Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan vs High Court Of Madras

2025 INSC 619 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5245 OF 2024

SHANMUGAM @ LAKSHMINARAYANAN …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADRAS .... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2024

M. MURUGANANDAM …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADRAS THROUGH THE REGISTRAR GENERAL .... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2025 (@ Crl. A. Diary No. 45480 of 2024) Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by VARSHA MENDIRATTA Date: 2025.05.02 16:58:09 IST Reason:

S. AMAL RAJ …. APPELLANT 2

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADRAS ...RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of

2024 is admitted.

2. The three appellants before us namely, Shanmugam @

Lakshminarayanan in Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024

(Contemnor No. 4 before the High Court), M. Muruganandam in

Criminal Appeal No. 4219 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 3 before the

High Court) and S. Amal Raj in Criminal Appeal arising out of

Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 7

before the High Court) stand convicted by the High Court for

committing contempt of Court and have been sentenced to

undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The

appellants have called in question the legality and validity of

the judgment and order of the High Court in the present

appeals.

3

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The District Munsiff Court, Tiruchengode passed a decree

dated 17.11.2004 in O.S. No. 212 of 2000 in favour of J.K.K.

Rangammal Charitable Trust1 ordering recovery of possession

and arrears of rent from the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3. The

Contemnors preferred appeal suits which were dismissed. The

Decree Holder preferred Execution Petition and when the Court

Amin went to execute the decree to effect delivery of

possession on 17.04.2018 the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 produced

interim orders passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P.

Nos. 1467 – 1469 of 2018 staying the decree.

3.1. The Decree Holder applied and obtained the copies of

the said orders produced by the Contemnors in Execution

Petition Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 2014 and also entered caveat

before the High Court. On verification, it was found, the said

orders produced before the Execution Court were fraudulently

created by committing forgery and impersonation in the name

of the Judge of the High Court of Madras.

1 “Decree Holder” 4

3.2. The Decree Holder submitted a complaint to the High

Court and Superintendent of Police, Namakkal District on

03.05.2018 and 15.05.2018 respectively. The Registrar

General, High Court, forwarded the complaint to the

Superintendent of Police, Namakkal on 18.07.2018.

The Decree Holder then preferred W.P. No. 22410 of 2018

before the High Court to direct the Superintendent of Police,

Namakkal to take action on the complaint dated 15.05.2018. In

the meanwhile, First Information Report in Crime No. 8 of 2018

was registered by the District Crime Branch, Namakkal for

offences under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal

Code, 18602 against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3/Judgment

Debtors. The writ petition was disposed of on 05.09.2018

directing the registry to place the matter before the Division

Bench, dealing with the criminal contempt matters, after

obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, for

the Division Bench to proceed with the matter in terms of

Section 15 (1) read with Section 18 (1) of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971. The Superintendent of Police, Namakkal

2 ‘IPC’ 5

District, was also directed to monitor the investigation in DCB

Crime No. 8 of 2018.

3.3. On 10.09.2018, the Contemnor No. 4/Shanmugam @

Lakshminarayanan3 was arrested by the District Crime Branch,

Namakkal and he made a statement about the manner in which

the fake order copies were prepared with the help of

Contemnor No. 6/P. Meiyappan4 in a Digital Net Centre at

Bhavani.

3.4. On 11.09.2018, Contemnor No. 3/M. Muruganandam5

was arrested. He disclosed the manner in which the fraudulent

order copies were obtained by the Contemnor No. 4 and

Contemnor No. 7. The District Crime Branch, Namkkal

completed the investigation and submitted a report on

14.08.2019 in C.C. No. 537 of 2020 before the Judicial

Magistrate, Komarapalayam against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5.

3.5. On account of the case bundle relating to W.P. No.

22410 of 2018 missing in the Registry, the criminal contempt

was not numbered from 2018 to 2022. On the Division Bench

being informed regularly, the bundle was traced, and the 3 ‘C4’ 4 ‘C6’ 5 ‘C3’ 6

contempt petition was numbered as 2493 of 2022. Initially,

statutory notice was issued to the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5 and

thereafter to the Contemnor No. 6 and Contemnor No. 7 when

they were also found to be involved in the process of

preparation of the fake order of the High Court. Since the

Contemnor nos. 1 and 2 died during proceedings, the same

stood abated against them.

3.6. The Division Bench framed charges against

Contemnor Nos. 1, 3, 4 & 5 on 19.12.2022 to the following

effect:

“Since S. Sundaram (2nd contemnor) has died, no charge could be framed against him.

2.That, you, Angamuthu (1st contemnor), rd Muruganandam (3 contemnor), Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan (4th contemnor) and Thangamani (5th contemnor) along with the deceased Sundaram submitted the photocopies of the following three fake orders of this Court, all dated 12.03.2018 to the bailiff, when he came for executing the decree as set out above.

i.C.R.P.No.1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018 ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of 2018 and iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of 2018 The above three orders appear to have been passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the records of the Registry show that no such Civil 7

Revision Petitions were even filed, and the said Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on 12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these three orders have been fabricated.” 3.7. Basing the affidavits filed by the Contemnor Nos. 1

and 3 to 5, during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the

High Court suo motu impleaded Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 on the

ground that the material available on record including the police

report revealed that these two contemnors are also involved in

the preparation and handing over of the fake High Court’s

orders to the litigants, Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5. Accordingly,

charges were framed by the High Court on 16.04.2024 against

the Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 as under:

“That, you, P. Meiyappan (6th contemnor) and S. Amal Raj (7th contemnor) along with Contemnor Nos.3 to 5, including the deceased, P. Angamuthu and S. Sundaram, created fake orders of this Court, all dated 12.03.2018 and aided in producing it to the bailiff, when he came for executing the decree as set out in the order dated 19.12.2022:

i. C.R.P.No. 1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018 ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of 2018 and iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of 2018 The above three orders appear to have been passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the records of the Registry show that no such Civil 8

Revision Petitions were even filed and the said Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on 12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these three orders have been fabricated.

The above act of yours prima facie attracts Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is punishable under Section 12, ibid., in that, by submitting the aforesaid three photocopies of the orders of this Court, you have interfered with the administration of justice, in the execution of proceedings before the District Munsif, Tiruchengode” 3.8. The Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5 preferred Crl. O.P. No.

17492 of 2023 for reinvestigation/fresh investigation of the

crime registered against them. The Division Bench passed an

order on 21.09.2023 directing the DGP to form a Special Team

whereupon the DGP transferred the investigation to CBCID

(OCU) and renumbered as Crime No. 2 of 2023. A detailed

investigation was carried out by CBCID, and voluminous

incriminating materials were collected against the Contemnor

Nos. 4 to 6.

3.9. P. Meiyappan/Contemnor No. 66 and S. Amal

Raj/Contemnor No. 77 were also arrested by the CBCID. The

statement of two witnesses namely, Thangaraj and Shanthi was

recorded under Section 164(5) of Cr. P. C. before the Judicial

6 ‘C6’ 7 ‘C7’ 9

Magistrate No. II, Namakkal. Sample voices of C3 and C4 were

also recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for

comparison with the cell phone conversation held between

them. CBCID filed first status report in the contempt petition on

18.10.2023 and also verified the record relating to C.R.P. Nos.

1467 – 1469 of 2018. The material objects were recovered

from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani and sent to the Tamil

Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory8. The CBCID filed second

status report in the contempt petition on 19.12.2023 and

thereafter third status report was filed on 12.02.2024. Basing

above status reports, C6 & C7 were impleaded .

3.10. In his affidavit in response to the contempt notice,

the C3 admitted that in the Execution case he and other

tenants were guided by C4 to prefer revision before the High

Court. According to him, the Judgment Debtor, in three suits,

paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for preferring revision. On the

relevant date his wife handed over the copy of bogus interim

order to the Court Amin which was given to him by C4 through

one Mr. P. Meiyappan. He categorically states that since C4 was

handling his case for the last two decades, there was no 8 ‘FSL’ 10

occasion to doubt the genuineness of the High Court order.

When he contacted C4, he stated that one Mr. Thangapandian,

advocate had given the said order to him. This conversation

was recorded in the automated Samsung android phone. He

had given transcript of the conversation between him and C4 to

the police along with the certificate under Section 65-B (4) of

the Evidence Act, 1872.

3.11. The High Court after considering the materials and

the submissions made by the appellants found that the three

appellants are responsible in preparation of the bogus High

Court interim orders and have accordingly sentenced them to

undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The High Court

found that the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 are also involved but

since they have died, the case stood abated against them.

Insofar as C6 is concerned, the High Court has given him the

benefit of doubt.

SUBMISSIONS

4. Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel and Mr. S.

Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants/contemnors would submit that the initiation of 11

contempt against the appellant/contemnors is barred by

limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 20 of

Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. It is also argued that formal

charges are not framed against the appellants/contemnors

without which contempt cannot proceed. It is vehemently

argued that standard of proof in a criminal contempt is the

same as required in a criminal case, therefore, the High Court

has erred in holding that standard of strict proof is not required

for conviction in a contempt matter. It is lastly submitted that

the High Court having given benefit of doubt to C6 and has

acquitted Contemnor No. 5, wife of the C3, the same yardstick

should have been applied against the appellant/C3 and thus, he

deserves to be acquitted.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/High Court

and Intervenor/Decree Holder have supported the impugned

order. According to them, the present appellants have been

found involved in creation of forged High Court order which

have rightly been dealt with by the High Court by punishing

them for committing contempt of Court. It is submitted that

when the contempt proceedings are drawn suo motu by the

High Court the law of limitation is not attracted. There being 12

sufficient material against the appellants/contemnors, it is not

a case where they have been found guilty and sentenced on

the basis of probabilities, but it is a case of cogent material

available against them.

ANALYSIS

6. The High Court has recorded the finding of guilt

against the appellants/contemnors on the basis of the report

filed by CBCID and the affidavits filed by the appellants in

response to the statutory notice issued against them. The

report of the CBCID was in turn founded on the statement of

witnesses as well as telephonic conversations held between C3

and C4 as also between C6 and C4. It has also come on record

that C4 has forwarded the format for the preparation of fake

stay order copies received from the advocate Thangapandian

through P. Meiyappan’s email. Thereafter, C4 prepared the fake

stay order copies and handed over the same to the accused,

Thangamani, Sundaram and Angamuthu through P. Meiyappan.

C4 further stated in his confession statement to the CBCID that

Contemnor No. 7/S. Amal Raj9 is the person who floated the

9 ‘C7’ 13

idea of preparing the forged High Court stay orders. The

properties were seized from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani

where the fake stay orders were prepared and the same were

sent to the FSL. The High Court has extracted the report of the

FSL in para 30 of the impugned order. Moreover, C3 in his

affidavit has alleged that C4 was the person who guided them

throughout in the litigation and it was he (C4) who handed over

fake orders through P. Meiyappan. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 15 &

16 of his affidavit have been reproduced by the High Court

which clearly supports the finding recorded by the High Court.

Thus, the case against the appellants/C3, C4 & C7 for

committing contempt has been found proved by the High Court

on the basis of cogent and reliable material available on record

and the same is recorded after considering their stand taken in

the affidavit.

7. Having deeply scrutinised the material, we are satisfied

that the finding recorded by the High Court does not suffer

from any illegality or perversity. The present is not a case

where it is not known as to who produced the fake interim

orders of the High Court or who prepared the same. The chain 14

of events emerging from 18.04.2018 onwards, when the fake

orders were presented at the time when the bailiff tried to

effect delivery of possession, have been found established. As a

matter of fact, C3 admits that he submitted the fake orders

before the Court Amin. From the conversation recorded

between C3 and C4 as produced before the CBCID and as

mentioned in the affidavits, clearly accuses that it was C4 who

was responsible for handing over the orders through P

Meiyappan. It was C7 who floated the idea of preparing the

forged orders. Thus, all three appellants/contemnors have

rightly been convicted.

8. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish

for contempt is always for maintaining the purity of

administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the

courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being

misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when

the order of the court is forged and produced to gain undue

advantage. A misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and

wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a

favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference

with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is 15

found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she

knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are

not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated

order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold

him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he

or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication. [See: In

Re: Bineet Kumar Singh10). Thus, C3, who is the beneficiary

of the fake interim orders is rightly held guilty of contempt.

9. In re: “Vinay Chandra Mishra”11, this Court has

held that the Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and the

duty to protect the same is apart from the function of

adjudicating the disputes between the parties and it is for this

purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary

power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or

outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and

bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them

and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear

or favour.

10

(2001) 5 SCC 501 11 (1995) 2 SCC 584 16

10. It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the

appellants that they were not given proper opportunity to

defend, inasmuch as, the charges were not framed against

them in a formal manner nor explained to them. This argument

deserves to be rejected at the outset in view of the settled

proposition in “Vinay Chandra Mishra”(supra) in the

following words:

“26.……….The criminal contempt of court undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even in this country has always been summary. However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection that the Judge deals with the contempt himself and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot, but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure does not offend against the principle of natural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of 17

justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and he must be able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses the court for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory, yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the court is commended and not faulted.”

11. Much emphasis was laid by the appellants taking

shelter under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197112

to raise the plea of limitation. It was submitted that the

contempt proceedings should have been initiated within one

year from the date of production of the fake interim orders i.e.

18.04.2018. However, the notice was issued after four years in

the year 2022 and as such entire proceeding is barred by

12 “1971 Act” 18

limitation. Reliance is placed on “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian

& Ors.”13

12. In “Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar”14 the following is

held:

“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held that the High Court has inherent power to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor to defend himself. But the procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court can be regulated by legislation by appropriate legislature under Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the Parliament has enacted the Act of 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court is given a constitutional foundation by declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken away by any legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section 22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The above position of law has been well settled by this

13 (2001) 7 SCC 549 14 (1993) Supp (1) SCC 529 19

Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2 SCC 571]holding thus:

“In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a subordinate court, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.”

24. From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. It would be appropriate, in this connection, to refer certain English authorities dealing with the power of the superior court as Courts of Record.

37. The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a summary power as held in the cases of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary and in Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P.

38. Peacock, C.J. laid down the rule quite broadly in the following words in Abdool, Re:

[(1867) 8 WR Cr 32, 33) “[T]here can be no doubt that every court of record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt.”

42. If we examine the facts of the present case in the backdrop of the proposition of law, the contentions raised by the appellant challenging the procedure followed by the High Court do not merit any consideration since the appellant has been served with a notice of contempt and thereafter permitted to go through the records and finally has been afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his explanation for the charge levelled against 20

him. Incidentally, we may say that the submission of the contemnor that the impugned order is vitiated on the ground of procedural irregularities and that Article 215 of the Constitution of India is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15 and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be countenanced and it has to be summarily rejected as being devoid of any merit.” (Emphasis supplied)

13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “Pallav Sheth”

(supra) has held thus:

“30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are courts of record, and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute, can thereby any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.

33. The question which squarely arises is as to what is the meaning to be given to the expression “no court shall initiate any proceedings for 21

contempt …” occurring in Section 20 of the 1971 Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different.

41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr Venugopal would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215.

22 Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided.

(Emphasis supplied)

42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. (Emphasis supplied) For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an application to court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section

15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise 23

that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.

(Emphasis supplied)

44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

(Emphasis supplied)

46. The record discloses that the Custodian received information of the appellant having committed contempt by taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts clandestinely only from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6- 1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in contempt and notice issued by the Special Court on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by 24

any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.

47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or the applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production. These provisions embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud.

48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving 25

information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6- 1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the appellant to punish him for contempt.

(Emphasis supplied) In view of the abovestated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20.”

14. While the appellants have referred to para 44 of

“Pallav Sheth”(supra), the respondent has relied upon

paragraph nos. 30, 41 & 42. Upon reading of the entire

judgment in the matter of “Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is clearly

depicted that the contempt action must be initiated either by

filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu

within a period of one year from the date on which the

contempt is alleged to have been committed. The originating

point for calculating the period of limitation has been 26

interpreted in para 42 of Pallav Sheth which is reproduced

again at the cost of repetition.

“ 42………………..On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.”

Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in paras

42 and 44 of “Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is to be seen as to

when the application was preferred by the respondent/Decree

Holder for initiation of action against the appellants. The

present contempt proceeding has its root in WP No. 22410 of

2018 preferred by the Trust/Decree Holder. This writ petition

was preferred on 20.08.2018 i.e. immediately after four months

from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were produced before

the Court Amin. In this writ petition, prayer was made to

initiate action against the respondents for committing act of 27

forgery and fraudulent creation of bogus orders in the name of

the High Court. When the matter was posted before the learned

Single Judge it was informed by the Registry that the matter

was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the

administrative side and the Hon’ble Chief Justice has directed

police investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Deputy

Registrar, High Court of Madras gave a complaint to the

Superintendent of Police, Namakkal Division for investigation

and eventually Crime No. 8 of 2018 was registered in District

Crime Branch, Namakkal Division on 04.09.2018. When the

matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on

05.09.2018, the Court was of the prima facie opinion that

despite registration of FIR further action needs to be taken for

initiation of contempt proceedings under the Act, 1971, as

there is prima facie material to show that criminal contempt

has been committed. The jurisdiction to proceed for criminal

contempt being with the Division Bench, the learned Single

Judge of the High Court directed the Registry to place the

matter before the Division Bench dealing with the criminal

contempt matters, after obtaining necessary orders from

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, for the Division Bench to proceed with 28

the matter in terms of Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of

the Act, 1971. Thus, it is this date i.e. 05.09.2018 when the

contempt proceedings were drawn by the High Court though

actual notice was issued later on by the Division Bench in the

year 2022. Significantly, it requires special reference that for

about 4 years the case bundle of WP No. 22410 of 2018 was

missing in the Registry of the High Court. On repeated

information/request by the Decree Holder the bundle was

traced, and the contempt case was registered in 2022.

However, it does not mean that the contempt was initiated in

the year 2022.

15. It is significant to notice that the case bundle of writ

petition in the High Court was misplaced in the registry of the

High Court so as to render the High Court powerless to punish

for contempt even though it may be fully convinced of the

blatant nature of the contempt and the same having been

brought to the notice of the Court within one year from the

date of commission of contempt. Such situation was clearly

foresighted by this Court in “Pallav Sheth”(supra), by

observing in para 41 that Section 20 of the Act, 1971, 29

therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid

such an anomaly and eventually concluded that the date of

initiation of suo motu contempt action is regarded as the

initiation by the Court for the purpose of Section 20. Therefore,

in the case in hand, initiation of contempt action shall be

treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when the learned

Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and this

date being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake

orders were presented before the Court Amin, we are of the

considered view that the present contempt action was not

barred by limitation.

16. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the

appellants is that the High Court has proceeded on an

assumption that the standard of strict proof required to convict

a person under the penal law need not be considered whereas

in Khushi Ram vs. Sheo Vati & Anr.15, it is held that the

charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal

charge and it must be established beyond all reasonable doubt.

Basing above, it is argued that the charge having not proved

beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellants cannot be 15 (1953) 1 SCC 726 30

punished. However, the present is a case where the High Court

has initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted facts

that C3 produced fake interim orders of the High Court and the

same were prepared by C4 & C7. Despite observation by the

High Court, we are of the view that present is a case where it is

established beyond all reasonable doubt that the present

appellants/contemnors have either used or created fake High

Court interim orders. It is not a case of mere probability of

commission of offence rather it is a proved case of commission

of offence. Creating fake orders of the Court is one of the most

dreaded acts of contempt of court. It not only thwarts the

administration of justice, but it has inbuilt intention by

committing forgery of record. Therefore, the charge of

contempt is fully proved against the appellants beyond all

reasonable doubt.

17. For the foregoing, we have no hesitation in affirming

the finding of guilt of commission of contempt by the

appellants, as recorded by the High Court. The appeals are,

accordingly, dismissed.

31

However, insofar as imposition of sentence of simple

imprisonment for six months is concerned, the same appears to

be harsh, therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of

the case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be

served if the appellants are sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for one month.

Accordingly, we confirm the conviction and modify the

sentence from simple imprisonment for six months to simple

imprisonment for one month. It is ordered accordingly.

The appellants shall surrender before the Registrar of the

High Court of Madras within 15 days from today to undergo the

sentence. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to

communicate this order to the concerned High Court for

compliance.

….…….………………………………………J. (SUDHANSHU DHULIA)

…....….………………………………………J. (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 02, 2025.