Sharad vs State Of Maharashtra

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.11 OF 2006

Sharad ... Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra ... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Aftab Alam,J.

1. For causing "the dowry death" of his wife Savita, the appellant is

convicted under section 304-B and is given the minimum statutory sentence

of 7 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with the default

sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three months. He is additionally

convicted under sections 306 and 498-A. Under these two sections he was

sentenced to imprisonment for lesser periods and all the sentences were

directed to run concurrently. He served out the sentences for the other two

offences before he was released on bail by order dated January 3, 2006,

passed in this appeal.

2. According to the prosecution case, in the marriage negotiation Savita's

father had agreed to pay Rs.9,000/- as dowry to the appellant. At the time of

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marriage, however, he was able to pay only Rs.4,000/- and the balance

amount of Rs.5,000/- remained unpaid. It is the case of the prosecution that

after marriage Savita had to face harassment and cruelty at the hands of her

husband, the appellant, and his parents in connection with the demand for

the unpaid amount of the dowry that was promised by her father. When

Savita was unable to bear the harassment and cruelty meted out to her, she

committed suicide by setting alight after dousing herself in kerosene oil.

She suffered 100% burn injuries and died.

3. It is an admitted position that Savita died within two and a half years

of her marriage with the appellant. It is also undeniable that her death was a

case of suicide and it was caused by 100% burn injuries suffered by her.

This takes us to the third ingredient of section 304-B and we find that too is

fully satisfied by the evidences of her brother Dhanraj, (the complainant)

PW.1, Pundalik (her uncle), PW.2 and Sau. Sheela, PW.3, one of the

neighbours of Savita's father. All the three witnesses have consistently

stated that out of the promised amount of dowry, the sum of Rs.5,000/- had

remained unpaid at the time of marriage and during her visits to her father's

place Savita used to tell them that the accused ill-treated her for non-

payment of Rs.5,000/- as part of the agreed dowry. The appellant used to say

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that he would beat her if she failed to bring the unpaid amount from her

father.

4. Mr. Renjith B., counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that

though there may be some evidence of ill-treatment of the deceased in

connection with the demand of dowry that alone would not be sufficient to

bring home the charge of "dowry death" against the appellant unless it was

shown that any harassment or cruelty was meted out to her in connection

with that demand "soon before her death". Learned counsel submitted that

any harassment or cruelty at a distant point of time, even though, in

connection with the demand for dowry would not make out a case under

section 304-B of the Penal Code and in order to bring the case under section

304-B of the Penal Code, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish

that not only the harassment or cruelty was in connection with the demand

for dowry but it was also soon before the death took place. In support of the

submission learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court in Durga

Prasad and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 9 SCC 73, Suresh

Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. , 2009 (7) SCALE 629 and Tarsem Singh v.

State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 155.

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5. We find no merit in the submission and, in our view, the decisions

relied upon by the counsel have no application to the facts of this case and

do not advance the case of the present appellant in any way. PW.1 in his

deposition before the court said that Savita last came to them to see her

ailing father just two days before committing suicide. In that visit also she

told her father that unless he paid Rs.5,000/-, she would not remain alive and

it would be the end of her life. The following day, she left her father's place

and went to her matrimonial home and in the evening of the same day she

committed suicide. PW.3, who was one of the neighbours of Savita's

parents, said that Savita came to see her ailing father on a Sunday and she

went back on Monday. She had then told her that her father was ill and the

accused were demanding dowry and ill-treating her. She also told her that

she would not remain alive thereafter. On the next day, they got the message

that Savita died due to burn injuries. We find it difficult to imagine a more

proximate link between harassment and cruelty in connection with the

demand of dowry and the death of the victim resulting from it.

6. Counsel for the appellant next tried to advance the plea that it was in

fact a case of accidental burn and Savita caught fire by falling down on the

chulha. It is seen above that Savita died from burn injuries within two and a

half year of her marriage with the appellant. It is also established that soon

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before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant

in connection with the demand for the unpaid amount of the dowry. All the

three facts and circumstances put together clearly attracts the provision of

section 113-B of the Evidence Act and the burden lay upon the appellant to

prove the defence plea that it was a case of accidental burn. There is,

however, no evidence on record even to remotely support the plea of

accidental burn.

7. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the doctor who conducted

post-mortem on the body of Savita was not examined as a witness and the

appellant was thus denied the opportunity to put any question to him

regarding the possibility of Savita catching fire by accident. Learned counsel

also submitted that though the post-mortem report was not in the list of

admitted documents and even though the doctor who conducted the post-

mortem was not examined, yet it was marked as an exhibit and was referred

to by the trial court and the High Court. This, according to him, vitiated the

trial and rendered the appellant's conviction unsustainable. We find no merit

in this submission either. The post-mortem report indeed indicates that

Savita died as a result of shock due to 100% burns but it does not say, as, in

fact, it can not say, whether it was a case of suicide or the catching of fire

was accidental. But apart from the post-mortem report there is sufficient

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evidence on record to show that Savita set herself on fire committing suicide

and she did not catch fire accidently. More importantly, in the charge against

the appellant it was clearly spelled out that Savita committed suicide by

setting herself on fire. Further, in course of his examination under section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was repeatedly put to the appellant

that Savita committed suicide by setting herself on fire in face of his

persistent demand for dowry (see question Nos. 15, 16, and 24). The

appellant of course denied the accusation saying "it is false" but he never

said before the trial court that Savita caught fire accidentally by falling down

on the chulha. It is, thus, clear that the plea of accidental fire is being raised

for the first time before this Court and hence, it can not be entertained.

8. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal, it is accordingly

dismissed.

.................................J.

(Aftab Alam)

.................................J.

(Anil R. Dave)

New Delhi;

January 31, 2012.