Seth Jayendrabhai Shantilal Shah And ... vs Sri R K Jain President Bharat Varsiye ...
- AIRAIR 2014 Jhar 75
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a Single Judge of a High Court passes an order on or after the 2002 Amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissing an application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, Section 100A CPC bars any Letters Patent Appeal against that order to the Division Bench, notwithstanding that the substantive order being challenged (such as an order of status quo in an earlier appeal) may have been passed prior to the 2002 Amendment. The temporal applicability of the bar in Section 100A is determined by the date on which the Single Judge's order dismissing the application was passed, not the date of the original order sought to be enforced. The effect of the 2002 Amendment introducing Section 100A CPC is to prohibit all further appeals from a Single Judge's decision to the Division Bench when that decision is itself an appeal or is heard in appellate jurisdiction, with the phrase "no further appeal shall lie" operating as a specific statutory exclusion that overrides the saving clause in Section 104(1) CPC and prevents recourse to Letters Patent appeals in such circumstances.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
----- Seth Jayendrabhai Shantilal Shah & Ors. Appellants Versus
Sri R.K.Jain & Ors. Respondents -----
For the Appellants : Mr.R.N.Sahay For the Respondents : ----- ----
CORAM HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
CAV on 27th January, 2014 Pronounced on 30th,January,2014
-----
R.Banumathi,C.J. This L.P.A is preferred against the order dated
27.8.2012
dismissing the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A
C.P.C read with Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for
violation of order dated 31.10.1991 passed in F.A No.145/1990(R).
2. The order dated 31.10.1991 was passed in F.A
No.145/1990(R), in which the suit land appertains to Khata No.25, Plot
No.27 of Mauja Parasnath Hill. When the first appeals were pending,
the appellants filed M.J.C No.349/1996(R) for alleged violation of the
interim order passed and for punishing the Opposite parties under
Order XXXIX Rule 2A C.P.C. Learned Single Judge dismissed the
application finding that there is no sufficient ground to proceed and
take action against the Opposite parties either under the provisions of
Rule 2A Order XXXIX CPC or under the provisions of Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
3. The case of the appellant is that the Opposite Parties have
violated the court order dated 31.10.1991 and 28.9.1992 and are liable 2
for contempt of court for violation of the order of temporary injunction
and also the order directing to maintain status quo. In extenso, the
learned Single Judge has referred to the facts of the case and therefore,
it is not necessary to narrate the entire fact. Suffice to note that F.A
No.145/1990(R) along with other connected First Appeals was disposed
of. Letters Patent Appeals arising therefrom, being L.P.A
No.332/1997(R) with L.P.A Nos.333, 334,335, 336 and 346 of 1997(R)
were also disposed of and the Special Leave Petition filed by the
petitioners and others, being S.L.P (Civil) Nos.25572-25576 of 2004 and
the counter Special Leave Petition by one Ratnesh Kumar Jain & Ano.,
being S.L.P (Civil) No.2818-2819 of 2005, are shown to be pending in
the Apex Court as per updated information dated 1st August, 2012,
obtained from the official website of the Supreme Court of India.
4. When the Letters Patent Appeal came up for admission, the
Court had raised query regarding maintainability of the appeal. Heard
the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants on the
question of maintainability.
5. It was submitted that the order passed by the learned
Single Judge in MJC No.349/1996(R) was passed in exercise of the
original jurisdiction and therefore, L.P.A is maintainable. It was further
submitted that as against the order passed under Order XXXIX Rule
2A, Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C provides for appeal. It was also
submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 104 C.P.C saves the Letters
Patent and Letters Patent Appeal may be availed of in relation to an
order passed by a court. The main contention of the appellants is that
by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 104 C.P.C, appeals provided for
under statute including Letters Patent are saved and therefore, an
appeal under Letters Patent is maintainable in relation to the order
passed by the Single Judge under Order XXXIX Rule 2A C.P.C. 3
6. The short point falling for consideration is whether as
against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in MJC
No.349/1996R, dismissing the application filed under Order XXXIX
Rule 2A CPC, L.P.A is maintainable?
7. MJC No.349/1996(R) was filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A
CPC for the alleged violation of the order of status quo dated
31.10.1991 and 28.9.1992 passed in F.A No.145/1990(R) and other
appeals. Learned Single Judge held that there is no sufficient ground to
proceed and take action against the Opposite Parties either under the
provisions of Rule 2A of Order XXXIX CPC or under the provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. As against the order passed under
Order XXXIX Rule 2A, under Order XLIII Rule 1(r), the appeal is
maintainable. Section 100A C.P.C as substituted by the Amendment
Act of 2002 in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against
the decree and judgment or order of Single Judge to the Division Bench,
notwithstanding anything contained in Letters Patent. Section 100A
C.P.C reads as under:-
"100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge."
8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that
notwithstanding Section 100A C.P.C as inserted by the Amendment Act
2002, Section 104(1) provides for an appeal from the original order.
Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that sub-section (1) of
Section 104 C.P.C saves the Letters Patent Appeal and Section 100A
and Section 104(2) C.P.C cannot be read to create a bar as regards the
maintainability of the appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. In 4
support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellants relied
upon the decision rendered in the case of P.S.Sathappan (Dead) By
LRS. Vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. [(2004) 11 SCC 672].
9. The question in the above decision before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was as to whether a Letters Patent Appeal is
maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge of the High
Court sitting in an appellate jurisdiction (prior to Amendment of Section
100A C.P.C by C.P.C Amendment Act 22 of 2002). In the said case,
validity of the court auction for realization of the decretal amount was
challenged and the same was dismissed by the Single Judge of the
Madras High Court. A Letters Patent Appeal in terms of clause 15 of the
Letters Patent of the Madras High Court was filed by the appellant. Full
Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal,
holding that in terms of Section 104(2) C.P.C, an appeal against an
order passed by the appellate court under Order XLIII Rule 1(j) read
with Section 104 was not maintainable. A certificate of fitness in terms
of Article 133 of the Constitution was granted by the Full Bench. When
the matter was placed before a Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme
Court, it noticed a conflict of opinion between decisions of two-Judge
Benches of the Supreme Court in New Kenilworth Hotel, (1997) 3 SCC
462 and Resham Singh Pyara Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 49, and referred the
matter to a larger Bench. Since the order passed by the Single Judge
was prior to C.P.C Amendment 2002, majority of Hon'ble Supreme
Court took the view that on facts and for the time being in force, Section
104 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C confers additional powers of
appeal to a larger Bench within the High Court. Section 104(2) C.P.C
only bars appeals against the orders passed in appeal under that
Section and thus, Section 104(2) C.P.C does not bar appeals permitted
by any law in force.
5
10. The above decision is not applicable to the case on hand,
since the order in M.J.C No.349/1996(R) was passed by the learned
Single Judge on 27.8.2012, the impugned order is governed by Section
100A after C.P.C Amendment 2002.
11. Even though the said decision in P.S.Sathappan's case
arose out of a case prior to C.P.C Amendment Act 2002, Hon'ble
Supreme Court considered the effect of Section 100A as amended in
2002 and referring Section 100A (after 2002), Hon'ble Supreme Court
held as under:-
"From Section 100A CPC, as inserted in 1976, it can be seen that when the Legislature wanted to exclude a letters patent appeal it specifically did so. Again from Section 100A, as amended in 2002, it can be seen that the Legislature has provided for a specific exclusion. It must be stated that now by virtue of Section 100A no letters patent appeal would be maintainable in the facts of the present case. However, it is an admitted position that the law which would prevail would be the law at the relevant time. At the relevant time neither Section 100A nor Section 104(2) barred a letters patent appeal. The words used in Section 100A are not by way of abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002 a specific exclusion is provided as the Legislature knew that in the absence of such words a letters patent appeal would not be barred. The Legislature was aware that it had incorporated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and incorporated Section 4 CPC. Thus now a specific exclusion was provided.
Therefore, on facts, the appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Madras High Court is an appeal provided by a law for the time being in force. Therefore, the finality contemplated by Section 104(2) did not attach to an appeal passed under such law."
12. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that under
Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C, appeal is maintainable against the order
passed dismissing the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A
CPC and declining to entertain the contempt petition.
13. As pointed out earlier, application under Order XXXIX Rule
2A CPC was filed in F.A No.145/1990(R) etc. After CPC amendment
2002, as against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, no further appeal lies to the High
Court.
6
14. The effect of C.P.C Amendment Act 2002 is that where an
appeal from an appellate order or decree is heard and decided by the
Single Judge of the High Court, no further appeal lies to the Division
Bench of the High Court. In Section 100A of the Amendment Act, "no
further appeal shall lie" is of great significance. It clearly means that no
further appeal shall be entertained in respect of the appeal filed after
1.7.2002. In this regard, we may usefully refer the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association,
Tamil Nadu vs. Union of India [AIR 2003 SC 189], which reads as
follows:-
"15. Section 100A deals with two types of cases which are decided by a Single Judge. One is where the Single Judge hears an appeal from an appellate decree or order. The question of there being any further appeal in such a case cannot and should not be contemplated. Where, however, an appeal is filed before the High Court against the decree of a trial court, a question may arise whether any further appeal should be permitted or not. Even at present depending upon the value of the case, the appeal from the original decree is either heard by a Single Judge or by a Division Bench of the High Court. Where the regular first appeal so filed is heard by a Division Bench, the question of there being an intra-Court appeal does not arise. It is only in cases where the value is not substantial that the rules of the High Court may provide for the regular first appeal to be heard by a Single Judge. In Such a case to give a further right of appeal where the amount involved is nominal to a Division Bench will really be increasing the workload unnecessarily. We do not find that any prejudice would be caused to the litigants by not providing for intra-Court appeal, even where the value involved is large. In such a case, the High Court by Rules, can provide that the Division Bench will hear the regular first appeal. No fault can, thus, be found with the amended provision Section 100A."
15. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted even though
the order passed in M.J.C No.349/1996(R) was passed on 27.8.2012,
the order of status quo in F.A No.145/1990(R) was passed on
31.10.1991, which was prior to the Amendment Act 2002 and therefore,
the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. The above contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants does not merit acceptance. Section
100A C.P.C as substituted by the Amendment 2002 will bring the
impugned order within its fold. In the present case, since the 7
impugned order was passed on 27.8.2012, even though the order of
status quo was passed in F.A No.145/1990(R) on 31.10.1991, the
Letters Patent Appeal would be barred in view of 2002 Amendment.
16. By virtue of Section 100A C.P.C, the Legislature has
provided a specific exclusion that no Letter Patent Appeal would be
maintainable and this L.P.A is, thus, dismissed as not maintainable.
(R.Banumathi, C.J)
(Shree Chandrashekhar,J) Dey/AFR 8
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