Sardar Meena vs The State Of Rajasthan
- SCC(2022) 13 SCC 282
- Neutral2022 INSC 220
- SCR[2022] 2 SCR 114
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. Under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, the State Government may suspend a member of a Panchayati Raj Institution on either of two distinct grounds: (a) against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-section (1) of that Section; or (b) against whom criminal proceedings regarding an offence involving moral turpitude are pending trial in court. These are independent and disjunctive bases for suspension, and reliance on one does not require reliance on the other. 2. Where the State Government purports to suspend a Panchayati Raj member under Section 38(4) on the basis of an enquiry initiated under Section 38(1), the criminal proceedings that may have prompted the enquiry are not themselves material to determining the conduct of the member in that enquiry. Instead, the determination must rest on material presented against the member in the enquiry proceedings itself, applying the standard of proof appropriate to such disciplinary proceedings—not the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 3. Notwithstanding the power to suspend under Section 38(4), suspension cannot continue indefinitely; where suspension is based on an enquiry under Section 38(1) rather than on the pending of criminal proceedings, the enquiry and suspension proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable and specified timeframe, and the suspension order cannot remain operational beyond that period. 4. In cases where political rivalry is alleged to underlie administrative action against an elected Panchayati Raj member, the process must be guarded against misuse, and a court may impose safeguards—such as timebound completion of proceedings—notwithstanding the absence of service jurisprudence protections applicable to other government employees, because restoration of the office and period of service is not possible even after vindication.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1558/2022 [@ SLP [C] NO.16820/2021]
SARDAR MEENA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. An FIR was registered on 12.05.2021 by the
complainant Ravi Kumar Meena against the appellant who
is a Sarpanch of Gola ka Bas alleging that the said
Sarpanch along with 8-10 other associates, with the
intention of committing the offence of robbery, loot
and murder came on a vehicle in the night armed with
weapons. They committed offence of house trespass and
with intention to cause fatal injury even started
indiscriminate firing. This has allegedly caused
injuries on several parts of the body of the
complainant. On the registration of the FIR, the police
started investigation and took the appellant into
custody. The endeavour of the appellant to procure bail
from the trial Court did not succeed but ultimately the Signature Not Verified High Court granted bail. The charge sheet is stated to Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2022.02.26 13:27:53 IST Reason: have been filed post investigation and is awaiting the
application of the mind by the trial Court concerned on
whether there is sufficient material to frame charges. 2
3. The aforesaid proceedings resulted in the
Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Rajgarh seeking
information about the FIR and further materials.
Successive reports were sent by the police. The
Development Officer wrote a letter on 24.05.2021 to the
Chief Executive Officer, District Parishad, Alwar
intimating the latest factual scenario. He in turn
shared the findings of his enquiry along with factual
reports received from the Police Station, Tahla with
the Governing Secretary and Commissioner, Rural
Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Government
of Rajasthan on 24.05.2021. A preliminary enquiry was
initiated under Section 38(1) of the Rajasthan
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 read with Rule 22(2) of the
Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 and a charge sheet
was issued on 16.06.2021. The appellant was suspended
on 16.06.2021 pending the enquiry.
4. The submission of learned counsel for the
appellant in substance is that this is an endeavour by
the opponent who lost the elections to the appellant as
the complainant is the son of this opponent. He also
seeks to rely on the bail order to show that there was
no case found out against the appellant. We may note
that the learned counsel for the respondent, on the
other hand, has referred to the order of the trial
Court refusing bail. We have dealt with this aspect at 3
the inception because we do believe that this line of
submission from either side is really not germane to
the controversy in question. We may add that the grant
of bail is only as a result of investigations being
complete and if we take the bail order as a reason for
no prima facie case, it would put the law on its head
more so, as we have been emphasizing that there is no
reason to keep people in custody once investigation is
complete unless there are heinous offences and
propensity of the accused to indulge in further crime
or influence witnesses.
5. We now come to the meat of the matter which is
Section 38 which refers to the removal and suspension.
We reproduce the relevant portion as under:
“38. Removal and Suspension.(1) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him and opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who-
(a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or
(b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The State Government may suspend any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson 4
of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-sec.(1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offense involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension.”
6. It is respondents’ own case that they had made
their preliminary inquiry not solely based on the
police report (as set out in the counter affidavit) and
found out a prima facie case of “disgraceful conduct”.
7. The State Government has power to suspend a
person in terms of Clause (4) of Section 38. The said
provision has two limbs: a) against whom an inquiry had
been initiated under Sub-Section (1) and; b) or against
whom criminal proceedings in regard to an offence
involving moral turpitude is pending trial in the Court
of law.
8. It is the say of the respondent that the action
is being taken against appellant under the first part
of the said provision.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to
contend that a reading of the order of suspension dated
16.06.2021 only refers to the initiation of the
criminal proceedings in pursuance to the FIR but then
on a bare reading of it, it does show that what is 5
attributed for suspension is a conduct in terms of
Clause (1). We may add that the suspension order
cannot be said to be the most happily worded one. It
is in these circumstances that we find that the ratio
of the judgment in Ajit Singh & Anr. v. Financial
Commissioner and Secretary to Government and Anr.1 -
would not apply as in that case, the formation of
opinion of the Deputy Commissioner was found to be
absent.
10. We do recognize an aspect of the submission of
the learned counsel for the appellant that in cases of
political rivalry, the process should not be permitted
to be misused, more so, as the principles of service
jurisprudence would not apply, as there is no question
of restitution to the aggrieved party post
determination of his conduct as the period for which
the Sarpanch had to act, will not be restored to him.
It is this submission which has weighed with us in
considering what would be the appropriate direction to
be passed in the present case.
11. We, at the cost of repetition, emphasize that
the own stand of the respondent is that the action is
based on the enquiry held by the concerned officer in
pursuance to the FIR. The sequiter would be that the
proceedings in the criminal case would not weigh at
1(2009) 16 SCC 308 6
this stage in determining the conduct of the appellant
but would be dependent on the material presented before
the competent authority against the appellant. That
being the position, the suspension can also not
continue in an ad infinitum manner, more so, when it
has not to await any criminal proceedings.
12. We thus are of the view that it is necessary to
bring an end to the proceedings initiated under Section
38(1) of the said Act at the earliest and it is stated
that the pleadings are complete. We are thus, of the
view that the respondent should conclude the
proceedings on or before 30th April, 2022 and it will be
the bounden duty of the appellant to cooperate with
those proceedings so as not to delay the same. The
result would be that the suspension order would
continue to be operational till 30th April, 2022 alone.
13. Needless to say that it will be for the
respondent(s) to establish the charge against the
appellant de hors the registration of the FIR on the
principles of such proceedings and not on the
principles of criminal proceedings of proof beyond
reasonable doubts.
7
14. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms
leaving parties to bear their own costs.
…………………………………………...J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
…………………………………………...J. [M.M. SUNDRESH]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 22, 2022.
8
ITEM NO.8 COURT NO.6 SECTION XV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16820/2021
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 13-09-2021 in DBSAW No. 633/2021 passed by the High Court Of Judicature For Rajasthan At Jaipur)
SARDAR MEENA Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 22-02-2022 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shekhar Prit Jha, AOR Mr. Sunil Kr. Jain, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Amitabh Kumar Chaubey, AAG Mr. Ketan Paul, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the reportable signed order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(ASHA SUNDRIYAL) (POONAM VAID) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed reportable order is placed on the file]
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