Shri Nashik Panchavati Panjarpol Trust & Ors. vs The Chairman & Anr.

2023INSC750 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2857 OF 2011

SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST & ORS. .... APPELLANTS

VERSUS THE CHAIRMAN & ANR. .... RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2858 OF 2011

SHREE NASIK PANCHAVATI PANJARAPOLE TRUST & ORS. .... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. .... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

1. The Respondent no. 1- Market Committee had preferred

two First Appeals being Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Deepak Guglani of 2006 before the High Court of Judicature at Date: 2023.08.22 13:24:40 IST Reason:

Bombay, challenging the award dated 07.03.2006

1 passed by the II Adhoc Additional District Judge,

Nashik (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Reference

Court’) in Land Reference No. 525 of 1997. The High

Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated

23.09.2009 allowed the First Appeal No. 1447 of 2006

and set aside the award dated 07.03.2006 passed by

the Reference Court, and remanded the matter to the

Reference Court to decide the question as to whether

the Reference made to the Reference Court was within

the limitation as per Section 18 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as

the ‘Act’) and decide the Reference afresh. The High

Court vide the separate order of the even date,

disposed of the First Appeal No. 1490 of 2006

observing that in view of the order passed in First

Appeal No. 1447 of 2006, the appeal had become

infructuous. The appellant- trust has preferred the

instant appeals being aggrieved by the judgments

and orders passed in First Appeal Nos. 1447 of 2006

and 1490 of 2006 by the High Court.

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2. Though the case has a chequered history, the bare

facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the

present appeals may be summarised as under:

(i) The lands bearing Survey Nos. 74, 75, 76 and

29 situated at Nashik, Makhamalabad belonging

to the appellant- trust were sought to be

acquired by the respondent no. 2 for the

respondent no. 1– Agricultural Produce Market

Committee under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act read with Section 126 of the

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,

1966 vide the Notification dated 17.06.1993.

(ii) In the said acquisition proceedings, an award

was declared under Section 11 of the Act on

12.01.1996. The appellant- trust filed the

Writ Petition being No. 607 of 1996

challenging the said proceedings on the

ground that the award declared was beyond the

statutory period of limitation. Initially the

High Court granted an ad-interim injunction

in favour of the appellant (the petitioner in

the said petition) on 06.02.1996, against

3 which the respondent had preferred a special

leave petition before this Court. However,

the SLP came to be dismissed by this Court.

(iii) Since by virtue of the said interim order

passed in the said writ petition, the

possession of the lands in question continued

with the appellant- trust, and though an

award was declared under Section 11 of the

Act, the amount awarded remained with

respondent no. 2, considering the hardship

caused to both the parties, the appellant

(the petitioner in the said petition) and the

respondent no. 1- Agricultural Produce Market

Committee (the respondent no. 4 in the said

writ petition) arrived at a Settlement on

20.10.1997 and requested the High Court to

dispose of the said writ petition in terms of

the consent terms arrived at between the

parties.

(iv) The High Court disposed of the said Writ

Petition No. 607 of 1996 by passing the

following order on 20th October, 1997: -

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“By consent of Parties Petition taken up for final hearing on board today. The consent terms between the petitioner and 4th Respondent taken on record. Perused the Consent Terms. The same are just, fair, and equitable and hence are accepted.

In view of the above, this shall be an order in terms of Consent Terms and it is hereby directed as under:

(a) It is directed that the relevant date for determining market value of suit land would be 1 & 1/2 year after the publication of (illegible) Notification under Section 6 i.e., 17.06.1993 and consequently both parties agree and admit that Market Value be determined as on 17.12.1994 date.

(b) It is further directed that the petitioner shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the 4th Respondent through 2nd respondent within 4 weeks from the date of this order and that the petitioner Trust shall be paid the amount determined under the Award under section 11 by the 2nd respondent at the time of handing over possession.

(c) It is further directed that the Petitioner Trust shall within 4 weeks file an Application to 2nd respondent under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the 2nd Respondent is directed to send the reference to District Court, Nasik within 4 weeks from the date of receipt. It is further directed that the District Court after hearing the reference shall determine the Market Value as on 17.12.1994 dated as agreed between the parties hereto.

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(d) The parties are at liberty to challenge the decision regarding valuation given in Reference in the District Court, in accordance with law.

(e) The compromise & decision so arrived finally, should not be treated as a precedent.

In view of the above, petition shall stand disposed of. No order as to cost.”

(v) Pursuant to the said order passed by the High

Court, the payment was made to the appellant

on 17.11.1997 and the possession of lands was

handed over by the appellant. The appellant

thereafter submitted an application on

03.12.1997 to respondent no. 2– Collector

seeking reference to the District Court. The

respondent No. 2– Collector accordingly

referred the matter to the District Court on

18.12.1997.

(vi) The Reference Court after considering the

issue of limitation raised on behalf of the

respondents in the said Reference, held that

the Reference filed with the Collector was

within the period of limitation as per the

order of the High Court. The Reference Court

further determined the amount of additional

6 compensation to be paid to the appellant-

trust vide the award dated 07.03.2006.

(vii) The respondent no. 1- Committee, being

aggrieved by the said award preferred the

First Appeals being 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of

2006 before the High Court, which came to be

allowed vide the impugned orders as stated

herein above.

3. The learned senior counsel Mr. B.H. Marlapalle

appearing for the appellant- trust submitted that

findings arrived at by the High Court with regard

to the issue of limitation are ex facie erroneous.

According to him, though the consent terms, more

particularly, clause (c) thereof was not happily

worded, the High Court while disposing of the Writ

Petition vide the order dated 20.10.1997 had

specifically directed the Reference Court to

determine the market value of the lands in question

as on 17.12.1994 as agreed between the parties, and

therefore, the respondents could not have raised the

issue of limitation contained in Section 18 of the

Act. He further submitted that both the parties had

7 to act in terms of the order passed by the High

Court based on the consent terms, and therefore the

respondent- Committee could not have raised the

issue of limitation under Section 18.

4. Per Contra, the learned senior Counsel Mr. Parag

Tripathi appearing for respondent no. 1- Committee

pressing into service clause (c) of the consent

terms vehemently submitted that there being no time

limit mentioned in the said clause, it was required

to be construed that the appellant- trust had to

make an application to the second respondent under

Section 18 of the said Act within four weeks from

the date of the order passed by the High Court i.e.

from 20.10.1997 and the appellant having made the

application seeking reference on 03.12.1997 i.e.

after four weeks of the order dated 20.10.1997, such

an application was clearly barred by limitation in

view of the consent terms as well as under Section

18 of the said Act.

5. Having carefully gone through the order dated

20.10.1997 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition

No. 607 of 1996 based on the consent terms arrived

8 at between the appellant- trust and the respondent

no. 1- Committee, and the award passed by the

Reference Court as also the impugned judgments and

orders passed by the High Court, we are of the

opinion that the issue of limitation raised by

respondent- Committee before the Reference Court and

before the High Court was not only not tenable but

was highly unreasonable and improper. As discernible

from the consent terms, the very purpose of arriving

at the said consent terms was to do away with the

hardship caused to both the parties because of the

pendency of the Writ Petition. A monetary loss was

being caused to the appellant- trust as it was

losing the interest on the awarded amount under

Section 11 of the said Act, and the respondent no.

1- Committee though was in dire need of the land,

was deprived of the possession of the said lands

under Acquisition. As per the said consent terms,

both the parties had agreed that the relevant date

for determining the market value of the lands in

question would be 17.12.1994. It was further agreed

that the appellant- trust would hand over the vacant

9 and peaceful possession to the respondent- Committee

and the appellant would be paid the amount

determined under the Award under Section 11 of the

Act by the respondent- Committee within four weeks

from the date of the order passed by the Court.

Lastly, it was agreed that the appellant- trust

shall within a period of four weeks file an

application to the respondent no. 2 under Section

18 of the Act and the respondent no. 2 shall send

the said reference for determination of value of the

land as on 17.12.1994 to the District Court, Nashik.

The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition

giving directions in terms of the said consent

terms.

6. Now, since the consent terms as well as the

directions contained in the order of High Court were

silent as to within what period the appellant should

make application to the respondent- Collector

seeking Reference under Section 18 of the Act, the

respondent- Committee taking undue advantage of such

ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of

limitation before the Reference Court. Such a plea

10 raised after taking over the possession of lands in

question from the appellant was not only not in

consonance with the tenor of the consent terms but

it smacked of ulterior motive on the part of the

respondent. The High Court while disposing of the

Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 had given directions

in terms of the consent terms, and both the parties

were expected to act accordingly. In view of said

directions given by the High Court, the issue of

limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act had

clearly paled into insignificance, and the

respondent could not have raised such a plea before

the Reference Court or before the High Court.

7. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal

proposition that in view of the proviso to Section

18 of the said Act, every application to the

Collector seeking reference under Section 18 is

required to be made within the time limit prescribed

in the proviso to Section 18. However, in the

instant case, the parties having entered into the

consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award under

Section 11 was made on 12.01.1996, and the

11 respondent having specifically agreed to pay the

compensation awarded under Section 11 and take over

the vacant and peaceful possession of the lands in

question from the appellant as also having agreed

to make reference to the District Court, Nashik, for

the determination of market value of the said lands

as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie in the mouth of the

respondent- Committee to say that the application

made by the appellant- trust seeking reference to

the District Court, Nashik was beyond the period of

limitation prescribed under Section 18 or was not

in consonance with the consent terms arrived at

between the parties. Since the market value of the

lands as on 17.12.1994 which was the reckonable date

agreed by the parties, was required to be determined

by the District Court, Nashik, making of an

application to the Collector seeking a Reference

under Section 18 was a sheer procedural formality

required to be followed by the appellant. Though the

consent terms and the directions of High Court were

silent as to within what period the appellant had

to make such an application, it was required to be

12 construed that appellant had to make application

after it received the compensation awarded under

Section 11 and after it handed over possession of

the lands, which it did.

8. It cannot be gainsaid that as per the rules of

doctrine of harmonious construction, the document

has to be read as a whole and in its totality. If

there is any ambiguity either patent or latent, in

any of the clauses of the document, the courts

should interpret such clause in such manner which

is consistent with the other clauses and with the

purpose and intent of the parties executing it.

9. The Reference Court after considering all the legal

and factual aspects of the matter had rightly held

that the Reference was filed with the Collector

within the period of limitation as per the order

passed by the High Court. In our opinion, the High

Court had committed gross error in interfering with

the said well-reasoned findings recorded by the

Reference Court, and in setting aside the entire

award and remanding the matter back to the Reference

Court for deciding it afresh. The impugned judgments

13 and orders passed by the High Court being ex facie

erroneous, the same are set aside.

10. In that view of the matter, both the appeals are

allowed.

……………………………………J. [BELA M. TRIVEDI]

……………………………………J. [DIPANKAR DATTA]

NEW DELHI;

August 22nd, 2023

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