Sib Nath Chatterjee vs Tulsidas Chatterjee

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 2026 INSC 409 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No(s). 4317/2026 @SLP(C) No. 23429/2019

SIB NATH CHATTERJEE Appellant(s)

VERSUS

TULSIDAS CHATTERJEE & ORS. Respondent(s)

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

Facts

2. The appellant had set-up a claim of

pre-emption under sub-section (1) of Section

8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1955 Act’)

being owner/ raiyat possessing land

contiguous to the land under transfer.

3. Admittedly, the application under sub-

section (1) of Section 8 of the 1955 Act was

Signature Not Verified submitted after 17 months from the date of Digitally signed by CHETAN ARORA Date: 2026.04.22 18:14:24 IST Reason: transfer. Therefore, the second and third

respondents (i.e., transferees) filed an

1 application to reject appellant’s

application on the ground that the owner/

raiyat possessing contiguous land could

exercise the right within four months of the

date of transfer and not later.

4. The Court of first instance accepted

respondents’ plea and rejected the

application holding the same to be ex facie

barred by limitation prescribed by the 1955

Act.

5. Aggrieved therewith, an appeal was

preferred.

6. The Appellate Court observed that,

though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

is not applicable to original proceedings,

the application cannot be rejected at the

threshold on the ground of limitation. More

so, when the case of the applicant is that

he was not served notice of the transfer.

The Appellate Court therefore set aside the

order passed by the Court of first instance.

7. Aggrieved by the Appellate Court’s

2 order, the second and third respondents

filed a revision before the High Court1

under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India.

8. The High Court held that the right of

pre-emption as conferred upon the raiyat

possessing land contiguous to the land under

transfer could be exercised within four

months from the date of transfer and since

the application under sub-section (1) of

Section 8 of the 1955 Act was submitted much

beyond four months, the same being ex facie

barred by limitation was rightly rejected by

the Court of first instance. Accordingly,

the High Court, vide impugned order dated

08.04.2019, set aside the order of the

Appellate Court and restored the order of

the Court of first instance.

9. Aggrieved by the order of the High

Court, this appeal has been filed.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties and have perused the materials 11 The High Court at Calcutta

3 placed on record.

Submissions

11. The submission on behalf of the

appellant is that unless the transfer is

brought to the notice of the pre-emptor, the

pre-emptor would not be able to avail his

right, therefore the requirement of notice

of the proposed transfer to the pre-emptor

would have to be read into the provision and

if no notice is given, then the pre-emptor

must be deemed to have right of pre-emption

within four months from the date of

knowledge of such transfer. It was submitted

that since no notice was provided to the

appellant, the limitation for filing the

application would have to be counted from

the date of knowledge. To support his

submissions, learned counsel relied on a

decision of this Court in Chhana Rani Saha

vs Mani Pal @ Kaltu Pal2. Therein this Court

had observed that the Trial Court had

rightly allowed the ownership of the land in

22 Civil Appeal No.5905 of 2009 decided on 15.11.2017

4 question, since it was found that the vendor

did not give notice of sale to the appellant

therein. In that light, it was argued that

the Appellate Court was justified in holding

that since the appellant was not served

notice of the transfer, the pre-emption

application could not have been rejected at

the threshold.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the

respondents submitted that sub-section (1)

of Section 8 confers right of pre-emption on

different categories of persons. Each

category has a different limitation period

within which it could exercise its right.

Insofar as a person/ raiyat holding/

possessing adjoining/ contiguous land is

concerned, he could exercise right within

four months of the date of transfer. As the

appellant falls in this category and,

admittedly, the appellant had failed to

exercise his right of pre-emption within

four months of the date of transfer, the

application at his instance was not

5 maintainable. Therefore, it was rightly

rejected by the Trial Court, and the High

Court justifiably restored the same.

13. We have accorded due consideration to

the rival submissions.

Discussion

14. Before we proceed to address the rival

submissions, we must understand the true

nature of the right of pre-emption.

15. In Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar

Jaipuria and others3, a five-Judge Bench of

this Court held that the law of pre-emption

imposes a limitation or disability upon the

ownership of a property to the extent that

it restricts the owner's unfettered right of

sale and compels him to sell the property to

his co-sharer or neighbor, as the case may

be. It was observed that the person who is

the co- sharer in the land or owns the land

in the vicinity consequently only gets an

advantage or benefit corresponding to the

33 (1954) 1 SCC 836: 1954 SCC OnLine SC 186

6 burden with which the owner of the property

is saddled; even though it does not amount

to an actual interest in the property sold.

It was observed that the crux of the whole

thing is that the benefit as well as the

burden of the right of pre-emption runs with

the land and can be enforced by or against

the owner of the land for the time being

although the right of the pre-emptor does

not amount to an interest in the land

itself. It was also observed that if the

right of pre-emption had been only a

personal right enforceable against the

vendee and there was no infirmity in the

title of the owner restricting his right of

sale in a certain manner, a bona fide

purchaser without notice would certainly

obtain an absolute title to the property,

unhampered by any right of the pre-emptor

and in such circumstances there could be no

justification for enforcing the right of

pre-emption against the purchaser on grounds

of justice, equity and good conscience on

7 which grounds alone the right could be

enforced on the present day. Thus, it was

held that the law of pre-emption creates a

right which attaches to the property and on

that footing only it can be enforced against

the purchaser.

16. In Bishan Singh & Ors. v. Khazan

Singh & Anr.4, a four-Judge Bench of this

Court approved the decision of Allahabad

High Court rendered by Mahmood, J. in

Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah5 wherein the

right of pre-emption was described as under:

“It (right of pre-emption) is simply

a right of substitution, entitling

the pre-emptor, by means of a legal

incident to which sale itself was

subject, to stand in the shoes of

the vendee in respect of all the

rights and obligations arising from

the sale, under which he derived his

title. It is, in effect, as if in a

sale deed the vendee’s name were

44 AIR 1958 SC 838: 1959 SCR 878: 1958 SCC OnLine SC 88 55 (1885) ILR 7 All 775, 809

8 rubbed out and pre-emptor's name

inserted in its place.”

And thereafter, this Court summarized the

law relating to the right of pre-emption as

under:

“To summarize: (1) The right of pre-

emption is not a right to the thing

sold but a right to the offer of the

thing about to be sold. This right

is called the primary or inherent

right. (2) The pre-emptor has a

secondary right or a remedial right

to follow the thing sold. (3) It is

a right of substitution but not of

re-purchase i.e., the pre-emptor

takes the entire bargain and steps

into the shoes of the original

vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire

the whole of the property sold and

not a share of the property sold.

(5) Preference being the essence of

the right, the plaintiff must have a

superior right to that of the vendee

or the person substituted in his

9 place. (6) The right being a very

weak right, it can be defeated by

all legitimate methods, such as the

vendee allowing the claimant of a

superior or equal right being

substituted in his place.”

17. Following the above decision, in

Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v.

Shridhar Alshi & Ors.6, a five-Judge Bench

of this Court held that there are no

equities in favor of a pre-emptor, whose

sole object is to disturb a valid

transaction by virtue of the rights created

in him by statute. Therefore, to defeat the

right of pre-emption by any legitimate means

is not fraud on the part of either the

vendor or the vendee and a person is

entitled to steer clear of the law of pre-

emption by all lawful means.

18. In Mohd. Noor and others v. Mohd.

Ibrahim and others7, following the decision

in Radhakishan (supra), it was observed that

66 AIR 1960 SC 1368: (1961) 1 SCR 248: 1960 SCC OnLine SC 308 77 (1994) 5 SCC 562

10 right of pre-emption has not been looked

upon favorably as it operates as a clog on

the right of the owner to alienate his

property. Therefore, a person claiming right

of pre-emption under a statute must strictly

fall within the four corners of the

provisions contained therein.

19. Upon consideration of various

decisions of this Court, in our view, what

is settled is that the right of pre-emption

is a weak right. There are no equities in

favor of the pre-emptor. As a result, such

right can be defeated by any lawful means.

Besides, it is considered a clog on the

right of the owner to alienate his property,

therefore, the right, if conferred by a

statute, must be exercised strictly in terms

of the statute. As a sequitur, the statute

conferring the right of pre-emption is to be

construed strictly and not liberally.

20. Now, we shall have a look at the

relevant provisions of the 1955 Act

11 regarding conferment and exercise of the

right of pre-emption. Section 8 of the 1955

Act not only confers the right but also lays

down the procedure for its exercise. It

reads thus:

“8. Right of purchase by co-sharer or contiguous tenant-

(1) If a portion or share of a plot of land of a raiyat is transferred to any person other than a co-

sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land, the bargadar in the plot of land may, within three months of the date of such transfer, or any co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land may, within three months of the service of the notice given under sub-section (5) of section 5, or any raiyat possessing land adjoining such plot of land may, within four months of the date of such transfer, apply to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction, for transfer of the said portion or share of the plot of land to him, subject to the limit mentioned in section 14-M on deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of ten per cent of that amount:

Provided that if the bargadar in the plot of land, a co-sharer of raiyat in a plot of land and a raiyat possessing land adjoining such plot of land apply for such transfer, the bargadar shall have the prior right to have such portion or share of the plot of land transferred to him, and in such a case, the deposit made by others shall be refunded to them:

12 Provided further that where the bargadar does not apply for such transfer and a co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land and a raiyat possessing land adjoining such plot of land both apply for such transfer, the former shall have the prior right to have such portion or share of the plot of land transferred to him, and in such a case, the deposit made by the latter shall be refunded to him:

Provided also that as amongst raiyats possessing lands adjoining such plot of land preference shall be given to the raiyat having the longest common boundary with the land transferred.

(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to -

(a) a transfer by exchange or by partition, or

(b) a transfer by bequest or gift, or hiba-bil-ewaz, or

(c) a mortgage mentioned in section 7,

(d) a transfer for charitable or religious purposes or both without reservation of any pecuniary benefit [for any individual, or]

(e) a transfer of land in favour of a bargadar in respect of such land if after such transfer, the transferee holds as a raiyat land not exceeding one acre (or 0.4047 hectare) in area in the aggregate.

Explanation - All orders passed and the consequences thereof under sections 8, 9 and 10 shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IIB.

(3) Every application pending before a Revenue Officer at the commencement of section 7 of the

13 West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to, and disposed of by, the Munsif having jurisdiction in relation to the area in which the land is situated and on such transfer every such application shall be dealt with from the stage at which it was so transferred and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provision of this Act, as amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972.”

21. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of

Section 8 of the 1955 Act would disclose that

the right of pre-emption arises on transfer of

a portion or share of a plot of land of raiyat

to any person other than a co-sharer of a

raiyat in the plot of land. When such transfer

takes place, the bargadar in the plot of land

may, within three months of the date of such

transfer, exercise his right of pre-emption.

Whereas a co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of

land may exercise the said right within three

months of the service of the notice given

under sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the 1955

Act. Besides those two, the raiyat possessing

land adjoining such plot of land has a right

14 of pre-emption. For convenience we refer to it

as the third category of persons who have been

conferred right of pre-emption. A person

belonging to the third category can exercise

the right of pre-emption within four months of

the date of such transfer.

22. Importantly, sub-section (1) of Section 8

does not use the phrase ‘within four months of

the date of knowledge, or notice, of such

transfer’. Rather, it uses the phrase ‘within

four months of the date of such transfer’.

Therefore, the question that arises for our

consideration is whether ‘knowledge or notice’

can be read into the provision.

23. The submission on behalf of the appellant

is that in absence of notice or knowledge of

transfer, the person who has a right of pre-

emption would not be able to exercise the

right and, therefore, if the requirement of

notice of the transfer, or the date of

knowledge of the transfer, is not read into

the provision, the right would be rendered

15 nugatory.

24. Before we address the issue as to whether

‘the date of knowledge of transfer’, or ‘the

date of notice of transfer’ must be read into

Section 8 qua the starting point of limitation

for exercise of right by the third category of

persons, Section 5 of the 1955 Act needs to be

noticed. Section 5 reads thus:

“5. Transferability of [plot of land] of a raiyat-

(1) A transfer of the [plot of land] of a raiyat or a share or portion thereof shall be made by an instrument which must be registered and the registering officer shall not accept for registration any such instrument unless-

(a) the sale price, or where there is no sale price, the value of the plot of land or portion or share thereof transferred, is stated therein;

(b) there is tendered along with it,

(i) a notice giving the particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form for transmission of the prescribed authority;

(ii) such notices and process fees as may be required by sub-section (4);

(c) the purpose for which the land shall be used by the transferee is stated therein; and

16

(d) such purpose for use of the land by the transferee is consistent with the purpose for which the land was settled or was being used and is not contrary to the provisions of section 4B, section 4C, section 4E or section

49.

(2) In case of bequest of such plot of land or portion or share thereof, no Court shall grant Probate or Letters of Administration until the applicant files in the prescribed form a notice giving particulars of the bequest together with the prescribed process fees for transmission to the prescribed authority.

(3) No Court or Revenue Officer shall confirm the sale of such a plot of land or portion or share thereof put to sale in execution of a decree or certificate and no Court shall make a decree or order absolute for foreclosure of a mortgage of such a plot of land or portion or share thereof, until the purchaser of the mortgagee, as the case may be, files a notice or notices similar to, and deposits process fees of the same amount as that referred to in sub- section (1).

(4) If the transfer of a portion or share of such a plot of land be one to which the provisions of section 8 apply, there shall be filed by the transferor or transferee notices giving particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form together with the process fees prescribed for the service thereof on all the co-sharers of the said plot of land who are not parties to the transfer and for affixing a copy thereof in the office of the registering officer of the Court house or the office of the Revenue Officer, as the case may be,

17 as well as for affixing a copy on the plot of land.

(5) The Court, the Revenue Officer or the registering officer, as the case may be, shall transmit the notice to the authority referred to in sub- clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-

section (1) who shall serve the notices on the co-sharers referred to in sub-section (4) by registered post and shall cause copies of the notice to be affixed on the plot of land and in the Court house or in the office of the Revenue Officer, or of the registering officer, as the case may be.

Explanation – in this section-

(a) “transferor”, “transferee”, “purchaser” and “mortgage” include their successors-in-interest, and

(b) “transfer” does not include simple or usufructuary mortgage or mortgage by deposit of title deeds.”

25. A careful reading of Section 5 (supra)

would indicate that it deals with three kinds

of situations: (1) transfer; (2) bequest; and

(3) court sale or foreclosure of mortgage,

pursuant to a decree. In the present case, we

are concerned with transfer by sale. Sub-

section (1) of Section 5 provides that an

instrument of transfer of a plot of land of a

raiyat or a share or portion thereof, shall

not be accepted for registration by the

18 registering authority unless the following

conditions are fulfilled: (a) sale price,

where there is no sale price, value of the

plot of land or share or portion thereof

transferred, is disclosed in the instrument;

(b) a notice giving particulars of the

transfer in the prescribed form for

transmission of8 the prescribed officer is

tendered with the instrument of transfer

together with such notice and process fee as

may be required by sub-section (4) of Section

5; (c) the purpose for which the transferee

shall use the land is stated in the

instrument; and (d) such purpose is consistent

with the purpose for which the land was

settled or was being used and is not contrary

to the provisions of Section 4B, Section 4C,

Section 4E or Section 49.

26. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides that

if the transfer of a portion or share of such

a plot of land be one to which the provisions

of Section 8 apply, there shall be filed by

88 Note: There appears some error, probably, it should be ‘to”

19 the transferor or transferee notices giving

particulars of the transfer in the prescribed

form together with the process fees prescribed

for the service thereof on all the co-sharers

of the said plot of land who are not parties

to the transfer and for affixing a copy

thereof in the office of the registering

officer of the Court house or the office of

the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, as

well as for affixing a copy on the plot of

land.

27. Sub-section (5) of Section 5 provides that

the Court, the Revenue Officer or the

registering officer, as the case may be, shall

transmit the notice to the authority referred

to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-

section (1) who shall serve the notices on the

co-sharers referred to in sub-section (4) by

registered post and shall cause copies of the

notice to be affixed on the plot of land and

in the Court house or in the office of the

Revenue Officer, or of the registering

officer, as the case may be.

20

28. A conjoint reading of sub-sections (1)

(b), (4) and (5) of Section 5 of the 1955 Act,

inter alia, makes it clear that for

registration of an instrument of transfer of a

plot of land of a raiyat or a share or portion

thereof, the instrument of transfer must be

tendered along with (a) a notice giving the

particulars of the transfer in the prescribed

form for transmission of9 the prescribed

authority and (b) such notices and process

fees as may be required by sub-section (4).

Sub-section (4) applies if the subject of

transfer is such to which provisions of

Section 8 applies. Notably, Section 8 applies

whenever the transfer is of the plot of land

of a raiyat or portion or share thereof to any

person other than a co-sharer of a raiyat in

the plot of land. Therefore, if the subject of

transfer is such to which provisions of

Section 8 applies, the transferor or

transferee shall supply notices giving

particulars of the transfer in the prescribed

99 See: Footnote 8

21 form together with the process fees prescribed

for the service thereof on all the co-sharers

of the said plot of land who are not parties

to the transfer and for affixing a copy

thereof in the office of the registering

officer of the Court house or the office of

the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, as

well as for affixing a copy on the plot of

land. Sub-section (5) of Section 5 specifies

the procedure regarding service of notice on a

co-sharer as well as for affixation of notice.

Thus, sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides

for supplying of notice in the prescribed form

along with process fee for: (1) effecting

service of notice on a co-sharer(s) if he, or

they, is /are not party to the instrument of

transfer; (2) affixation of a copy thereof in

the office of the registering officer of the

Court house or the office of the Revenue

Officer, as the case may be; and (3) affixing

a copy on the plot of land. Sub-section (5) of

Section 5 specifies the procedure regarding

service of notice on a co-sharer as well as

22 for affixation of notice.

29. It is, therefore, clear that though

Section 5 provides for a notice of the

transfer to a co-sharer, there is no provision

to serve notice on other categories of pre-

emptors. However, it is not that the transfer

would go unnoticed since there is a

requirement to affix notice in the office of

the registering officer of the Court house, or

the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, and

of affixing a copy of the notice on the plot

of land.

30. From the discussion above, the legislative

intent is clear. The three categories of pre-

emptors are distinct, and they have distinct

timeline within which they are to exercise

their respective right of pre-emption under

the 1955 Act. A Bagardar can exercise his

right within three months from the date of

transfer whereas any raiyat possessing land

adjoining such plot of land can exercise

within four months from the date of transfer.

23 Insofar as co-sharer is concerned, the

limitation runs from the date of service of

notice under sub-section (5) of Section 5.

31. Now, we shall consider the argument on

behalf of the appellant that the requirement

of a notice as is there for a co-sharer must

be read into sub-section (1) of Section 8 of

the 1955 Act for the other two categories of

pre-emptors as well.

32. The law in this regard is settled. The

doctrine of reading down or of recasting the

statute can be applied in limited situations.

It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a

statute from being struck down on account of

its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of

the principle that when two interpretations

are possible – one rendering it constitutional

and the other making it unconstitutional, the

former should be preferred. The second

situation is where the provisions of the

statute are vague and ambiguous and it is

possible to gather the intentions of the

24 legislature from the object of the statute,

the context in which the provision occurs and

the purpose for which it is made. However,

when the provision is cast in a definite and

unambiguous language and its intention is

clear, it is not permissible either to mend or

bend it even if such recasting is in accord

with good reasons and conscience. In such

circumstances, it is not permissible for the

court to remake the statute. In short, the

object of reading down is to keep the

operation of the statute within the purpose of

the Act and constitutionally valid10. Harshness

of a provision is no reason to read down the

same, if its plain meaning is unambiguous and

valid11.

33. By applying the afore-stated principles as

to when a statutory provision can be read

down, we shall now consider whether sub-

section (1) of Section 8 of the 1955 Act needs

to be read down to save it from being

1010 Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, paragraphs 255 and 326 1111 Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641, paragraph 102.

25 unconstitutional.

34. In our view, Section 8 is clear and

categoric. The Section not only confers the

right of pre-emption on three different

categories of persons but also provides for

separate periods of limitation within which

each category could exercise its right.

Importantly, the right of pre-emption gets

triggered only when transfer is not to a co-

sharer. Understandably, a co-sharer stands on

a different footing as he has a direct

interest in the subject matter of transfer.

Therefore, the legislature specifically

provided for service of notice on him. The

other two categories of pre-emptors cannot

equate themselves with a co-sharer. In such

view of the matter, if the legislature, in its

wisdom, did not require service of notice on

them as in the case of a co-sharer, there is

no discrimination. Moreover, the right of pre-

emption is neither a fundamental right nor a

constitutional right, rather it is a weak

right which, in the case on hand, has been

26 conferred by a statute and, therefore, must

strictly be exercised in terms thereof. Thus,

in our view, reading down sub-section (1) of

section 8 is not required either to save it

from being declared unconstitutional or to

make it clear. More so, when it is neither

vague nor ambiguous.

35. Having regard to the discussion above, we

are of the considered view that there is no

substance in the argument that since no notice

of transfer was served on the appellant, the

period of limitation to file the application

under Section 8 of the 1955 Act would commence

from the date of knowledge of the transfer.

36. The decision in Chhana Rani Saha (supra)

relied by the appellant is of no help to the

appellant as it deals with a case where the

claim of pre-emption was rejected without

considering that the pre-emptor fell in the

category of a raiyat possessing land adjoining

the plot under transfer and therefore, even

though the pre-emptor was not a co-sharer, he

27 was entitled to assert his right of pre-

emption.

37. As the case of the appellant falls in the

third category where the limitation period

would be four months from the date of

transfer, we are of the view that the High

Court was correct in holding that the

application, which was filed much beyond the

prescribed period, was barred by limitation.

38. At last, a feeble attempt was made to

canvass that the subject matter of transfer

had come from common ancestors and, therefore,

the appellant could be bracketed in the

category of a co-sharer. This argument, in our

view, is completely misconceived as admittedly

at the time of transfer the estate stood

partitioned and the appellant was not a co-

sharer. Therefore, advisedly, this plea was

not pressed before the High Court.

39. Accordingly, we find no merit in the

appeal, the appeal stands dismissed.

40. Pending application(s), if any, stand

28 disposed of.

………………………………………………….J [MANOJ MISRA]

………………………………………………….J [VIPUL M. PANCHOLI] New Delhi;

April 09, 2026

29 ITEM NO.25 COURT NO.14 SECTION XVI

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s). 4317/2026 @SLP(C) No. 23429/2019 SIB NATH CHATTERJEE Appellant(s)

VERSUS TULSIDAS CHATTERJEE & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 09-04-2026 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

For Appellant(s) : Mr Rahul Kushwaha, Adv.

Mr Suraj Kumar, Adv.

Mr Ashutosh Singh, Adv.

Mr Sohit Bhardwaj, Adv.

Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick, AOR

For Respondent(s) : Ms. Manju Jetley, AOR

Mr Rajesh Sen, Adv.

Ms Shibani Bhattacharjee, Adv. Mr Shashikant Yadav, Adv. Mr. Manohar Pratap, Adv. Mr. Ajit Kumar Ekka, AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. The appeal stands dismissed in terms of the signed Reportable order placed on the file.

3. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

(CHETAN ARORA) (SAPNA BANSAL) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)

30