Shrikrishna vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1533 OF 2011

SHRIKRISHNA …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

The Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Basoda, in Sessions Case No. 33 of 1993, by judgment and

order dated 9th December, 1997, convicted the appellant –

Shrikrishna – original accused no.4, along with other

accused persons for the offences under Section 302 read with Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NISHA KHULBEY Date: 2026.01.09 16:58:57 IST Reason: Page 1 of 20 Section 149, Section 324 read with Section 149 and Section

323 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The

appellant came to be sentenced for life imprisonment with

hard labour for the offence under Section 302 read with

Section 149, IPC. He was convicted for rigorous

imprisonment for three years, one year, and two years for the

offences under Sections 324, 323 and 147, IPC respectively.

All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

2. The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence

as above by preferring an appeal before the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh. The High Court altered the conviction of

the appellant from under Section 302, IPC to Section 304,

Part II, IPC, sentencing the appellant to rigorous

imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in

default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment

for three months. The aggrieved appellant has filed the

present appeal before this Court against the conviction and

sentence imposed on him as above by the High Court.

Page 2 of 20

3. First Information Report No.181 of 1992 came to be

registered with the police station concerned. As per the

prosecution case, on 10.12.1992 at about 6 p.m. at Village

Dudankhedi, a quarrel took place between the son of the

appellant herein and the son of one Ram Singh. It was stated

that the said Ram Singh had gone to the house of the

appellant to complain as to why the appellant's son had

beaten Gowardhan Singh - son of Ram Singh. At that time,

other accused persons assembled at the place with a

common criminal object. It was the case that the co-accused

named Ajab Singh and Lakhan Singh had been holding axes

(Farsa) in their hands, whereas the others, including the

appellant, had been holding lathis.

3.1 It was the case that the accused persons assaulted

Ram Singh with the respective weapons they had been

wielding with an intention to kill Ram Singh. Upon hearing

the cries of Ram Singh, his son - Gowardhan Singh (PW-

8), Bahadur Singh (PW-1), Narayan Singh (PW-9), and

Page 3 of 20 Swaroop Singh (PW-10) reached the place. There were

three other persons also, named Ajuddhibai, Gambhir

Singh, and Najim Singh, who reached the place of offence

and it was alleged that they were also assaulted by the

accused persons and suffered bodily injuries. These persons

did not, however, enter the witness box.

3.2 Gowardhan Singh (PW-8) lodged the First

Information Report No. 181 of 1992 (Ex. P-19), before the

Police at Shahabad Police Station. The case was registered

against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, and

307, IPC. The injured Ram Singh and other injured persons

were sent for medical examination. Ram Singh died on

11.12.1992 while receiving medical treatment. In view of

the same, the police converted the case under Section 302,

IPC.

3.3 A cross-First Information Report No. 182 of 1992

was also lodged before the same Police Station by the

appellant - Shrikrishna against the other 16 persons for the

Page 4 of 20 offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324 and 506,

IPC. The allegations in the said FIR were inter alia that

Najim Singh and Parvat Singh were armed with Farsa (axe)

and the others had lathis. It was alleged that Najim Singh

hit the appellant on the head which the appellant took hold

of in his hand and that Ram Singh also assaulted the

appellant with lathi, inflicting blow on the left side of the

head. According to the allegation in this cross-FIR, the

appellant fell down and shouted. The plea put forward by

the appellant was that as he was attacked, he acted in his

own defence, thus raising the plea of private defence.

3.4 The prosecution examined 14 witnesses, amongst

whom included Bahadur Singh (PW-1), Khushilal (PW-4),

Gowardhan Singh (PW-8), Narayan Singh (PW-9), and

Swaroop Singh (PW-10) and in addition, 3 members named

Gambhir Singh, Ajuddibai and Najim Singh were also

injured but they were not examined. PW-8 stated that when

his father Ram Singh returned home, he informed his father

Page 5 of 20 that his younger brother - Kalyan was hit by the son of Ram

Singh. At that time, it was stated that Ram Singh went to

reprimand Shrikrishna about the incident, whose house was

nearby and opposite to the house of Ram Singh.

3.5 It was further stated that accused Ajab Singh and

Lakhan Singh, who were holding axes in their hands as well

as other members of the accused party, including the

appellant, who had lathis in their hands, started beating his

father. It was deposed that appellant-Shrikrishna used lathi

and attacked on Ram Singh who fell down unconscious.

Khushilal (PW-4), Bahadur Singh (PW-1) and Swaroop

Singh (PW-10) as well as Narayan Singh (PW-9) supported

the story of PW-4, who further stated that he rushed to the

place to rescue his father, where he was also hit by the

members of the other side named Khelan Singh, Kanhaiya

and Ram Narayan. He stated that PW-1 had already reached

there.

Page 6 of 20 3.6 According to PW-9, at the time of the incident, he

was at his home, which was nearby and heard the shouts.

He stated that he saw that the accused persons were engaged

in hitting Ram Singh. He stated that Ajab Singh and Lakhan

Singh had axes in their hand and Shrikrishna had lathi. It

came out from the total reading of the evidence of the above

prosecution witnesses that all five were neighbours and they

were staying near the spot of crime.

3.7 Upon appreciation of ocular evidence, the trial

Court observed that accused persons hit Ram Singh on the

head and that appellant-Shrikrishna hit him on head by

using lathi. The conviction of the appellant was guided

mainly by the medical evidence of Dr. Anand Uniya (PW-

2), who had examined the injured Ram Singh, who found

one lacerated wound on the middle part of the head. He

stated that there was swelling on the left parietal bone and

on the right parietal bone. There was also one contusion on

the left frontal bone. All these injuries were mentioned in

Page 7 of 20 the medical report (Ex. P-7). He also found upon medical

examination of Ram Singh that on his parietal region, there

was an open wound of size 4.5 cm..

3.8 Upon examination of Ram Singh, PW-2 noticed

the following injuries, (i) One lacerated wound which was

7 cm long, 1½ cm width, ½ cm deep on the mid aspect of

skull. Blood clots were deposited over the wound. This

injury was caused by any hard and blunt object. (ii) One

diffuse swelling which was 6 cm long, 1½ cm width on left

parietal bone. This injury was caused by any hard and blunt

object. (iii) One diffuse swelling, which was 4 ½ cm long,

3/½ cm width, it was present on right parietal bone. (iv) One

contusion mark 3 cm long, 1 ½ cm width it was present on

left frontal bone. This injury was caused by a hard and blunt

object and it was simple in nature. PW-2 opined that the

injuries, more particularly Injury No.3 above, were caused

by hard and blunt object.

Page 8 of 20 3.9 The injured Ram Singh was referred for further

treatment to District Hospital Vidisha. Dr.Ashok Kumar

(PW-12) performed the post-mortem of Ram Singh, who

died in the course of treatment. P.W.12 opined on the basis

of post-mortem that there was a fracture of parietal bone

and hematoma. PW-12, further opined that the deceased

died due to head injury.

4. Heard learned counsel Mr.Shubhranshu Padhi who was

requested by the court to assist as amicus curiae, and

learned government advocate Mr.B.P.Singh for the

respondent – State.

5. Looking at the outset, the applicable provisions of

Indian Penal Code, the group of offences affecting the

human body are contained in Chapter XVI of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860. Section 299 is the offence of culpable

homicide. It provides that whoever causes death by doing

an act with the intention of causing death, or with the

intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause

Page 9 of 20 death, or with the knowledge that it is likely by such act to

cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

5.1 Section 300 defines “murder”. According to this

section, culpable homicide is murder where an act is done

by which the death is caused and such act is done with the

intention of causing death. Secondly, if it is done with an

intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender

knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom

the harm is caused, it is also a murder. Thirdly, in the

section, “murder” is committed if the act is done with an

intention of causing bodily injury and the bodily injury

intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course

of nature to cause death. Fourthly, if the person committing

the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it

must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as

is likely to cause death, he commits murder when such act

is committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of

causing death.

Page 10 of 20 5.1.1 Exceptions to Section 300 mentions when

culpable homicide is not murder. The same may be

extracted to be relevant in the context of the facts obtained

in the present case,

Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—

First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Page 11 of 20 Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

5.1.2 While Section 302 deals with the punishment of

murder, Section 304 is about punishment for culpable

homicide not amounting to murder. The offence under

Section 304, IPC is punishable in its Part I as well as in Part

II. When the prosecution proves the death of the person in

question and further that such death was caused by the act

of the accused, and that the accused knew that such act is

Page 12 of 20 likely to cause death, the offence would be punishable

under Section 304 Part II.

5.1.3 Section 304, IPC has two parts namely; Section

304 Part I and Section 304 Part II. The distinction between

these two Parts of Section 304, IPC is required to be

considered having regard to the provisions of Sections 299

and 300, IPC. Whether the offender had intention to cause

death or he had no such intention brings out the vital

distinction.

5.1.4 In Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of

Haryana 1 , this Court observed that the distinguishing

feature is the mens rea for the said purpose, the exceptions

contained in Section 300, IPC are taken into account.

Culpable homicide is genus, the murder is its specie. The

two ingredients namely that the infliction of bodily injury

on the deceased was caused intentionally and secondly, that

the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary

1 (2008) 15 SCC 753

Page 13 of 20 course of nature, are satisfied, the offence would become

the offence of murder. However, there may be

circumstances which may emerge from the operative facts

and the evidence available in a given case that the offence

would be one of culpable homicide not amounting to

murder.

5.1.4.1 In Kesar Singh1, the concept of “culpable

homicide not amounting to murder” was explained by

stating,

“If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no intention to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall under Part I but where no such intention is established and only knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part II.”

5.1.5 The charges against the appellant was also

levelled under Section 147, IPC, which is punishment for

Page 14 of 20 rioting. Section 148 is the offence of rioting armed with

deadly weapon. These offences were held to be not proved.

Similarly, the High Court has found that offence under

Section 149, which provides that every member of unlawful

assembly would be guilty of offence committed in

prosecution of common object, but the common object is

not made out, is the finding.

5.2 With the above background of statutory

provisions, reverting back to the facts of the present case,

the scenario of the offence was one of a free fight. There

was a commotion where the anger-filled group of two rival

parties attacked each other, and injuries were sustained by

both sides. The High Court was justified in its reasoning

that in such circumstances, it is not possible to reason and

to conclude that there was a formation of unlawful assembly

with common object of causing death. The accused persons,

including the appellant, could not be said to have acted with

common intention along with others.

Page 15 of 20 5.2.1 In the group fight, which broke out pursuant to a

quarrel, the persons from both sides were involved, and they

suffered injuries on various parts of their bodies. It is

accordingly rightly held that they cannot be held guilty

jointly under Section 149, IPC, and the charges under

Section 148 and 147, IPC were not proved to hold the

accused persons, including the appellant, to treat them

guilty for those offences. At the same time, the kind and

nature of the individual act in the commission of the offence

would matter, and the guilt or otherwise of the accused

would have to be accordingly ascertained and established.

5.3 In this light, looking at the individual role of the

appellant herein, he with a lathi hit on the head of Ram

Singh. The medical evidence suggested that the injuries

corroborated and confirmed that there was a single blow

with a blunt object on the head of the deceased, which was

the cause of his death. The appellant herein also suffered

grievous injuries on the head, from the free fight that ensued

Page 16 of 20 when the deceased went to the house of the appellant to ask

about the assault of his son by the son of the appellant. In

the group fight, it was the defence of the appellant that in

the group clash and in the explosive circumstances, he had

to act in private defence to use lathi, which caused the

injuries on the head of the deceased Ram Singh.

5.4 The High Court was correct in its approach in

holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable

under Section 304 Part II, IPC by assessing the individual

role on his part. Having regard to the evidence on record

regarding the role played by the appellant and the injuries

caused by him on the head of the deceased by using lathi,

he could be presumed to have acted with an intention to

cause death or such bodily injury which he knew that it

would be of such kind and nature that would cause, in

ordinary course, the death of the person to whom it is

caused. However, the degree of the offence in the facts and

circumstances of the case, could not be said to be partaking

Page 17 of 20 the offence of murder under Section 302, but the offence

committed would be punishable under Section 304 Part II,

IPC.

5.5 The way as the sequence of events happened in

the instant case and since the offence by the appellant was

committed in the midst of commotion and group clash, it

could be legitimately inferred that the appellant acted

without any premeditation as such to cause the death of

Ram Singh, although in eye of law, having regard to the

kind of weapon used and the nature of injury inflicted,

which corresponded to the weapon used, knowledge could

be inferred in law. Even according to the prosecution, the

incident occurred when the deceased came to the house of

the appellant, to question him, when some others also

gathered and there was a free fight. In fact, the appellant

suffered serious injuries to his head in the same transaction.

5.6 For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment

and order of the High Court convicting the appellant for the

Page 18 of 20 offence under Section 304 Part II, IPC is justified and

warrants no interference. It is sustained.

6. The appellant was arrested on 19.12.1992. The

High Court granted bail to him on 05.08.1998. He was then

released on bail, after spending five years, seven months

and 17 days in jail at that point of time. He was required to

surrender, and he surrendered on 06.12.2010. This Court

granted bail to the appellant on 05.08.2011. Thus, from

06.12.2010 to 05.08.2011, the appellant underwent further

imprisonment for eight months. In view of the above details

borne out from the record, the total period of incarceration

of the appellant comes to six years and three months.

6.1 The appellant is more than 80 years of age at

present. Since the appellant is an old and aged person, and

in the December of his life, it would be harsh and

inadvisable to send him behind the bars again at this stage.

The courts are not supposed to be insensitive. Therefore, in

view of the advanced age of the appellant and considering Page 19 of 20 the totality of the facts and circumstances, while upholding

the conviction of the appellant under Section 304, Part II,

IPC, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to what is

already undergone, to be substituted accordingly.

7. The appeal stands dismissed subject to the above

modification in the sentence.

All interlocutory applications, as may be pending,

would not survive in view of disposal of the main Appeal.

…………………………………..,J.

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

…………………………………..,J.

[ N.V. ANJARIA ] NEW DELHI;

09.01.2026.

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