Shivamma (Dead) By Lrs vs Karnataka Housing Board

2025 INSC 1104 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11794 OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019)

SHIVAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2025.09.12 16:31:07 IST Reason: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the following parts: -

INDEX I. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX .......................................................................... 4 II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES............................................................... 7 A. Submissions on behalf of the appellant. ...................................................... 7 B. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State. ......................................... 9 III. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION ................................................................. 13 IV. ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 13 A. Section 5 of the Limitation Act. .................................................................. 13 i. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Within Such Period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. .............................................................. 14 a. Contradictory Views on the subject. .............................................. 16 b. Textual Import of the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. ............................................................................................. 28 c. The expression “within such period” cannot be conflated with “during such period” or “for such period”. ................................... 35 d. The contextual import of the expression “within such period” with the Canons of Law of Limitation. ................................................. 38 e. Decisions which Rewa Coal Fields (supra) failed to take into consideration. ................................................................................. 57 f. Condonation of Delay entails Extension of Limitation and not Exclusion. ....................................................................................... 64 B. What is to be understood by “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation. .................................................................................................... 73 i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. .............. 81 ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantial Justice. ......................... 83

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 2 of 170 C. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with? ...................................................................................... 87 D. There is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. ................................................................ 102 i. View on the subject of Condonation of Delay prior to the decision of Postmaster General. .............................................................................. 102 ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of Postmaster General. .............................................................................. 120 iii. The ratio of the decision of Postmaster General. .................................. 135 iv. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law may be interfered with? ................................................................................ 145 v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the State or any of its instrumentalities. ...................................................... 149 E. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay? ........... 153 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 167

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 3 of 170

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of

Karnataka at Kalaburagi dated 21.03.2017 in I.A. No. 1 of 2017 filed in the

Regular Second Appeal No. 200059 of 2017 (hereinafter the “Impugned

Order”), by which the High Court condoned the delay of 3966 days in

preferring the second appeal against the judgment and order passed by the

First Appellate Court in Regular Appeal No. 405 of 2004 arising from the

judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Original Suit No. 1100 of

1989.

I. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under: -

a. It appears from the materials on record that a parcel of land bearing

Survey No. 56/A, admeasuring 9 acres 13 guntas was originally owned

and possessed by the father of the appellant herein.

b. After the demise of the appellant’s father, some disputes arose between

inter-alia between the legal heirs of the original owner including the

appellant herein and one Sri Gurulingappa C. Patil, which led to the

institution of the partition suit being O.S. No. 74 of 1971.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 4 of 170 c. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, Sri Gurulingappa C. Patil

purportedly “donated” 4 acres out of the aforesaid land which was the

subject matter of the suit (hereinafter the “land in question”) to the

Government of Karnataka.

d. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the respondent housing corporation sometime

in the year 1979 took over the possession of the land in question for the

purpose of establishing a housing colony.

e. On 03.04.1989, a compromise decree was passed in the aforesaid partition

suit by which the appellant herein became the absolute owner of the parcel

of land bearing Survey No. 56/A including the 4 acres of land in question.

f. However, since the possession of the land in question was not reverted to

the appellant herein, one another suit being O.S. No. 1100 of 1989 was

instituted, this time against the respondent housing corporation, praying

for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land in question.

g. The said suit came to be dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated

17.04.1997.

h. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred the Regular Appeal No.

405 of 2004 (hereinafter the “first appeal”) before the 3rd Addl. District

Judge, Gulbargam (hereinafter the “First Appellate Court”).

i. The First Appellate Court vide its judgment and order dated 03.01.2006

allowed the appeal and accordingly decreed the suit in favor of the

appellant, granting the declaration as prayed for in the suit. However, the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 5 of 170 First Appellate Court declined to grant the relief of possession in view of

the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the

land in question by the respondent housing corporation, and thus, instead

directed the grant of compensation to the appellant herein.

j. Since no action was taken by the respondent no. 1 in accordance with the

decree drawn by the First Appellate Court, the appellant herein initiated

execution proceedings on 20.01.2011.

k. Remarkably, it was only on 14.02.2017, that the respondent no. 1 realized

the seriousness of the situation and accordingly a second appeal came to

be filed by it before the High Court along with an application for

condonation of delay of 3966 days against the judgment and decree

passed by the First Appellate Court vide its order dated 03.01.2006.

l. The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dated 21.03.2017,

allowed the aforesaid application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963 (for short, the “Limitation Act”) read with Section 151 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the “CPC”) by the respondent no. 1

herein, and thereby condoned the delay.

4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this

Court with the present appeal.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 6 of 170 II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES.

A. Submissions on behalf of the appellant.

5. Mr. Akshat Shirvastava, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants

in his written submissions has stated thus: -

“PREPOSTION / SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

A. That it is most respectfully submitted that the respondent no. l failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause and there is no explanation as to why the regular second appeal could not have been filed by the respondent no. l within the prescribed period of limitation.

B. That it is most respectfully submitted that from the perusal of the application filed by the respondent no. 1, the last entry in the file of Karnataka Housing Board dates back to 20.03.2008 and that there is no subsequent entry with regard to the movement of files.

C. That it is most respectfully submitted that the respondent no. 1 admits that due to the negligence of its officers the appeal could not have been filed within the prescribed period of limitation that there has been a pedantic approach on the part of the officials of the Housing Board and despite service of notice in the execution proceedings way back on 20.04.2011, no explanation is forthcoming as to what steps had been taken by the Board immediately thereafter in filing the appeal before the Hon'ble High Court.

D. That it is most respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble Court in a plethora of judgments has explained the expression "sufficient cause" u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 in Para 24 & 25

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 7 of 170 "24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting he plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest."

E. Case laws relied by the Petitioner: -

1. Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.

ofBrihan Mumbai, (2012) SCC 157

2. Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2014) 11 SCC 351

3. Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531”

6. In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed on behalf of the

appellant that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 8 of 170

B. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State.

7. Ms. Kiran Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents

in her written submissions has stated thus: -

“SUBMISSIONS

I) The first submission is that Section 5 of the Llmitation Act provides for condonation of delay if "sufficient cause" is shown for "such period". While interpreting the word "such period" under Limitation Act, there is some conflict as to for which period sufficient cause is required to be shown.

a) The following judgments provide that the word "such period" would mean the explanation of delay from the last day prescribed for filing of an appeal till the date on which appeal is filed:-

i) AIR 1962 SC 361 (Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd). Para 8 ii) 1996 (3) sec 132 (State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors). Para 3

b) The following judgments provide· that explanation of delay has to be shown for the period of limitation means if period of limitation is 90 days, then explanation as to why the petitioner was unable to institute the proceedings within 90 days and the events occurred after 91 st day till the last day is of no consequence.

iii) 2024 SCC online SC 3612:(State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary) Para 7

iv) 1981 (1) SCC 495 (Ajit Singh Thakur Singh AndAnr. v. State of Gujarat) Para 6

II) That Second submission is that when the Hon'ble High Court has exercised its discretionary powers and condoned the delay holding that there is sufficient cause shown by the respondent No. 1 herein, Law is well settled that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below." It is further submitted that "an appellate Court interferes not when the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 9 of 170 order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong."

i) 2023 (10) SCC 531 (Sheo Raj Singh(D) Tr. Lrs v.

Union Of India). Para 33

ii) 2003 (10) SCC 390 (Manjunath Anandappa Urf. v.

Tammanasa& Ors.) para 36 and 37

iii) 1980 (2) SCC 593 (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd v.

Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha) Para 73

In the present case, the Hon'ble High Court has exercised its discretionary power after considering the sufficient cause and the same cannot be said to be clearly wrong so as to require interference.

III) That third submission is that in case there have been deliberate lapses on the part of the public officials and public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, delay, however huge may be, should be condoned and the latter be decided on merits.

i) 2015 (3) SCC 569 (Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (D) By Lrs.) para 3 and 4

IV) That fourth submission is when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the former would_ prevail specially when public interest is involved. It is submitted that it is not the length of delay but sufficiency of cause, which is relevant.

i) 1987 (2) SCC 107 (Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag &Anr. v. Mst. Katiji& Ors). para 3 ii) 2005 (3) SCC 752 (State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao & Ors.) Para 8 & 9 iii) 2013 (12) SCC 649 (Esha Bhattaharyajeev. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy) Para 21 iv) 2019 (10) SCC 408 (The State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang) Para 10

V) The fifth submission is that the Government cannot carry on business upon principle of distrust and men in

responsible position are to be trusted. The deliberate inaction on the part of the officials and mala fide of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 10 of 170 officers, cannot be imputed to the government or Government undertakings.

i) 1988 (2) SCC 142 (G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore) Para l5 to 17

VI) The sixth submission is that the discretion by the Hon'ble

High Court is exercised in 2017 and judgments in "(2020) (10) SCC 654) (State of MP v. Beru Lal &(2020 (13) SCC 745 (University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors." are subsequent. Therefore, the exercise of power is to be seen from the point of view of the cases of Katiji, Rameguda, Chandra Mani cases etc.

i) 2023 (10) SCC 531 (Sheo Raj Singh (D) by Lrs) v.

Union of India &Anr.) Para 34

VII) The seventh submission is that if inordinate delay has occurred and it has not resulted in the litigant being benefitted by such delay, such belated approach must be construed by adopting justice oriented approach. In the present case, there had been negligence on the part of the officials, who were supposed to protect the interest of KHB and action has been taken against those officers by suspending them and initiating disciplinary proceedings.

VIII) That KHB has taken decision to file an appeal in the year 2006 itself and had appointed litigation conducting officer to engage advocate. KHB had again appointed litigation conducting officer in 2011 to engage advocate and appear in Execution petition. There was no reason for the KHB to dis rust its officer. It is only in 2017 when a letter was received from Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner, KHB that the commissioner came to know about their non-

representation and non filing of the appeal. Immediate action is taken thereafter.

IX) It is submitted that Sh. AD. Inamdar was authorised by the Commissioner to act as litigation conducting officer for filing appeal and also to appear in EP on 02.04.2011.

SLAO sent letter dated 06.04.2011 to said AD Inamdar to engage counsel and take appropriate action. The said Inamdar appointed AEE as special officer. Even though the Executive Engineer was authorized to engage the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 11 of 170 Advocate and contact the Advocate regularly, order sheet of Execution Petition reveals that neither the Executive Engineer nor the Assistant Executive Engineer have engaged Advocate in Execution Petition. KHB came to know the issue -of warrant of attachment of their movables from Deputy Commissioner only on 28.01.2017. Both the officers were suspended.

X) It is submitted that neither the land is purchased nor acquired by the KHB nor any allotment is made by KHB.

The petitioner filed a suit for possession. The lower appellant court moulded the relief and directed payment of compensation. The payment of compensation without acquisition of land by Respondent-1 is against public interest and it also involves huge public money.

Respondent-1 cannot be directed to pay compensation when they have not acquired the land. The persons in possession are illegal occupants and the KHB has nothing to do with that land or its occupants. It is relevant to note that petitioners filed WP No. 82306/2011 praying for mandamus direction R-1 and R-2 to acquire the land, which was withdrawn on 19.07.2011.

XI) KHB has no objection if decree is passed for possession against the persons in possession and not against the KHB. It is also relevant to Note that the petitioner has not made the persons in possession as party to the proceedings. The delay of 3966 days will not clothe the petitioner with any right in law when the petitioner is not entitled for any relief against Defendant-I and Defendant-2.”

8. In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed on behalf of the

respondent that there being no merit in the present appeal, the same may

be dismissed.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 12 of 170

III. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone

through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our

consideration: -

I) What is the meaning and import of the expression “within such

period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act?

II) When can the exercise of discretion in condoning the delay by a

lower court be interfered with by a court in appeal?

III) Whether the High Court in the present case at hand was justified in

condoning the delay?

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reads as under: -

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 13 of 170

11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section

5 of the now-repealed Limitation Act, 1908, confers upon the courts the

discretionary power to admit any appeal or application (except that under

Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) if filed after the expiry of

the prescribed period of limitation, provided the erring party is able to show

to the court a sufficient cause for not filing the same within the stipulated

period of limitation, and the court is satisfied with sufficiency of such cause.

It is only in cases, where such “sufficient cause” for the resultant delay in

filing / presenting of the appeal or application is shown by the defaulting

party, and the courts are satisfied with the explanation and sufficiency of such

cause that the recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be taken by

the courts, and in exercise of its discretion the delay be condoned and thereby

admit the appeal or application.

i. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Within Such Period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

12. Ms. Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents herein

vociferously contended that although it is a well settled position of law that

for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, the delay in the filing of an appeal or application beyond

the stipulated period of limitation has to be explained by demonstrating the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 14 of 170 existence of a “sufficient cause” yet there appears to be a divergence of

opinion as to the precise period for which the “sufficient cause” must be

demonstrated for seeking condonation.

13. It was submitted that, there is a cleavage of opinion expressed as regards the

meaning of the expression “within such period” occurring in Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, wherein the expression has been understood to mean the

period commencing from the last date on which the appeal or application, as

the case may could have been filed i.e., the last day on which the period of

limitation would have expired, up to the actual date on which such appeal or

application is ultimately filed. In other words, the delay that has to be

explained is only for the interregnum period between the expiry of limitation

and the actual date of filing, and the court concerned should be satisfied about

the existence of a sufficient cause resulting in such delay for this period

alone. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in

Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR 1962

SC 361 and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. reported in (1996) 3

SCC 132, respectively.

14. Whereas on the other hand, the same expression has been construed to mean

that “sufficient cause” must be shown to have existed not merely during the

period of delay post the expiry of limitation, but rather throughout the entire

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 15 of 170 statutory period of limitation itself till the date of actual filing. According to

this line of authority, “within such period” for the purpose of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, means the entire duration from the date when the cause of

action accrued or the clock of limitation began to tick, until the date of actual

filing. To put it simply, if the party seeking condonation of delay has no good

explanation to offer for demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause”

during the period of limitation, which inhibited the timely filing of the appeal

or application, then even if there existed a “sufficient cause” after the expiry

of the limitation that contributed to the delay, the same would be

inconsequential insofar as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. In

this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of Ajit Singh Thakur &

Anr. v. State of Gujrat reported in (1981) 1 SCC 495 and State of Madhya

Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612,

respectively.

a. Contradictory Views on the subject.

15. The expression “within such period” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, first fell for the consideration of this Court in Rewa Coalfields (supra).

This Court speaking through P.B. Gajendragadkar J. (as his Lordship, then

was) held that the aforesaid expression means that existence of a sufficient

cause for the delay in filing the appeal or application, as the case may be, has

to be shown for the period from the last day of the limitation prescribed till

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 16 of 170 the date of the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be.

In other words, if the period of limitation is, say, 90-days, delay has to be

explained only for the 90th day till the day of actual filing of the appeal or

application, as the case may be. The said decision is in three parts: -

(i) First, it held that in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the

expression “within such period” used therein, means the period from

the last day of the limitation that has been prescribed till the day on

which the appeal or application is filed. Thus, it held that for the

purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, the party has to assign sufficient cause for why he was unable to

file an appeal for the entire period covered from the last day of the

limitation prescribed till the day on which such appeal or application

came to be filed. The relevant observations read as under: -

“8. [...] The context seems to suggest that “within such period” means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Section 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 17 of 170

(ii) Secondly, although, this Court acknowledged that the context in which

the aforesaid expression has been employed, seems to suggest that it

only means “within the period which ends with the last day of

limitation prescribed” yet, it was reluctant to adopt the aforesaid

interpretation, as it would be too unreasonable to expect or require a

party to take necessary action on the very first day after the cause of

action accrues. It observed if such an interpretation is adopted the same

would result in the expression “within such period” being construed as

“during such period”, an understanding which is repugnant to both the

bare text as-well as the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The

relevant observations read as under: -

“8. Now, what do the words “within such period” denote? It is possible that the expression “within such period” may sometimes mean during such period. But the question is : Does the context in which the expression occurs in Section 5 justify the said interpretation? [...] The context seems to suggest that “within such period” means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. [...] To hold that the expression “within such period” means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in the context. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Thirdly, it observed that since a party is entitled to take its time and

file the appeal or application, as the case may be, on any day, during

the prescribed period of limitation, it would be unreasonable, where

there has been any delay in preferring such appeal or application, to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 18 of 170 then call upon the party to explain its conduct during the whole of the

said period. Accordingly, it rejected the contention that for the purpose

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in filing of the appeal or

application, as the case may be, has to be explained for the entire

period of the limitation prescribed. The relevant observations read as

under: -

8. [...] If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file an application to act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on any day during the said period; and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed. [...] (Emphasis supplied)

(iv) Lastly, it held that the thumb rule of general consideration of the

diligence of parties in pursuing their legal remedies cannot be applied

for the purpose of construing the import of the expression “within such

period” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This is because,

even after sufficient cause has been shown the court still has to enquire

whether it, in its discretion, should condone the delay. As such the only

place where such considerations of diligence and bona-fides of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 19 of 170 party may be of relevance under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is at

the stage of deciding whether the discretionary power to condone the

delay should be exercised by the court or not, after sufficient cause has

been shown, to its satisfaction. However, this Court cautioned, that

considerations of bona fides or due diligence, which unlike in Section

14 of the Limitation Act, have not been expressly made material or

relevant under Section 5, ought not be applied to the same extent or

manner as under Section 14, so as to invite an enquiry into the reasons

for the party’s inaction during the entire prescribed period of

limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -

“8. [...] In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in construing the words of Section 5. [...]

xxx xxx xxx

10. On the other hand, in Kedarnath v. Zumberlal the Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur has expressed the view that an appellant who wilfully leaves the preparation and presentation of his appeal to the last day of the period of limitation prescribed therefor is guilty of negligence and is not entitled to an extension of time if some unexpected or unforeseen contingency prevents him from filing the appeal within time. According to this decision, though the period covered between the last day of filing and the day of actual filing may be satisfactorily explained that would not be enough to condone delay because the appellant would nevertheless have to show why he waited until the last day. In coming to this conclusion the Judicial Commissioner has relied substantially on what he regarded as general considerations. “This habit of leaving things to the last moment”, says the learned Judge, “has its origin in laxity and negligence; and, in

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 20 of 170 my opinion, having regard to the increasing pressure of business in the law Courts and the many facilities now available for the punctual filing of suits, appeals and applications therein, it is high time that litigants and their legal advisers were made to realise the dangers of the procrastination which defers the presentation of a suit, appeal or application to the last day of the limitation prescribed therefor”. There can be no difference of opinion on the point that litigants should act with due diligence and care; but we are disposed to think that such general consideration can have very little relevance in construing the provisions of Section 5. The decision of the Judicial Commissioner shows that he based his conclusion more on this a priori consideration and did not address himself as he should have to the construction of the section itself. Apparently this view has been consistently followed in Nagpur.

12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.

The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 21 of 170 considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. The ratio laid down in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) was followed by a three-

Judge Bench of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra), wherein this Court

reiterated that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not

necessary to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment

till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient for the purpose of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act to only explain the delay caused during the period between

the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application

is actually filed. The relevant observations read as under: -

“3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, the ‘Act’) extends prescribed period of limitation in filing an application or an appeal except under the provisions of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, the ‘Code’) and gives power to the court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The only condition is that the applicant/appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused in the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed.”

(Emphasis supplied) Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 22 of 170

17. Thus, as per the decisions of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) and

Chandra Mani (supra), respectively, the expression “within such period”

used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been construed to mean the period

commencing from the last date on which the prescribed period of limitation

would have expired, and extending up to the actual date on which such appeal

or application comes to be filed, and therefore, “sufficient cause” for the

delay in such filing has to be explained only for this circumscribed interval,

rather than for the whole of the period of limitation prescribed.

18. On the other hand, in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this

Court held that “sufficient cause” for the delay in filing of an appeal or

application, as the case may be, has to be established by some event or

circumstance that had arisen before the limitation expired. It observed that,

although a party is entitled to wait until the last day of the prescribed period

of limitation for filing an appeal or application, as the case may be, yet when

it allows the limitation to expire and then pleads sufficient cause for not filing

the same earlier, such a plea or explanation must be traced to a cause arising

within the period of limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -

“6. [...] Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 23 of 170 was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.” (Emphasis supplied)

19. It is pertinent to mention that the decision of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur

(supra) did not refer or take into consideration, the earlier decision of this

Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

20. Arguendo, it could be said that the observation made in Ajit Singh Thakur

(supra), more particularly, that “the sufficient cause must establish that

because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it

was not possible to file the appeal within time” could not be said to be in

conflict with the observations made in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that

sufficient cause has to be established from the last day of the limitation

prescribed till the day on which such appeal or application came to be filed,

inasmuch as, the starting point from when “sufficient cause” includes the

prescribed period of limitation i.e., the period before the limitation prescribed

had expired as per Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and the last day on which the

limitation would have expired as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), as the net

effect of embracing both these perspectives, is one and the same, that

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 24 of 170 “sufficient cause” is required to be established for the period within the

prescribed limitation, which includes the last day on which the said period

would have expired, as clarified in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), till the date of

actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be.

21. However, we do not think, that when this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra)

said that “no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can

constitute such sufficient cause”, what it had in its mind was that the

sufficient cause must establish some event or circumstance, only for the last

day of the prescribed period of limitation, as held in Rewa Coal Fields

(supra). This is because, nowhere has this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra)

made any reference to the point of origin if a “sufficient cause” would suffice

to mean only the last day of the prescribed period of limitation. The ratio laid

in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) to our mind, must be understood as a whole,

and in the context of two pertinent observations made by it; “that a party is

entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal” juxtaposed

with the observation “but when it allows limitation to expire”, which can only

mean one thing, that it is not sufficient to only explain the delay caused in

the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which

the appeal/application is actually filed, and rather explanation must be

offered for what the concerned party was doing for the entire period of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 25 of 170 prescribed limitation till the date of actual filing. We shall discuss the same

in a greater detail in the latter parts of this judgment.

22. In Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013)

14 SCC 81, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that “sufficient cause” as

used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, connotes that the party who failed to

file the appeal or application within the prescribed limitation period, must

demonstrate that such failure was not due to negligence, lack of diligence or

vigilance, nor the result of indolence or inactivity, and that it was not

occasioned by any lack of bona fides. The relevant observations read as

under: -

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 26 of 170 court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [...]

xxx xxx xxx

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), this very Bench had the occasion to

examine the meaning of the expression “within such period” used in Section

5 of the Limitation Act. Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Ajit

Singh Thakur (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), it was held that for the purpose

of Section 5, the party seeking condonation of delay has to explain why it

was unable to institute the proceedings within the prescribed period of

limitation. Events that occurred after the expiry of the period of limitation till

the date of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, would

be of no consequence insofar as condonation is concerned, if it is unable to

explain what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it. It

reiterated that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation

can constitute such sufficient cause, where the party allowed the limitation

to expire unless it can trace such failure in allowing the limitation to expire

to a cause arising within the period of limitation. The relevant observations

read as under: -

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 27 of 170 “7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1 st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. Thus, there appears to be a cleavage of opinion expressed as regard the

meaning and interpretation of the expression “within such period” occurring

in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

b. Textual Import of the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 28 of 170

25. At the cost of repetition, we deem it necessary to once again quote the

provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for a better exposition. The same

reads thus: -

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

26. The text of the provision stipulates that where an appeal or application, as the

case may be, is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the same

may be admitted if “sufficient cause” for such failure is shown. The court

may, in its discretion, proceed to condone the delay, if it is satisfied, that the

appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, had “sufficient cause” for not

preferring the appeal or making the application, respectively, “within such

period”.

27. A plain yet careful reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, leaves very

little to imagination insofar as how the import of the phrase “within such

period” should be construed for the purpose of the said provision. The

aforesaid phrase cannot be singled out and construed devoid of the context

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 29 of 170 provided by the other expressions used throughout the provision. The

expression should be interpreted and understood in the precise context in

which it has been employed in the bare text of the provision. The provision

of Section 5, itself makes it amply clear how the phrase “within such period”

ought to be understood by supplying the necessary context and interpretive

key, through two significant phrases, namely; “after the prescribed period”

and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”.

28. We say so because, the use of the word “such” in “within such period”

signifies that it is alluding to something that the legislature has already

alluded to within the provision, and thus, the significance of this phrase, has

to be necessarily construed in reference to the expressions “after the

prescribed period” and “for not preferring ... or making ... within such

period”.

29. The phrase “within such period” has been consciously prefaced by the

legislature with the expression “for not preferring the appeal or making the

application”. This prefatory expression denotes that period of window within

which the appeal or the application, as the case may be, was required or

expected to be instituted under the law. It signifies the original period within

which, the appeal or the application, should have been filed, if not for the

delay. It refers to none other than that period within which, the appeal or

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 30 of 170 application, could have been instituted in the first place, had there been no

delay, or, to put it simply, the statutory period of limitation, within which,

such an appeal or application, should have ordinarily been filed.

30. The negative terminology couched in “for not preferring ... or making” is

suggestive of the lapse or default that the appellant or applicant, as the case

may be, has committed in preferring the appeal or application, respectively,

which is nothing but the failure to file it within the prescribed statutory period

of limitation. This is further reinforced when one considers the meaning that

would have been derived, if the negative language used in the provision is

stripped away, or in other words, by understanding the opposite meaning of

the aforesaid phrase, which the legislature has deliberately chosen not to

provide by use of the negative language “for not”.

31. By removing or inverting the said negative connotation from the phrase “for

not preferring ... or making”, the expression would then inevitably have

connoted that point of time at which the appeal or application, as the case

may be, ought to have been instituted or the period within which, the

appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, was otherwise well within its

right to prefer the appeal or make the application, respectively.

32. The aforesaid makes it crystal clear that the legislature, by employing the

phrase “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”, is

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 31 of 170 unmistakably alluding to the original statutory period of limitation within

which the appeal or application, as the case may be, was required to be

instituted or simpliciter the prescribed period of limitation, for the purpose

of construing the expression “within such period”.

33. However, one must be mindful that the aforesaid is not the only time period

that has been mentioned in the language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

In other words, the meaning of the expression “within such period” does not

refer to only the original period of limitation.

34. One another expression of significance that, the legislature has introduced,

within the text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is “after the prescribed

period”. This expression refers to the point of time when the appeal or

application, as the case may be, in question, has come to be instituted, which

is, after the statutory period of limitation expired. It denotes the period after

the prescribed limitation had run out till the actual date when the filing of the

appeal or application, as the case may be, took place.

35. By use of the phrase “after the prescribed period”, it is clear that the

legislature, for the purpose of construing the expression “within such period”,

has contemplated to also include the time period after the expiry of the

prescribed period of limitation till the actual date of filing of the appeal or

application, as the case may be.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 32 of 170

36. In Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the phrases “for not preferring the appeal

or making the application” and “after the prescribed period” have been used

by the legislature conjointly to assign meaning to the expression “within such

period”. As already discussed, the former refers to the period in which the

appeal or the application was required by the law to be filed within, while the

latter signifies the period within which such appeal or application, is being

filed or in other words, the original prescribed period of limitation and the

period after the expiry of limitation till the actual date of institution,

respectively.

37. When one reads the phrase “within such period” together with the

expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal

or making the application”, it becomes as clear as a noon day, that the said

phrase i.e., “within such period” includes both the original period of

limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual

filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. There can be no

question of construing “within such period” as making a reference either to

only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay

after the expiry of limitation.

38. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a

provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 33 of 170 by the legislature within the text of the provision. In interpreting a provision,

a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act

and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be

read holistically with the entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated

with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or

words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached

from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as-well as the

other provisions within the statute.

39. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a

necessary implication indicate that the phrase “within such period” signifies

that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period within

which, the appeal or the application, as the case may be, should have been

filed, if not for the delay, but also the period taken in addition to the

prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application, as the

case may be.

40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking

condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may

be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be

explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted

in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period

after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 34 of 170 application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be

given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began

to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by

recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

c. The expression “within such period” cannot be conflated with “during such period” or “for such period”.

41. We may now look into the decision of Rewa Coal Fields (supra), more

particularly the observations “to hold that the expression “within such

period” means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in

the context”, made therein. Rewa Coal Fields (supra), in arriving at the

conclusion, that the expression “within such period” refers to the period after

the expiry of limitation, beginning from the last day of the limitation that has

been prescribed till the day on which the appeal or application is filed, had

held that, if the expression is interpreted to mean only the prescribed period

of limitation ending with the last day of limitation, then the same would

tantamount to reducing the expression “within such period” to “during such

period”, an understanding which is repugnant to the bare text as-well context

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 35 of 170

42. With all humility at our command and with due deference if this is what was

in the mind of the learned Judges then we are afraid that is not the correct

position of law.

43. We shall discuss the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in detail, in

the latter parts of this judgment. For now, we shall test the meaning of the

expression “within such period” from the textual interpretation of the

provision.

44. Insofar, as the apprehension that Rewa Coal Fields (supra) harboured as

regards the expression “within such period” being conflated with “during

such period” if Section 5 is construed to mean that delay has to be explained

for the duration of the prescribed period of limitation, the same, to our minds

does not appear to be a correct understanding of the bare text of the provision.

45. No doubt, in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the legislature has not used the

expression “during such period” and instead, has consciously employed the

phrase, “within such period”, and thus, the expression cannot be solely

confined to mean only the prescribed period of limitation. To the extent of

the aforesaid, we are in complete agreement with Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

46. However, to say that the expression “within such period” has to then

necessarily be construed to mean only the period after the expiry of

limitation, beginning from the last day of the prescribed limitation till the day

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 36 of 170 on which the appeal or application is filed, is not a correct appreciation of the

provision.

47. We must be mindful of the fact, that the legislature has consciously not

employed the phrase “for such period” within the provision so as to convey

that the period for which explanation has to be offered refers to only that

period which is in actual delay i.e., the period after the expiry of limitation,

beginning from the last day of the limitation that has been prescribed till the

day on which the appeal or application is filed, as has been inadvertently

understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra).

48. If at all we are to go into the semantics of what has been used and what has

not been used by the legislature within the bare text of the said provision,

then we must also not ignore how the legislature refrained from employing

the phrase “for such period”. Merely because, the expression “during such

period” has not been used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is by no stretch

of imagination, a reason to construe that the phrase “within such period”

would cover within its ambit only that period which is in actual delay or

beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Had the intent of the legislature

been so, then it would have used the phrase “for such period” instead.

49. What can be discerned from the above discussion is that the meaning of the

expression, “within such period” cannot possibly be confined or restricted to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 37 of 170 mean any one extreme i.e., it can neither be construed to mean only the

prescribed period of limitation nor to denote only that period beyond the

prescribed limitation, sans the use of the phrase “during such period” or “for

such period”, respectively, by the legislature.

50. Thus, the only natural corollary that could be supplied to the aforesaid is that,

the phrase “within such period” must then necessarily be construed to refer

and encompass both; the original prescribed period of limitation as-well as

the period subsequent to its expiry, extending up to actual date of filing of

the appeal or application, as the case may be, i.e., the entire continuum

commencing from the point at which the limitation period first began to run,

until the eventual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. An

interpretation, which is also naturally apparent and forthcoming, when the

phrase “within such period” is read and understood in conjunction with the

expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal

or making the application”, as contained in the said provision.

51. We shall now look into the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, more

particularly the manner and the circumstances in which the court condones

the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be.

d. The contextual import of the expression “within such period” with the Canons of Law of Limitation.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 38 of 170

52. This Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) observed that since a party is entitled

to take its time and file the appeal or application, as the case may be, on any

day, during the prescribed period of limitation, it would be “unreasonable

that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be

called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation

prescribed”. Although, it said that such consideration may be of relevance

for the purpose of deciding whether a particular case is one fit for the court

to exercise its discretion to condone the delay, yet the same would be a

question to be answered, only after sufficient cause is shown, as otherwise it

is of no significance, for the purpose of construing the period for which delay

has to be explained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It further

elaborated that the general considerations of diligence of parties in pursuing

their legal remedies “have very little relevance in construing the provisions

of Section 5” and that there cannot be any “enquiry as to why the party was

sitting idle during all the time available to it”.

53. It is for this reason, that this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), hesitated in

accepting the contention, that the period for which explanation has to be

given by demonstrating sufficient cause is the duration from the last day of

expiry of limitation leading up to the actual date of filing of the appeal or

application, as the case may be.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 39 of 170

54. We find ourselves, yet again, unable to agree to the aforesaid reasoning

assigned by this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) for the reasons that we

shall assign hereinafter.

55. First, we must try to understand what was in the mind of this Court in Rewa

Coal Fields (supra) when it made the aforementioned observations as regards

examining into the diligence of parties for the purpose of condonation of

delay. What has been conveyed in so many words, by Rewa Coal Fields

(supra) is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not expressly lay down

parameters of bona-fides or diligence of the litigant, as opposed to Section

14 of the self-same Act, where the legislature has specifically employed the

words “good faith”.

56. What Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is trying to convey is that, if such parameters

which otherwise cannot be culled out from the text of the provision, can only

be read into “sufficient cause” that too for the limited purpose of deciding

whether the discretion to condone the delay be exercised or not, then such

parameters will be of no significance insofar as interpreting “within such

period” is concerned, for it is confined only to the “sufficient cause”, and if

that be the case, then the inaction of party for the entire prescribed period of

limitation, will too, be of no significance.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 40 of 170

57. Thus, the party would effectively be required to only come and explain the

delay in filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, only from the

last day on which the limitation would have expired, till the actual date of

filing of such appeal or application.

58. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is

to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed

to agitate his claim after a long delay.

59. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are

meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy

promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage

caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for

such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is

precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time,

newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal

remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each

remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending

uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy

must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The law of

limitation is thus founded on public policy. [See: N. Balakrishnan v. M.

Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123] Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 41 of 170

60. The bedrock of law on limitation flows from two age-old Latin maxims;

interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura

subveniunt, which mean; “it is in the interest of the State that there be an end

to litigation” and “the law assists those who are vigilant, and not those who

sleep over their rights”, respectively. The former emphasizes that protracted

litigation puts a strain on the judicial system and undermines the law’s role

in dispute resolution, and so the public interest requires that disputes be

resolved in some final form rather than continuing indefinitely to drain the

resources of courts and the parties. While the later connotes that a person

who has slept on his rights may be denied enforcement of the same when the

resulting delay would cause an unfair prejudice.

61. What flows from the aforesaid is that the dominant objective underlying the

law of limitation is that any lis cannot be kept in a state of flux or uncertainty,

doubt or suspense. Public interest demands that at some point finality be put

to the litigation. It is in this context that the Limitation Act, prescribes the

specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for

the institution of actions or recourse to litigation. On expiry of such period,

no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay

for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies,

and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 42 of 170 enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. [See: DDA v. Tejpal & Ors., (2024)

7 SCC 433]

62. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to Section 3 of the Limitation Act,

which reads as under: -

“3. Bar of limitation.— (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

(2) For the purposes of this Act,—

(a) a suit is instituted,—

(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;

(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and

(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted—

(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;

(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;

(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 43 of 170

63. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit

is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed

period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or

defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by

the defendant, respondent or opponent, as the case may be, the court or

authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that

the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. Limitation goes to the

root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a

court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to

entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. [See:

Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 445]

64. Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act makes every proceeding filed

after the prescribed period, liable to be dismissed, subject however to the

provisions in Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It mandates that it

would be the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the

prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not

been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation,

a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant

intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation. [See: V.M. Salgaocar and

Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao, (2005) 4 SCC 613]

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 44 of 170

65. The above exposited fundamental pillars of the law on limitation, namely, (i)

that the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for

an indeterminate period and (ii) those who have been lethargic in

safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue,

are reflected in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, more particularly sub-section

(1) inasmuch as it enjoins a duty upon the courts to dismiss any suit instituted,

appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation

prescribed therefor by Schedule I irrespective of the fact whether the

opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court

not to proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period of

limitation prescribed.

66. Thus, the Limitation Act is an embodiment of a clear legislative policy that

litigation must be commenced, prosecuted, and concluded within a definite

timeframe. Section 3 of the Limitation Act gives effect to this mandate in

categorical terms by obligating courts to dismiss every suit, appeal, or

application instituted beyond the prescribed period, irrespective of whether

limitation is raised as a defence. This provision is not a matter of discretion

but of duty, for it reflects the underlying public interest in ensuring certainty,

finality, and repose in legal disputes.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 45 of 170

67. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is only an exception to the aforesaid

unexceptionable rule. Likewise, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is no

different. It cannot be construed in isolation from Section 3 or from the

overarching rationale behind the said provision. When we say, that Section(s)

4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, which includes Section 5, is only an exception,

we do not for a moment say that it is an exception to the core axioms of

‘interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus

jura subveniunt’ that underline the Limitation Act. The aforesaid form the

very jurisprudential underpinnings on why we even have prescribed periods

of limitation, and are the very basis for the existence of statutes on limitation

in every civilized country that has ever existed.

68. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are only an exception insofar as the

mandate enshrined under Section 3 is concerned, which enjoins a duty upon

the courts to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred, or application made

after the prescribed period of limitation. They as a matter of exception, enable

the courts to entertain a suit, appeal or application, filed even after the

prescribed period of limitation where the delay was owed to factors beyond

the reasonable control of the litigant. But this does not mean, that delays

occasioned or accompanied to some extent by negligence, inaction, or a lack

of care or vigilance of the litigant would also be liable to be excused, or at

the very least ignored by the court even if the delay in question happens to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 46 of 170 formulaically fulfil the statutorily prescribed parameters for excusing the

same.

69. To say otherwise, that Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and by

extension Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is an exception to the rule requiring

litigants to be vigilant and diligent in their endeavours for pursuing legal

remedies, or that the negligence or inaction of a litigant during the prescribed

period of limitation have no place, insofar as Section(s) 4 to 24 are

concerned, would have a chilling effect of eradicating every basic tenet for

which a prescribed period of limitation exists and could result in manifest

injustice to those prejudiced by such laches or delays, if condoned. It would

tantamount to reducing Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to tools for

subverting rather than effectuating the legislative intent to not excuse

negligence, inaction, or lack of diligence on the part of a litigant except where

the delay is occasioned by factors that lie beyond its reasonable control, and

thereby create a very skewed and distorted understanding of the Limitation

Act, where despite the aforesaid legislative intent being imbued in every

other provision of the Limitation Act, permeating across the scheme thereof,

the same would be discarded for a select set of provisions i.e., Section(s) 4

to 24, while being scrupulously enforced for all other provisions.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 47 of 170

70. Thus, Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, including Section 5, must be

understood in the broader framework of the law of limitation. They cannot

be construed as a gateway to overlook or overcome the sound principles of

‘interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus

jura subveniunt’ that are the elementary constituents of the Limitation Act

and all its ideals. It is in the same breath that we say, that the provision of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be read in a manner which is either

derogatory to, or tends to dilute the aforesaid fundamental edifice of the law

of limitation to a mere ad-lib.

71. In this regard we may refer to the decision of this Court in Hameed Joharan

(Dead) & Ors. v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs & Ors., reported in (2001) 7

SCC 573, wherein it was observed that the general policy of the law of

limitation encapsulated in the Limitation Act is to favour the use of legal

diligence. Expounding the maxim of ‘vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura

subveniunt’ it was held that a court of law never tolerates an indolent litigant

since delay defeats equity. It further held that lapse of time is a species for

forfeiture of right. The relevant observations read as under: -

“14. Needless to record that engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper — this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 48 of 170 consistent legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine of prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal diligence and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour. Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity — the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. Wood, V.C. in Manby v. Bewicke (K&J at p. 352) stated: (ER p. 1144)

“The legislature has in this, as in every civilized country that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe certain limitations of time after which persons may suppose themselves to be in peaceful possession of their property, and capable of transmitting the estates of which they are in possession, without any apprehension of the title being impugned by litigation in respect of transactions which occurred at a distant period, when evidence in support of their own title may be most difficult to obtain.”” (Emphasis supplied)

72. As aptly noted in Hameed Joharan (supra), lapse of time is a specie for

forfeiture of right, which is why where a litigant allows the limitation to

expire for any right or remedy, due to its own volition, be it in the form of,

inaction, lethargy, negligence or mistake, which could have been avoided, no

indulgence should ordinarily be shown by the courts in entertaining or

enforcing the assertion of such rights, de hors, the litigant otherwise

demonstrating a cause for such delay, which may as well also fit within any

of the parameters of the exceptions carved out within Section(s) 4 to 24 of

the Limitation Act.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 49 of 170

73. Thus, the reasoning of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that the

parameters of ‘bona-fides’, ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ of the litigant have no

bearing on relevance for the purpose of construing Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, in the absence of any express language in this regard being couched in

the provision is flawed. These parameters flow directly from the maxim

‘vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt’ enshrined in the

Limitation Act, albeit to varying degrees depending upon the provision in

question, but by no stretch are they excluded from application, wantonly or

otherwise, in any provision thereof. Merely because the provision does not

explicitly lay down any of the aforesaid parameters cannot be construed to

mean that the legislative intent behind the provision also, was to not allude

to the same.

74. The legislature always speaks through the statute it enacts, and its intention

behind any provision or provisions thereof, is to be gathered from the

language used in the provision along with the avowed objects with which the

same came to be enacted. In construing or interpreting a provision, any

deviation from the legislative intent that backs the particular statute

containing the said provision cannot be done casually. Mere omission of few

stray words, does not detract or take away the lofty intent behind enacting

the statute and cannot always be interpreted to impute a contrary intent unless

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 50 of 170 the same is apparent and supported by some other salutary object with which

such omission may have been made.

75. In this regard, it could be argued that the legislature may have intentionally

omitted the express mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters pertaining

to party diligence in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to lay stress on two key

components of the law of limitation. First, that a party has a right to file an

appeal or application, as the case may be on any day within the prescribed

period of limitation and secondly, that the rules of limitation are not meant to

destroy or extinguish rights of litigants but only to curb deliberate dilatory

tactics.

76. If at all such was the intention behind the legislature, then the same is being

adequately subserved by virtue of the discretion bestowed onto the the courts

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

77. There was no need to exclude the applicability of these parameters from the

expression “within such period” or the overall provision of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, if all that the legislature intended was to ensure that expiry

of limitation should not result in extinguishment of rights of parties.

78. The legislature in its wisdom, has in order to lay emphasis that rights of a

party ought not to be defeated or relinquished by the expiry of limitation,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 51 of 170 conferred the discretion to courts to condone the same, subject to showing

sufficient cause.

79. But to read this entitlement to file the appeal or application, on any day of

the limitation, as instrument to construe the import of “within such period”,

would run counter to the object of limitation, which is to enthuse a sense of

responsibility and vigilance upon the litigants and avoid protraction of the

lis. It would, in our opinion, invariably give the litigants, a ‘free-pass’ to

resort to dilatory tactics for the substantial portion of the prescribed period

of limitation, with little to no consequence.

80. For illustration, any person, who is able to demonstrate that he or she, began

to take some steps towards preferring the appeal or making the application,

on the very last day of limitation, whereafter, he or she, ran into some snags

which otherwise, was a sufficient cause, for the subsequent delay, would be

entitled to condonation of the same. The courts in such a scenario, even after

being satisfied about the existence of a ‘sufficient cause’ may nevertheless

have the discretion to choose not to condone the same, but not for the reasons

of prior inaction of such litigant during the remaining period of limitation if

the dictum of Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is squarely followed. This is because,

Rewa Coal Fields (supra) also deprecates “an enquiry as to why the party

was sitting idle during all the time available to it” even after sufficient cause

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 52 of 170 is shown to it, although not as a straitjacket formula, but still nevertheless

very rigidly.

81. On the contrary, recognizing the flip side of the proposition that rules of

limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties into the exercise of

discretion by the courts to admit any assertion of the same, after the

prescribed period of limitation, provided there is no inaction or negligence,

on the part of the litigant, rather than reading the same into “within such

period” or “sufficient cause”, to our minds, appears to be the least disruptive

interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that would balance the

salutary object of any statute of limitation, in toto. It would not only ensure

that not even an ounce of dilatory tactics by a litigant is allowed to pollute

the streams of justice, but also curb the seriously falling standards of

diligence that the litigants today have towards assertion of their rights or

availment of remedies, and a growing tendency to leave things for the last

moment, at the cost of prejudice to other litigants, and without any modicum

of respect for the courts and judicial resources. At the same time, it will also

allow courts to save those rights and permit their enforcement or

adjudication, by a judicious exercise of their discretion in justified instances

of delays, that are not a byproduct or result of the litigant’s own inaction or

negligence.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 53 of 170

82. Thus, to our minds, the fixation by Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that “within

such period” covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the

actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text

of the provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual

concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any inaction,

negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, that could be suggestive of the legislative intent to avoid applicability of

such parameters for the condonation of delay thereunder.

83. We need not dwell any further on this. We may only say, that even in the

absence of any express mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters, the

legislature’s intent is very limpid. The use of the prefix “sufficient” in Section

5 of the Limitation Act, itself for lack of a better word, sufficiently indicates

that the legislature was conscious of its use and import, and inherently

intends to convey the applicability of these parameters to these provisions.

Once it is clear, that such parameters of diligence or lack of any inaction etc.,

can be read into “sufficient cause” it can be no one’s case that, the same

would also not include averting to any inaction of the party during the

remaining period of limitation, and only to the last day of expiry of limitation,

as Rewa Coal Fields (supra) has understood.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 54 of 170

84. We say so, because both the expressions “sufficient cause” and “within such

period” are inextricably linked together. We have already alluded how the

expression “within such period” is to be construed. For the purpose of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the foremost requirement is to demonstrate

existence of a “sufficient cause” for the period covered by the expression

“within such period”, thereby meaning that, any inaction of the litigant

during the remaining prescribed period of limitation apart from the last day

of the limitation would be equally relevant for determining sufficiency of

cause or to be precise the lack thereof. To put it simply, if the inaction of a

party is relevant for the last day of the limitation to determine that there was

no sufficient cause as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), then it would also,

invariably be relevant for the remaining period of the prescribed limitation,

as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation leading up to the actual

filing of the appeal, as the expression “within such period” used in Section

5, does not demarcate any difference between these intervals.

85. Rather, the expression “within such period” treats, ‘the prescribed period of

limitation’, ‘the last day of expiry of limitation’ and ‘the period after the

expiry of limitation till the date of filing’, as the same for the purpose of

condonation of delay, which is to say that, as long as there was a “sufficient

cause” continuing between all these three intervals, the court would have the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 55 of 170 discretion to condone the same, provided the sufficient cause is not the result

of negligence, inaction or lack of diligence of the litigant.

86. One another good reason that fortifies our mind to hold the aforesaid is due

to the very nature of the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The

said provision, as evident from its text, is only applicable in respect of

appeals or applications. Lis that arises from appeals or applications, more

often than not, do not partake the character of original proceedings. The

deliberations and contemplations that a party undertakes before availing the

remedy of the courts, is much lesser in threshold in case of appeals or

applications, than in proceedings of original nature.

87. The aforesaid unique distinction between the nature of original and appellate

proceedings for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was

recognized by this Court in University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors.

reported in (2020) 13 SCC 745, with the following relevant observations: -

“25. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days is twofold i.e. the non-availability of the Vice-Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the appellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due deliberation. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 56 of 170

88. It follows, that such appeals or applications, are generally preferred as

continuation of proceedings already instituted or within proceedings already

ongoing before a forum. In such instances, the degree of vigilance that is

expected is much higher, a party is required be prompt in making all possible

endeavours to take the next step by filing the appeal or application. The

inaction or laxity of the party in making such endeavours is all the more

significant for deciding if delay should be condoned or not, as, by the time

the stage of preferring the appeal or application, arises, it already has the

necessary knowledge to act upon quickly, by virtue of the prior or ongoing

proceedings. If despite it, a party chooses to wait till the very last date, it may

in all probability be the result of a deliberate action to dilate the proceedings

or the lack of any modicum of respect for the prescribed period of limitation.

89. Thus, the notion that a party who failed to timely avail its remedies, by way

of appeal or application, despite having sufficient awareness of the original

proceedings should be shown due deference in condonation of delay, and is

entitled to wait, without being questioned, till the last day of limitation, is

preposterous.

e. Decisions which Rewa Coal Fields (supra) failed to take into consideration.

90. There are a conspectus of decisions, by this Court, which lay down that

general considerations of lack of diligence or vigilance, indolence or

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 57 of 170 inactivity are of relevance for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

more particularly for both the expressions “sufficient cause” and “within such

period”. We need not discuss, all the decisions, and rather intend to only refer

and rely upon a handful of them.

91. In Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj, reported in (1954) 1 SCC

800, a five-Judge Bench of this Court was inter-alia called upon to examine

Section 85 of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951, which is materially

similar to Section 5 of the erstwhile Limitation Act, 1908, which is pari

materia to its counterpart provision under the present Limitation Act. In the

said decision, this Court approvingly referred to a Full Bench decision of the

Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan reported in 1889 SCC

OnLine Mad 1, to hold that the words “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the

Limitation Act should receive “a liberal construction so as to advance

substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is

imputable” (emphasis). The relevant observations read as under: -

“Even if the matter had to be judged under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would have been a proper exercise of the power under that section to have excused the delay. As was observed in the Full Bench decision in Krishna v. Chathappan in a passage which has become classic, the words “sufficient cause” should receive “a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant”. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the order dated 2-7-1952 is on the facts a proper one to pass under the proviso to Section 85.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 58 of 170 (Emphasis supplied)

92. Thus, as per the dictum laid by a five Judge Bench all the way back in 1954

in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra), considerations of negligence, inaction or want

of bon-fides, are relevant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, more

particularly for determining “sufficient cause”. Rewa Coal Fields (supra),

whilst making the observations that “it would be immaterial and even

irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in

construing the words of Section 5 ... If sufficient cause is shown then the court

has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This

aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant

facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may

fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the

discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be

limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify

an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available

to it” failed to take into account the earlier larger bench decision of this Court

in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra).

93. It would be apposite to refer to one another decision of this Court in Sitaram

Ramcharan Etc. v. M.N. Nagarshana & Ors. reported in 1959 SCC OnLine

SC 89, which was, remarkably, rendered by the very same Bench that later

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 59 of 170 rendered the decision of Rewa Coal Fields (supra). In the said case, the

appellants therein had filed applications for claim of overtime wages, that

they were entitled to receive on the strength of one decision of the Small

Causes Court delivered on May 2nd 1952. However, since the applications

for claim of overtime wages, had been filed after expiry of the prescribed

period of limitation, an additional prayer for condonation of delay was made

under the second proviso to Section 15 sub-section (2) of the Payment of

Wages Act, 1936, which empowered the concerned authority to inter-alia

condone the delay was due to sufficient cause. The prayer for condonation fo

delay was rejected by the concerned authority and thereafter by the High

Court as-well.

In appeal, this Court placed reliance on Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, to construe the import of the term “sufficient cause”. Although, this

Court ambiguously observed that “in dealing with the question of

condonation of delay” the “party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient

cause” and “this has always been understood to mean that the explanation

has to cover the whole of the period of delay”, yet it never explained or

elaborated what duration of period would be covered. It did not allude

whether the same would include only the period from the last day of expiry

of limitation, till the date of actual filing, or only the prescribed period of

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 60 of 170 limitation, or both, nor does the decision relied upon by it shed any light on

the same.

However, a closer look at the decision would reveal that, what was

in the mind of this Court was that explanation has to cover both the aforesaid

periods i.e., the entire duration from when the limitation period started till

the actual date of filing. Moreover, it also appears to have applied the general

considerations of inaction and lack of diligence of the parties for construing

“sufficient cause”. We say, so, because this Court held that the appellants

therein had failed to establish “sufficient cause” as they could not explain

their inaction between May 2nd 1952 (which we may clarify, was the date

when the limitation period began to run) till the respective dates on which

they filed their applications, and thus, would be fatal to their prayer for

condonation of delay, and by extension the ultimate fate of their applications.

The relevant observations read as under: -

“4. [...] On May 2, 1952, the appellate decision delivered by the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, in the case of Ruby Mills, however, construed Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act and held that the employees falling under the provisions of the said section were entitled to claim overtime wages under Section 59 of the Factories Act. In other words, this decision for the first time properly construed Section 70 of the Bombay Act and held that the said section in substance extended the provisions of Section 59 of the Factories Act to the employees covered by Section 70.

xxx xxx xxx

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 61 of 170

14. As we have already noticed the authority has held against the appellants on two grounds, one that ignorance of law cannot be a sufficient cause, and second that, even if it was, in fact the appellants had not explained the delay made by them in making the present applications after they knew of the decision in the case of Ruby Mills on May 2, 1952. This latter conclusion is a finding on a question of fact and its propriety or validity could not have been challenged before the High Court and cannot be questioned before us in the present appeals. Unfortunately it appears that the attention of the learned judges of the High Court was not drawn to this finding; otherwise they would have considered this aspect of the matter before they proceeded to deal with the interesting question of law raised before them.

15. Mr Phadke fairly conceded that he could not effectively challenge the finding of the authority that no satisfactory explanations had been given for the delay in question. He, however, argued that the said finding would not effect the final decision because, according to him, once it is held that ignorance of law can be a sufficient cause, then the period until May 2, 1952, would be covered by the appellants' ignorance about the true scope and effect of the provisions of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. This position may be conceded. It is true that the true effect of the said section was not appreciated by either the workmen and Their union or the employers or the authorities under the Factories Act, or even by the industrial courts. But the question still remains whether the appellants are not required to explain the delay made by them after May 2, 1952. Mr Phadke says that it is not necessary for his clients to explain this delay. His argument is that what the relevant proviso really means is that if sufficient cause has been shown for not making the application within the prescribed period of six months then the application can be made any time thereafter. The statutory bar created by the prescribed limitation is removed once it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period; and once that bar is removed, there is no further question of limitation and the applicant cannot be called upon to explain the subsequent delay.

That is the effect of the argument urged by Mr Phadke on the relevant proviso.

xxx xxx xxx

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 62 of 170

19. The proviso with which we are concerned has prescribed the limitation of six months for the institution of the application itself, and so the principle laid down in Lingley case can have no application to the question which we have to decide. Indeed, the present proviso is in substance similar to the provision in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Mr Phadke has fairly conceded that there is consensus of judicial opinion on the question of the construction of Section 5. It cannot be disputed that in dealing which the question of condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay (vide Ram Narain Joshi v. Parameswar Narain Mehta. Therefore the finding recorded by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim. That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger question of law which Mr Phadke sought to raise before us.

(Emphasis supplied)

94. From the above, it is manifest that in Sitaram Ramcharan (supra) this Court

has in so many words, held that “sufficient cause” for the purpose of

condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would entail

explaining the existence of such “sufficient cause” within the prescribed

period of limitation till the actual date of filing of appeal or application, as

the case may be. It is also manifest that the general considerations of

negligence or inaction of the litigant during the prescribed period of

limitation would be equally relevant for the purpose of determining

“sufficient cause”. Thus, it appears that the very Bench which rendered Rewa

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 63 of 170 Coal Fields (supra) failed to refer to its own earlier decision in Sitaram

Ramcharan (supra).

f. Condonation of Delay entails Extension of Limitation and not Exclusion.

95. Even otherwise, one another reason why we find ourselves unable to agree

with Rewa Coal Fields (supra) insofar as its observations as regards the

context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, may be understood

from one another angle.

96. The marginal note appended to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is titled

“Extension of prescribed period in certain cases”. The provision provides

that where an appeal or application, as the case may be, is not filed within

the prescribed period of limitation, the same may be admitted if “sufficient

cause” for such failure is shown. The court may, in its discretion, proceed to

condone the delay, if it is satisfied about the existence of such sufficient cause

that resulted in the delay. In doing so, the court condones the delay in such

filing by ‘extending’ the prescribed period of limitation in order to bring the

application or appeal, as the case may be, in the eyes of law, within the

limitation period, to then admit the same.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 64 of 170

97. What is pertinent to take note of is that the condonation of delay does not

result in exclusion of the period during which the sufficient cause persisted,

it instead talks about extension of the period from the date when the

prescribed period of limitation expired till the actual date of filing of the

appeal or application. This gives the very first clue, that the expression

“within such period” includes the prescribed period of limitation as-well. We

say so, because, when the court condones the delay, it only extends that

amount of period that would be required to bring the appeal or application,

as the case may be, in the eyes of law, within the limitation period. Even if

the “sufficient cause” occasioned on the very first day when the clock of

limitation began to tick, the court would effectively only extend for that

period, which was consumed after the expiry of limitation. Thus, the neither

the expression “after the prescribed period of limitation” nor the period

which is being extended by the court in condoning the delay, could be said

to be the sole constituent of the expression “within such period”.

98. It is no more res-integra, that for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, “sufficient cause” must have occasioned during the prescribed period of

limitation, and even Rewa Coal Fields (supra) concurs with the aforesaid,

although to the limited extent that, only the sufficient cause on the last day

of expiry of limitation is material.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 65 of 170

99. This Court in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari reported in 1968 SCC

OnLine SC 139 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a

discretion, where even if sufficient cause for the delay is made out, the court

may refuse to condone the delay. The relevant observations read as under: -

“7. The next question is whether the delay in filing the certified copy or, to put it differently, the delay in refiling the appeal with the certified copy should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If the appellant makes out sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may in its discretion condone the delay. As laid down in Krishna v. Chathappan “Section 5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words “sufficient cause” receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.”

(Emphasis supplied)

100. In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, reported in (2010) 14

SCC 419 this Court reiterated that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a

party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is

trite that in construing sufficient cause. The relevant observations read as

under: -

“6. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party.

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 66 of 170

101. From the above discussion, it is clear that the period which is being

effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would

have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes

it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the

duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the

provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by

the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section

5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is

demonstrated. Rather, the expression “may be admitted after the prescribed

period” clearly indicates that it is only that period, which has been subsumed

after the expiry of limitation, as a result of the “sufficient cause” persisting,

which would be effectively getting extended by way of condonation. Thus,

while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself

inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with

the manner in which the court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period

which the court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act.

102. If the contention is accepted that “sufficient cause” has to be demonstrated

only for that length of the period that is required to be extended, in order to

admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, then it would result in

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 67 of 170 “extension” being conflated with “exclusion”. Although semantically both

may appear to be one and the same, and even the end-result that would ensue

if “extension” is read as “exclusion” would in substance be the same, as

ultimately it would be that period after the expiry of limitation till the actual

filing that would be extended or excluded to admit the appeal, yet there is

very fine but discernible difference between the two, which if not

appreciated, would completely warp the mechanism of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, as envisaged by the legislature.

103. If the court in condoning the delay in exercise of its powers under Section 5

of the Limitation Act is construed as excluding that period which was

consumed after the expiry of limitation, in order to bring it within the

“prescribed period of limitation”, for the limited purpose of admitting the

appeal or application, as the case may be, then this would bring one

significant change in how sufficient cause is to be demonstrated.

104. The net-effect of the aforesaid would be that, a litigant for seeking

condonation of delay, would only be required to demonstrate that “sufficient

cause” only for that amount of period which is necessary to be excluded so

that it is able to bring its appeal or application, as the case may be, within the

prescribed period of limitation. For illustration, say, the prescribed period of

limitation was 90-days, and the actual date of filing took additional 10-days.

Now, in such a scenario, if we read “extension” as “exclusion”, then

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 68 of 170 “sufficient cause” only has to be shown for the 10-days so that, once it is

excluded, his filing would be deemed as if it was filed on the 90 th day.

105. Although the aforesaid, may not, on the surface seem like a drastic

consequence if “extension” is read as “exclusion”, yet, it would have an

underlying effect which would be contrary to the provision of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, which we shall now explain. If “extension” is read as

“exclusion” and a party is required to demonstrate “sufficient cause” only for

that duration necessary to be excluded, for the appeal or application, to once

again fall within the prescribed period of limitation, for it to be admitted, then

the entire exercise contemplated under Section 5, would in simple terms

involve showing “sufficient cause” such that after the exclusion, the litigant

is once again put back into the “prescribed period of limitation”.

106. In other words, if the above interpretation is adopted then the litigant would

only have to show “sufficient cause” for that period, which after excluding

would at the very least put him back into the outermost date on which he

could have filed the appeal or application i.e., the last day on which the

limitation would have expired.

107. However, the power that the court exercises in condoning the delay, is not

for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have

enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation. This is because, during

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 69 of 170 the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right,

to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, and the courts cannot

object or refuse to admit the same.

108. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not say that, once “sufficient

cause” is established and the court is also satisfied about the same, then the

appeal or application, has to be mandatorily be admitted. On the contrary, the

provision, by use of the word “may” lays emphasis that even after the court

is satisfied about the existence of a “sufficient cause”, it has the discretion to

decide, whether to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, or not.

A catena of decisions of this Court including Rewa Coal Fields (supra) hold

that “even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the

condonation of delay in question as a matter of right ... if sufficient cause is

shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should

condone the delay”.

109. If at all, what is contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is

exclusion of the period consumed after the expiry of limitation for the filling

of appeal or application, such that the litigant is put into the same position,

he enjoyed on the last day of limitation, or any other day within the prescribed

limitation, then where is the question of the courts still being able exercise

discretion for deciding to admit or not admit such appeal or application.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 70 of 170

110. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, also does not speak that the discretion

conferred to the courts is limited only for determining if sufficient cause

exists or not, and where it has in its discretion decided that such “sufficient

cause” existed, it has to then mandatorily condone the delay. As succinctly

put in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), even “if sufficient cause is shown then the

court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay”.

111. The discretion that the courts have been conferred under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, is two-fold, for determining if “sufficient cause” existed and

where the former is answered in the affirmative, then whether the case is a

fit one for it to condone the delay, to admit the appeal or application as the

case may be. Which is why, the legislature consciously used the word

“extension” rather than “exclusion” in marginal note to Section 5 of the

Limitation Act.

112. To say, that the purpose for demonstrating “sufficient cause” is to exclude

only that extent of period which would once again put the litigant back into

the last day on which, he could have filed the appeal or application, would,

in our opinion, gravely misconstrue the entire mechanism of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act. Thus, the expression “within such period” for this reason also

cannot be possibly construed to mean the period from the last day of expiry

of the limitation, till the actual date of filing of appeal or the application, as

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 71 of 170 understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra). The phrase “extension” used in

Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not a misnomer.

113. It is for this reason that the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur

(supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) held that “sufficient cause” for

the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, has to be

established by some event or circumstance that had arisen before the

limitation expired and that the party seeking condonation has to explain the

delay the entire continuum commencing from the point at which the

limitation period first began to run, until the eventual filing of the appeal or

application, as the case may be.

114. We may, with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify that the observations

made by this Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), particularly that “what

events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence” should

not be construed devoid of its context. When this Court in Ramkumar

Choudhary (supra) said that events after the expiry of limitation till the date

of actual filing would be of no consequence, the same was made in view of

the well-established rule that “sufficient cause must be establish that because

of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired”. The

aforesaid observations of “what events occurred after the 91st day till the last

is of no consequence” in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) were made in the

peculiar facts of that case, where the appellant had failed to assign any

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 72 of 170 “sufficient cause” occasioning during the period of limitation, which

rendered the events occurring after the expiry of limitation as irrelevant.

115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of

condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay

has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the

entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of

filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is

filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire

100-days.

B. What is to be understood by “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation.

116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for the purpose of seeking

condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to

demonstrate the existence of a “sufficient cause” “within the prescribed

period” to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, establishment of “sufficient

cause” is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay. Insofar,

as what is meant by the phrase “sufficient cause”, neither Section 5 nor the

Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what its constituent elements

ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate

reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 73 of 170 exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each

case.

117. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial

application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for

condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough

to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by

delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise,

being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the

applicant. Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the

explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor.

118. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A

justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities, as one

motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory

tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is

therefore sometimes necessary, despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous.

The expression “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as

to advance substantial justice.

119. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately

elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which

subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 74 of 170 of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such

matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the message

had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and,

accordingly, emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice-

oriented approach. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC

531]

120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable

explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned

whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the

explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must

distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is

designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something.

It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person

to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really

not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation”

from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse”

as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two,

there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v.

Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531] Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 75 of 170

121. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of

Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, after

examining a plethora of decisions on what is meant by “sufficient cause”,

summarized its principles as under: -

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 76 of 170 attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 77 of 170 adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-

serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.

122. The exceptional provision of condonation of delay on grounds of “sufficient

cause” is couched as a manifestation of substantive justice. This Court in

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA),

reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, summarized the principles governing

the exceptions imagined under “sufficient cause” vis-à-vis substantive justice

as under: -

“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 78 of 170 various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” (Emphasis supplied)

123. From above, it is manifest that that the phrase “sufficient cause” in Section

5 of the Limitation Act is an expression of elastic import, incapable of

precise definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to empower

courts to advance the cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from

being shut out on account of unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is

equally clear that the phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to

revive stale claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes.

124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking

condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide,

and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined

contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the

conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 79 of 170 inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona

fides and diligence.

125. The expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of

pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with

justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for

circumstances beyond their control.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual

indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae

ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to

secure.

127. The expression “sufficient cause” must be construed in a manner that

advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation.

The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather

by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable

diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide,

plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned

towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual

approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 80 of 170 i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative.

128. When it comes to condonation of delay, the length of delay is immaterial,

and what matters is the acceptability of the explanation. A short delay may

still warrant dismissal if unsupported by sufficient cause, whereas even a

long delay may be condoned if justified by circumstances demonstrating

bona fides.

129. Delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence. In certain cases,

unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or

bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if

they are explained with candour and supported by material. Conversely, an

unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate

disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to

indulgence.

130. The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the

cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of

delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5

of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only

if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,

acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning

the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 81 of 170

131. The decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the length of

delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking condonation acted with

reasonable diligence during the prescribed period and whether the reasons

advanced demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time. Thus, the test

is qualitative rather than quantitative.

132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A long delay naturally

casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent, credible, and

convincing explanations. The proof required becomes stricter in proportion

to the delay. The longer the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that

must be put forth. Hence, length is instructive in determining the degree of

scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.

133. The length of the delay functions as a contextual indicator but not a

determinative factor. It alerts the court to the degree of rigour required in

examining the explanation, yet the ultimate focus remains on whether

“sufficient cause” has been shown. The doctrine thereby preserves both the

integrity of statutory timelines and the imperative of doing justice in

deserving cases.

134. Thus, in exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the

courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made

between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 82 of 170 of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to

the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious

approach but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a

case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in

this regard. The court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case

keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the

principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.

ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantive Justice.

135. In construing “sufficient cause” it must be borne in mind that rules of

procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become

an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly

underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound

principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced

from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out

from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities.

136. When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of

substantial justice, the latter should ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation

are not designed to destroy the rights of parties but to prevent inordinate

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 83 of 170 delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of “sufficient cause”

must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather

than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing applications for

condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the

sheer arithmetical length of the delay.

137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is duty-

bound to apply a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance

technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not

stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and

justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section

5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the

proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than

technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret “sufficient cause,” they are

expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and

equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.

138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be

generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice

between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally

construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly

true that a justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding application

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 84 of 170 under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case

delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section

5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning

the delay.

139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation

is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not

in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty

is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.

140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on

merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for

condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to

whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal

or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the

underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look

into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries

between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication,

thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is

legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable

justification for the delay.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 85 of 170

141. Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted by an examination of the

merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on

explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If

merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with

condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even

if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and

inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that

the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.

142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of

delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against

one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into

merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours

the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required

at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and

nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs

in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.

143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless

of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import

merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this

uniformity.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 86 of 170 C. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with?

144. One another submission that was canvassed on behalf of the respondents

herein is that, where the court of first instance was satisfied as to the

existence of “sufficient cause” for not filing the appeal or application, as

the case may be, during the prescribed period of time and, on that basis,

exercised its discretion in condoning the delay, then, in such cases, a court

siting in appeal ought not to ordinarily interfere with the subjective view

and prerogative of the court below in condoning the delay.

145. Ms. Suri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted

that, in the present case, the High Court, whilst passing the impugned

judgment and order, was satisfied with the explanation given by the

respondents herein as to the existence of a sufficient cause which had

prevented them from filing the appeal within the period of limitation, and

that it was only after due consideration of all the material on record that the

High Court proceeded to exercise its discretion to condone the delay in the

filing thereof. She would submit that once the High Court, in its wisdom

had, found the case at hand to be a fit one for the exercise of its discretion

in condoning the delay, and had accordingly passed such an order, then this

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 87 of 170 Court ought to refrain from interfering with the subjective view taken by

the High Court.

146. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel drew are attention to three

decisions of this Court in Sheo Raj Singh (D) Tr. Lrs. v. Union of India,

reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, Manjunath Anandappa urf. Shivappa

Hanasi v. Tammanasa & Ors. reported in (2003) 10 SCC 390 and Gujarat

Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha reported in (1980)

2 SCC 593.

147. The expression “may be admitted” vests in the court a discretion, the

exercise of which is pre-conditioned to the proof of a “sufficient cause” for

the failure to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, within the

prescribed period of limitation. It enables a court to either admit or reject

any appeal or application, for being barred by limitation, even if “sufficient

cause” is shown to its satisfaction. The idea behind vesting the courts with

such discretion is to ensure that the power to condone any delay in the filing

of an appeal or application, as the case may be, is exercised only to advance

substantial justice, where no prejudice or injustice would meted from such

delay being condoned. Condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a

discretion of the court.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 88 of 170

148. The recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is

not an inter-parte proceeding. Condonation of delay essentially is a

question that the court has to decide on the basis of the material on records

and the relevant law. The role of the parties is only confined to brining on

record the relevant material to assist the court in exercising its discretion.

Unlike adversarial proceedings in a lis where competing claims and

counterclaims of parties are adjudicated, the adjudication under Section 5

is primarily inquisitorial in nature, with the court being called upon to

assess, on an objective consideration of facts and circumstances, whether

the explanation offered is sufficient and reasonable so as to warrant an

extension of time, from the material it has relied upon for furnishing such

explanation.

149. The Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami

Chettiar reported in 1917 SCC OnLine PC 70 held that an order of a court

excusing the delay is not final or precluded from being questioned, and that

it is always open to reconsideration at the instance of the party so affected

by it. The relevant observations read as under: -

“It has been argued that the admission of the appeal by Sankaran Nair, J., was final, and that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction at the hearing of the appeal to reconsider the question whether the delay was excusable. But this order of admission was made not only in the absence of Ramasami Chettiar, the contesting Respondent, but without notice to him. And yet in terms it purported to deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 89 of 170 to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice. It must, therefore, in common fairness be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that though unqualified in expression it should be open to reconsideration at the instance of the party affected; and this view is sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India.” (Emphasis supplied)

150. The aforesaid observations came to be endorsed by a Five judge-Bench of

this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu (supra). The relevant observations read as

under: -

8. [...] In this respect, the position under the proviso to Section 85 is materially different from that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which an order excusing delay is not final, and is liable to be questioned by the respondent at a later stage.

(Vide the decision of the Privy Council in Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar.)

151. In Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation reported in 1981

Supp SCC 73, this Court held since the issue, whether there is a sufficient

cause or not is a question of fact, where an order has been made under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court in the exercise of its

discretion allowing or refusing an application to extend time, it cannot be

interfered with in revision, unless the lower court has acted with material

irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no

evidence. The relevant observations read as under: -

“3. We find that Contention (1) is not correct. The order against which Gian Chand Bansari went in revision before the Director did not fall within the purview of Section 9-A of the U.P.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 90 of 170 Consolidation of Holdings Act and, as such, was not appealable under Section 11 of that Act. We however find a good deal of force in the second contention of the appellant. Whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and the proposition is well-settled that when order has been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court in the exercise of its discretion allowing or refusing an application to extend time, it cannot be interfered with in revision, unless the lower court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no evidence. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

152. This Court in N. Balakrishnan (supra) held that once the court below

accepts the explanation of delay as sufficient, the superior court should not

disturb such finding unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly

untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. However, where the first court

refuses to condone the delay, there the superior court would be free to

consider the cause shown for the delay afresh to come to its own finding de

hors the conclusion of the court below. The relevant observations read as

under: -

“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 91 of 170 untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.

10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:

“The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.””

(Emphasis supplied)

153. In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini reported in (2003)

10 SCC 691 this Court held that the finding of the court below on the

question of availability of “sufficient cause” ought to be given weight and

should not normally be interfered with in superior jurisdiction. The relevant

observations read as under: -

“9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the court. The opinion of the trial Judge allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his finding on the question of availability of “sufficient cause” within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be given weight, and once arrived at would not normally be interfered with by superior jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 92 of 170

154. A coordinate Bench of this Court in a recent decision of Sheo Raj Singh

(supra) speaking through Hon’ble Justice Dipankar Datta, held that there

exists a fine distinction between when a court is hearing application for

condonation of delay and when it is sitting in appeal over the exercise of

discretion granting condonation of delay. In the former, the only material

question is whether the delay be condoned or not, whereas in the latter the

question is confined to if there has been proper exercise of discretion in

favour of grant of such prayer. It further cautioned that a court of appeal

should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts

below. The relevant observations read as under: -

“33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held that:

“an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 93 of 170

155. In Manjunath Anandappa (supra) this Court reiterated that a court of

appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the

courts below. The relevant observations read as under: -

“36. It is now also well settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below.

37. In U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros., the law is stated in the following terms:

“8. It is well established that where the discretion vested in the court under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act has been exercised by the lower court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial Judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. This principle is well established; but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L.C., in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston

‘The law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case.’”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 94 of 170 (Emphasis supplied)

156. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha

reported in (1980) 2 SCC 593, this Court speaking through the inimitable

V.R. Krishna Iyer J. (as his Lordship then was), observed that “an appellate

power interferes when the order appealed is not right but only when it is

clearly wrong”. The erudite observations read as under: -

“73. While the remedy under Article 226 is extraordinary and is of Anglo-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional restraints like availability of alternative remedy hold back the court, and judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where the other two branches fear to tread, judicial daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process. There is a native hue about Article 226, without being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude. Viewed from this jurisprudential perspective, we have to be cautious both in not overstepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not failing to intervene where a grave error has crept in. Moreover, we sit here in appeal over the High Court's judgment. And an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine.

(Emphasis supplied)

157. However, the aforesaid observations must not be viewed in isolation from

the immediately preceding paragraph. The observations therein are

significant, for a holistic understanding. This Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 95 of 170 (supra) whilst holding the aforesaid, elaborated on when a court in appellate

jurisdiction may be compelled to interfere with the order of a court below.

It observed that where such order was vitiated by the fundamental flaws of

gross miscarriage of Justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading

of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure,

and any other defects of like nature, the appellate court would be justified

to intervene. The relevant observations read as under: -

“72. Once we assume that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to enquire into the alleged misconduct was exercised, was there any ground under Article 226 of the Constitution to demolish that holding? Every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it is wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of Justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like.”

(Emphasis supplied)

158. Deciding whether there was any proper and judicious exercise of discretion

to condone the delay or not, is a slippery slope. Despite lengthy cautionary

tales from this Court of judicial restraint in wantonly interfering with the

subjective view of a court below, having been preached for time

immemorial, it is plausible for an appellate court to falter in adhering to the

same.

159. We are in complete agreement with the decision of this Court in Sheo Raj

Singh (supra) as regards the significance of the distinction in scope when a

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 96 of 170 court is hearing application for condonation of delay and when it is sitting

in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting condonation of delay.

160. It is no more res integra that where a court below refused to condone the

delay, then the court sitting in appeal would be entitled to consider if delay

should be condoned or not afresh, notwithstanding the decision of the lower

court. However, some weight and importance would have to be given to the

reasons which swayed the court below from refusing to exercise its

discretion. Because refusal to condone the delay is also, nevertheless an

exercise of discretion to not exercise discretion. However, the scope,

available to the appellate court to substitute its findings in such scenarios

would enjoy a considerable degree of play in its joints.

161. However, where a court is sitting in appeal over the exercise of discretion

granting condonation of delay, it is only required to see if there was a proper

exercise of discretion by the courts below and if the same was for advancing

the cause of justice. But the question that we ask ourselves is, what is meant

by “proper exercise of discretion”? What does the enquiry into the propriety

of discretion encompass?

162. Proper exercise of discretion in condoning the delay connotes that the such

exercise was not improper or unwarranted. This as a naturally corollary

would open up an inquiry into the fundamental constituents or ingredients

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 97 of 170 necessary for the exercise of power to condone delay. As such it would

require the appellate court to see if the sufficient cause had occasioned

during the prescribed period of limitation, if the explanation offered

inspires confidence, if the court below in construing “sufficient cause” had

ventured into extraneous considerations. Likewise, where a lower court’s

decision in accepting the “sufficient cause” is either contrary to the law or

suffers from any material irregularity or is vulnerable for lack of evidence,

then such an order condoning the delay would be a fit one to be interfered

with by the appellate court.

163. Thus, a two pronged inquiry is required by the appellate court; first, into

the existence of a “sufficient cause” and secondly, into the exercise of

discretion itself, where the first test is satisfied.

164. This would necessarily entail the appellate court to look into the material

on record, the contents of the explanation that had swayed the mind of the

court below. However, the extent to which the court sitting in appeal is to

look into the same is confined to ascertaining whether the view taken by

the court below is forthcoming and plausible or not. The observations “but

if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial

court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts

then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the

trial court's exercise of discretion” made in Manjunath Anandappa (supra)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 98 of 170 bolster this view. Thus, the appellate court must see if the material on record

inspires confidence for accepting the plea of “sufficient cause” and the

explanation offered in that regard for the entirety of the period from when

the limitation began till the actual date of filing. If the lower court had

accepted the explanation capriciously or without proper legal material to

support its decision, then the same may be interfered with.

165. However, we again at the cost of repetition, make it clear, that the entire

purpose this enquiry is only to see if the view that was arrived at by the

court below could have been taken by it, from the material on record, had

it been in seisin of the matter as a court of first instance, or had the court

below refused the prayer for condonation of delay. Once the appellate court

is of the opinion that the view arrived at by the court of below is plausible

and not contrary to the law, it would not be open for it to interfere with the

same, merely because another view is also equally plausible.

166. The role of the appellate court is limited to assessing the material on record,

and to satisfy itself that the order passed by the court below is not vitiated

due to any material irregularity, want of evidence, extraneous

considerations, failure to take into consideration any relevant fact, or being

contrary to the law of the land, which inevitably includes if the ingredients

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were met or not. It is to ensure that a plea

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 99 of 170 of “sufficient cause” is not accepted superficially merely because some

explanation was offered by looking into the material that constituted such

sufficient cause.

167. Once, the material on record lend support to the view arrived at by the court

below, the enquiry of the appellate court into the material on record ends.

Thereafter, what remains to be seen is only the exercise of discretion by the

court below, which warrants a careful and delicate approach from the

appellate court. This is because acceptance of the explanation as a sufficient

cause is the result of a positive exercise of discretion and normally the

appellate court should not disturb such exercise of discretion, unless the

exercise of discretion was on wholly waterable grounds or arbitrary or

perverse.

168. In this regard, what the appellate court has to see is that the discretion that

was exercised by the court below, was not done in a mechanical or routine

manner and without any application of mind as to whether such an exercise

would advance the cause of justice or lead to miscarriage of justice. The

exercise of discretion must have been in a reasonable manner, and should

not have resulted in any grave prejudice to the other side. The test is to is if

the exercise of discretion was patently wrong or not, and ordinarily the

appellate court will be slow and circumspect to substitute its own opinion

on the exercise of discretion, once it is satisfied that the view of the court

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 100 of 170 below in accepting the plea of sufficient cause was plausible. If it is found

that in exercising the discretion to condone the delay, the court below had

lost sight of a general rule or misdirected itself as to the applicability of the

rule, then it will be deemed to have misdirected itself as to the law

applicable to the case, and the appellate court will interfere and remit the

case or itself exercise the discretion.

169. To sum up, the appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a

finding based on its likes or dislikes. The true test is to see, if it had been

up to the appellate court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for

the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the

material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act were fulfilled or not. If the ingredients of the provision is found to not

have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the

order of the court below.

170. However, if the aforesaid is answered in an affirmative, all that remains to

be seen is that the discretion that was exercised in condoning the delay was

not done mechanically, arbitrarily or capriciously, and was exercised for

the purpose of advancing the cause of justice. Only where the exercise of

discretion was clearly wrong, would the court sitting in appeal, interfere

with the same.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 101 of 170 D. There is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

171. The next submission that was advanced on behalf of the respondents herein

is that, in matters pertaining to condonation of delay, a certain degree of

leeway ought to be accorded to the Government and Public Authorities

owing to the innate complexities in the way the State apparatus functions.

The argument is that due to the inherent bureaucracy and involvement of

various departments of different hierarchy which are endemic to the

functioning of the State and its instrumentalities, unavoidable delays tend

to crop up even without any deliberate intention, and thus, the courts ought

to be pragmatic and liberal where the State or any of its instrumentalities is

seeking condonation of delay in the filing of the appeal or application, as

the case may be. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this

Court in G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer, Bangalore reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142.

i. View on the subject of Condonation of Delay prior to the decision of Postmaster General.

172. Prior to the landmark decision of this Court in Postmaster General v.

Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the practice that

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 102 of 170 was in place consistently leaned in favour of affording a degree of latitude

to the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. The

rationale underlying such an approach was the recognition of the

peculiarities of governmental functioning, which, unlike private litigants, is

impersonal, heavily layered, and subject to multiple levels of procedural

clearances before culminating into a decision.

173. As early as in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma,

reported in (1996) 10 SCC 634, a two-Judge Bench of this Court

emphasized that since the State represents the collective cause of the public,

any delay on its part ought not to be viewed through the same lens as that

of a private party. It observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof in

respect of the State or its instrumentalities, where no one takes personal

responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously, would lead to grave

miscarriage of public justice. Thus, it held that in such circumstances, the

correct approach to be adopted is to be pragmatic and condone the delay

without insisting upon explaining every day's delay. The relevant

observations read as under: -

“2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 103 of 170 decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day's delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.” (Emphasis supplied)

174. Likewise, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, reported in (1996) 3 SCC

132, this Court reiterated that some latitude must be shown to the State and

its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. It observed that “the

State represents the collective cause of the community” and so a pragmatic

view ought to be adopted while dealing with applications for condonation

of delay filed by public authorities. It further emphasised that technicalities

of limitation should not result in grave injustice to the public interest,

especially where the delay was not tainted by mala fides. The relevant

observations read as under: -

“11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 104 of 170 are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 105 of 170 (Emphasis supplied)

175. The above view came to be affirmed in the decision of State of Nagaland

v. Lipok AO, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, wherein this Court

acknowledged the bureaucratic realities that often account for delay in

governmental decision-making. It held that deference must be shown to the

fact that governmental actions are “conducted by officers who cannot act

on their own but must obtain approvals at different levels,” and thus, the

element of delay is almost “inbuilt in the governmental decision-making

process.” Accordingly, it held that factors which are peculiar to and

characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions requires

adoption of pragmatic and justice-oriented approach by the courts in

matters pertaining to condonation of delay. The relevant observations read

as under: -

“13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 106 of 170 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-

purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 107 of 170 respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.

16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634]. It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 108 of 170 protract (sic) public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal.

17. When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles as noted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay is set aside.”

(Emphasis supplied)

176. In Indian Oil Corpn. (supra) this Court held that although Section 5 of the

Limitation Act makes no distinction between the State and a private litigant

insofar as the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court is

concerned, yet adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the

Government, which is dependent on the actions of its officials, who often

have no personal interest in its cause, may lead to grave miscarriage of

justice and thus, certain amount of latitude may be permitted to them. The

relevant observations read as under: -

“9. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 864] while observing that although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels, highlighted the following observations of this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] : (Ahmed Jaan case [(2008) 14 SCC 582 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 864] , SCC p. 588, para 11)

“11. ‘… 15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 109 of 170 Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.’ [ As observed in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, p. 760, para 15.]”

(See also Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634] , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] .)

10. It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court, and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependent on the actions of its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases.”

(Emphasis supplied)

177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this Court observed that public interest

suffers if appeals brought by the Government are thrown out due to the

lapse of the limitation period. Accordingly, it held that a certain amount of

latitude towards the Government is, therefore, not impermissible, for the

purpose of condonation of delay. The relevant observations made therein

read as under: -

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 110 of 170

“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffeed owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government.

Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)

178. What can be discerned from the aforesaid is that, the position of law, as it

originally stood, was that there existed a marked difference in a case where

the delay was attributable to a private litigant and a case where the delay

was occasioned on part of the State or its instrumentalities. This distinction

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 111 of 170 was founded on the impersonal character of public authorities, where no

one public officer has any vested individual interest in diligently espousing

the State’s cause. This resultantly rendered the actions of the State and its

instrumentalities qualitatively different from those of private individuals

who are motivated to act in their own cause.

179. Unlike a private litigant, where the State or any of its instrumentalities

happens to be the litigant in a lis, the decision to prefer an appeal or file an

application is seldom the result of a singular will; rather, it emerges from a

collective exercise involving procedural compliance, legal opinion,

administrative authorisation and responsible officers bound by rigid

protocols and established hierarchies. Consequently, it was an accepted

norm that unavoidable delays would inevitably arise in its litigation, not out

of any want of diligence or mala fides, but as a by-product of the

bureaucratic processes.

180. One another reason why this distinction assumed significances was for the

reason that, if the cause espoused by the Government is non-suited merely

on the ground of delay, the ultimate prejudice is not restricted just to the

Government as a litigant. The real brunt of such dismissal falls upon the

public at large, for it is the public exchequer and, consequently, public

interest that stand to suffer. Unlike in the case of private parties, where the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 112 of 170 consequences of dismissal may remain confined to the litigants themselves,

the dismissal of a proceeding initiated by the State has a cascading effect,

as it directly impacts the community whose interests the State represents.

Adoption of a rigid and uncompromising standard towards the State in

matters of condonation of delay, would, in substance, punish the public for

delays that are occasioned by systemic and institutional constraints rather

than by deliberate inaction or negligence.

181. It is in light of the aforesaid, the understanding which prevailed was that,

for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in cases where

condonation of delay is sought by the State or any of its instrumentalities,

there the courts should not apply the standard of strict scrutiny that is

ordinarily applied to private parties. Instead, a pragmatic approach must be

adopted that acknowledges the practical realities of governmental

functioning and accords some latitude to the State, consistent with the

maxim; ‘lex non cogit ad impossibilia’ i.e., the law does not compel the

impossible. The courts ought to remain mindful of the proverbially slow

pace at which governmental decisions often move, weighed down by

procedural encumbrances and institutional delays. A certain degree of

latitude, therefore, must be extended to the State and its instrumentalities in

matters concerning the condonation of delay, lest the rigidity of limitation

operate to the detriment of public interest.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 113 of 170

182. The ultimate test that was evolved whether substantial justice would suffer

if condonation were denied. Thus, the balance was tilted in favour of

condonation when the litigant was the State, as denial could prejudice

public interest, frustrate legitimate claims, or impact the public exchequer.

The jurisprudence therefore evolved to give primacy to public interest over

procedural rigidity.

183. However, the aforesaid understanding was never intended to be accepted as

an immutable proposition or treated as gospel truth. This is particularly

evident from a catena of other decisions of this Court that were rendered

around the same time.

184. Long before the decision of K.V. Ayisumma (supra) this Court in State of

W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality reported in (1972) 1 SCC

366 had observed that irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government

entity or a private person, the provisions of law applicable are the same and

as such same consideration that is shown by courts to a private party when

he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be

adopted towards the State. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be

construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Government and the

courts are not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf

of the State to explain the delay. The relevant observations read as under: - Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 114 of 170

“26. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fairly well-settled. It is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But it may be safely stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps, which he could have or should have taken. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and each case will have to be decided by the courts on the facts and circumstances of the case. Any observation of an illustrative circumstance or fact will only tend to be a curb on the free exercise of the judicial mind by the Court in determining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to “sufficient cause” or not. It is needless to emphasise that courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice.

27. Mr D. Mukherji, learned Counsel for the first respondent, is certainly well-founded in his contention that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be available to the State.

28. In the case before us, it must be stated in fairness to the learned Solicitor General that he has not contended that the State must be treated differently. On the other hand, his contention is that the reasons given by the appellant, which, according to him will establish “sufficient cause” have not at all been adverted to, much less, considered by the High Court. In our opinion, the contention of the learned Solicitor General is perfectly justified in the circumstances of this case. The High Court, certainly, was not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf of the State to explain the delay. But, it was the duty of the High Court to have scrutinised the reasons given by the State and considered the same on merits and expressed an opinion, one way or the other. That, unfortunately, is lacking in this case.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 115 of 170 (Emphasis supplied)

185. Similarly in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. reported in 2011 SCC

OnLine SC 403 this Court deprecated the High Court in condoning the

delay in filing of the appeal therein, that was occasioned not by any

unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and ineptitude of

the Government Pleaders concerned, merely because the party seeking

condonation happened to be the State. In doing so, this Court observed that

concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”,

“substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of

limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that there is no

justification for the delay. The relevant observations read as under: -

“26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders.

27. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the Government Pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that, “This is a classic case, how the learned Government Pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability (emphasis supplied) are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients.” Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the Government Pleaders concerned in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at which the Government Pleaders had exhibited almost culpable

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 116 of 170 negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found the justification given by the Government Pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay.

28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.” (Emphasis supplied)

186. It is also not out of place to mention that the observations made by this

Court in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) as

regards the distinction between the State or any of its instrumentalities vis-

à-vis a private individual, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, should be understood in its proper context and true spirit.

187. This Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) explicitly held

that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be put on the same

footing as a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It observed that an individual would always

be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 117 of 170 of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the

State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants,

bound by bureaucratic methodology. Thus, it held that although equality

before law is sacrosanct, equality does not mandate a refusal to recognise

institutional realities.

188. However, what is equally significant to note is that the aforesaid

observations of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra)

were accompanied by a clear message to the State and all its

instrumentalities, that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue

for all times to come. It had urged the State and all public authorities to

constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are

involved for decision by the courts, if not then then endeavour should be

made towards arriving at a settlement instead, rather than reagitating the

belated causes before the courts. It further observed that where the case

requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then prompt

action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he

should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.

189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed

the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where

condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 118 of 170 inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries

cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held

that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be

confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate

inaction on part of the State.

190. From the aforesaid, it is manifest that prior to the decision of this Court in

Postmaster General (supra), the approach was characterised by judicial

sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of

condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At

the same time, there also existed contrary views such as Administrator,

Howrah Municipality (supra) and Lanka Venkateswarlu (supra) which

held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a

private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and

any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same.

191. Even in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra)

where this Court recognized the necessity for drawing a demarcation

between a State or any of its instrumentalities, on the one hand and a private

individual, on the other, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

this Court simultaneously observed that such differential treatment cannot

continue for all times to come. We say so, because this Court, in the latter

parts of the aforesaid decisions, conveyed an emphatic message to all the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 119 of 170 States and its instrumentalities to constitute legal cells for the timely

scrutiny of its cases, to explore the possibility of settlement instead of

pursuing belated claims, wherever possible and to ensure that filing of

appeals or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and

the officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable

for lapses, if any.

ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of Postmaster General.

192. However, despite the aforementioned exhortations of this Court in

Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra), the same largely remained

unheeded as the State and its instrumentalities continued to approach the

courts after significant delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as

though it were a license for indolence and institutional lethargy.

193. It was in this backdrop, particularly, the persistent disregard to the laws of

limitation by the States and its instrumentalities that compelled this Court

in Postmaster General (supra) to deviate from the earlier practice of

extending unwarranted leniency governmental agencies, and to emphasise

that the law of limitation binds the State no less than the ordinary litigant.

The said decision is in three parts: -

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 120 of 170

(i) First, This Court held that claims of the Government and its

functionaries being an impersonal machinery and inherited with

bureaucratic methodology can no longer be accepted to excuse

delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in view of the modern

technologies being used and available. The relevant observations

read as under: -

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 121 of 170

(ii) Secondly, this Court in Postmaster General (supra) held that it was

high time that the practice of condoning delay merely because the

litigant is a government entity was done away with, and that delay

should be condoned only where there is a reasonable and acceptable

explanation for such delay and was accompanied by a bona fide

effort. It further observed that the usual explanation of bureaucratic

inefficiency and of procedural red tapism can no longer be accepted.

The relevant observations read as under: -

“29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.” (Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Lastly, as regards the earlier line of thought that if meritorious causes

advanced by the State or any of its instrumentalities are dismissed on

the ground of delay, the resultant hardship would ultimately fall upon

the public exchequer and thereby the public at large, was

emphatically rejected by this Court. It held that condonation of delay

is a matter of exception and cannot be treated as an anticipated

privilege accruing to governmental bodies by reason of their

hierarchical structure or bureaucratic methodology. The law shelters

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 122 of 170 everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the

benefit of a few. Thus, the plea of public interest cannot by any

stretch be used as a carte blanche for official inaction. It observed

that Government departments, far from being entitled to presumptive

indulgence, are in fact under a higher obligation to discharge their

functions with diligence, vigilance, and scrupulous regard to

limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -

“29. [...] The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” (Emphasis supplied)

194. In Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 4

SCC 52 this Court held that although a liberal approach is to be adopted in

matters of condonation of delay, such indulgence cannot be extended in

cases where the delay is attributable to serious laches or negligence on the

part of the State. Delays as a result of the official business of the

government requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective.

It held that delay should not be condoned mechanically in the absence of

“sufficient cause” merely because the party happens to be the State. The

relevant observations read as under: -

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 123 of 170

“9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State. There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient cause” for explaining every day's delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sarma [(2013) 4 SCC 57 :

AIR 2011 SC 1237] the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.

10. In the instant case as noticed above, admittedly earlier objection filed by the respondent State under Section 47 of the Code was dismissed on 17-8-2010. Instead of challenging the said order the respondent State after about one year filed another objection on 15-9-2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of attachment was issued by the executing court that the respondent preferred a civil revision against the first order dated 17-8-2010 along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause has been shown which would entitle the respondent to get a favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that courts should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case where there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under Section 47 till the decree-holder puts the decree in execution. As noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 124 of 170 respondent State from interfering with the possession of the suit property of the appellant-plaintiff. It is evident that when the State tried to interfere with possession the decree-holder had no alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the decree with regard to interference with possession. In our opinion their delay in filing the execution case cannot be a ground to condone the delay in filing the revision against the order refusing to entertain objection under Section 47 CPC. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court while deciding the petition for condoning the delay. Merely because the respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in the absence of “sufficient cause” delay shall not be condoned.”

(Emphasis supplied)

195. The view taken in the decision of Postmaster General (supra) also came to

be endorsed and followed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Amar Nath

Yadav reported in (2014) 2 SCC 422.

196. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC

654 this Court expressed its deep anguish over the routine manner in which

the State and its instrumentalities continue to seek condonation of delay on

the pretext of bureaucratic inefficiencies. It held that the earlier decisions

that had afforded a degree of leeway for such inefficiencies no longer

reflects the correct position of law insofar as condonation of delay is

concerned. This Court held that in view of the decision of Postmaster

General (supra), any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or

the process of arranging for them through bureaucratic process works is no

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 125 of 170 longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay. The relevant

observations read as under: -

“2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counselling to the Government and government authorities has fallen on deaf ears i.e. the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes prescribed.

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [...]

4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only “due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents”. In para 4, a reference has been made to “bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs”.

xxx xxx xxx

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 126 of 170 improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

(Emphasis supplied)

197. This Court in Bherulal (supra) further cautioned that where any public

authority persists in approaching the courts for condonation of delay on

such feeble and untenable grounds would not only be denied the indulgence

of condonation but would also be imposed with costs for wastage of judicial

time. The relevant observations read as under: -

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

(Emphasis supplied)

198. This Court in University of Delhi v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 13

SCC 745 held that consideration for condonation of delay under Section 5

of the Limitation Act does not and cannot vary depending on the identity or

status of the party, whether it be the Government, a public body, or a private

litigant, so as to apply a different yardstick. The ultimate consideration

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 127 of 170 should be to render even-handed justice to the parties, irrespective of their

status. Furthermore, any explanation which betrays a casual or indifferent

approach on the part of the Government or its instrumentalities,

demonstrating a lack of regard for the mandate of limitation, cannot be

excused or condoned merely by invoking the impersonal character of

bureaucratic decision-making. The relevant observations read as under: -

“23. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800%.

24. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 128 of 170 of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.” (Emphasis supplied)

199. A similar view was iterated in Government of Maharashtra (Water

Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse

Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC

460 wherein this Court placing reliance on Postmaster General (supra) held

that a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down

merely because the Government is involved. The relevant observations read

as under: -

“59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.”

200. In State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda reported in (2021) 11

SCC 560 this Court held that the leeway which was earlier enjoyed by the

State and its instrumentalities on account of bureaucratic inefficiencies in

matters of condonation of delay is no longer available in view of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 129 of 170 technological advancement and the shift in jurisprudence as elucidated in

Postmaster General (supra). It observed that no case under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act could be said to be made out where there is no reason or

excuse given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The

relevant observations read as under: -

“3. A reading of the aforesaid shows that there is no reason much less sufficient and cogent reason assigned to explain the delay and the application has also been preferred in a very casual manner. We may notice that there are number of orders of this State Government alone which we have come across where repeatedly matters are being filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed. We have been repeatedly discouraging such endeavours where the Governments seem to think that they can walk in to the Supreme Court any time they feel without any reference to the period of limitation, as if the statutory Law of Limitation does not exist for them.

4. There is no doubt that these are cases including the present one where the Government machinery has acted in an inefficient manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either of the two situations, this Court ought not to come to the rescue of the petitioner. No doubt, some leeway is given for Government inefficiency but with the technological advancement now the judicial view prevalent earlier when such facilities were not available has been over taken by the elucidation of the legal principles in the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. We have discussed these aspects in State of M.P. v. Bherulal and thus, see no reason to repeat the same again.

5. In the present case, the State Government has not even taken the trouble of citing any reason or excuse nor any dates given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The objective of such an exercise has also been elucidated by us in the aforesaid judgment where we have categorised such cases as “certificate cases”.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 130 of 170 6. The object of such cases appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say nothing could done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is mere completion of formality to give a quietus to the litigation and save the skin of the officers who may be at fault by not taking action in prescribed time. If the State Government feels that they have suffered losses, then it must fix responsibility on officers concerned for their inaction but that ironically never happens. These matters are preferred on a presumption as if this Court will condone the delay in every case, if the State Government is able to say something on merits.

7. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider it appropriate to impose costs of Rs 25,000 to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Welfare Fund. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing both the writ appeal and the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery be also filed in this Court within the same period of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

201. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266,

this Court once again deprecated the tendency of State and its

instrumentalities to proceed on the assumption that they may approach the

courts at their own convenience and sweet will, disregarding the period of

limitation prescribed by statute, as though the Limitation statute does not

apply to them. It held that the leeway which was at one point extended to

the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional

inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision

of Postmaster General (supra). The relevant observations read as under: -

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 131 of 170 “3. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgments in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] and State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 300 : (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 393] . The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] Despite this, there seems to be little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.

4. We have also categorised such kind of cases as “certificate cases” filed with the only object to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court on the ground that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. The objective is to complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who may be in default in following the due process or may have done it deliberately. We have deprecated such practice and process and we do so again. We refuse to grant such certificates and if the Government/public authorities suffer losses, it is time when officers concerned responsible for the same, bear the consequences. The irony, emphasised by us repeatedly, is that no action is ever taken against the officers and if the Court pushes it, some mild warning is all that happens.

5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner(s) of Rs 25,000 for wastage of judicial time which has its own value and the same be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Welfare Fund within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 132 of 170 responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the same period of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

202. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 489, this Court speaking through one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.)

held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or

Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an

appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department

has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide

effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept

pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural

red tape in the process. The relevant observations read as under: -

“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 133 of 170 of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. [...]

(Emphasis supplied)

203. This Court in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) further held that when

it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay should not be excused as

a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a free-pass to

cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay

is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was

reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter. The relevant observations

read as under: -

“35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 134 of 170 iii. The ratio of the decision of Postmaster General.

204. We are conscious of a few decisions of this Court, particularly, Inder Singh

v. State of M.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 600, Sheo Raj Singh v.

Union of India, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 and State of Manipur v.

Koting Lamkang reported in (2019) 10 SCC 408 wherein the decision of

Postmaster General (supra) was distinguished or not followed, and the

delay on account of the government entity therein was condoned. We shall

briefly take a look at these decisions.

205. In Koting Lamkang (supra) there was a delay of 312-days in preferring the

regular first appeal by the State Government therein. Both the courts below

had declined to condone the delay on the ground that there was no

explanation for a certain period of time. This Court whilst setting aside the

impugned order and condoning the delay in filing of the appeal, held that

interest of justice would be better served, if the delay is condoned and the

matter is allowed to be heard on merits, as otherwise it would be the public

interest which would likely suffer if the State is non-suited on the ground

of delay. We have gone through the decision multiple times. Nowhere has

this Court in Koting Lamkang (supra) referred to or taken note of the

change in position of law by the decision of Postmaster General (supra).

Thus, in our considered opinion, this decision falls smack of and is in teeth

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 135 of 170 of the ratio laid in Postmaster General (supra) that has been consistently

followed.

206. In Inder Singh (supra) there was a delay of 1537-days in filing of the

Second Appeal by the respondent state therein. While the First Appellate

Court refused to condone the delay for want of sufficient cause, the High

Court on the other hand, condoned the delay. In appeal, this Court whilst

affirming the condonation of delay by the High Court observed that the

respondent state therein had demonstrated “sufficient cause” for the delay

by virtue of having pursed a Review Petition, which itself had been delayed,

and further delay on account of COVID-19. Although, the decision of

Postmaster General (supra) was not alluded to, yet a closer reading of the

decision reveals that the explanation offered by the respondent state was

not the typical departmental delays or bureaucratic inefficiency, and rather

had assigned detailed, plausible account of delay, which is why the delay

was condoned. Even otherwise, what is of importance, is that, nowhere has

this Court in Inder Singh (supra) accorded any special treatment in

condonation of delay, by virtue of the party being a State, thus, we need not

dwell on this decision any further.

207. The decision of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) is of particular significance, and

may be the most instructive in understanding the decision of Postmaster

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 136 of 170 General (supra). In the said case, there was a delay of 479-days in

preferring the appeal. The explanation put forth by the respondent state for

the delay were of the nature of lamentable institutional inefficiency and the

deplorable bureaucratic inertia, which ultimately found favour with the

High Court, and accordingly the delay was condoned. In appeal, the

decision of the High Court was assailed on the touchstone of the decisions

of Postmaster General (supra) and a catena of other decisions that had held

that such an explanation of bureaucratic lethargy cannot be accepted.

208. This Court in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) exhaustively examined all the

decisions of this Court, prior to and after the decision of Postmaster

General (supra). It observed that although, the subsequent decisions of this

Court have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in

presenting appeals as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, because

the High Court had condoned the delay by accepting such explanation

before the decision of Postmaster General (supra) was rendered, the

exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the

liberal and justice oriented approach as expounded in the decisions which

earlier occupied the field. It was in light of the aforesaid that this Court,

refused to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court

therein. The relevant observations read as under: -

“33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 137 of 170 appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held that:

“an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”.”

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-

2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, K.V. Ayisumma and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal16 is one such decision apart from University of Delhi which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above.

xxx xxx xxx

41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision 1 to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 138 of 170 appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.

(Emphasis supplied)

209. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court

in State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal

Representatives & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592, wherein this Court

explained the ratio of the decision in Postmaster General (supra). This

Court explained that as per Postmaster General (supra) there cannot be any

preferential treatment towards the State or any of its instrumentality, when

it comes to condonation of delay. It further explained that as long as there

is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a broad

and liberal approach should be adopted when dealing with an application

for seeking condonation of delay. Unless the explanation furnished for the

delay is wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered or

if the delay is inordinate and third-party rights had become embedded

during the interregnum the courts should lean in favour of condonation. The

relevant observations read as under: -

“8. It is correct that condonation of delay cannot be a matter of course; it is also correct that in seeking such condonation the State cannot claim any preferential or special treatment. However, in a situation where there has been no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides this Court has always

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 139 of 170 taken a broad and liberal view so as to advance substantial justice instead of terminating a proceeding on a technical ground like limitation. Unless the explanation furnished for the delay is wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered or if the delay is inordinate and third-party rights had become embedded during the interregnum the courts should lean in favour of condonation. Our observations in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. and Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B. do not strike any discordant note and have to be understood in the context of facts of the respective cases.”

(Emphasis supplied)

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on

condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly

where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a

significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence

to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional

inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the

government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is

better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering

accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public

litigation.

211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V. Ayisumma (supra),

Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil Corpn (supra)

insofar as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its

instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay, and showed indulgence

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 140 of 170 in condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-moving nature of

these entities, no longer reflects the correct position in law. No litigant, be

it a private party or a State or any of its functionaries, is entitled to a broader

margin of error, falling in the category of inaction, negligence or

casualness, in matters of limitation.

212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster General

(supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an

exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties,

must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent

such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the

identity of the applicant.

213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj

Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General

(supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its

instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters

concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The

State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do

otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier

view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of

its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 141 of 170 habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape,

procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for

seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a

“sufficient cause” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such

reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought

to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in

endless uncertainty in litigation.

214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster

General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic

lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may

nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though

involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause

for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation

demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the

delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are

established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay.

215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on

condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic

processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result

of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 142 of 170 and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the

inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former

category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation,

the latter can still attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake

and the cause is shown to be reasonable.

216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever “sufficient

cause” is sought to be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic

inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an

“explanation” or an “excuse”. Although the two may appear to be one and

the same, yet there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an

“excuse” and an “explanation”.

217. As illustrated in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) an “excuse” is often offered by a

person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort

of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply

that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An “explanation”

on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons

assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence,

deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in

conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and,

therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence

of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 143 of 170

218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is

sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent

complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than

not would invariably always is an “excuse”, as experience has shown us,

depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where

the decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks

to convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State

or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of

delay in a casual manner.

219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a plethora

of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases

where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of

bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and

reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as

“sufficient cause”. They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in

condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the

explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and

promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction,

lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be

accepted.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 144 of 170 iv. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law may be interfered with?

220. Before we close this issue, we may address ourselves on one contention,

vociferously canvassed on behalf of the respondents herein. It was

submitted that since, in the present case the discretion to condone the delay

was exercised by the High Court in 2017, and prior to the decisions of

Bherulal (supra) and University of Delhi (supra), the High Court cannot be

faulted with accepting the explanation offered by the respondents, tune with

the decisions earlier occupying the field. Accordingly, it was urged that the

exercise of discretion by the High Court must be tested on the anvil of the

decisions that occupied the field when the delay was ultimately condoned. In this regard, reliance was placed on Sheo Raj Singh (supra).

221. As already discussed, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) since the explanation of

bureaucratic inefficiencies was accepted and delay had been condoned by

the High Court by exercising its discretion before the decision of

Postmaster General (supra) came to be rendered, this Court in Sheo Raj

Singh (supra) held that the exercise of discretion by the High Court would

then, invariably have to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice

oriented approach as expounded in the decisions which earlier occupied the

field. We may at the cost of repetition again reproduce the relevant

observations of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) in this regard: - Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 145 of 170

“34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12- 2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, K.V. Ayisumma and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal16 is one such decision apart from University of Delhi which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above.” (Emphasis supplied)

222. At the outset, we may reject this contention outrightly. We say so, because

the decisions of this Court in Bherulal (supra) and University of Delhi

(supra) have followed the ratio laid in Postmaster General (supra), which

was rendered all the way back in 2012 i.e., much prior to when the delay

came to be condoned by the High Court in the case on hand.

223. Even if we assume, that the decision Postmaster General (supra) was not

in existence, the contention of the respondent deserves to be rejected for the

reasons we shall assign hereunder.

224. We have already elaborated in the earlier parts of this judgment on the two-

pronged inquiry that is required to be undertaken by the appellate court

when sitting in appeal over a lower court’s decision in condoning the delay,

which involves, first, looking into the existence of a “sufficient cause” and

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 146 of 170 secondly, into the exercise of discretion itself, where the first test is

satisfied. This threshold test, involves ascertaining whether the order passed

by the court below is not vitiated due to any material irregularity, want of

evidence, extraneous considerations, failure to take into consideration any

relevant fact, or being contrary to the law of the land (emphasis).

225. Where, however, the law, during the pendency of the appeal, has undergone

a shift, there the court sitting in appeal, would not only be bound by the

change in position of law, but would be well empowered to interfere with

the lower courts decision, on that ground alone, notwithstanding the fact,

that when the original decision was rendered, that was not the position of

law. If any authority is required, in this regard, one may profitably refer to

the decision of this Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj

Kumar Arora & Ors. reported in [2025 INSC 498] wherein one of us (J.B.

Pardiwala J.) held that a decision of the court which either overrules or

results in a change in position of law, generally operates retrospectively.

226. The question, whether interference on ground of change in law during

pendency of proceedings, would really turn upon the context and nature of

the discretion exercised. Ordinarily, such an interference would not only be

justified but also warranted. But when it comes to condonation of delay, the

considerations are slightly different, inasmuch as the court is required to

prioritize a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach over technicalities.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 147 of 170 Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Thus, in

such situations, the court may be refuse to interfere with the exercise of

discretion by the lower court in condoning the delay, as long as view that

was arrived at by the court below could have been taken by it, from the

material on record, keeping in mind the position of law that prevailed then.

However, this would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of

each case, and the attending circumstances, and what inevitably follows is

that, there may be situations, where the appellate court may interfere,

keeping in mind the changed position of law. No hard and fast rule can be

laid down in this regard.

227. We may, with a view to obviate any confusion, clarify that ‘change in

position of law’ should not be conflated with the ‘position of law’ that

existed at the time of exercise of discretion to condone delay. In the former,

the courts may or may not, interfere with the condonation of delay, if the

same is in contradiction to a subsequent change in law, but in the latter, the

courts ought to interfere with condonation of delay, for such a view could

not have been plausibly arrived at by the lower court, in view of the law

that already existed at the time of condonation of delay.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 148 of 170 v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the State or any of its instrumentalities.

228. Limitation laws are themselves grounded in public policy, as already

discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the

maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it is for the general

welfare that a period be put to litigation”. Therefore, public interest is better

served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses.

State cannot simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public and

yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by allowing limitation

periods to lapse.

229. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in

governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter

of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its

instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted,

merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest

runs the risk of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public

interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling

efficiency, responsibility, and timely action.

230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter of course for the

Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising

inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 149 of 170 culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that

its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of “public interest,”

there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or

for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The

consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but rather its

betrayal.

231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental

negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely

decision-making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal

condonation of delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that

refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a

misplaced proposition. Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of

the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of

law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that functions

with diligence and accountability.

232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the

protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible

governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every

matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of

the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on

grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 150 of 170 object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised

jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order.

233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy embodied

in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in administration, and

bring a balance between accountability and autonomy of action, It would

result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as it pleases with

the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell doom all over the

collective responsibility that the State and its instrumentalities are entrusted

with. Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be

condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State

and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no

stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3

and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the

bedrock of the Limitation Act.

234. Even otherwise, it is no more res-integra, that law of limitation has to be

applied all but the same and with all its rigour, even if it may harshly affect

a particular party. In Basawaraj (supra) this Court observed that a result

flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power

to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from

its operation. Even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 151 of 170 inconvenience to a particular party the court has no choice but to give full

effect to the same. It is based on the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., “the

law is hard but it is the law”. The relevant observations read as under: -

“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. [...]”

(Emphasis supplied)

235. An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within

the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause

to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay

without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in

violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter

disregard to the statute.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 152 of 170 E. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay?

236. We heard Mr. Akshat Shrivastava, the learned counsel appearing for the

appellant. He would argue that the respondent no. 1 failed to assign any

“sufficient cause” for the gross delay, more particularly as to why the second

appeal could not be filled within the prescribed period of limitation. He

submitted that the High Court erred in allowing the application seeking

condonation of delay in the absence of any sufficient cause thereof. The

learned counsel contended that the filing of the second appeal by the

respondent housing corporation is nothing but gross abuse of process of law,

more particularly when the officials of the respondent housing corporation

did nothing for a period of almost 6-years, despite notice being served to

them at the time of execution of the decree on 28.03.2011. He would submit

that the condonation of such gross and inordinate delay by the High Court

could be said to be ex-facie illegal and against the very fundamental cannons

of the law of limitation and public policy.

237. Per contra, Ms. Kiran Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

respondent no. 1, would argue that the High Court no error not to speak of

any error of law in condoning the delay and in accepting the sufficient cause

assigned for the same. She would submit that, when substantial justice and

technical considerations are pitted against each other, the latter must give

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 153 of 170 way to the former, more particularly when public interest is involved. She

further submitted that the delay was on account of the deliberate negligence

on the part of the officers, and in such circumstances the interest of

respondent no. 1, as an instrumentality of State, must not be put to a

disadvantage. She further brought to the notice of this Court that the

respondent no. 1 had already taken disciplinary action against the erring

delinquent officials.

238. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the suit filed by the appellant

was one for possession, however, the First Appellate Court proceeded to

erroneously grant the relief of compensation, aggrieved by which the

respondent no. 1 had to prefer second appeal before the High Court. She

submitted that the persons who were found to be in unlawful possession of

the suit property had nothing to do with the respondent no. 1, and that it

would be very harsh to recover such compensation from the respondent no.

1, which functions on public exchequer.

239. Indisputably, there was a gross and inordinate delay of almost 11-years in

filing the second appeal. The respondent no. 1 maintains that the delay was

on account of five erring officials, including an Executive Engineer who was

designated as the litigation conducting officer. It is the case of the respondent

housing corporation that the day it came to learn about the decree passed by

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 154 of 170 the First Appellate Court dated 15.04.2006, its legal department on

27.05.2006 advised the respondent to prefer a second appeal. However, due

to the sheer negligence exhibited by the Executive Engineer in furnishing the

requisite information and documents to the Special Land Acquisition Officer

(hereinafter the “SLAO”), in spite of various correspondence requesting for

the same on 01.06.2006, 09.06.2006 and 20.07.2006, respectively the second

appeal could not be filed in time.

240. It further appears that the decision to file the second appeal was taken only

on 17.10.2006, which was anyway beyond the limitation period. Despite the

expiry of the limitation period, it is only after almost a year that the matter

was assigned to an advocate, on whose complaints of no assistance from the

Executive Engineer, the SLAO pursued the Executive Engineer again, vide

letter dated 16.10.2007, requesting him to provide the necessary files and

record of the case. It is the case of the respondent no. 1, that such

correspondences were exchanged until 2008.

241. The execution proceedings came to be initiated by the appellant on

20.01.2011, pursuant to which the first notice was issued to the respondent

no. 1 on 28.03.2011. Despite the callousness exhibited by the person holding

the office of the Executive Engineer, the same officer was appointed to make

representations for the respondent no. 1 in the proceedings. The

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 155 of 170 Commissioner of the respondent no. 1 was informed about the aforesaid

proceedings on 28.01.2017 when an order of attachment was passed by the

Executing Court. Thereafter, a new officer was appointed to facilitate the

respondent’s litigation, and the second appeal was finally filed on 10.02.2017

before the High Court, along with an application under Section 5 of the 1963

Act read with Section 151 of the CPC.

242. To our utter shock and dismay, the High Court accepted the explanation of

sufficient offered by the respondent no. 1. We are at our wits “end” to

understand the aforesaid findings recorded by the High Court. It appears that

the respondent no. 1 has tried to make the Executive Engineer a scapegoat,

who undoubtedly acted in a most irresponsible and callous manner but did

not have to take the entire blame to himself. This is more apparent from the

fact that the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned Executive

Engineer allegedly responsible for the delay was initiated only on

10.03.2017, while the application for condonation of delay was filed exactly

a month before i.e., on 10.02.2017. It appears to us that the respondent no. 1

took such coercive actions only to ingratiate itself before the High Court to

demonstrate its bona fides and butter its cries of vigilance.

243. It was urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents

herein that the deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part of the officials

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 156 of 170 cannot be imputed to the State or its instrumentalities, since the Government

cannot carry on business upon principle of distrust. In this regard, reliance

was placed on the decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major (supra).

244. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra) this Court observed that due to the

impersonal nature of the Government, it would be unfair and unrealistic to

put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such

matters. Thus, where a government makes out a case where public interest

was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of

its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes

with it, then the conduct of such officers should not be imputed to the

Government for refusing condonation of delay. The relevant observations

read as under: -

“17. [...] It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. observed, though in a different context:

“Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them.”

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the government to realise that the law officers failed that trust.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 157 of 170 18. While a private person can take instant decision a “bureaucratic or democratic organ” it is said by a learned Judge “hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, — unmindful of time and impersonally”.

Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after January 20, 1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in office till December 15, 1970 had applied for certified copies on July 20, 1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader.”

(Emphasis supplied)

245. As already discussed in the earlier parts of this judgment, State or any of its

instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters

concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. G.

Ramegowda, Major (supra) itself acknowledges that, ordinarily there is “no

general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel or agents”.

Even if “there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona

fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 158 of 170 side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal”. The relevant observations

read as under: -

“14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari; Concord of India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time- barred appeal.”

246. However, the reason why, this Court nonetheless, held that acts of fraud or

bad faith on the part of its officers or agents should not be imputed to the

Government atleast for condonation of delay was in view of the earlier

position of law, whereby the State and its instrumentalities were not placed

on the same pedestal as any ordinary private litigant, in view of the

impersonal character of the Government as an entity.

247. But the position of law is no longer this. As per Postmaster General (supra)

and the subsequent decisions of this Court, consideration for condonation of

delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not and cannot vary

depending on the identity or status of the party, whether it be the

Government, a public body, or a private litigant, so as to apply a different

yardstick.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 159 of 170

248. The subsequent decision of this Court in Tejpal (supra), after duly taking

note of the change in position of law, specifically rejected the contention that

acts of mala fides on the part of specific individuals should not be imputed

to the State or its instrumentalities. It held that to accept such a proposition

would amount to creating an artificial distinction between the private parties

and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. The relevant

observations read as under: -

“54. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the aforesaid account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fides or an act of mala fides on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance.” (Emphasis supplied)

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities

and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State

to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay

with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation

statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 160 of 170 privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a

culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.

250. As far back as 1996, this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) held that where the

case requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then

prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal

and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Thus, even

if for a moment, we accept that, mala-fide actions of few officers should not

be imputed to the Government, the position still remains that, once the State

or its instrumentality finds that, few of its officers were negligent, it should

promptly take action to file the appeal or application, as the case may be,

through its other officers and simultaneously take action against the

delinquent officers.

251. As already observed, in the present case at hand, despite the callousness

exhibited by the Executive Engineer, the respondent no. 1 herein took no

steps towards mitigating the delays and ensuring that the appeal was

preferring as soon as possible. On the contrary, the Executive Engineer was

appointed to make representations for the respondent no. 1 in the

proceedings. Even the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned

Executive Engineer came to be initiated much later, to be precise exactly a

month before the date on which the application for condonation of delay was

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 161 of 170 filed. In such circumstances, even if we do not impute the deliberate inaction

or mala fides on the part of the Executive Engineer to the respondent no. 1

herein, there is nothing to show that the respondent no. 1 acted in a

reasonably diligent manner.

252. Even if the case put up by the respondent no. 1 is to be accepted at its face

value, the respondent no. 1 could be said to have failed to assign any genuine

sufficient cause to justify the delay from the date of receiving intimation

about the order of the First Appellate Court, passed on 15.04.2006 till the

expiry of the limitation period, which was sometime in July 2006, because it

was only in the correspondence dated 17.10.2006 that the respondent no. 1,

while acknowledging the advice tendered by its advocate, reflected that it

would prefer a second appeal. We have little to no hesitation in saying that

on 17.10.2006, it was already too late in the day to take any decision or make

any forms of mind. Nonetheless, the second appeal was only filed on

10.02.2017, with a delay of almost 11 years.

253. As already noted in the foregoing parts of this judgment the respondent no.

1 could be said to have failed to explain the delay on its part from the date of

the receipt of the order of the First Appellate Court till the expiry of the

limitation period.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 162 of 170

254. We say so because if such observations by the High Court, to condone delay

in the interest of a State-machinery, were allowed to be sustained by us, it

would allow the State-machineries a leeway to systematically orchestrate

delays in the guise of laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the majesty

and colossality a State-machinery would hold against a private litigant, it

would be grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually entangled in

the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays, like that of almost 11 years in

the present case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has never turned

a blind eye to the gradients of substantive justice.

255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes

to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to

approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the

relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no

prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This

litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025. Almost 36

years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to

reap the fruits of his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice

by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ask the appellant to

undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 163 of 170

256. As far as the contention of the respondent no. 1 is concerned apropos to the

merits of molding of relief by awarding of compensation by the First

Appellate Court, the same is squarely answered by the principles

encapsulated in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), wherein it is categorically

maintained that the court considering a condonation of delay ought not go

into the merits of the case at hand.

257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position

incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-

hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent

no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable

in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court

recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its

mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a

“sufficient cause”. We hold such observations to be erroneous and ex facie

bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of

Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the

appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court

sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the

Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of

limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 164 of 170 condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of

peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

“3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...]

xxx xxx xxx

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case.

It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 165 of 170 pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.”

(Emphasis supplied)

258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into

consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or

not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they

want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for

which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party

has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own

inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in

such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial

justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While

considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with

the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the

bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is

only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the

other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of

the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical

consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound

public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 166 of 170 Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of

time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court

has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain

lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the

proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent

no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the

relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating

that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section

5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents

and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of

single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by

sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different

footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to

accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court.

V. CONCLUSION

261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court

deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem

it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 167 of 170 laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and

we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays

shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper

case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to

establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.

Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and

more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the

procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of

limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude

of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious,

if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should

not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts

ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants

cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of

their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at

pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,

not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as

by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in

appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already

limited to questions of law.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 168 of 170

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to

attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us

is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an

enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such

litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a

party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the

condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for

another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As

courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not

sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be

permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order

of the High Court is hereby set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs 25,000/-

imposed by the High Court, to be paid by the respondent no. 1 to the

appellant, we impose an additional cost of Rs 25,000/- on the respondent no.

1, to be paid to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period

of four weeks from today.

266. The Court of Principle Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, is directed to

proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the appellant in E.P.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 169 of 170 No. 2 of 2011, and shall ensure that the proceedings conclude within a period

of 2 months from the date of this judgment.

267. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

268. Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts.

....................................... J.

(J.B. Pardiwala)

....................................... J.

(R. Mahadevan)

New Delhi;

12th September, 2025.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019 Page 170 of 170