Sethuraman vs Rajamanickam
- SCC(2009) 5 SCC 153
- Neutral2009 INSC 363
- SCR[2009] 4 SCR 510
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
An order passed by a Trial Court refusing to call documents and rejecting an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling a witness are interlocutory orders, and therefore revision against those orders is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. A High Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction in relation to such interlocutory orders. Where an accused seeks production of personal documents belonging to the complainant and such production was rejected by the Trial Court, the High Court ought to issue notice to the complainant and afford him a hearing before interfering with the Trial Court's order, so that the complainant may demonstrate that the documents do not exist or that there is no basis for their production, particularly where the complainant has not been cross-examined on those documents.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
"REPORTABLE"
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.486-487 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2688-89 of 2005)
Sethuraman .... Appellant
Versus
Rajamanickam .... Respondent
JUDGMENT
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In these appeals, the common order passed by the Learned Single
Judge of the Madras High Court in three Criminal Revisions, is in
challenge. By the instant order, the Learned Single Judge set aside the
three orders passed by the Trial Court dated 26.7.2004 in Crl.M.P. No.
3057 of 2004 in C.C. No. 216 of 2003 and dated 1.4.2004 in Crl.M.P. Nos.
4184 and 4185 of 2004 in C.C. No. 215 of 2003, and allowed those
Crl.M.Ps. Shortly stated, the appellant herein had filed a criminal complaint 2
under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
to as `Cr.P.C.' for short), complaining therein that a cheque signed by the
respondent and given for returning the amount of Rs.2 lakhs, which was a
loan, was bounced and inspite of the notice given thereafter, the accused
(respondent herein) had failed to return the money. A Trial ensued on the
basis of this complaint and the complainant (appellant herein) was
examined as a first witness for the prosecution on 24.8.2004. He was
cross-examined also. On 20.9.2004, the respondent herein filed
applications under Section 91 Cr.P.C. and Section 311 Cr.P.C., seeking
directions to produce the Bank Pass Books, Income Tax Accounts and the
L.D.S. deposit receipts of the appellant, as also for recalling him for cross-
examination. This was objected to by a Reply dated 24.9.2004. The Court
passed an order on 1.10.2004, rejecting the applications made by the
respondent/accused. The respondent/accused filed Criminal Revisions
before the High Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the High Court, by
the impugned common order, proceeded to allow the same. It is this order,
which has fallen for consideration before us in these appeals.
3. Very strangely, the High Court did not even issue notice to the
appellant/complainant, on the spacious ground that the production of the
documents, which was sought for by the accused, would cause no
prejudice to the appellant/complainant. We fail to understand this logic.
After all, if the documents in possession of the appellant/complainant,
which were his personal documents, sought for by the accused and the 3
production of which was rejected by the Trial Court, and which were
ordered to be produced by the High Court, at least a hearing should have
been given to the appellant/complainant. He could have shown, firstly, that
no such documents existed or that there was no basis for the production of
those documents, particularly, in view of the fact that he was not even
cross-examined in respect of those documents. On this ground, the order
of the High Court would have to be set aside.
4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the
Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application
under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the
revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2)
Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that
the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only
defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that
the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial
Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This
order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the
orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production
of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for
recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case,
under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such
circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional 4
jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would
have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.
.................................................J. [Tarun Chatterjee]
.................................................J. [V.S. Sirpurkar]
New Delhi March 18, 2009 5
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