Shamahad Ahmad & Ors vs Tilak Raj Bajaj (D) By Lrs. & Ors

Judge III (FTC), Dehradun (Appellate 2

Authority), dated May 25, 2001 in Rent Control

Appeal No. 165 of 1995 and restored the order

passed by the Prescribed Authority (First

Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division),

Dehradun dated November 18, 1995 in P.A. Case

No. 53 of 1989 by which the application of the

landlords for eviction of respondent-tenant

came to be dismissed.

2. For appreciating the controversy in

the present appeal, few relevant facts may be

noted.

3. The appellants are landlords having

Shop No.2 in Building No. 43 situated on Gandhi

Road in the city of Dehradun. The respondents

are heirs of one Prakash Chand. Initially, the

property was let out to Prakash Chand,

grandfather of the respondents who are heirs

and legal representatives of said Prakash

Chand. The tenancy was created in 1956 at a

monthly rent of Rs.18.75 paise per month which

was subsequently raised to Rs.25.50 paise. 3

4. It appears that the landlords served

notice on October 3, 1988 to the tenant

terminating his tenancy. A suit for possession

was thereafter instituted being Eviction Suit

No. 4 of 1989 titled Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. v.

Prakash Chand in the Small Causes Court,

Dehradun and the matter was sub-judice. During

the pendency of the suit, landlords made an

application to the Prescribed Authority under

Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings

(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,

1972 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') for

possession of the suit shop on the ground that

the landlords required the shop bona fide for

carrying on business by Matloob Ahmad, husband

of Smt. Kishwar Ahmad-applicant No.6 with Kum.

Faraha Matloob, daughter of Smt. Kishwar Ahmad

and Matloob Ahmad for running business in

readymade garments.

5. It was the case of the landlords that

Matloob Ahmad, husband of Smt. Kishwar Ahmad

who was working in C.D. Account Service, was 4

due to retire within a short period. He had no

any other business of his own. Smt. Kishwar

Ahmad, therefore, wanted to get possession of

suit shop so that her husband Matloob Ahmad

could carry on business in readymade garments

with her daughter Kum. Faraha Matloob.

6. The tenant Prakash Chand filed a

written statement controverting the facts

stated and averments made in the application

and contested the claim of the landlords. It

was stated that landlords were having huge

property in Dehradun. They were enjoying high

status and were a `reputed family' in the city.

They were very rich and having business in

timber wood. They did not require the shop for

doing business in readymade garments. Matloob

Ahmad was in Government service and had not

retired. It was also contended that even after

retirement, he would not do business in

readymade garments. Neither Matloob Ahmad nor

Kum. Faraha Matloob had any experience in the

business of readymade garments and on that 5

ground also, the claim was not well founded.

Moreover, both Smt. Kishwar Ahmad and Kum.

Faraha Matloob were pardanasin ladies. For that

reason also, they could not come in public and

could not do any business. The application was

filed only with a view to get the tenant

evicted. Moreover, one suit which had already

been instituted for getting possession on the

ground that the property was in dilapidated

condition and was required repairing, was

pending and hence an application under Section

21 of the Act was not maintainable. It was

stated that the tenant was very poor having a

grocery shop. He was doing business since last

about forty years. The income from the grocery

shop run by the tenant from the suit shop was

the only means of income for the entire family

consisting of nine members. If eviction order

is passed against the tenant, he would be

deprived of livelihood and his family would

starve. It was, therefore, submitted that the

application was liable to be dismissed. 6

7. The Prescribed Authority, on the basis

of the pleadings of the parties, considered the

rival claims and perused the evidence led by

both the sides. As far as maintainability of

the application is concerned, it was held that

such application was tenable. The ground put

forward by the landlords in the application

under Section 21 was totally different,

distinct and independent of the suit filed by

the landlords earlier and hence the application

was not liable to be dismissed on that ground.

It was also held that it could not be contended

that pardanasin lady/ladies cannot do business.

No such provision of law was brought to the

notice of the Prescribed Authority so as to

compel the Authority to dismiss the application

on that count. Hence, even that ground also was

not well founded for dismissing the

application.

8. The Authority, however, observed that

neither Matloob Ahmad nor Kum. Faraha Matloob

had any experience in doing business in 7

readymade garments. The Authority noted that

Kum. Faraha had obtained B.A. degree but she

had no experience in readymade garments. Nor

Matloob Ahmad who was to retire, had any such

expertise. The Authority, therefore, held that

in absence of such experience, requirement

pleaded by the landlords could not be said to

be bona fide or genuine. The Authority also

held that if the landlords wanted to do

business in readymade garments, they would

require an office room. They would also require

sufficient space for preparation of readymade

garments and godown for export of garments. In

absence of such accommodation, it could not be

said that the requirement was bona fide. The

Authority proceeded to observe that family of

the landlords was reputed family having high

status in the society and they were living in

high standard, doing business in timber wood

and enjoying facilities of car, scooter,

telephone, etc. It, therefore, could not be 8

said that they were interested in doing

business in readymade garments.

9. On the other hand, according to the

Authority, tenant was in possession of the shop

since about forty years wherein he was doing

business in grocery articles. The entire family

of the tenant was earning livelihood from the

income of the said shop. Hence, even on the

ground of comparative hardship, it was the

tenant who would suffer greater hardship than

the landlords. In view of the above findings,

the Prescribed Authority dismissed the

application for eviction of the tenant.

10. Being aggrieved by the order passed by

the Prescribed Authority, the landlords

preferred an appeal before the appellate

authority. The Additional District Judge who

heard the appeal, again appreciated the

evidence on record. The learned Judge held that

the Prescribed Authority had rejected the

application on `flimsy' ground. The Authority

did not appreciate the evidence on record in 9

its proper perspective. The learned Judge noted

that Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6

had already retired from service on December

31, 1993 after office hours. Obviously,

therefore, applicant No.6 was right in praying

for possession of shop for bona fide

requirement of her husband as he was to do work

and was not doing any other business. The

learned Judge also noted that for doing

business in readymade garments, no `expertise'

was necessary and the Prescribed Authority was

wholly wrong in rejecting the claim of the

applicants on the ground that Matloob Ahmad was

not `expert' in the said business. The learned

Judge also noted that by the time the matter

came up for hearing, Kum. Faraha Matloob who

had acquired B.A. degree, had also obtained Law

degree and had become an advocate. She was

practising in Civil Court at Dehradun and she

was in need of an office room. The lower

appellate Court, therefore, held that the

requirement of landlords of the suit shop was 10

bona fide. A part of it was required for the

purpose of doing business in readymade garments

by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6 and

a part of it was required by Kum. Faraha

Matloob for running an office as an advocate.

According to the appellate Court, therefore,

bona fide requirement of the landlords was

proved.

11. Regarding comparative hardship, the

appellate Court noted that no attempt

whatsoever had been made by the tenant for

getting alternative accommodation and hence it

could not be said that if the order of eviction

would be passed and application of landlords

would be allowed, greater hardship would be

caused to the tenant. Accordingly, an order

passed by the Prescribed Authority was set

aside and direction for eviction of tenant was

issued.

12. The said order was challenged by the

tenant by filing a writ petition in the High

Court of Uttaranchal under Articles 226 and 227 11

of the Constitution. A Single Judge of the High

Court, by a brief order, allowed the writ

petition, set aside the decision of the

appellate authority and dismissed the

application filed by the landlords. The said

order is challenged by the landlords in the

present proceedings.

13. On November 22, 2004, leave was

granted and final hearing of the appeal was

fixed in the year 2005. The matter, however,

could not be heard. An application for early

hearing was filed by the appellants and on

March 28, 2008, the Bench presided over by

Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India directed the

Registry to place the matter for final hearing

in summer vacation. That is how the matter was

placed before us.

14. We have heard learned advocates for

the parties.

15. The learned counsel for the appellants

strenuously contended that the High Court was

wholly wrong in interfering with findings of 12

fact recorded by the appellate Court. According

to the counsel, the High Court was exercising

jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution and it was not open to the Court

to enter into questions of fact or mixed

questions of law and fact. After appreciating

the evidence on record, the appellate Court

held that bona fide requirement of landlords

was proved. A finding was recorded that no

greater hardship would be caused to the tenant

if an order of eviction would be passed against

the tenant. The findings were findings of fact

and they ought to have been accepted by a writ

Court as final.

16. The counsel also contended that even

though Kum. Faraha was selected and appointed

in Judiciary, bona fide requirement of Matloob

Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6, who had

retired in 1993 remained for running business

in readymade garments. A clear cut and

unequivocal finding was recorded by the

appellate authority that the said requirement 13

was proved. Not only the High Court had no

jurisdiction to interfere with the said

finding, in fact, the said finding has not been

disturbed. Once the finding in favour of the

landlords had been recorded, it could not be

said that the requirement of the landlords was

not bona fide.

17. As to comparative hardship, the

appellate authority expressly stated that no

attempt whatsoever had been made by the tenant

from which it can be shown that there was an

attempt by him to get alternative accommodation

but he could not get such accommodation. On the

contrary, according to the counsel, the tenant

had left Dehradun and settled down in Delhi.

18. The counsel also submitted that

crucial date for the purpose of deciding

requirement of the landlord is the date of

institution of suit or proceeding and not the

date when final order is passed by a Court or

Authority. In the present case, the date on

which an application under Section 21 of the 14

Act was filed, the landlords needed the shop

for bona fide requirement. Subsequent events

could not deprive them from getting possession

of the suit shop.

19. On all these grounds, it was submitted

that the order passed by the High Court

deserves to be set aside by restoring the order

of the appellant authority and by confirming

the order of possession granted by the

Additional District Judge, Dehradun.

20. The learned counsel for the tenant, on

the other hand, supported the order passed by

the High Court. He submitted that when the

Prescribed Authority dismissed the application

filed by the landlords and the appellate

authority allowed such application, the High

Court was fully justified in entering into the

findings recorded by the appellate authority.

21. He also submitted that subsequent

events were required to be considered. In view

of the fact that Kum. Farah was selected by the

Public Service Commission and was appointed as 15

a Judge, the so called requirement as a

practising advocate and having an office for

that purpose did not survive. The said

development was a relevant consideration and

the High Court was right in setting aside the

order of eviction. Even otherwise, as per

settled law, the need and necessity of the

landlord for getting possession of properly

must continue to remain till the proceedings

are finalized.

22. The trail Court, submitted the learned

counsel, was right in observing that neither

Matloob Ahmad nor Kum. Faraha had experience in

business in readymade garments and in absence

of expertise, no order of eviction could be

passed against the tenant. According to the

counsel, the tenant is in possession of the

shop since last fifty years. It was true that

the tenant had shifted from Dehradun to Delhi

but it was really of a temporary nature. In no

way, it would suggest that the tenant was not

in need of the shop or that he had permanently 16

shifted to any other place. In fact, the

business is going on in the suit-shop.

23. The counsel also submitted that the

Prescribed Authority was right in observing

that the landlords belonged to high strata of

society having business in timber wood. Even in

early 1990s, they were having facilities of

car, scooter, telephone, etc. Obviously, they

would not do business in readymade garments.

24. The counsel urged that taking into

consideration all these facts, the Prescribed

Authority refused to make an order of eviction

against the tenant. The said finding ought not

to have been disturbed by the appellate Court

and the High Court was, therefore, compelled to

interfere with the order passed by the

appellate authority. It was, therefore,

submitted that the appeal deserves to be

dismissed.

25. Having heard learned counsel for the

parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to

be allowed.

17

26. So far as the larger question, namely,

whether subsequent events can be taken into

consideration by an appellate, revisional or

writ Court, we express no opinion in view of

the fact that the appeal can be decided without

entering into the said controversy. We may,

however, note that learned counsel for both the

sides referred to leading decisions of this

Court. In some of the cases, the Court held

that the crucial date for deciding requirement

of a landlord is the date of institution of

suit/proceeding. In other cases, however, a

contrary view has been taken. There is thus a

cleavage of opinion on that vexed issue. We

leave the matter there.

27. On merits, in our judgment, the

submission of the learned counsel for the

appellants is well founded that the Prescribed

Authority was wrong in dismissing the

application filed by the landlords. We had

already observed that the Prescribed Authority

negatived the contention of the tenant that the 18

application was not maintainable. It,

therefore, entered into the merits of the

matter and decided it against the landlords. It

observed that applicant No.6 hailed from "a

reputed family of Dehradun" and "they had a

very big business of timber wood". It also

noted that applicant No.6 had been enjoying the

facilities of car, scooter, telephone, etc.

28. In our opinion, the grievance voiced

by the learned counsel for the appellants is

well founded that the above grounds and reasons

were irrelevant and extraneous so far as the

requirement of the landlords was concerned. The

authority can undoubtedly decide whether the

need or requirement of landlords was or was not

bona fide. It can record a finding against the

landlords if such requirement is not proved.

But the authority cannot decline the prayer of

the landlords on the ground that they belonged

to upper class society having facilities of

car, etc. Similarly, the Prescribed Authority

was wrong in commenting on the experience of 19

the landlords in business of readymade

garments. Again, the authority went wrong in

stating that if the applicants wanted to do

business in readymade garments, they needed `an

office' and place of godown for preparation of

readymade garments to be exported.

29. The complaint of the learned counsel

for the landlords is that the authority was

wholly wrong in holding that for doing business

in readymade garments, there must be need and

necessity of office or place for preparation of

garments or godown. It was equally wrong in

coming to the conclusion that for such business

`technical education' was necessary. The

appellant authority, therefore, rightly set

aside the said finding describing the ground

weighed with the authority as `flimsy'.

30. The counsel is also right in

submitting that admittedly, Matloob Ahmad had

retired from service. Even if the tenant was

right in submitting that the landlords belonged

to a higher strata of society, it did not mean 20

that all throughout his life after retirement,

Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6 should

not do any work. If he wanted to get himself

engaged in doing some business, it could not be

held that he would not be entitled to

possession of property for doing business since

he was rich and even without doing any

business, he could maintain himself. A finding

as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade

business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly

recorded by the appellant authority. The said

finding was a finding of fact. Neither it could

have been interfered with, nor it has been set

aside by the writ court. In view of the above

position, the High Court was wrong in allowing

the writ petition.

31. As observed earlier, statutory remedy

has been provided under the Act against an

order passed by the Prescribed Authority by

filing an appeal before the District Judge

(Section 22). There is no further remedy under

the Act. The tenant, in the circumstances, 21

approached the High Court by filing a petition

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

32. Though powers of a High Court under

Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and

extensive over all Courts and Tribunals

throughout the territories in relation to which

it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be

exercised within the limits of law. The power

is supervisory in nature. The High Court does

not act as a Court of Appeal or a Court of

Error. It can neither review nor reappreciate,

nor reweigh the evidence upon which

determination of a subordinate Court or

inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to

correct errors of fact or even of law and to

substitute its own decision for that of the

inferior Court or Tribunal. The powers are

required to be exercised most sparingly and

only in appropriate cases in order to keep the

subordinate Courts and inferior Tribunals

within the limits of law.

22

33. In Chundavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v.

Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, this Court

stated;

"Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities".

34. Even prior to Chundavarkar, in

Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta

& Anr., (1975) 1 SCC 858, dealing with

supervisory power of a High Court under Article

227 of the Constitution, Bhagwati, J. (as His

Lordship then was) stated;

"If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the 23

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts".

(emphasis supplied)

35. In State of Maharashtra v. Milind,

(2001) 1 SCC 4, this Court observed;

"The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, while exercising the power of judicial review against an order of inferior Tribunal being supervisory and not appellate, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the conclusion of the Tribunal, only when it records a finding that the inferior Tribunal's conclusion is based upon exclusion of some admissible evidence or consideration of some inadmissible evidence or the inferior Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all or that the finding is such, which no reasonable man could arrive at, on the materials on record".

36. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6

SCC 641, this Court reiterated;

24

"Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised `as the cloak of an appeal in disguise'." (emphasis supplied) 25

37. While dealing with petitions under the

present statute, the above principles have been

followed.

38. In Om Prakash & Ors. v. Sunhari Devi

(Smt.) & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 397, a similar

question came up for consideration before this

Court. There an application under Section 21

((1)(a) of the present Act was filed by the

landlords against the tenants on the ground

that they bona fide required the tenanted

premises, a shop, for their own use. The

Prescribed Authority dismissed the eviction

petition holding that the applicants'

requirement was not bona fide and greater

hardship would be caused to the tenants than to

the landlords. The landlords filed an appeal

and the appellate authority allowed the same

holding that the requirement of the landlords

was genuine and bona fide. It also recorded a 26

finding in favour of the landlords on the

question of comparative hardship.

39. The High Court of Allahabad in a

petition by the tenants, set aside the finding

recorded by the appellate authority and

dismissed the eviction application. Aggrieved

landlords approached this Court.

40. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the

order passed by the High Court and restoring

that of the appellate authority, this Court

held that even in second appeal, the High Court

should restrict itself to question of law. It

was all the more so, in a writ petition. When

findings were recorded by the appellate

authority, the High Court was wrong in

interfering with the said findings and in

setting aside the order of eviction, observed

this Court.

41. In Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash,

(2004) 3 SCC 682, again this Court while

interpreting the provisions of the Act in

question, held that the High Court, while 27

exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution, cannot act like an appellate

Court and re-appreciate or revaluate the

evidence while exercising certiorari or

supervisory jurisdiction. Only a patent error

which did not require establishment by lengthy

and complicated arguments or by long drawn

process of reasoning is amenable to certiorari

jurisdiction. If two opinions were reasonably

possible, the finding arrived at one way or the

other by the appellate authority, cannot be

disturbed.

42. In Mst. Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul

Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1979) 1 SCC

273, this Court held that rent control laws

must be construed reasonably. They should be

interpreted in such a way as to achieve the

object of enabling landlord to evict tenant

where the statute grants such right in favour

of landlord.

43. Dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir

Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, the 28

Court observed that `reasonable requirement'

undoubtedly postulates that there must be an

element of `need' as opposed to a mere `desire'

or `wish'. The distinction between `desire' and

`need' should doubtless be kept in mind. That

does not, however, mean that even a genuine

need should be treated as nothing more than a

desire or wish. The connotation `need' or the

word `requirement' should not be artificially

expanded nor its language so unduly stretched

or strained as to make it impossible or

extremely difficult for the landlord to get a

decree for eviction. Such construction would

defeat the very purpose of the Act, which

affords facility of eviction of the tenant to

the landlord on certain specified grounds.

44. In the case on hand, a finding had

been recorded by the appellate authority that

requirement of the landlords for doing business

by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6 was

bona fide and genuine. Thus, the requirement of

the landlords was established. The said finding 29

stands today. The High Court by a cryptic

order, without disturbing the said finding

which was based on appreciation of evidence,

set aside the order of eviction against the

tenant, inter alia, observing that Matloob

Ahmad was a `retired person' and was getting

pension and was living in his village at a

distance of five kilometers from Dehradun. It

is no doubt true that the tenancy was created

before about fifty years but that should not be

a ground for depriving the landlord for doing

business if the requirement of the landlord is

bona fide and reasonable.

45. The learned counsel for the landlords

also stated that in May 2001, the order of

eviction was passed by the Additional District

Judge, Dehradun and the appeal was allowed.

When the said order was challenged by the

tenant in the High Court, the High Court asked

the tenant to inform the Court as to when they

would vacate the premises.

30

46. The order passed by the High Court on

August 24, 2001 reads as under;

"Put up on 7-9-2001. On that day the petitioners shall inform this Court as to when they are going to vacate the premises."

47. Finally, however, the petition was

allowed by the same Judge, the order passed by

the appellate authority was set aside and the

application filed by the landlords for

possession of property was dismissed.

48. Regarding comparative hardship,

nothing has been stated by the tenant as to

whether any attempt has been made by him to get

alternative accommodation and he failed to get

such accommodation. In the circumstances, in

our opinion, the appellate authority was right

in observing that there was no evidence to show

that no shop was available to the tenant. It is

quite possible, as noted by the appellate

authority, that the tenant might have to pay

more rent. But that would not preclude the

landlords from getting possession of the suit- 31

shop once they had proved genuine need of the

property.

49. It was also submitted by the learned

counsel for the landlords that the tenant is

not using the suit shop and has shifted to

Delhi. In a counter affidavit filed by Sudhir

Kumar Bajaj in this Court on November 3, 2004,

the deponent has mentioned his address as

resident of 126, Dhamawala, Dehradun "having

temporarily come down to Delhi". In the

affidavit in rejoinder, applicant No.2 stated

that Sudhir Kumar Bajaj is permanently residing

in Delhi since last more than one year. The

rejoinder was filed on 16th November, 2004. It

is further stated that the premises in dispute

is vacant and is locked.

50. In view of the facts and circumstances

in their entirety and on the findings recorded

by the appellant authority, we have no

hesitation in holding that the High Court was

not right in interfering with the order passed 32

by the appellate authority and in dismissing

the application of the landlords. The said

order, therefore, deserves to be set aside and

we do accordingly.

51. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal

is allowed. The order passed by the High Court

is set aside and the order of eviction recorded

by the appellant authority and the Additional

District Judge III on 25th May, 2001 is

restored.

52. The learned counsel for the

tenants, at this stage, prayed for grant of

time to vacate the suit shop stating that the

tenant is doing business in the suit shop and

if he is evicted immediately, enormous hardship

would be caused to him. Prima facie, in our

opinion, the learned counsel for the landlords

is right in submitting that the tenant is not

using the property. But on overall

considerations, we are of the view that ends of 33

justice would be met if we grant time upto

March 31, 2009 on usual undertaking being filed

by the respondents herein. Such undertaking

shall be filed on affidavit within a period of

four weeks from today, a copy of which should

be given to the learned counsel for the

appellants.

53. The appeal is allowed accordingly. On

the facts and in the circumstances of the case,

however, there shall be no order as to costs.

.....................................................................J. (C.K. THAKKER)

NEW DELHI, .....................................................................J. September 11, 2008. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)