephone receipt
(Ex.PW1/B) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). The viscera
and other belongings were sent to SFSL, Junga. Reports
(Exs. PX & PY) were issued stating that "dupatta" could
easily bear the weight of an average female body, and no
poison was detected in the viscera. The final report was
issued by Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7). Statements of
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remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version,
and after completion of the investigation, the challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Judicial
.
Magistrate, First Class-I, Palampur, who committed it to
the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala for
trial.
3. Learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at
Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) charged the accused
with the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC, to which she pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to
prove its case. Sudershan Singh (PW1) is the informant
and father of the deceased. Manjeet Kaur (PW2) is the
mother, Poonam (PW3) is the sister, and Smt. Udhma Devi
(PW4) was the grandmother of the deceased. Smt. Veena
Kumari (PW5) was looking after the public call office,
from where the deceased made a call to her home. Dr.
Anjana Tuli (PW6) examined the deceased and declared
her dead. Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7) conducted the post-
mortem examination. HHC Jaswant Singh (PW8) proved
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entry in the daily diary. Inspector Meghnath (PW9) signed
the F.I.R. and filed the charge-sheet before the Court. ASI
Kamal Deep (PW10) conducted the investigation.
.
5. The accused, in her statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its
entirety. She claimed that the deceased used to run away
from her matrimonial home without any reason. Her
parents were called, who asked the deceased why she was
running away from home. The mother of the deceased
advised her to live properly. The accused remained ill due
to a mental problem. She was getting treatment for her
mental disease. She never demanded any dowry and bore
the expenses of the delivery of the child. Statements of Dr.
R.S. Dhatwalia (DW1), Dr. A.K. Maini (DW2), S.K. Sharma
(DW3) and Chander Prabha (DW4) were recorded in
defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the relationship
between the parties was not disputed. The testimonies of
prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. It was
duly proved that the accused used to taunt the deceased.
Her father purchased household articles and left them in
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the matrimonial home of the deceased. The constant
taunting of the deceased by the accused would constitute
mental cruelty. The death had taken place within 07
.
years, and the presumption under Section 113A of the
Indian Evidence Act would apply. The deceased would
have confided to her relatives, and the non-examination
of an independent witness did not make the prosecution's
case doubtful. The defence evidence did not prove that the
accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act
and that whatever she was doing was wrongful or
contrary to law. Therefore, the defence evidence would
not help the accused. Consequently, the accused was
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the
present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court
overlooked the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence. The evidence was misappreciated. No
witness deposed that the accused had harassed the
deceased and created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act did not
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apply to the present case, and the learned Trial Court erred
in relying upon it. The accused is suffering from a chronic
disease of schizophrenia, and this fact was duly proved on
.
record. Her mental condition was such that she could not
make any demand for dowry. Therefore, it was prayed that
the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8.
I have heard Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Tek Chand, learned
counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr. Jitender K.
Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the
respondent-State.
9. Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Advocate
for the appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred in appreciating the evidence placed on record. The
statements made by the prosecution witnesses regarding
the cruelty were highly vague. There was no evidence that
the accused had created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide. It was duly proved on record that the accused was
suffering from schizophrenia. Therefore, she was unable
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to harass the deceased. The learned Trial Court failed to
properly appreciate the evidence on record. Therefore, he
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
.
judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted
that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the
deceased would have confided to her relatives, and non-
examination of the independent witnesses was not
material. The evidence on record proved that the accused
had demanded dowry and taunted the deceased. The
accused created such circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other option except to commit suicide. The
death had taken place within 07 years of marriage, and it
was proved by the prosecution that the deceased was
subjected to harassment by the accused. Therefore, the
presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence
Act was rightly applied. He prayed that the present appeal
be dismissed.
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11. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
.
12. Sudershan Singh (PW1) stated in his
examination-in-chief that no dowry was demanded at the
time of marriage. Meenu was kept properly for 5-6
months. She did not make any complaint. The accused
started saying after 05-06 months of marriage that
Meenu had not brought any dowry. Meenu narrated this
incident to her parents. Sudershan purchased one steel
almirah, one double bed and bedding, etc and left all the
articles in the house of the accused at Palampur. He
received a call on the same day from Meenu that her
parents-in-law were saying that the expenses of the
delivery of the child should have been borne by the
informant instead of providing the articles. Meenu gave
birth to a daughter on 19.07.2007. The parents-in-law of
Meenu left for their house and never returned. They said
that Meenu should have given birth to a son. He brought
Meenu to his home. His son-in-law visited his home, but
parents-in-law of Meenu did not visit her. Meenu told
him telephonically that she was being tortured by the
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accused, however, her husband was keeping her properly.
She made a call to Poonam on 05.05.2007 and told her that
she was being harassed by her parents-in-law. Meenu told
.
that she would come to the function of Shivji and would
narrate the incident. The informant received a telephonic
call from the husband of the accused that Meenu had
consumed poison, and she was admitted to the hospital.
Subsequently, the informant found that Meenu had died
due to hanging.
13. The statement of the informant is highly
vague. He made general allegations that Meenu was being
harassed in her matrimonial home because she had not
brought any dowry. The details of the dowry demanded by
the parents-in-law of the deceased were not given.
14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to
see that particulars of the offences committed by every
accused and the role played by the accused in committing
the offence are required to be given in the complaint
made to the police. It was observed: -
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"9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each
.
and every accused and the role played by each and
every accused in committing that offence.
10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is
sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence, and what is the exact role played by these appellants is in the commission of the offence. There could be said
that something is against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely, but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process
of law to allow the prosecution to continue against
the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants." (Emphasis supplied)
15. Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of
M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the
tendency of false implication by way of general omnibus
allegations, if left unchecked, would result in the misuse
of the process of law. It was observed:
"13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar
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situation where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws
.
were general omnibus allegations which would be
liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased
tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial
disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law . On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held
that allowing their prosecution in the absence of
clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual
acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.
14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667], this Court noted that the tendency to
implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the
Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband's close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.
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15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184], this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint is not the 'be all and end all' of the matter, as what is required to be
.
brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars
of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence. These
observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana,
16.
2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a
person to face criminal allegations without any specific
instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of
the process of the Court. It was observed:
"18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicates that the allegations
levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of
criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the
police thought it fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case.
25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to
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subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a
.
criminal charge, more particularly when a
prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute ."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. It was further held that in matrimonial
disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make
a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial
conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute
cruelty. It was observed: -
"32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and
making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband
and his family members, brings about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The
first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the
matter reach the Police than even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view
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in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be
.
disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In
matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a
second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what would be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only
reason why we are saying so is that, instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of
genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the
husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should
be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband to
ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at
the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of
the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty"
18. Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar
Reddy v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2)
SCR 252 that the phenomenon of false implication by a
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general omnibus allegation in the case of a matrimonial
dispute is not unknown to the Court. It was observed: -
"14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there
.
is significant merit in the submissions of the
Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the
Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither
discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the
offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar
(2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A
and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded
to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.
xxxx
17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by
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Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution."
.
19. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of
Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621, that general and
vague allegations of cruelty made against the husband and
his relatives are not sufficient to constitute cruelty. It was
observed: - r "10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and
omnibus allegations is noticed by this Court in many decisions. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 , this court observed
that:
"16... the respondent alleged commission of offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423,
467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said
allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would reveal that the allegations are vague and
they do not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the alleged offences.... The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegations against the appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as well as the purpose
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of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident, and further that the dispute involved is essentially of a civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of a criminal offence in
.
the issue..."
10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti
(2009) 10 SCC 184, this court observed that:
"7. ...what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to the date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact
number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in r the complaint, and it is a general and vague
complaint that the ornaments were sometimes given in the custody of the appellants, and they were not returned. What strikes us more is that even in Para 10 of the
complaint, where the complainant says that she asked for her clothes and ornaments, which were given to the accused, and they
refused to give these back, the date is significantly absent."
xxxx
12. The complaint also refers to a small incident
where the complainant's brother accompanied her to the matrimonial house when appellants no. 1 and 3 are alleged to have refused to take her back, but on persuasion by her brother, she was allowed to stay. There is also a vague allegation that, when the complainant gave birth to a second child, appellants 1 and 2 came and "quarrelled" with the complainant, her brother, and her parents and threatened them. This Court had occasion to examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes.
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In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:
"14. ...A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the
.
Appellants are wholly general and omnibus
in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a
case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of
the Appellants in the commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the r course of matrimonial disputes is not
unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her
in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash
the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked,
would result in the abuse of the process of law."
xxxx 13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court noticed the injustice that may be caused when parties are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial based on general and omnibus allegations. The relevant portion of the observation is as under:
"11. ...in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly, and there is greater disaffection and friction surrounding the
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institution of marriage now more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as Section 498- A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.
.
18. ... upon a perusal of the contents of the
FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the
appellants. The complainant alleged that "all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her with terminating her pregnancy". Furthermore, no specific and
distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein, i.e. none of the appellants has been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general
allegations made against them. This simply
leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can,
at best, be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes... However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the
allegations made against them, being general and omnibus, do not warrant
prosecution.
21. ...it would be unjust if the appellants are
forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo a trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged."
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20. This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3682, wherein it was observed:
.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant
No. 1 harassed her and that appellant Nos. 2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.
21.
A similar view was taken in Geddam Jhansi v.
State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it
was observed:
"31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive
measures, which can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which constitute offences
punishable under the Penal Code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It
applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations.
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These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, the preservation of family
.
relationships has always been emphasised. Thus,
when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the family bond, courts should be
circumspect and judicious and should allow invocation of the criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment
or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to
implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself
constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter,
there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that
such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not
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occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since
.
violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by
close relatives is now criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such
cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of
domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not
indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in
a sweeping manner.
34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn
sour to an extent to make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not
happen at the spur of the moment, and such an acrimonious relationship would develop only in
the course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turn, otherwise, an amicable relationship into a
fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.
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35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who is accused of such
.
offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately
dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated on the
victim and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic
violence unless the circumstances clearly
indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against
them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence
would amount to abuse of the process of law."
22. Therefore, the allegations made by the
informant are insufficient to constitute the cruelty.
23. The informant specifically stated in his
statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C (Ex. PW1/A)
that the accused Silmo Devi started taunting the deceased.
However, he changed his version in the Court to say that
parents-in-law of Meenu harassed her. He specifically
stated that he received a telephonic call from his daughter,
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who said that her parents-in-law were saying that the
expenses of the delivery of Meenu should have been
provided. He again stated that the parents-in-law of
.
Meenu left for their home and never returned. Therefore,
it is apparent that the informant has changed the initial
version projected in the F.I.R. that Meenu was being
harassed by the accused, Silmo Devi, to that the deceased
was being harassed by her parents-in-law in the Court.
24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93: 1997
SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different
case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was
observed:
"11. It was very emphatically contended by Shri
Gambhir that as in the first information report (FIR), there is no mention of the dying declaration, we should discard the evidence of
PW 1 and PW 2 regarding the dying declaration, because of what has been pointed out by this Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] We do not, however, agree with Shri Gambhir, for the reason that what was observed in Ram Kumar case [(1975) 3 SCC 815:
1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] after noting the broad facts, was that material omission in the FIR would cast doubt on the
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veracity of the prosecution case, despite the general law being that statements made in the FIR can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker. This view owes its origin to the thinking that if there be a material departure
.
in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, which would be so if material facts not mentioned in the FIR are deposed to by
prosecution witnesses in the court, the same would cause a dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is built, as the substratum of the prosecution case then gets altered.
The prosecution cannot project two entirely different versions of a case. This is entirely different from thinking that some omission in r the FIR would require disbelieving the
witnesses who depose about the fact not mentioned in the FIR. Evidence of witnesses has to be tested for its strength or weakness. While doing so, if the fact deposed be a
material part of the prosecution case, about which, however, no mention was made in the FIR, the same would be borne in mind while
deciding about the credibility of the evidence
given by the witness in question."
25. Therefore, the prosecution's case would
become suspect due to a shift in the informant's
testimony.
26. Manjeet Kaur (PW2) stated that the accused
and her husband started treating Meenu with cruelty.
Meenu said that she was forced to sleep on the floor by the
accused. One almirah, one bed box and complete bedding
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were provided to Meenu. However, Meenu said that the
accused and her husband were saying that the expenses
for the delivery of Meenu should have been provided by
.
Meenu's parents.
27. This witness has also made a general
statement without any particulars of harassment and
details of dowry. She stated that Meenu was being asked to
sleep on the floor, which was not mentioned by the
informant. She also included the husband of the accused as
the person who had harassed the deceased. This is
contrary to the initial version projected in the F.I.R.
(Ex.PW9/A) that only the accused was harassing the
deceased. Therefore, the version of Manjeet Kaur (PW2)
being contrary to the prosecution case, cannot be relied
upon.
28. Poonam (PW3) stated that the accused started
taunting Meenu for not providing any dowry. She
demanded dowry. Meenu was being told to bring dowry
from her parents. Dowry articles were provided to the
accused. She received a call on 05.05.2007, and Meenu told
her that her parents-in-law were torturing her. She
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narrated the call details to her parents. Meenu committed
suicide subsequently.
29. The statement of this witness also does not
.
mention the details of the demand, and time and the place
of the demand. She also stated that the demands were
made by the accused and her husband, whereas it was
specifically stated in the F.I.R. (Ex. PW9/A) that the
demand was made by the accused Silmo Devi. Therefore,
her testimony does not establish the cruelty to the
deceased.
30. Udhma Devi (PW4) stated that the accused and
her husband ill-treated Meenu. Meenu told about the ill-
treatment. Almirah, bed box and bedding were provided to
the accused, however, the accused did not treat Meenu
properly. The deceased made a call, which was attended by
Poonam. Meenu told that she was being ill-treated by the
accused.
31. The statement of this witness also does not
contain any details of harassment or cruelty. She has also
made a general statement regarding the harassment
without providing particulars of the date, time and place.
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The informant stated in his complaint (Ex. PW1/A) that
the accused started taunting the deceased six months after
her marriage.
.
32. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Kamal & others vs. State of Gujarat & anr. 2025 INSC
504, that when the allegations of the harassment were
limited to taunts without the details, the same are not
sufficient to infer the cruelty. It was observed:-
"11. What is important, for the purposes of
deciding this case, is that in the FIR, there is no
specific allegation of demand of dowry by the accused. Further, the allegation of harassment of the complainant at the instance of the parents- in-law is limited to extending taunts and
custody-related issues of minor children. However, there is no disclosure about the nature of those taunts. Admittedly, the second
respondent was married to the first appellant in the year 2005, and for the last several years, since
before lodging the FIR, the complainant had been working and staying in rented accommodations at
different places. Besides that, the FIR was lodged on 20.07.2019, just three days after service of summons of the divorce proceedings initiated by the first appellant. In these circumstances, we will have to consider whether the impugned proceedings are vexatious and mala fide, particularly in the context of a matrimonial dispute where time and again, Courts have been cautioned to be circumspect to obviate malicious prosecution of family members of the main accused.
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12. Even if we assume that there are some allegations of assault and of physical and mental torture of the complainant, they are against the husband. As against the parents-in-law, the allegations are only of extending taunts and of not
.
parting with the money for managing household
expenses. Specific details in respect of those taunts have not been disclosed. Moreover, a few taunts here and there are a part of everyday life,
which, for the happiness of the family, are usually ignored. Interestingly, as per her own allegations in the FIR, the complainant admits that when she reported those issues to her parents and uncle,
she was counselled to be patient. In the circumstances, in our considered view, no case to proceed against the parents-in-law, namely, the second and third appellant, is made out."
33. In the present case, the prosecution's case
against the accused is confined to the taunts. There was
no other evidence showing the harassment of the
deceased, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that
the evidence was sufficient to fulfil the ingredients of
cruelty.
34. Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia (DW1) stated that Silmo Devi
was examined by him on 18.6.1988, and she was
diagnosed to be suffering from chronic schizophrenia. He
treated the patient till 2001. The patient suffered from
hallucinations and delusions.
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35. Dr. A.K. Maini (DW2) stated that he examined
Silmo Devi and treated her. He provided a certificate of
treatment. Silmo Devi was suffering from schizophrenia,
.
which could not be cured. S.K.Sharma (DW3) proved the
OPD slip issued in the name of Silmo Devi. Chander
Prabha (DW4) proved the OPD register.
36. Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia stated in his cross-
examination that he could not identify the lady who was
examined by him. However, that is not material because
the prescription slips produced by the accused were issued
in her name, which shows that she was being treated by
the doctors.
37. Learned Trial Court held that the ingredients
of Section 84 of IPC were not satisfied because it was not
proved that the accused was not aware of the nature of the
act or that whatever she was doing was morally wrong.
Indeed, evidence on record does not fulfil the requirement
of Section 84 of the IPC. However, the evidence proved
that the accused is suffering from schizophrenia, which
cannot be cured. As per the statement of Dr. A.K. Maini, a
patient of schizophrenia loses contact with reality.
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Similarly, Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia stated that the patient will
have disorganisation of functions of the mind, will
hallucinate and have delusions. This evidence showed
.
that the accused is not in a fit state of mind, and the
prosecution's version that she harassed the deceased to
compel her to commit suicide is not acceptable. When the
accused is suffering from schizophrenia, she would not be
in a position to form a rational opinion about the acts
being done by her, and would not have the necessary
mens rea. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1725, that the accused must have the
necessary mens rea before he can be held guilty of
abetment of suicide. It was observed:
"22. What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein before cited is that, even if there is
allegation of constant harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the direct consequence of such continuous ha- rassment, the last proximate incident having fi- nally driven the subject to the extreme act of tak- ing one's life. Figuratively, 'the straw that broke the camel's back'; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on individual
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predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find mens rea. Merely because the vic- tim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his
.
life cannot by itself result in finding a positive in-
stigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim.
23. The victim may have felt that there was no al- ternative or option but to take his life, because of what another person did or said, which cannot lead to a finding of mens rea and resultant abetment on
that other person. What constitutes mens rea is the intention and purpose of the alleged perpetrator as discernible from the conscious acts or words and
the attendant circumstances, which in all proba- bility could lead to such an end. The real intention
of the accused and whether he intended by his ac- tion to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide, is the sure test. Did the thought of goading the vic-
tim to suicide occur in the mind of the accused, or whether it can be inferred from the facts and cir- cumstances arising in the case, as the true test
of mens rea would depend on the facts of each case. The social status, the community setting, the rela-
tionship between the parties and other myriad fac- tors would distinguish one case from another. However harsh or severe the harassment, unless
there is a conscious deliberate intention, mens rea, to drive another person to suicidal death, there cannot be a finding of abetment under Section
306."
38. Learned Trial Court held that a death had taken
place within seven years of the marriage, and the
presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence
Act applied to the present case. This finding cannot be
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sustained. In the present case, the evidence regarding the
cruelty is not satisfactory, and no reliance can be placed
upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid
.
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naresh Kumar
versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC 573 that the
presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence
Act will only apply when there is proof of the cruelty. It
was observed: -
"29. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act requires
proof : (1) that her husband or relatives subjected
her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage.
30. Although it is not necessary for us to refer to
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which raises a presumption as to dowry death, yet, to indicate the fine distinction between the two presumptions, we
are referring to Section 113-B. In Section 113-A, the legislature has used the word "may", whereas in
Section 113-B, the word used is "shall".
31. In this appeal, we are concerned with Section
113-A of the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the
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case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
32. What is important to note is that the term "the court may presume, having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide had
.
been abetted by her husband" would indicate that
the presumption is discretionary, unlike the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act, which is mandatory. Therefore, before the presumption under Section 113-A is raised, the prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or incessant harassment in that regard.
33. The court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under Section 113-A for finding out if cruelty was meted out. If it transpires that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and differences in
domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given
society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court would not be satisfied for holding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide
was guilty.
34. Section 113-A has been interpreted by this Court in Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 173:
1994 SCC (Cri) 235], Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309: 1998 SCC (Cri) 740] and Shanti v. State of Haryana [Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1 SCC 371: 1991 SCC (Cri) 191].
35. This Court has held that from the mere fact of suicide within seven years of marriage, one should not jump to the conclusion of abetment unless cruelty was proved. The court has the discretion to raise or not to raise the presumption because of the words "may presume". It must take into account
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all the circumstances of the case, which is an additional safeguard.
36. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC by
.
raising a presumption under Section 113-A."
39. A similar view was taken in Abhinav Mohan
Delkar (supra) wherein it was observed:
25. In this context, useful reference can be made to Sections 113A & 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, providing statutory presumptions in aid of Sections 498A & 304B, respectively, of the IPC.
When a woman dies by suicide within seven years of her marriage, if it is shown that she was
subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relative ,
there arises a presumption that the husband or such relative abetted the suicide, in which event the penalty under Section 306 is attracted. The presumption under Section 113A was statutorily
employed by the Parliament, realising the menace and in an attempt to prevent domestic violence unleashed on women in the patriarchal society, by
deterrence. This exercise would not have been necessary if Section 107 did provide for finding
abetment without conscious instigation constituting mens rea. This Court held in Mangat
Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595 that the provision only enabled the court to presume on the abetment, having due regard to all other circumstances of the case and drawing such presumption is purely within the discretion of the Court.
40. In the present case, the evidence regarding the
cruelty is not satisfactory, and no reliance can be placed
upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
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41. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Naresh Kumar versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC
573 that the prosecution is required to prove that the
.
accused had created such circumstances that the deceased
was left with no other option but to commit suicide. It was
observed:
"17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of
Rajasthan [Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144], considering the provisions of Section 306 IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107 IPC, observed as runder: (SCC pp. 149-50, paras 14-16)
"14. Section 306IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same. ...
15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word "instigate" is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court
in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2001) 9 SCC 618: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , has defined the word "instigate" as under : (SCC p. 629, para 20)
'20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act".'
16. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its correlation with Section 306 IPC have been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465] , it was observed as under: (SCC p. 197, para 25)
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'25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid
.
in committing suicide, a conviction
cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court
are clear that to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no option, and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide."
18. This Court in M. Arjunan v. State [M. Arjunan v. State, (2019) 3 SCC 315: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 219], while explaining the necessary
ingredients of Section 306 IPC in detail, observed as under: (SCC p. 317, para 7) "7. The essential ingredients of the offence
under Section 306 IPC are (i) the abetment and (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or
instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however,
insulting the deceased by using abusive language, will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such an act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC."
19. This Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 306 ], held that to
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convict an accused under Section 306IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability. It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 321-22, para 16) "16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide,
.
there must be proof of direct or indirect acts
(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the
question of the cause of suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one involving multifaceted and complex attributes of
human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of an accusation of abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of r incitement to the commission of suicide. In
the case of suicide, a mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which
compels the person to commit suicide, and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence.
Whether a person has abetted the commission of suicide by another or not
could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted the commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly
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circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused, by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct, creates a
.
situation which leads the deceased to
perceive no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused
plays an active role in tarnishing the self- esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of
abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if
the acts and deeds are only of such nature
where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence
of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a
particular case may be that of abetment of
suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts
while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased."
20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560:
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387 ], after referring to the above-referred decisions rendered in the context of culpability under Section 306 IPC, observed as under: (SCC para 45) "45. ... It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there
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must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide.
Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the
.
part of the accused which led or compelled
the person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
21. This Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417] , observed that whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids
by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing, a person can be said to have abetted in doing that thing. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind
to commit a particular crime must be visible to
determine the culpability.
22. This Court in Kashibai v. State of Karnataka [Kashibai v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 15 SCC 751:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 575], observed that to bring
the case within the purview of "abetment" under Section 107IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional
aid on the part of the accused and for the purpose proving the charge under Section 306IPC, also
there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
or aid to drive a person to commit suicide.
23. Had there been any clinching evidence of incessant harassment on account of which the wife was left with no other option but to put an end to her life, it could have been said that the accused intended the consequences of his act, namely, suicide. A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continues and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is
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achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind (a "subjective" test).
24. For intention in English law, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, provides the frame in which the mens rea is assessed. It states:
.
"A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he
intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions, but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the r circumstances."
Under Section 8(b), therefore, the jury is allowed wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intent or foresight on the basis of all the evidence.
25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere
harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. It also
requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly
present but has to be visible and conspicuous.
42. This position was reiterated in Patel Babubhai
Manohardas and others vs State of Gujarat 2025 INSC 322,
wherein it was observed:
15. Attempt to commit suicide is an offence in In-
dia. Section 309 IPC says that whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards such an act shall be punished with simple imprisonment
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for a term which may extend to one year or with a fine or with both. However, once suicide is carried out, the offence is complete. Considering the na- ture of the offence, such a person would be beyond the reach of the law. Therefore, the question of pe-
.
nalising him would not arise, but whoever abets
the commission of such suicide would be penalised under Section 306 IPC. The punishment prescribed under Section 306 IPC is imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to a fine. What Sec- tion 306 IPC says is that if any person commits suicide, then whoever abets the commission of
such suicide shall be punished as above.
16. Therefore, the crucial word in Section 306 IPC is 'abets'. 'Abetment' is defined in Section 107 of the IPC. As per Section 107 IPC, a person would be
abetting the doing of a thing if he instigates any
person to do that thing, if he encourages one or more person or persons in any conspiracy for do- ing that thing or if he intentionally aids by any act
or illegal omission in doing that thing. There are two explanations for Section 107. As per Explana- tion 1, even if a person, by way of wilful misrepre- sentation or concealment of a material fact which
he is otherwise bound to disclose, voluntarily
causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2 clarifies that whoever
does anything in order to facilitate the commission of an act, either prior to or at the time of the com- mission of the act, is said to aid in the doing of that act.
17. Section 114 IPC is an explanation or clarification of Section 107 IPC. What Section 114 IPC says is that whenever any person is absent but was present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such an act or offence and would be liable to be punished as an abettor.
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18. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court held that to 'instigate' means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of 'insti- gation', it is not necessary that actual words must
.
be used to that effect or that the words or act
should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Where the accused, by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct,
creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then 'insti- gation' may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the conse-
quences to actually follow cannot be said to be 'in- stigation'
19. Elaborating further, this Court in Chitresh Ku- mar Chopra versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
(2009) 16 SCC 605 observed that to constitute 'in-
stigation', a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by 'goading' or 'urging forward'.
This Court summed up the constituents of 'abet- ment' as under:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful
omission or conduct which may even be a
wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make
the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, the presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.
20. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 is a case where this Court held that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of
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incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide,
.
conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not
be sustainable. A similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Ude Singh versus State of Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301
21. After considering the provisions of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC, this Court in Rajesh versus State of Haryana (2020) 15 SCC 359 held that conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the
allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide.
22. Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental
process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in the doing of a thing. Without a positive proximate act on the part of the accused to
instigate or aid in committing suicide, a conviction cannot be sustained. Besides, in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence.
23. This Court in Amudha versus State 2024 INSC
244 held that there has to be an act of incitement on the part of the accused proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide. The act at-
tributed should not only be proximate to the time of suicide but should also be of such a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to take the drastic step of committing suicide.
24. Again, in the case of Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi versus State of Karnataka (2024) SCC Online SC 3541, this Court observed that discord and differences in domestic life are quite common in society. The commission of suicide largely depends upon the mental state of the victim. Until and unless some guilty intention on the part of the accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible
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to convict the accused for an offence under Section 306 IPC.
25. Prakash versus State of Maharashtra. 2024 INSC 1020 is a case where this Court, after analysing various decisions on the point, summed
.
up the legal position in the following manner:
14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of the IPC has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well established. To
attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in
close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should
put the victim in such a position that he/she
would have no other option but to commit suicide.
25.1. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court referred to its earlier decision in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh
Sengar versus State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 and held that in a given case, even a time gap of 48 hours between using of abusive language by the
accused and the commission of suicide would not
amount to a proximate act."
43. In the present case, the evidence on record is
insufficient to conclude that the accused had created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other
option but to commit suicide.
44. Learned Trial Court was swayed by the fact
that the witness consistently deposed about the
harassment. He did not have the advantage of judgments
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of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, noticed above, requiring
that the allegations of cruelty in a matrimonial home have
to be proved specifically by mentioning date, time and
.
place, which ingredients are not satisfied in the present
case. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the
learned Court cannot be sustained.
45. In view of the above, the present appeal is
allowed and the accused is acquitted of the charged
offences. The fine amount be refunded after the expiry of
the period of limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and
in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
46. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the appellant/accused is
directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/-
with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of
the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six
months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special
Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on
grant of the leave, the appellant/accused on receipt of
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notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
47. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also
.
the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
48. A copy of the judgment, along with records of
the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
22 August, 2025.
(yogesh) to (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge
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