Shri K Ganesh vs Shri Govind Reddy

-1- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF MARCH, 2026

BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR REVIEW PETITION NO.587 OF 2025 BETWEEN:

1. SHRI K. GANESH SON OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 42 YEARS. 2. SHRI C. MANJU SON OF SHRI M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, AGED 42 YEARS, BOTH ARE RESIDENTS OF NO.329, 'VEERABHADRA NILAYA' 3RD CROSS, KODIHALLI, AIRPORT ROAD, BANGALORE-560008. ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI ARUN B. M., ADVOCATE)

AND: Digitally signed by MALLIKARJUN RUDRAYYA KALMATH 1. SHRI GOVIND REDDY Location: High Court of Karnataka, SON OF LATE SHRI MUNIYAPPA, Dharwad Bench AGED 69 YEARS, REP. BY GPA AND SON SHRI G. RAVI REDDY,

2. SHRI G. RAVI REDDY, SON OF SHRI GOVIND REDDY, AGED 39 YEARS, BOTH ARE RESIDENTS OF NO.19/1, THIRUPALYA VILLAGE, NEXT TO GOVERNMENT SCHOOL, TOWARDS HULIMANGALA ROAD, BOMMASANDRA INDUSTRIAL AREA, BENGALURU-560099. -2- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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3. SMT. Y. SUGUNA WIFE OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 67 YEARS.

4. SHRI K. MUNIRAJ SON OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 50 YEARS.

5. SHRI PRITHVI KRISH SON OF SHRI K. MUNIRAJ, AGED 13 YEARS.

6. MASTER ROHAN REDDY SON OF SHRI K. MUNIRAJ AGED 10 YEARS.

7. KUMARI NEHA DAUGHTER OF SHRI K. GANESH, AGED 18 YEARS.

8. MASTER NITHEN SON OF SHRI K. GANESH, AGED 10 YEARS. 9. SMT. K. PADMA DAUGHTER OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 49 YEARS. 10. MASTER SHREYASH SON OF MRS. K. PADMA, AGED 16 YEARS. 11. SMT. K. BHAGYA DAUGHTER OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 47 YEARS. 12. MR. MANISH SON OF SMT. K. BHAGYA, AGED 23 YEARS. 13. MR. LOHITH, SON OF SMT. BHAGYA, AGED 19 YEARS. 14. KAMARI KAVITHA -3- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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DAUGHTER OF LATE M. KRISHNAPPA, AGED 39 YEARS. 15. SHRI M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, SON OF LATE MUNIYAPPA, AGED 73 YEARS. 16. SMT. Y. VANALAKSHMI, WIFE OF SHRI M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, AGED 64 YEARS. 17. SHRI C. VIJAYA KUMAR, SON OF M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, AGED 45 YEARS. 18. KUMARI MAHALAKSHMI DAUGHTER OF SHRI C. VIJAYAKUMAR, AGED 20 YEARS. 19. MASTER CHIRAG, SON OF SHRI C. VIJAYAKUMAR, AGED 16 YEARS.

20. SMT. HEMAVATHI DAUGHTER OF M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, AGED 49 YEARS. 21. KUMARI NAVYA DAUGHTER OF SMT. HEMAVATHI, AGED 23 YEARS. 22. MASTER ANKITH SON OF SMT. HEMAVATHI, AGED 19 YEARS.

23. SMT. USHA DAUGHTER OF SHRI M. CHANNARAYA REDDY, AGED 40 YEARS. 24. MASTER GURUSWAROOP SON OF SMT. USHA, AGED 10 YEARS. RESPONDENT NOS.5, 6, 8, 10, 19 & 24 ARE MINORS AND REP. BY THEIR PARENTS/NATURAL GUARDIANS 4TH RESP. 1ST PETR., 9TH RESP., -4- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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17TH RESP. AND 24TH RESP. RESPS. NO.3 TO 24 ARE RESIDENTS OF NO.329 'VEERABHADRA NILAYA' 3RD CROSS, KODIHALLI, AIRPORT ROAD, BANGALORE-560008. 25. SMT. CHANNAMMA DAUGHTER OF SHRI MUNIYAPPA, AGED 75 YEARS, RESIDENT OF NO. 329 'VEERABHADRA NILAYA' 3RD CROSS, KODIHALLI, AIRPORT ROAD, BANGALORE-560008.

26. MR. KISHORE KUMAR, SON OF SHRI SHANTHILAL, AGED 51 YEARS, RESIDENT AT FLAT NO.102, 1ST FLOOR, NO.432, 30TH CROSS, 7TH 'B' MAIN, 4TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU-560011.

27 M/S. METRIK INFRA PROJECTS PVT. LTD., A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY, HAVING ITS OFFICE AT FLOOR-11, 'JAIN HEIGHTS SOLUS', NO.2, 1ST CROSS, J. C. ROAD, BENGALURU-560027, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI SUNIL KUMAR H., ADV. FOR R1 AND R2; SRI PARUSHURAM AJJAMPUR, ADV. FOR R25 NOTICE TO R3 TO R24, R26 AND R27 ARE DISPENSED WITH) THIS REVIEW PETITION IS FILED UNDER ORDER 47 RULE 1 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE ORDER DATED 05.11.2025 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN MFA NO.7416/2025, VIDE ANNEXURE-'A' AND CONSEQUENTIALLY, ALLOW THE APPEAL FILED IN MFA NO.7416/2025 AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 17.09.2025 IN O.S.NO.4625/2025 PASSED BY THE XXIV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALUR CITY (CCH NO.6) IN SO FAR AS ALLOWING I.A.NO.1 IS CONCERNED AND ETC. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR -5- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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CAV ORDER

This review petition is filed by the review petitioners,

who are defendants No.5 and 19 in O.S.No.4625/2025

challenging the order dated 17.09.2025 passed by the

Court of XXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,

Bangalore City (C.C.H.No.6). The review petitioners were

the appellants in MFA No.7416/2025, which was disposed

of by this Court on 05.11.2025. The review petitioners

have preferred this petition seeking review of the order

dated 05.11.2025 passed by this Court in MFA

No.7416/2025.

2. The appeal filed by the review petitioners in MFA

No.7416/2025 was allowed in part by modifying the order

dated 17.09.2025 passed in O.S.No.4625/2025 on

I.A.Nos.1 and 2 filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of

CPC. This Court directed that the appellants in MFA

No.7416/2025, who are defendants No.5 and 19 in

O.S.No.4625/2025 shall reserve 1/4th share in all the suit

schedule properties in the name of plaintiffs and defendant -6- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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No.25. The appellants/defendants were permitted to utilize

other remaining respective shares and were further

directed to furnish the details of apartments constructed

over suit Item Nos.8 and 9 and to submit such particulars

before the Trial Court, as ordered in MFA No.7416/2025.

3. Being aggrieved by the direction to reserve 1/4th

share in the name of plaintiffs and defendant No.25, the

present review petition is filed. According to the review

petitioners, there ought not to have been any direction to

reserve 1/4th share in favour of plaintiffs and defendant

No.25.

4. This review petition is filed by raising various

grounds, which are summarized as follows:

4.1 This Court has not taken note of the conduct of

plaintiff No.1/respondent No.1 and defendant

No.25/respondent No.25;

4.2 That the defendant No.25 had filed suit earlier in

O.S.No.2085/2021 and was unsuccessful in -7- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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obtaining interim order of injunction and in the

meantime, the respondents No.1 and 2 herein

have filed suit in O.S.No.4625/2025 and in this

suit, the plaintiff in O.S.No.2085/2021 is arrayed

as defendant No.25 and later on, defendant No.25

has withdrawn the said suit OS.No.2085/2021;

4.3 It is contended that the above fact was

suppressed in the subsequent suit in

O.S.No.4625/2025. According to the review

petitioners, such suppression amounts to

misconduct on the part of plaintiffs and defendant

No.25. It is further contended that filing of

O.S.No.2085/2021 and O.S.No.4625/2025

seeking partition of the suit properties amounts to

abuse of process of Court. Further, the review

petitioners also contend that this Court while

passing the order in MFA No.7416/2025 failed to

extract and properly consider the relevant

paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon'ble -8- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Supreme Court in MANDALI RANGANNA AND

OTHERS vs. T RAMACHANDRA AND OTHERS1,

regarding conduct of parties while considering

grant of equitable relief of temporary injunction;

4.4 It is further contended that this Court erred in

reserving 1/4th share in favour of plaintiffs and

defendant No.25 despite there being an

inordinate delay of 12 years in challenging the

joint development agreement dated 08.08.2013.

According to the review petitioners, permitting

such reservation despite the delay constitutes an

error apparent on the face of the record;

4.5 Further, the review petitioners contend that there

is an error apparent on the face of record,

inasmuch as, this Court has observed that

whatever alienations made would be subject to

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18822

this alone is sufficient, but proceeded to grant

1 (2008) 11 SCC 1 2 Hereinafter referred to as the 'T.P. Act' -9- NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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temporary injunction albeit with modification.

According to them, such direction is contrary to

the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of VINOD SETH Vs. DEVINDER BAJAJ AND

ANOTHER3;

4.6 It is further contended that this Court has wrongly

interpreted the said judgment and also the

judgment in MANDALI RANGANNA's case

(supra) and the said judgment is contrary to the

order dated 03.09.2025 passed by this Court in

MFA No.2475/2024. It is therefore contended

that this Court ought to have confined its

observation only to the applicability of Section 52

of the T.P. Act without directing reservation of

shares in favour of plaintiffs and defendant No.25.

5. This Court hereby makes clear that whatever

observations and discussions made in this order are only

passed on the documents produced by both sides and not

3 (2010) 8 SCC 1 - 10 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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more than that. This Court is required to examine

whether the order passed in MFA No.7416/2025 suffers

from any error apparent on face of the record so as to

warrant review of the said order.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BOARD OF

CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA AND ANOTHER vs.

NETAJI CRICKET CLUB AND OTHERS4, has laid down

the principles of law governing the scope of review under

Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. The relevant

paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted

hereinbelow:

"88. We are, furthermore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a review application cannot be said to be ex facie bad in law. Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedents laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit.

89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason.

4 (2005) 4 SCC 741 - 11 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit".

91. It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. The Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius8, this Court made observations as regard limitations in the application of review of its order stating: (SCR p.529)

"Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule'."

but the said rule is not universal.

92. Yet again in Lily Thomas (supra), this Court has laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC pp. 247-48, para 52)

"52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It - 12 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute."

This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error." (Emphasis supplied)

93. It is also not correct to contend that the court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the court accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29th September, 2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake."

7. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SANJAY

KUMAR AGARWAL vs. STATE TAX OFFICER AND

5 ANOTHER , has discussed regarding scope of review and

laid down the principles of law, which are extracted below:

"10. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when

5 R.P. (Civil) No.1620 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.1661/2020 and connected with other matters - 13 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so6.

11. In Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others7, this Court made very pivotal observations: -

"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."

12. Again, in Shanti Conductors Private Limited vs. Assam State Electricity Board and Others8, a three Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others (supra) dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others9, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

14. In R.P. (C) Nos. 1273-1274 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8345-8346 of 2018 (Arun Dev Upadhyaya vs. Integrated Sales Service Limited & Another), this Court reiterated the law and held that: -

"15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at

6 AIR 1965 SC 845, Sajjan Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 7 (1997) 8 SCC 715 8 (2020) 2 SCC 677 9 (2021) 13 SCC 1 - 14 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions."

15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation vs. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) and Others10, held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of co-ordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that: -

i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected."

v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."

vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/ judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

10 (2021) 3 SCC 1 - 15 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Analysis: 17. Keeping in view the afore-stated legal position, let us examine whether the Review Petitioners have been able to make out any case within the ambit of Order XLVII of Supreme Court Rules, read with Order XLVII of CPC, for reviewing the impugned judgment."

8. Therefore, keeping in view the principles of law

laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the present

review petition is considered on the materials produced

once again in the review petition. The materials produced

by the review petitioners through the learned counsel,

Sri.B.M.Arun were already submitted during the course of

his arguments in MFA No.7416/2025. According to the

learned counsel, Sri.B.M.Arun a comment is made on the

conduct of the plaintiffs and defendant No.25 in

O.S.No.4625/2025. According to learned counsel,

Sri.B.M.Arun the defendant No.25 has filed a suit in

O.S.No.2085/2021 for partition claiming 1/4th share and

was unsuccessful in getting an order of temporary

injunction and later on the plaintiffs in O.S.No.4625/2025

(who were parties in O.S.No.2085/2021) have filed the

suit O.S.No.4625/2025 and obtained an interim order of - 16 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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temporary injunction on 02.07.2025 and later on, the

defendant No.25 who was plaintiff in O.S.No.2085/2021

has withdrawn the said suit. Therefore, according to

learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun this is misconduct.

9. Further learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun has

contended that rejection of application for temporary

injunction in O.S.No.2085/2021 is not disclosed in

O.S.No.4625/2025. Therefore, this suppression of fact is

misconduct on the part of plaintiffs and defendant No.25 in

O.S.No.4625/2025.

10. It is pertinent to mention here that both

O.S.Nos.2085/2021 and 4625/2021 are for partition. It is

stated that original propositus is Muniyappa, who has four

children namely, Govinda Reddy, Channamma, Krishnappa

and Channaraya Reddy. The relationship between them is

admitted. Smt.Channamma has filed O.S.No.2085/2021

for partition and later on, it was withdrawn on 24.09.2025

with liberty to agitate her right in O.S.No.4625/2025 by - 17 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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mentioning reasons that she is old aged woman and

therefore, could not pursue by engaging lawyer and as

such, she will agitate her right through O.S.No.4625/2025.

Accordingly, the trial court has dismissed the suit

O.S.No.2085/2021 as withdrawn by reserving liberty to

Channamma to agitate her legitimate right in

O.S.No.4625/2025. When admittedly there are four joint

family members/co-sharers, among them two sons have

entered into exercise of executing the joint development

agreement, general agreement, etc. Here as per the

materials produced by the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun

the same have to be considered, which is apparent on the

face of record.

11. There is rival contentions among the members

of the joint family whether the suit item Nos.8 and 9 are

joint family properties or not. It is one of the contentious

issue in the suit and this is yet to be decided in full fledge

trial in the suit. There was joint development agreement

dated 25.10.2007 in which Govinda Reddy and his wife - 18 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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and children are recognized as owners of the suit item

Nos.8 and 9 properties, but Channamma (daughter of

Muniyappa) is not recognized as joint owner. As why the

review petitioners have left out Channamma from the

array of joint owners, is best reasons known to the review

petitioners. This joint development agreement dated

25.10.2007 with one Kishore Kumar, who is developer. In

this agreement, except Channamma all others have been

considered as owners. It is not disputed that Channamma

(daughter of Muniyappa) is not a sister of Krishnappa and

Channaraya Reddy. However, the sister Channamma is

given a go-by in this joint development agreement. Thus,

prima facie it is nothing but causing deprivation of right of

Channamma.

12. Again on 12.04.2011 a supplementary

agreement was executed in which also review petitioners

have been left out Channamma being made as party as

joint owner. Further there is one more joint development

agreement with the same developer by the same parties - 19 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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on 08.08.2013, in which also the review petitioners, other

joint family members and plaintiffs, wife and children have

been made as parties but Channamma is left out for the

best reasons known to the review petitioners. Thus,

causing deprivation of right of Channamma.

13. Considering all these three documents,

Channamma is left out and admittedly she is a sister

review petitioners being daughter of Muniyappa has not at

all been considered in all these documentary transactions

while executing joint development agreement with

developer. Therefore, Channamma has filed suit

O.S.No.2085/2021 for partition seeking her 1/4th share in

all the properties including item Nos.8 and 9 in the suit

schedule properties. But Channamma was unsuccessful in

obtaining the order of temporary injunction. The plaintiff

in O.S.No.4625/2025 Govinda Reddy, admittedly he is

dumb and deaf. Therefore, when these two co-sharers

one being physically disabled person and another being old

aged woman, being vulnerable at the hands of the review - 20 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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petitioners, have filed the suit for partition claiming their

legitimate rights of share. Under these circumstances, the

suit filed by Channamma in O.S.No.2085/2021 and

O.S.No.4625/2025 filed by Govinda Reddy are considered

and Channamma has withdrawn the suit

O.S.No.2085/2021 by assigning reason that she being old

aged woman, she could not pursue the suit independently.

Therefore, when her own brother had initiated suit

O.S.No.4625/2025 and as such permission sought for to

agitate her right in O.S.No.4625/2025 and withdrew the

suit O.S.No.2085/2021. But according to learned counsel

Sri.B.M.Arun it is misconduct on part of Govinda Reddy

and Channamma, but the misconduct by the review

petitioners is also to be highlighted here.

14. In the joint development agreements of the

year 2007, 2011 and 2013 though plaintiff - Govinda

Reddy was shown as owner in joint development

agreement of the year 2007 and 2011, but suddenly in the

joint development agreement dated 08.08.2013 this - 21 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Govinda Reddy has made as confirming party.

Furthermore, this joint development agreement executed

at the hands of the review petitioners and developer, it is

made as Govinda Reddy and his branch have no right, title

and interest whatsoever any person over the suit schedule

property, which are item Nos.8 and 9 in the suit schedule

properties. Therefore, here the review petitioners and

developer both have decided the ownership and title of the

parties according to their convenient documents. If this is

not misconduct, then no other things would be

misconduct. Therefore, when this Court while passing

order in MFA No.7416/2025 ordered whatever alienations

or transactions are subject to Section 52 of T.P. Act, but

also protected the rights of plaintiffs of O.S.No.4625/2025

and Channamma just by ordering to reserve their 1/4th

share.

15. Sri.B.M.Arun, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of review petitioners being aggrieved and also

annoyed by this order of reserving 1/4th share, has argued - 22 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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in high pitch voice that this order of reserving 1/4th share

could not have been done according to him. Sri.B.M.Arun

while addressing his submissions thinking that this Court

has committed a blunder submitted that this order could

not have been made and virtually he has dictated the

Court to write the order according to his convenience and

his whims and fancies. It is not disputed that on item

Nos.8 and 9 properties review petitioners with joint

development agreement with developer have constructed

hundred numbers of flats in apartment.

16. When the two co-sharers have filed the suit for

partition and considering the facts and circumstances

involved in the case, the review petitioners along with the

developer have constructed hundred number of flats and if

those flats are sold away entire property consisting of flats

then even if decree is passed for partition then there are

every possibilities of plaintiffs and defendant No.25 would

not get any fruitful share in reality and practically. Then

whatever decree would be paper decree. Therefore, when - 23 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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this Court has ordered with a view to protect the interest

of plaintiffs and defendant No.25, that too subject to result

in the suit with avowed object that even if a decree is

passed the parties must be able to get fruitful of decree

otherwise the decree would become a paper decree.

Therefore, if all the flats and apartments are sold out even

if decree is passed by granting share but for realising the

fruits is only nightmares for the decree holders.

Therefore, protecting the rights of co-sharers as it is

inherent to claim share in joint family properties and such

order is made, which is attacked in this review petition.

Here when the review petitioners have pointed out conduct

on the part of plaintiffs and defendant No.25 in

O.S.No.4625/2025 filing suit for partition is abuse of

process of Court with a single finger, but other four fingers

are pointing towards the review petitioners is lost sight by

learned counsel, Sri.B.M.Arun.

17. Upon considering the three documents of

agreement of the years 2007, 2011 and 2013, the plaintiff - 24 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Govinda Reddy being recognized as the owner in

agreement of the years 2007 and 2011, but in the

agreement of 2013 suddenly he has been shown as a

confirmed parties showing a recital in the agreement that

he has no right and title. Therefore, a question comes up

in the mind of the Court whether such title or ownership

can be changed in any agreement between some parties

at their whims and fancies in the family as in the present

case by review petitioners is to be considered in the suit in

the trial. This is observed because of the fact that

admittedly Govinda Reddy is deaf and dumb moreover

Channamma is not at all included in the share. This is the

conduct and attitude shown by the review petitioners and

this is found prima facie apparent on face of the record as

submitted by learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun himself.

18. Just because non granting order of temporary

injunction in O.S.No.2085/2021 is not disclosed in

O.S.No.4625/2025 is not amounting to suppression of fact

prima facie. O.S.No.4625/2025 is filed by Govinda Reddy - 25 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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and not by Channamma. Though the contents in both the

plaints are same, but are having different cause of actions

and filed by different members of Joint Family. In the suit

for partition the cause of action is continues and

concurrent one till the division takes place. Therefore, the

review petitioners have found fault that Channamma and

Govinda Reddy filing suit for partition is wrong. Therefore,

what the review petitioners desire is that other two co-

sharers namely, Govinda Reddy and Channamma are

being under the mercy of the review petitioners and to see

that Govinda Reddy and Channamma would not get any

share in reality. This is the conduct shown by the review

petitioners. Therefore, in this regard, there is no merit in

the grounds urged by the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun,

Advocate of the review petitioners.

19. Further, one of the document on the face of

record produced by the learned counsel for the review

petitioners Sri.B.M.Arun a deed of partition executed on

11.07.2018 between Mrs.Y.Suguna, who is wife of late - 26 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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M.Krishnappa and M.Channaraya Reddy S/o. Late

Muniyappa and other children of M.Krishnappa and

Channaraya Reddy entered themselves as first party,

second party and third party. This deed of partition is only

between wife and children of M.Krishnappa and

Channaraya Reddy and his children regarding division of

share of residential flats among themselves without taking

into consideration Govinda Reddy and Channamma in

respect of apartment and flats constructed on item Nos.8

and 9 properties. This is one of the conducts shown by

the review petitioners on face of the record itself.

Therefore, systematically excluded Govinda Reddy and

Channamma in respect of properties item Nos.8 and 9.

The suit is filed for partition also in respect of item Nos.8

and 9 properties. Whether this is joint family property or

not, is a question to be determined in the trial in the suit.

Therefore, if all the flats mentioned in the deed of partition

dated 11.07.2018 are sold out and in the event the suit is

decreed in respect of item Nos.8 and 9 properties, Govinda - 27 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Reddy and Channamma are compelled once again start

litigation against several hundred purchasers to realize the

fruit in terms of the decree to be passed in respect of

partition against by way of final decree proceedings and

execution. Therefore, in order to protect the right of share

to get in the share this Court has ordered to reserve 1/4th

share. But according to review petitioners filing of suit

itself is abuse of process of Court which can be certainly

termed as ridicule. Therefore, it is very redicule

submission that when Govinda Reddy and Channamma

have filed suit for partition for claiming their legitimate

share in the properties, is abuse of process of Court.

Considering the conduct of the review petitioners that they

are making every attempt to deprive the legitimate share

of the Govinda Reddy and Channamma on the one hand

and submission made by the review petitioners that filing

of such suit for partition is abuse of process of Court, the

review petitioners are going to make new definitions of

what is legitimate exercise of right and abuse of process of - 28 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Court. This attempt of the review petitioners on the face

of the record produced by the learned counsel

Sri.B.M.Arun are considered while observing in the order

that the protection under Section 52 of the T.P. Act is

weak protection, therefore, ordered to reserve shares till

disposal of the suit. Justice must be given really and

substantially, but should not be a mere paper decree.

Whatever order of reservation in MFA is subject to result in

the suit. Therefore, this conduct of the review petitioners

on the face of record is also considered. Hence, there is

no merit in the grounds urged by the review petitioners

through learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun.

20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

MANDALI RANGANNA AND OTHERS vs.

T.RAMACHANDRA AND OTHERS11 case it is observed

that while granting relief of injunction the conduct of

parties also be considered. Learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun

has argued much and taken on this Court that this Court

11 (2008) 11 SCC 1 - 29 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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has not extracted the paragraph 21 in MANDALI

RANGANNA's case. Non extracting of this paragraph 21

of the judgment according to Sri.B.M.Arun is a misconduct

on the part of the Court. This argument is very ridicule

and misconceived and untenable when considering the

gross misconduct on the part of review petitioners as

above discussed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said

case at paragraph 21 has held as follows:

"21. While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto viz. existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties."

21. Therefore, the conduct of the review petitioners

has to be considered while granting equitable relief of

injunction in the order. This Court in MFA No.7416/2025

has ordered by modifying the order of trial court that the

review petitioners shall make claims of other share of

properties, which they would get in the suit for partition,

but reserved shares of plaintiff and defendant No.25 in

order to protect their rights. Therefore, when this Court - 30 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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protects the rights of co-sharers being members of joint

family this is being annoyed and aggrieved by learned

counsel Sri.B.M.Arun. Therefore, the review petitioners

desire the Court shall pass order according to whims and

fancies and their convenience, which argument of

Sri.B.M.Arun is having found no merit against ethics f

advocacy profession. Considering the argument virtually

the review petitioners through learned counsel

Sri.B.M.Arun is amounting to dictating and browbeating

the Court in order to see that the order be passed in their

favour. According to learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun filing

of suit for partition by two co-sharers who are Govinda

Reddy and Channamma are abuse of process of Court.

This attitude of the review petitioners is found with

malafide intention having oblique motive just to see that

Govinda Reddy and Channamma do not get any fruitful

share in reality even if the suit is decreed and making

them frustrated and relegating to further litigations in

future with purchasers of flats to get share. - 31 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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22. According to the learned counsel for the review

petitioner Sri.B.M.Arun filing of suits by Channamma and

Govinda Reddy as stated above claiming their legitimate

right of share is abuse of process of Court. Channamma

was not at all party in any of the agreements from 2007 to

2013 as explained above. Therefore, she filed the suit for

partition. When Channamma with apprehension that all

the suit properties are being sold only by review

petitioners who are representing two branches in the

family and she may not get any share or fruit in the joint

family properties, therefore, she filed a suit but was

unsuccessful in obtaining interim order of temporary

injunction. Considering the factors that the suit filed for

partition, there might have been other documents

executed but the main relief is to seeking partition in the

joint family/ancestral properties is inherent right of

members of joint family/coparceners and that cannot be

taken away by any of the documents. Therefore, when

considering the main relief is partition, unless there is a - 32 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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division/severance in the joint family properties, the cause

of action continuous. The review petitioners with a desire

to deprive the legitimate share of Govinda Reddy and

Channamma have executed the agreements above stated.

Channamma is not at all taken into confidence in the

agreements, whereas Govinda Reddy is made a party in

the agreement of the year 2007 and 2011 as owners and

sharers, but suddenly in the agreement of the year 2013

Govinda Reddy and his branch were made as only

confirming parties and also by mentioning the recitals that

he has no right and title. Therefore, this is an attempt

made by the review petitioners apparent on the face of the

record. Somehow to exclude the shares to Govinda Reddy

and Channamma so far as item Nos.8 and 9 properties are

concerned, when this being the facts revealed on the

materials placed by the review petitioners itself, observing

that whatever transactions made are subject to Section 52

of the T.P. Act, is a weak protection for the reason that

suppose if 1/4th share each to plaintiff and defendant - 33 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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No.25 is not reserved and the review petitioners and

developers would sell all the properties during the

pendency of the suit, then, in real terms Section 52 of

T.P.Act would not come to give real fruit of decree to

plaintiffs and defendant No.25. In such an event,

whatever decree would be passed in future would become

a mere paper decree. At the most the decree would be

paper tiger or cinema tiger. If this protection of

reservation is not given and mere if Section 52 of the

T.P.Act is made a shield, then this shield is a weak shield

unable to protect the interest of the plaintiffs and

defendant No.25. In case all the flats are sold out, then,

the co-sharers/members of joint family once again will

relegate to cumbersome legal proceedings against every

purchasers of the review petitioners and developers who

are hundred in numbers and in such an event, the rights

of plaintiffs and defendant No.25 would be frustrated and

rendering virtually impossible to get share practically.

Therefore, this Court has modified the order of trial court - 34 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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allowing MFA No.7416/2025 in part permitting the review

petitioners to utilise the remaining portion, but reserved

1/4th share each to the plaintiffs and defendant No.25.

Therefore, this order is completely in protecting the rights

and interest of the plaintiffs and defendant No.25.

Therefore, the contention taken by the learned counsel

Sri.B.M.Arun that filing of suits for partition is abuse of

process of Court is nothing but a redicule and ferocious

submission virtually making the plaintiffs and defendant

No.25 cannot claim their legitimate share/right.

Therefore, virtually the review petitioners are in abuse of

process of the entire legal proceedings including the

transactions made through agreements above stated.

Hence, there is no merit found in the submission of the

learned counsel for the review petitioners.

23. There is no bar under law if one member of the

joint family files a suit for partition and another member of

the joint family cannot maintain the suit for portion. - 35 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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24. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2,

who are plaintiff in O.S.No.4625/2025 submitted that the

suit filed by Channamma in O.S.No.2085/2021 the cause

of action is different and there is no specification of

identifying the property with its boundaries, therefore trial

court has not granted an order of temporary injunction.

Later on, Govinda Reddy has filed the suit

O.S.No.4625/2025 for partition as in Channamma's suit

there is no order of temporary injunction. Therefore, to

protect his right and interest he filed the suit in

O.S.No.4625/2025, but the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun

pointed out that this is abuse of process of Court.

Therefore, the review petitioners wanted no share would

be given to plaintiff and defendant No.25. Therefore, this

desire of review petitioners is nothing but abuse of process

of entire legal proceedings and by this trying to engulp

entire properties.

25. Learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun places reliance on

the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of - 36 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Y.B.PATIL AND OTHERS v. Y.L.PATIL12 at paragraph 4,

which reads as follows:

"4. In appeal before us Mr. Gupte on behalf of the appellants has contended that the High Court was in error in not interfering with the order of the Tribunal whereby the revision petition filed by the appellants had been dismissed. It is urged that the Tribunal in affirming the findings of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner regarding the question of the appellants being strangers qua the land in dispute took a very restricted view of section 79 of the Act dealing with revision. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. The High Court at the time of the decision of the earlier writ petition on December 18, 1964 recorded a finding and gave directions to the Tribunal not to reopen the questions of fact in revision. The Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967 complied with those directions of the High Court. The appellants are bound by the judgment of the High Court and it is not open to them to go behind that judgment in this appeal. No appeal was filed against that judgment and it has become final. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. In view of the High Court judgment dated December 18, 1964, the Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967, disposing of the revision petition filed by the appellant, could not reopen the questions of fact which had been decided by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding in the judgment under appeal that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be set aside in the writ petition. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs."

26. The above said judgment is found to be

distinguishable on facts in comparison with the facts 12 (1976) 4 SCC 66 - 37 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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involved in the present case. Therefore, this judgment is

not helpful to the review petitioners.

27. According to the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun

appearing for the review petitioners making observations

that whatever transactions made are subject to Section 52

of the T.P. Act is sufficient and not more than that. He

places reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the case of VINOD SETH v. DEVINDER BAJAJ AND

ANOTHER13 wherein at paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 it reads

as under:

"41. Having found that the direction of the High Court is unsustainable, let us next examine whether we can give any relief to the defendants within the four corners of law. The reason for the High Court directing the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking to pay damages in the event of failure of the suit, is that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to the suit property and the pendency of the suit interfered with the defendant's right to enjoy or deal with the property. Section 52 of TP Act provides that during the pendency in any court of any suit in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. The said section incorporates the well-known principle of lis pendens which was enunciated in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566] 44 ER 842:

13 (2010) 8 SCC 1 - 38 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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"It is, as I think, a doctrine common to the Courts both of Law and Equity, and rests, as I apprehend, upon this foundation - that it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendant's alienating before the judgment or decree, and would be driven to commence his proceedings de novo, subject again to be defeated by the same course of proceeding."

42. It is well-settled that the doctrine of lis pendens does not annul the conveyance by a party to the suit, but only renders it subservient to the rights of the other parties to the litigation. Section 52 will not therefore render a transaction relating to the suit property during the pendency of the suit void but render the transfer inoperative insofar as the other parties to the suit. Transfer of any right, title or interest in the suit property or the consequential acquisition of any right, title or interest, during the pendency of the suit will be subject to the decision in the suit.

43. The principle underlying section 52 of TP Act is based on justice and equity. The operation of the bar under section 52 is however subject to the power of the court to exempt the suit property from the operation of section 52 subject to such conditions it may impose. That means that the court in which the suit is pending, has the power, in appropriate cases, to permit a party to transfer the property which is the subject-matter of the suit without being subjected to the rights of any part to the suit, by imposing such terms as it deems fit. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that this is a fit case where the suit property should be exempted from the operation of Section 52 of the TP Act, subject to a condition relating to reasonable security, so that the defendants will have the liberty to deal with the property in any manner they may deem fit, inspite of the pendency of the suit."

28. The principle of law laid down regarding

pendente lite transactions attract Section 52 of the T.P.

Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in VINOD SETH's case - 39 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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(supra) has dealt with the challenges made to the order

passed by the High Court regarding validity of a novel and

innovative direction by the High Court, purportedly issued

to discourage frivolous and speculative litigation. The

facts in the above case are that the appellant/plaintiff is a

builder cum real estate dealer and filed the suit for specific

performance upon oral agreement and defendants are the

owners of the property. Therefore, the High Court has

imposed cost of Rs.25 Lakhs on the appellant as it has

brought false and frivolous litigation. In these facts and

circumstances, the observations were made at paragraphs

41, 42 and 43 as above stated. Also at paragraph 45, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has highlighted the need for

reform for curbing false and frivolous litigations. The High

Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court have expressed

concern to protect the right of defendants, who are owners

of the property and held several transactions made are

subject to Section 52 of T.P. Act. In those circumstances,

it is observed that whatever transactions to be made by - 40 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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defendants conveying the property attracts Section 52 of

T.P.Act and observed that imposition of cost is

unnecessary. In that case, the High Court both Single

Bench and Division Bench have concluded that the suit

filed by appellants is vexatious, frivolous and speculative

litigation and therefore, imposed cost of Rs.25 Lakhs. But

the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 45 observed that

there is need to make reform and if there is no any

effective provision to curb frivolous litigations, then the

High Courts may impose costs. Therefore, in that case

virtually High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court have

arrived to protect the rights of defendant, who is the

owner of the property. Therefore, considering the same

spirit expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in VINOD

SETH's case (supra), this Court has also in the same spirit

has passed the order protecting the rights and interest of

the co-sharers/members of the joint family.

29. In the present case, this Court held that under

the facts and circumstances involved in the case ordered - 41 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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to reserve 1/4th share to Channamma and Govinda Reddy

as the shield of Section 52 of T.P.Act is a weak protection

to protect the right and interest of Govinda Reddy and

Channamma for the reasons above stated. Also at the

cost of repetition why this order is made for the reason

that the entire transactions are made by the review

petitioners only with builders and if the review petitioners

and the builders sell all the flats in the property during the

pendency of the suit though those transactions are hit by

Section 52 of the T.P.Act, then the real litigation will start

between the purchasers who are large in numbers and

Govinda Reddy and Channamma on the other side and

therefore, it would frustrate Channamma and Govinda

Reddy to get their legitimate share and will keep remain

litigation in getting fruitful decree even in case the suit is

decreed. Therefore, subject to result in the suit and

Section 52 T.P.Act this Court has ordered to reserve 1/4th

share each. Therefore, there is no merit found in the - 42 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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submission made by the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun for

the review petitioners.

30. Here it is worth to refer the judgment of the

High Court of Delhi in the case of MRS DEEPAK KAUR vs.

S HARI SIMRAN SINGH & ORS14 wherein at paragraph

7 it is observed as follows:

"7. As far as the filing of the earlier suit CS(OS)738/2010 (713/2007) is concerned, it is admitted fact that no decree of partition was passed in that suit. It was agreed that the plaintiff would have 20% undivided share in the land. The plaintiff now seeks partition of the property seeking to have her share of 20% of the suit property determined. The right to seek partition is a recurring cause of action. In Sri. Kishan v. Shir Ram Kishan, 2009 (110) DRJ 323 this court held as follows:--

"17. The right to enforce partition is a legal incident of a co-ownership and as long as such co-ownership subsists, the right to seek partition continues. The mere fact that a co-owner files a suit for partition and then abandons or withdraws it will not deprive him of his right to seek partition of the joint property. The substantive right of a co-owner to seek partition of the joint property will not be extinguished by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1. If the plaintiff brings a suit for partition and then, for any reason, decides not to enforce the right immediately and withdraws the suit, then he would be deemed to have chosen to continue the ownership in common for some time more till he would find it necessary again to seek its termination. A suit which is barred by withdrawal of the claim under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) is one which is based on the same cause of action but a suit for partition and separate possession of the share which may be brought subsequently will be on a cause of action arising upon a demand subsequently made and refused [See Radhe Lal v. Mulchand: AIR 1924 ALL 905]. 14 2019 SCC Online 7487 - 43 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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18. A Division Bench of this Court in Jai Devi v. Jodhi Ram: 6 (1970) DLT 549 has held that the bar of second suit contemplated in Order XXIII, Rule 1(4) is not applicable to a partition suit, as the cause of action in such a suit is a recurring one. In the said case the husband of the appellant therein, Mr. Babu Ram had filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Delhi for partition of the joint family properties. An application was moved in the said suit by the plaintiff stating that he intended to withdraw the suit and did not want to pursue the same. Liberty was not reserved by the plaintiff either in his application or in his statement in Court to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit nor was permission granted by the Court to withdraw with liberty to institute a fresh suit. Thereafter the wife of the plaintiff and his sons filed a suit for the partition of the same properties. One of the issues before the Court was whether the subsequent suit was barred by Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed:

(13) Coming to the merits of the appeal the only Issue which require determination is whether the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was barred by Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that where a party withdraws a suit without seeking permission to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action or abandons a part of the claim, he is precluded from claiming the abandoned relief or from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. This proposition, as a general proposition, is correct but it does not apply to suits for partition. In 1967 (1) Mlj 175 in re: Bajah V. Maheswara Rao v. Bajah V. Bajeswara Rao it has been held that:

So far as a suit for partition or a suit for redemption is concerned, it is axiomatic that, when the plaintiff withdraws his suit, he will be entitled to file a fresh suit as the cause of action is recurring cause of action. Even if the plaintiff is not granted permission, under Order 23, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, he will nevertheless have a right to file a suit for partition at any time he pleases.

(14) To the same effect are the cases reported in AIR 1944. Sindh 192; AIR Mad 112;: AIR 1935 Mad 909 and: AIR 1924 All 905. We may only mention one other case reported in AIR 1950 FC In re: Thota China Subha - 44 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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Rao v. Mattapalli Raju where it has been observed:

Provisions like Order 9, Rule 9 or Order 23, Rule 1 will not debar the mortgagor from filing a second suit for redemption because, as in a partition suit the cause of action in a redemption suit is a recurring one.

(15) Even though, therefore, liberty was not reserved while withdrawing the earlier suit, the present suit would not be barred by Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

31. Considering the prayers made in both the suits,

one is for seeking partition of 1/4th share and other one is

seeking relief of declaration to declare that joint

development agreement dated 08.08.2013 as null and

void. The right of filing suit for partition is having

recurring effect and cause of action is continuous one till

severance is taken place. Just because in subsequent suit

filed in O.S.No.4625/2025 by Govinda Reddy, if he has not

mentioned that Channamma has filed O.S.No.2085/2021

and not granted order of temporary injunction that would

not amount to abuse of process of Court considering the

facts and circumstances involved in the case. The trial

court has exercised discretionary power while granting

equitable relief of temporary injunction protecting the - 45 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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rights of plaintiff and defendant No.25. In such an event

where an inherent right is involved in deciding the case,

the limitation is to be considered on the main relief of

seeking partition but not on any other ancillary

documentary transactions.

32. The joint development agreement is dated

08.08.2013, but this joint development agreement is only

at the behest of review petitioners having executed to

deprive rights of Govinda Reddy and Channamma,

considered Govinda Reddy as a confirmed party making

recital that he does not have any right, title and

Channamma is not made a party. When this being the

position, the limitation is counted for main relief of

partition and would be dealt in the suit as it is a mixed

question of fact and law, such alone cannot make

deprivation of claiming legitimate right of partition. Under

these facts and circumstances, the judgment relied on by

the counsel for the review petitioners in the case

M.R.VINODA vs. M.S.SUSHEELAMMA (DEAD) BY - 46 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS15 could be

distinguished and not applicable in the present case. The

learned counsel for the review petitioners while

highlighting the factual matrix and observations made at

paragraphs 4 to 11 (which are extracted below) has

submitted that suit filed for partition is bared by limitation.

"4. On 13-3-1969, M.R. Rajashekar, the eldest among five sons of M.C. Rudrappa who had expired in 1967, and M.P. Basavaraju, only son of Mogannagowda alias Puttaswamygowda, who it appears had also expired, executed a relinquishment deed, marked Ext. P-2, of the property admeasuring 6 acres 34 guntas in Survey No. 29, Madenahalli Village (the suit property), in favour of Patel Mallegowda.

5. On 18-11-1994, M.R. Shivakumar (Plaintiff 1), M.R. Mallesha (Plaintiff 2), M.R. Vinoda (Plaintiff 3) and M.R. Chidananda (Plaintiff 4), all younger sons of late M.C. Rudrappa, filed a suit seeking a declaration that the relinquishment deed dated 13-3-1969, Ext. P-2, executed by their eldest brother M.R. Rajashekar, Defendant 4, and their cousin, M.P. Basavaraju, Defendant 3 in favour of their eldest uncle Patel Mallegowda, is null and void. Patel Mallegowda, having expired, his sons M. Shantappa and H. M. Puttappa were impleaded as Defendants 1 and 2.

6. The plaint, in a nutshell, states that Plaintiff 4 being minor on 13-3-1969, their eldest brother M.R. Rajashekar, the fourth defendant, had no right to relinquish their shares. [As per the plaint, all the plaintiffs had attained majority at the time of execution of the relinquishment deed except Plaintiff 4. It is observed that there is some discrepancy with regard to the year of birth of four plaintiffs. However, in the context of the present judgment this would not make any difference.] The relinquishment deed dated 13-3-1969, Ext. P-2, being void, the property remained the joint Hindu family property and should be partitioned equally amongst them.

15 (2021) 20 SCC 180 - 47 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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7. The suit was resisted by Defendants 1 to 3 primarily on the ground that the relinquishment deed is valid and the suit is barred by limitation.

8. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation and that Defendant 4, being the eldest male member, was entitled to execute the relinquishment deed on behalf of his branch of the family.

9. In the regular first appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge decreed the suit inter alia holding that Defendant 4 was not competent to execute the relinquishment deed, which being void, the suit was not barred by limitation.

10. Legal representatives of Defendant 1 preferred Regular Second Appeal No. 1989 of 2006 and have succeeded by the judgment [M.S. Susheelamma v. M.R. Shivakumar, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 548] under challenge passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore on 19-11-2008 inter alia ruling that the relinquishment deed is not void ab initio and the suit having been filed beyond three years as stipulated under Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 was barred by limitation. The prayer for the partition was rejected as the property had ceased to be a joint Hindu family property inter se the three branches.

11. Aggrieved by the decision, Plaintiff 3 has preferred this appeal. Plaintiff 1, who is represented by his legal representative, Plaintiffs 2 and 4, having not preferred this appeal are the pro forma Respondents 8, 9 and 10. Defendant 1, represented by his legal representatives are Respondents 1 to 4, and Defendant 2 represented by his legal representative is Respondent 5, and Defendant 4 is Respondent 7 in the present appeal. Defendant 3, Respondent 6 herein, has been deleted from the array of parties."

33. The facts in the above said case are that on

15.04.1961 there are partition deed dividing the joint

hindu family properties inter-se between the three - 48 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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branches and the validity of legality of the partition deed,

is accepted and not under challenge. On 13.03.1969 a

relinquishment deed was executed. On 18.11.1994 filed a

suit seeking declaration that relinquishment deed dated

13.03.1969 is null and void. The trial court dismissed the

suit as barred by limitation. The said suit is for declaration

to declare the relinquishment deed dated 13.03.1969 is

null and void and the trial court dismissed the suit as

barred by limitation. The above said suit is not for

partition and the main relief involved in the above stated

case is for declaration to declare relinquishment is null and

void. The suit was dismissed on the limitation, but in the

present case the substantive relief asked is partition. The

relief of declaration to declare agreement dated

08.08.2013 is null and void is ancillary one. This makes

distinguishment in the facts and circumstances in the

above said case and in the present case. Therefore, this

judgment is not applicable to the case of the review

petitioners. - 49 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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34. The learned counsel for the review petitioners

has placed reliance on the order passed by this Court in

MFA No.1416/2022 dated 25.03.2022 wherein it is

observed that the suit is for partition and the facts are that

there was already partition on 26.10.2004 and then after

13 years once again the suit is filed for re-partition. Under

these factual matrix and circumstances it is observed that

while denying to grant the relief of temporary injunction

but observed whatever alienations are subject to Section

52 of the T.P. Act. Here in the present case Govinda

Reddy and Channamma have not filed the suit for seeking

re-partition. Also in the present case it is not the case of

review petitioners that there was prior partition. For the

first time, the suits are filed for partition but in the above

cited stated case there is already a registered partition in

the year 2004 and the appellant was party to the said

partition deed. This makes difference in the facts and

circumstances involved in the above cited case and in the

present case. In the present case, it is not sufficient to - 50 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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safeguard the rights and interest of the Govinda Reddy

and Channamma with the aid of Section 52 of the T.P.Act

only and prima facie warrants to give more protection.

35. Further, learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun appearing

for the review petitioners argued that the relief prayed in

prayer (iii) in the plaint regarding seeking declaration of

the joint development agreement 08.08.2013 as null and

void by contending that said prayer is barred by limitation

and where main relief could not be granted, then interim

relief shall also not be granted. He places reliance on the

judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

COTTON CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED v.

UNITED INDUSTRIAL BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS16

wherein at paragraph 10, it has held as follows:

"10. Mr Sen, learned counsel for the respondent Bank, contended that Section 41(b) is not at all attracted because it deals with perpetual injunction and the temporary or interim injunction is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure specially so provided in Section 37 of the Act. Expression 'injunction' in Section 41(b) is not qualified by an adjective and therefore, it would comprehend both interim and perpetual injunction. It is, however, true that Section 37 specifically provides that temporary injunctions which have to continue until a

16 1983 (4) SCC 625 - 51 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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specified time or until further order of the court are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a dichotomy is introduced by confining Section 41 to perpetual injunction only and Section 37 read with Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure being confined to temporary injunction, an unnecessary grey area will develop. It is indisputable that temporary injunction is granted during the pendency of the proceeding so that while granting final relief the court is not faced with a situation that the relief becomes infructuous or that during the pendency of the proceeding an unfair advantage is not taken by the party in default or against whom temporary injunction is sought. But power to grant temporary injunction was conferred in aid or as auxiliary to the final relief that may be granted. If the final relief cannot be granted in terms as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can hardly if ever be granted. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [1951 SCC 1024 : AIR 1952 SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28 : 1951 SCJ 764] a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted. The Court said that 'an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding'. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted. To illustrate this point, let us take the relief which the Bank seeks in its suit. The prayer is that the Corporation be restrained by an injunction of the court from presenting a winding up petition under the Companies Act, 1956 or under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In other words, the Bank seeks to restrain the Corporation by an injunction of the court from instituting a proceeding for winding up of the Bank. There is a clear bar in Section 41(b) against granting this relief. The court has no jurisdiction to grant a perpetual injunction restraining a person from instituting a proceeding in a court not subordinate to it, as a relief, ipso facto temporary relief cannot be granted in the same terms The interim relief can obviously be not granted also because the object behind granting interim relief is to maintain status quo ante so that the final relief can be appropriately moulded without the party's position being altered during the pendency of the proceedings." - 52 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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36. It is the principle of law laid down in the above

said case that if the final relief cannot be granted in terms

as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can

hardly be granted. There is no complete bar for granting

an order of temporary injunction. The word used is "can

hardly be granted". Considering the prayer made in the

suit in the present case and also in O.S.No.2085/2021, the

substantive relief is seeking partition. Considering the

relief claimed by the plaintiffs in both the above said suits

filed by Channamma and Govinda Reddy, the substantive

relief in the suits is partition of suit properties. Other

prayers are ancillary. The right seeking partition cannot

be curtailed by any instrument by some of members of

joint family. Main relief is to be considered which is

partition here and if it is proved the properties are joint

family properties then there could be grant of relief of

partition as it is prima facie revealed in the present case.

On the factual matrix involved in the above said case it

can be distinguished from the present case, as above - 53 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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explained, therefore this judgment is also not applicable to

the present case.

37. Therefore, the grounds taken at paragraph 13

in the review petition that interim relief could not be

granted is found to be meritless and this Court has not

extended undue latches, but this Court by allowing the

appeal in-part has safeguarded and protected the interest

and right of the co-sharers/members of the joint family for

the reasons stated supra during pendency of the suit. Also

the court has permitted the review petitioners utilize other

portion of properties for consideration. Hence, there is no

absolute bar to utilize other portions. There is no merit

found in the review petition to review the order and

whatever arguments addressed by the learned counsel for

the review petitioners in MFA were already canvassed in

the appeal and those are considered and as such, there is

no error apparent on the face of the record. - 54 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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38. Learned counsel for the review petitioners

Sri.B.M.Arun has filed a Memo stating that in respect of

item Nos.8 and 9 of schedule properties the joint

development agreement dated 08.08.2013 is executed

with the developer/respondent No.27 stating that the

plaintiffs have no claim over the suit schedule properties

as they are not parties to the suit and submitted

calculation, which reads as follows:

1) Total number of Towers: 7. 2) Total number of Flat: 380. 3) Share of Flats of the Petitioners and Respondents 3 to 24/Defendants 1 to 24: 129. The have sold 69 Flats, remaining 50 Flats are available. 4) Share of Flats of the Developer (Respondent No.27) 216. All 216 sold. 5) Share of Vasudeva Reddy and family: 31 (nor part of the suit). 6) 4 Flats-kept as vendors Hold in the Sharing Agreement dated 12.08.2013. 7) Estimated Amount towards Completion of the remaining portion of the Share of the 50 Flats of Petitioners and respondents 3 to 24/Defendants 1 to 24-Rs.10 Crores (approx). - 55 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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8) Settlement with the Appellant Owner's Association amount payable Rs.3 Crores. 9) Pending works (BWSSB, BESCOM, Occupancy Certificate etc., of the entire project), Petitioners and Respondents 3 to 24/Defendants 1 to 24 share -Rs.10 Crores. 10) It is of note that Maintenance Charges and Electricity Charges may become applicable towards unsold flats.

39. Considering the above said memo with factual

figures of the flats is found to be false one for the reason

that it is stated that still amount is required for completion

of remaining portion of share of the 50 flats of the

petitioners and respondent Nos.3 to 24 of Rs.10 Crores by

showing pending works as BWSSB, BESCOM, Occupancy

Certificate, etc. But at the same time, in the Memo it is

stated that the share of flats of developer which are 216

were sold and the share of flats of petitioners and

respondent Nos.3 to 24, which are all 129 flats out of

which 69 flats were sold and remaining 50 flats are

available, but at the same time it is stated some pending

works are required. Therefore, without completion of - 56 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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pending works and without obtaining completion certificate

how the flats were sold out is a question for consideration

on the Memo filed by the counsel for the review

petitioners. If some works of BWSSB, BESCOM and

obtaining occupancy certificate and completion certificate,

etc., are pending, how the flats were sold out without

there being these essential things to be done. Therefore,

this itself falsifies the contention of the review petitioners.

40. Furthermore, it is stated that there are total 7

towers and total number of flats are 380 and the shares

are apportioned between the developers, review

petitioners and defendant Nos.1 to 24, but there is no

allotment of shares to be made to plaintiffs and defendant

No.25. Therefore, in this context, if all the flats are sold

out then nothing remains for plaintiff and defendant No.25

for getting fruits out of decree in case the suit is decreed

for partition. Therefore, the review petition filed is found

to be nothing but threatening and dictating the Court to

pass such orders according to the convenience of the - 57 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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review petitioners and at their whims and fancies. In this

regard the arguments canvassed by the counsel for the

review petitioners in such a way that virtually it is

amounting to dictating and threatening the Court. I have

my own doubt whether the review petitioners have

instructed the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun in this regard

to make these types of submissions, which are witnessed

in the open Court Hall.

41. Therefore, the entire review petition is

misconceived one. Apart from vexatious, false and

frivolous as present case is one of the example how the

mighty people are controlling and dominating the

vulnerable sections, vulnerable parties to deprive the

legitimate rights of getting share in the properties. The

petitioners have entered into an agreement in such a way

that there could not be share given to plaintiffs and

defendant No.25 hand-to-hand with the developer.

Therefore, in these circumstances, this case would be one

of the example how the mighty people are causing - 58 - NC: 2026:KHC:12942 RP No. 587 of 2025

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deprivation of co-sharers/members of the joint family in

giving their legitimate share, who are vulnerable people.

Whether suit item Nos.8 and 9 properties are joint family

properties or not is the question to be decided in the suit.

42. Therefore, the review petition is found to be

misconceived, frivolous and vexatious and thus, liable to

be dismissed for the reasons above discussed. Hence, it is

dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/-.

43. Hence, I proceed to pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The review petition is dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/-.

ON ADVOCACY:

44. Now let me make observations on the manner

in which the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun has argued on

the review petition is to be observed and considered here.

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45. Sri.B.M.Arun, learned counsel argued the

matter on review petition in the tone of virtually

threatening the Court and with an intention to compel to

pass the order according to his whims and fancies what he

wants. Just because in MFA No.7416/2025 according to

his understanding he failed to get the order according to

his wishes and by making certain remarks on the Court he

has argued with all vehemence showing his anguish

personally to the Court. These submissions are made on

three occasions dated 18.12.2026, 09.02.2026 and

06.02.2026. Therefore, this Court is constrained to make

some observations, which are as follows:

(i) There are several duties of an Advocate to the Court and one among prominent is the Advocate shall act in the Court in a dignified manner and respect the court;

(ii) This court need not make any observations on Sri.B.M.Arun, Advocate but because of his submissions which are virtually threatening and remarking on the Court, compelled this Court to make some observations not with any punitive

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action but to make remembering to the said Advocate. This observation is confined to only learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun, Advocate.

(iii) It appears to the Court prima facie by his argument that said advocate has too much personally involved in the case as if it is his own brief and when he is dissatisfied with the order passed by this Court in MFA No.7416/2025 it is an option for him to approach the Hon'ble Apex Court, but without doing so on the guise of filing review petition has browbeaten, threatening and dictating in nature and his submissions are appearing to disrespect the Court and virtually he wanted to get orders according to his wishes. This makes the Court unhappy regarding conduct of the learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun.

46. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

CHETAK CONSTRUCTION LTD. vs OM PRAKASH AND

OTHERS17, reminds the Lawyers and Judges of their

duties and functions and towards dispensation of justice.

The words expressed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

above said case at paragraphs 16 and 17 should remind all

17 (1998) 4 SCC 577

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of us the duties of Lawyers' and the Judges' as to how

they are important in the voyage of justice. At paragraphs

16 and 17 their Lordships were pleased to observe as

follows:

"16. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty and rule of law would receive a setback. The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot be allowed to "terrorize" or "intimidate"

Judges with a view to "secure" orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilised system of administration of justice can permit it. We certainly, cannot approve of any attempt on the part of any litigant to go "forum-shopping". A litigant cannot be permitted "choice" of the "forum" and every attempt at "forum- shopping" must be crushed with a heavy hand.

17. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to remember that Judges must act as impartial referees and decide cases objectively, uninfluenced by any personal bias or prejudice. A Judge should not allow his judicial position to be compromised at any cost. This is essential for maintaining the integrity of the institution and public confidence in it. The credibility of this institution rests on the fairness and impartiality of the Judges at all levels. It is the principle of highest importance for the proper administration of justice that judicial powers must be exercised impartially and within the bounds of law. Public confidence in the judiciary rests on legitimacy of judicial process. Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal application by the Judge of recognised objective principles which owe their existence to a system as distinguished from subjective moods, predilections, emotions and prejudices. Judges must always ensure that they do not allow the credibility of the institution to be eroded. We must always remember that justice must not only be done but it must also be seen to be done."

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47. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOYAL, ADVOCATE, IN RE18

has observed that an Advocate being an Officer of the

Court has a duty to ensure smooth functioning of the

Court and also Lawyers are equal partners with the Judges

in the administration of justice.

48. The Lawyers play an important and pivotal role

in the administration of justice. The profession itself

requires the safeguarding of high moral standards. Since

the main job of lawyer is to assist the Court in

dispensation of justice, therefore, the Advocate cannot

behave with the Court in a disrespectful manner. But, in

the present case, the way in which Sri.B.M.Arun, Advocate

has argued is nothing but shouting to the Court derogative

to the dignity and decorum of the Court, which is

witnessed by the Officials of the Court as well as

Advocates, who were present in the Court Hall at Dharwad

Bench.

18

AIR 2014 SC 850

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49. It is worthwhile to mention here in what way

the order is passed in MFA No.7416/2025. The suit is filed

for partition. This Court has ordered to protect the

interest of co-sharers by passing the orders of reserving

the shares to plaintiff and defendant No.25 on the reason

that the other co-sharers have played dominant role

virtually causing deprivation of giving a share to defendant

No.25 and to the plaintiff both who are old aged woman

and deaf & dumb respectively. The agreement of the year

2007, 2011, 2013 and 2018 above stated are the example

that protection by mere Section 52 of the T.P. Act is not

sufficient, also compelled this Court to make order for

reserving shares of plaintiff and defendant No.25. The

reason is, if all the flats and apartments are sold out

during the pendency of the suit though Section 52 of

T.P.Act is applicable, but virtually plaintiff and defendant

No.25 would be relegated to more litigations with hundred

number of persons who are purchasers of flats in future

that frustrate the parties who seeks justice at the hands of

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the Court. Dispensation of justice must be real and

practical but shall not be a mere paper decree. Therefore,

in this context, the observations are made in MFA

No.7416/2025 but learned counsel Sri.B.M.Arun Advocate

became angry and made remarks in the Court, which are

unwarranted.

50. The Court has witnessed that Sri.B.M.Arun has

frustrated himself by the order passed in MFA

NO.7416/2025. Even this Court has expressed its view if

being aggrieved by the order passed in MFA

No.7416/2025, then the parties are at liberty to approach

the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Filing of review petition is

statutory right of the parties and let them file, but on the

guise of filing review petition no one should threaten or

defame or browbeat the Court, just because they did not

receive the order what they want. Therefore, this Court is

constrained to make above observations.

51. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

MAHABIR PRASAD SINGH v. M/S. JACKS AVIATION

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PVT. LTD.19 has observed that the judicial function cannot

and should not be permitted to be stoneward by

browbeating or bullying methodology either it is by

litigants or by counsel. Therefore, this Court is compelled

to make the above observations what it transpired in the

Court while hearing the review petition.

52. A client engages a lawyer for addressing his

grievances. The lawyer is not an agent of his client, but

he is dignified, responsible spokesman. The lawyer cannot

wear shoes of his client. The Court cannot satisfy both

parties; one party obviously being dissatisfied and the

Advocate - Sri.B.M.Arun could not have stepped into the

shoes of the client to express his dissatisfaction as if it is a

personal case and ought not to have addressed the Court

in the conduct disrespecting the Court and harming dignity

and decorum of the Court. In this review this Court

observed the learned Advocate - Sri.B.M.Arun has

19 AIR 1999 SC 287

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exceeded his limits while addressing the Court on the

review petition.

53. Though this may be one of the factors to

request the Bar Council to take necessary disciplinary

action against said Advocate - Sri.B.M.Arun, but this court

has restrained itself not to take such excessive steps as

the Court has highest regard to Advocates.

54. For the aforesaid reasons discussed from

paragraph Nos.1 to 43, the review petition is dismissed

on its merit. It is made clear that the observations made

at paragraph Nos.44 to 53 are only regarding the manner

in which the arguments are canvassed by the learned

counsel Sri.B.M.Arun and these observations are nothing

to do with the merit and result in the review petition.

Sd/-

(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR) JUDGE DR List No.: 19 Sl No.: 1