Senior Intelligence Officer vs Jugal Kishore Samra

Senior Intelligence Officer ... Appellant

Versus

Jugal Kishore Samra ... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

AFTAB ALAM, J.

1. Leave granted

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court dated March 22, 2007 in Crl. R.C. No.300 of 2007 by

which the High Court dismissed the criminal revision filed by the appellant

and affirmed the order of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated December

15, 2006, directing that any interrogation of the respondent may be held only

in the presence of his advocate.

3. The facts and circumstances in which this appeal arises need to be

noticed first. On July 20, 2006, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue

Intelligence (for short "DRI") Hyderabad, raided the premises of M/s Hy-

Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Private Ltd. and found a shortage of 250kgs of

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Dextropropoxyphene Hydrochloride (DPP HCL). DPP HCL is a

manufactured narcotic drug as specified in Government of India's

notification S.O. 826(E), dated November 14, 1985, at Serial no.87.

4. C.K. Bishnoi (accused no.1) and P.V.Satyanarayana Raju (accused

no.2), the Managing Director and the Production Manager, respectively, of

M/s Hy-Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Private Ltd., admitted that the drug was

clandestinely cleared to M/s J. K. Pharma Agencies, New Delhi, of which

the respondent, Jugal Kishore Samra and his brother, Ramesh Kumar Samra

(accused no.3) happen to be the partners. On the next day, i.e., July 21,

2006, a search was carried out at the Cargo Complex of the Indira Gandhi

International Airport, New Delhi, and five drums containing DPP HCL were

discovered. On examination of the cargo it was found that the contraband

was manufactured by M/s Hy-Gro Chemicals Pharmatek Pvt. Ltd. and was

sent to M/s J.K. Pharma Agencies by wrongly declaring the consignment as

5-Amino Salicylic Acid. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence registered

a case against C.K. Bishnoi, P.V.Satyanarayana Raju and Ramesh Kumar

Samra for the offences punishable under sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "NDPS Act").

5. While the statements of accused no.1 and accused no.2 had already

been recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, the DRI officials

summoned the respondent and his brother (accused no.3). According to the

respondent, on November 5, 2006, when he, accompanied by his brother and

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another person arrived at the DRI office in, Hyderabad, at 10:30pm, they

were tortured by the DRI Officials. Unable to withstand the torture, the

respondent suffered a heart attack and was moved to a hospital. The

respondent was discharged on November 7, 2006 and advised complete bed

rest for a month. But he went directly to the DRI Office to enquire about the

whereabouts of his brother. He was kept waiting for 2 days and was also

given threats of third degree methods. On November 9, 2006, en route to the

DRI Office, the respondent developed chest pain and was again hospitalized

till November 11, 2006.

6. In this background, the respondent filed an application for anticipatory

bail under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was

allowed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge by order dated December 1,

2006, on the ground that the respondent was not shown as an accused in

the case and, therefore, the bar under section 37 of the NDPS Act did not

apply to him and further, the medical record filed by the respondent showed

that he had been suffering from heart disease and had already undergone

heart surgery on two occasions.

7. After the grant of anticipatory bail, the respondent filed another

application under section 438(2) of the Cr .P. C. for modification of the

order of anticipatory bail to the extent that the interrogation and examination

of the respondent be conducted in the presence of his advocate and a

cardiologist. The Metropolitan Sessions Judge, by order dated December 15,

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2006, partly allowed the application of the respondent after perusing the

medical record and holding that the presence of an advocate at the time of

interrogation of the respondent by the DRI officials is necessary to ensure

free and fair interrogation.

8. Aggrieved by the order of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated

December 1, 2006, the appellant moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court in

Crl. M.P. No.5772 of 2006 praying for cancellation of the anticipatory bail

granted to the respondent. The High Court found no merit in the petition and

dismissed it by order dated January 31, 2007.

9. Here it may be noted that on the same day, i.e. January 31, 2007,

another bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowed another petition

(Crl. M.P. No.5880 of 2006) filed by the appellant and cancelled the bail

granted to the respondent's brother, Ramesh Samra by the Metropolitan

Sessions Judge on December 19, 2006. Challenging the order of the High

Court, however, Ramesh Kumar Samra, came to this Court in SLP (Crl.)

No.1077/07. The special leave petition was allowed and by order dated

December 10, 2009 this Court set aside the order of the High Court. The bail

of Ramesh Kumar Samra too was, thus, restored.

10. Coming back to the case of the respondent, aggrieved by the order of

the Metropolitan Sessions Judge dated December 15, 2006 directing for the

respondent's interrogation to take place only in presence of his lawyer, the

appellant sought to challenge it in revision before the High Court in Crl. R.

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C. No.300 of 2007. The High Court dismissed the revision petition by order

dated March 22, 2007, upholding the order of the Sessions Judge and

observing as follows:

"9. In the present case, on account of the apprehension of the

respondent, the lower court permitted the Advocate to be

present during the course of interrogation. But the Advocate

was directed not to interfere during the course of interrogation.

The purpose of the respondent requesting the presence of the

Advocate is only on account of the apprehension that the

Investigating Officers are likely to apply third degree methods

like physical assault, etc., therefore, the learned Sessions Judge

passed the impugned order.

10. It is an undisputed fact that application of third degree

method to the accused is prohibited and interrogation of the

accused is a right provided to the Investigating Officer to elicit

certain information regarding the commission of the offence.

Though the Advocate was permitted to be present during the

course of interrogation, he was prevented from interference

during the course of interrogation. When the police do not

resort to apply third degree methods, there cannot be any

problem for them to interrogate the respondent to elicit

necessary information relating to the above crime in the

presence of his Advocate.

11. After considering the above aspects, I am of the view that

the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is in no way

affecting the right of the Investigating Officer to interrogate the

respondent in the presence of his Advocate, therefore, I do not

find any merit in this Revision Case."

11. Now, the matter has been brought to this Court by the appellant in

appeal by grant of leave. At the special leave petition stage, the Court had

made the direction that interrogation of the respondent can be carried out in

accordance with the direction of the High Court. We are, however, informed

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that the respondent has not been interrogated so far and the appellant is

awaiting the order of the Court on his appeal.

12. Mr. K. T. S. Tulsi, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent

stoutly defended the order passed by the Sessions judge and affirmed by the

High Court. He invoked the rights guaranteed under Articles 20(3), 22(1)

and 22(2) of the Constitution of India to justify the respondent's plea that his

interrogation can take place only in presence of his lawyer. In support of the

submission he placed great reliance on a decision by a bench of three judges

of this Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424.

13. Nandini Satpathy, a former Chief Minister of the State of Orissa was

named as one of the accused in a case registered under sections 5 (2) read

with section 5 (1) (d) & (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and

under sections 161, 165 and 120B and 109 of the Penal Code on the

allegation of amassing assets disproportionate to her known and licit sources

of income. For interrogation in connection with that case she was sent a long

questionnaire along with summons to appear before the investigating officer

on the fixed date and time and to answer those questions. She did not appear

before the investigating officer as required by the summons where-upon the

investigating officer filed a complaint against her under section 179 of the

Penal Code. The Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the

offence and issued process against her. Questioning the order of the

magistrate as violative of her right to silence she challenged it first before

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the High Court of Orissa and on being unsuccessful there brought the matter

to this Court.

14. The decision of the Court in the case of Nandini Satpathi was

delivered by Justice Krishna Iyer and it is a fine example of his Lordship's

inimitable polemical style of writing. The boldness of Miranda v. Arizona,

(1966) 384 US 436 as an instance of judicial innovation and positivism was

still quite fresh and taking Miranda as a source of inspiration, Iyer J.,

pondered over issues of Judicial philosophy and speculated about the

frontiers to which he would have liked to expand the constitutional

guarantee under Article 20(3), maintaining, of course, the fine balance

between the rights of the individual and the social obligation "to discover

guilt, wherever hidden, and to fulfill the final tryst of the justice system with

the society.

15. At the beginning of the judgment in paragraph 10, the Court framed

10 issues that arose for consideration, three of which may have some

relevance for our present purpose and those are as follows:

"1. Is a person likely to be accused of crimes i.e. a suspect

accused, entitled to the sanctuary of silence as one 'accused of

any offence'? Is it sufficient that he is a potential-of course, not

distant-candidate for accusation by the police?

3. Does the constitutional shield of silence swing into action

only in court or can it barricade the 'accused' against

incriminating interrogation at the stages of police investigation?

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7. Does 'any person' in Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code

include an accused person or only a witness?"

16. At the end of a lengthy debate, the Court proceeded to answer the

issues in paragraph 57, which is reproduced below:

"57. We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the

accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article

20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as

contended, commencing in court only. In our judgment, the

provisions of Article 20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially

cover the same area, so far as police investigations are

concerned. The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence,

while one investigation or trial is under way, goes beyond that

case and protects the accused in regard to other offences

pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary

disclosure of criminatory matter. We are disposed to read

'compelled testimony' as evidence procured not merely by

physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric

pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity,

overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like-not legal

penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal

to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded as

compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect

of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a

constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a

calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of

pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect,

but sufficiently substantial, applied by the policeman for

obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of

guilt, it becomes 'compelled testimony', violative of Article

20(3)."

17. It may be mentioned here that in holding, "the prohibitive sweep of

Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as

contended, commencing in court only" the decision in Nandini Satpathy

apparently went against two earlier constitution bench decisions of this

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Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, 1969 (2) SCR 461

and Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, 1969 (2) SCR 613.

18. In Nandini Satpathy, the Court proceeded further, and though the

issue neither arose in the facts of the case nor it was one of the issues framed

in paragraph 10 of the judgment, proceeded to dwell upon the need for the

presence of the advocate at the time of interrogation of a person in

connection with a case. In paragraphs 61-65 of the judgment, the Court

made the following observations:

"61. It may not be sufficient merely to state the rules of

jurisprudence in a branch like this. The man who has to work it

is the average police head constable in the Indian countryside.

The man who has to defend himself with the constitutional

shield is the little individual, by and large. The place where

these principles have to have play is the unpleasant police

station, unused to constitutional nuances and habituated to other

strategies. Naturally, practical points which lend themselves to

adoption without much sophistication must be indicated if this

judgment is to have full social relevance. In this perspective we

address ourselves to the further task of concretising guidelines.

62. Right at the beginning we must notice Article 22(1) of the

Constitution, which reads:

No person who is arrested shall be detained in

custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of

the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the

right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal

practitioner of his choice.

The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not be

denied to any person who is arrested. This does not mean that

persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied that

right. The spirit and sense of Article 22(1) is that it is

fundamental to the rule of law that the services of a lawyer shall

be available for consultation to any accused person under

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circumstances of near custodial interrogation. Moreover, the

observance of the right against self-incrimination is best

promoted by conceding to the accused the right to consult a-

legal practitioner of his choice.

63. Lawyer's presence is a constitutional claim in some

circumstances in our country also, and, in the context of Article

20(3), is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right

to silence. The Miranda decision has insisted that if an accused

person asks for lawyer's assistance, at the stage of interrogation,

it shall be granted before commencing or continuing with the

questioning. We think that Article 20(3) and Article 22(1) may,

in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the police to

permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be

present at the time he is examined. Overreaching Article 20(3)

and Section 161(2) will be obviated by this requirement. We do

not lay down that the police must secure the services of a

lawyer. That will lead to `police-station-lawyer' system, an

abuse which breeds other vices. But all that we mean is that if

an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his

side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be

denied, without being exposed to the serious reproof that

involuntary self-crimination secured in secrecy and by coercing

the will, was the project.

64. Not that a lawyer's presence is a panacea for all problems of

involuntary self-crimination, for he cannot supply answers or

whisper hints or otherwise interfere with the course of

questioning except to intercept where intimidatory tactics are

tried, caution his client where incrimination is attempted and

insist on questions and answers being noted where objections

are not otherwise fully appreciated. He cannot harangue the

police but may help his client and complain on his behalf,

although his very presence will ordinarily remove the implicit

menace of a police station.

65. We realize that the presence of a lawyer is asking for the

moon in many cases until a public defender system becomes

ubiquitous. The police need not wait for more than for a

reasonable while for an advocate's arrival. But they must

invariably warn -and record that fact- about the right to silence

against self-incrimination; and where the accused is literate take

his written acknowledgment."

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19. It is on these passages in Nandini Satpathy that Mr. Tulsi heavily

relies and which practically forms the sheet-anchor of his case.

20. The difficulty, however, is that Nandini Satpathy was not followed by

the Court in later decisions. In Poolpandi & Ors v. Superintendent, Central

Excise & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 259, the question before a three judge bench of

this Court was directly whether a person called for interrogation is entitled to

the presence of his lawyer when he is questioned during the investigation

under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Foreign Exchange

Regulation Act, 1973. On behalf of the persons summoned for interrogation,

strong reliance was placed on Nandini Satpathy. The Court rejected the

submission tersely observing in paragraph of 4 of the judgment as follows:

"4. Both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit strongly relied on the

observations in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC

424. We are afraid, in view of two judgments of the

Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v.

State of W.B., (1969) 2 SCR 461, and Illias v. Collector of

Customs, Madras, (1969) 2 SCR 613, the stand of the appellant

cannot be accepted. The learned counsel urged that since

Nandini Satpathy case was decided later, the observations

therein must be given effect to by this Court now. There is no

force in this argument."

21. Further, in paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Court referred to the

Constitution Bench decision in Ramesh Chandra Mehta and observed as

follows:

"6. Clause (3) of Article 20 declares that no person accused of

any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

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It does not refer to the hypothetical person who may in the

future be discovered to have been guilty of some offence. In

Ramesh Chandra Mehta case, the appellant was searched at the

Calcutta Airport and diamonds and jewelleries of substantial

value were found on his person as also currency notes in a

suitcase with him, and in pursuance to a statement made by him

more pearls and jewellery were recovered from different places.

He was charged with offences under the Sea Customs Act.

During the trial, reliance was placed on his confessional

statements made before the Customs authorities, which was

objected to on the ground that the same were inadmissible in

evidence inter alia in view of the provisions of Article 20(3).

While rejecting the objection, the Supreme Court held that in

order that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion

incorporated in Article 20(3) may be claimed by a person, it has

to be established that when he made the statement in question,

he was a person accused of an offence. Pointing out to the

similar provisions of the Sea Customs Act as in the present Act

and referring to the power of a Customs Officer, in an inquiry

in connection with the smuggling of goods, to summon any

person whose attendance he considers necessary to give

evidence or to produce a particular document the Supreme

Court observed thus: (pp.469-70)

"The expression `any person' includes a person

who is suspected or believed to be concerned in the

smuggling of goods. But a person arrested by a Customs

Officer because he is found in possession of smuggled

goods or on suspicion that he is concerned in smuggling

is not when called upon by the Customs Officer to make

a statement or to produce a document or thing, a person

accused of an offence within the meaning of Article

20(3) of the Constitution. The steps taken by the Customs

Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry under

the Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of

goods dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties. The

Customs Officer does not at that stage accuse the person

suspected or infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs

Act with the commission of any offence. His primary

duty is to prevent smuggling and to recover duties of

Customs when collecting evidence in respect of

smuggling against a person suspected of infringing the

provisions of the Sea Customs Act, he is not accusing the

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person of any offence punishable at a trial before a

Magistrate."

The above conclusion was reached after consideration of

several relevant decisions and deep deliberation on the issue,

and cannot be ignored on the strength of certain observations in

the judgment by three learned Judges in Nandini Satpathy case

which is, as will be pointed out hereinafter, clearly

distinguishable."

22. An argument in support of the right of the persons called for

interrogation was advanced on the basis of Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court rejected that submission also observing in paragraph 9 of the

judgment as follows:

"9. Mr. Salve has, next, contended that the appellant is within

his right to insist on the presence of his lawyer on the basis of

Article 21 of the Constitution. He has urged that by way of

ensuring protection to his life and liberty he is entitled to

demand that he shall not be asked any question in the absence

of his lawyer. The argument proceeds to suggest that although

strictly the questioning by the Revenue authorities does not

amount to custodial interrogation, it must be treated as near

custodial interrogation, and if the same is continued for a long

period it may amount to mental third degree. It was submitted

by both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit that the present issue should be

resolved only by applying the 'just, fair and reasonable test', and

Mr. Lalit further added that the point has to be decided in the

light of the facts and circumstances obtaining in a particular

case and a general rule should not be laid down one way or the

other. Mr. Salve urged that when a person is called by the

Customs authorities to their office or to any place away from

his house, and is subjected to intensive interrogation without

the presence of somebody who can aid and advise him, he is

bound to get upset, which by itself amounts to loss of liberty.

Reference was made by the learned counsel to the minority

view in Re Groban, 352 US 330, 1 L Ed 2d 376, declaring that

it violates the protection guaranteed by the Constitution for the

State to compel a person to appear alone before any law

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enforcement officer and give testimony in secret against his

will."

23. Referring to the facts in Re Groban and the view taken in the minority

judgment in the case the decision in Poolpandi observed in paragraph 10 as

follows:

"10.....We do not share the apprehension as expressed above in

the minority judgment in connection with enquiry and

investigation under the Customs Act and other similar statutes

of our country. There is no question of whisking away the

persons concerned in these cases before us for secret

interrogation, and there is no reason for us to impute the motive

of preparing the groundwork of false cases for securing

conviction of innocent persons, to the officers of the state duly

engaged in performing their duty of prevention and detection of

economic crimes and recovering misappropriated money justly

belonging to the public. Reference was also made to the

observation in the judgment in Carlos Garza De Luna, Appt. v.

United States, American Law Reports 3d 969, setting out the

historical background of the right of silence of an accused in a

criminal case. Mr. Salve has relied upon the opinion of

Wisdom, Circuit Judge, that the history of development of the

right of silence is a history of accretions, not of an avulsion and

the line of growth in the course of time discloses the expanding

conception of the right than its restricted application. The Judge

was fair enough to discuss the other point of view espoused by

the great jurists of both sides of Atlantic before expressing his

opinion. In any event we are not concerned with the right of an

accused in a criminal case and the decision is, therefore, not

relevant at all. The facts as emerging from the judgment

indicate that narcotics were thrown from a car carrying the two

persons accused in the case. One of the accused persons

testified at the trial and his counsel in argument to the jury

made adverse comments on the failure of the other accused to

go to the witness box. The first accused was acquitted and the

second accused was convicted. The question of the right of

silence of the accused came up for consideration in this set up.

In the cases before us the persons concerned are not accused

and we do not find any justification for "expanding" the right

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reserved by the Constitution of India in favour of accused

persons to be enjoyed by others."

24. In the end, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue

authorities in the case in which the High Court had directed for interrogation

to take place in presence of the advocate and dismissed all the other appeals

in the batch on behalf of the individuals in whose cases the High Court had

declined to give any such direction.

25. It is seen above that the respondent applied for and got anticipatory

bail on the premise that he was not an accused in the case. There was no

change in his position or status since the grant of bail till he was summoned

to appear before the DRI officers. On the facts of the case, therefore, it is

futile to contend that the respondent is entitled, as of right, to the presence of

his lawyer at the time of his interrogation in connection with the case.

Moreover, the respondent's plea for the presence of his lawyer at the time of

his interrogation clearly appears to be in teeth of the decision in Poolpandi.

Nonetheless, Mr. Tulsi contended that the respondent's right was recognized

by this Court and preserved in Nandini Satpathy and the decision in

Poolpandi has no application to the present case. According to Mr. Tulsi, the

respondent is summoned for interrogation in connection with a case

registered under the NDPS Act, which Mr. Tulsi called a "regular criminal"

case, while Poolpandi was a case under the Customs Act and so were the

two cases before the constitution bench in Ramesh Chandra Mehta and in

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Illias that formed the basis of the decision in Poolpandi. In our view, the

distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Tulsi is illusory and non-existent. The

decision in Poolpandi was in cases under the Customs Act, 1962 and the

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Both these Acts have stringent

provisions regarding search, seizure and arrest and some of the offences

under each of these two Acts carry a punishment of imprisonment up to 7

years. We, therefore, fail to see, how a case registered under NDPS Act can

be said to be a "regular criminal" case and the cases under the Customs Act

and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, not as criminal cases.

26. In view of the clear and direct decision in Poolpandi, we find the

order of the High Court, affirming the direction given by the Sessions Judge

clearly unsustainable.

27. We may, however, at this stage refer to another decision of this Court

in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416. In this case, the

Court, extensively considered the issues of arrest or detention in the

backdrop of Articles 21, 22 and 32 of the Constitution and made a number

of directions to be followed as preventive measures in all cases of arrest or

detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf. The direction at serial

number 10 in paragraph 35 is as follows:

"(10). The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during

interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation."

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28. Strictly speaking the aforesaid direction does not apply to the case of

the respondent, because he being on bail cannot be described as an arrestee.

But, it is stated on behalf of the respondent that he suffers from heart disease

and on going to the DRI office, in pursuance to the summons issued by the

authorities, he had suffered a heart attack. It is also alleged that his brother

was subjected to torture and the respondent himself was threatened with

third degree methods. The medical condition of the respondent was accepted

by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and that forms one of the grounds for

grant of anticipatory bail to him. Taking a cue, therefore, from the direction

made in DK Basu and having regard to the special facts and circumstances

of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the interrogation of the

respondent may be held within the sight of his advocate or any other person

duly authorized by him. The advocate or the person authorized by the

respondent may watch the proceedings from a distance or from beyond a

glass partition but he will not be within the hearing distance and it will not

be open to the respondent to have consultations with him in course of the

interrogation.

29. The order passed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and affirmed by

the High Court is substituted by the aforesaid directions made by us.

30. Before closing the record of the case, we may state that arguments

were advanced before us, when does a person called for interrogation in

connection with a case ceases to be a mere provider of relevant information

18

or a witness and becomes an accused entitled to the Constitutional

protections. Arguments were also addressed on Article 20(3), 22(1) and

22(2) and section 161 of the Cr.P.C. But, in the facts of the case we see no

reason to go into those questions and we are satisfied that the present case is

fully covered by the three judge bench decision of this Court in Poolpandi.

31. In the result, the orders passed by the High Court and the

Metropolitan Session Judge are set aside and the appeal is allowed to the

extent indicated above.

.........................................J

(AFTAB ALAM)

.........................................J

(R.M. LODHA)

New Delhi,

July 5, 2011.