Sanjay Kumar Sharma vs State Of Bihar

2026 INSC 223 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No………of 2026 [@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 15378 of 2024] Sanjay Kumar Sharma ...Appellant Versus

State of Bihar & Ors. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Leave granted.

2. Overzealous investigation is as fatal to prosecution as

are the lethargic and the tardy. Framing a case on public

perceptions and personal predilections ends up in a mess,

often putting to peril an innocent and always letting free the

perpetrator. Here, we have a case of gruesome death of a

couple when their house was gutted in a fire, with the son

and daughter-in-law accused of murder. The entire case is

founded on motive; the ill-will the son harbored against the

father for not having given him his due share in the ancestral Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH property. The entire village was against the son and the Date: 2026.03.11 16:04:11 IST Reason:

mishap ended in an investigation where truth was sacrificed

Page 1 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 at the altar of perceived vengeance, ably assisted by the

Investigating Officer’s selective but careless pursuits,

derailing the entire prosecution.

3. On the early hours of 23.11.2016, a shanty in which a

lawyer and his wife were residing was gutted in a fire,

killing the old man immediately and his wife after two days

in a hospital at Patna. It was alleged that the younger son and

daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous enmity

arising from land disputes, torched the hut with the intention

to murder the parents. In defense, as is permissible,

inconsistent stances were taken; of the neighbour, who was

managing the properties of the deceased, and the elder son

having colluded to murder the couple and an accidental

fire, by reason of the cooking gas cylinder bursting. The

Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court

acquitted him. We are faced with the divergent findings of

the Trial Court and the High Court; that of the High Court by

its order of acquittal having fortified the presumption of

innocence available to the accused.

4. Sri Smarhar Singh, Advocate-on-Record, appearing

for the petitioner, the elder son of the deceased, argued that

Page 2 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 the High Court has completely lost sight of the evidence in

the case and entered an acquittal totally ignoring the dying

declarations. In addition to the recorded dying declarations

as coming out from the First Information Statement (FIS) and

that recorded by PW8, a Block Development Officer (BDO),

PWs 1 to 3, 5 and 6 also spoke of the statement made by one

of the deceased pinning the dastardly act of setting ablaze

the hut and murdering the parents on the accused. There

was sufficient evidence to prove the motive, which together

with the dying declarations ought to have persuaded the

High Court to affirm the conviction ordered by the Trial

Court. The Doctor who carried out the post-mortem spoke

only of 60% burns and confirmed the mental status of the

deceased, who spoke about the cause of her death and that

of her husband. A number of decisions are placed before us

to put forth the contention that a dying declaration can be

solely relied on to enter a conviction. In the present case,

there was sufficient corroboration from the medical

evidence, the motive proved and the testimony of witnesses

who reached the crime spot immediately afterwards. The

High Court ought to have ensured that the parricide was not

Page 3 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 left unavenged, when egregiously the accused were

acquitted without a proper appreciation of the evidence.

5. Sri Amanullah, learned Counsel appearing for the

State sought to uphold the conviction of the Trial Court and

reverse the order of acquittal especially pointing out the

dastardly crime. The testimonies of the witnesses, the dying

declaration and the motive proved ought to have convinced

the High Court about the culpability of the accused is the

contention.

6. Sri Vipin Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the

accused pointed out the lapses in the investigation and the

concerted effort to somehow punish the accused, by

manufacturing evidence not only in the form of inconsistent

dying declarations but also by way of interested testimony

of the witnesses. There was a clear pick and choose

employed in bringing witnesses to the trial, all interested

and by their testimony validating the defense of a cooked-

up prosecution story. The learned counsel for the accused

also urged the laxity with which the Trial Court considered

the matter. None of the incriminating circumstances were

put to the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal

Page 4 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 Procedure, 19731 and the defense set up was given a

complete go by. The Trial Court proceeded on merely

surmises and conjectures without looking into the relevant

aspects in the testimony of the witnesses, which would

validate the defense of the accused, either of a motivated

accusation having been levelled or an accidental fire having

occurred, the defense being entitled to take different pleas.

7. In the context of the divergent findings and the

peculiar circumstance of a son (A1) and daughter-in-law

(A2) being accused of murdering A1’s parents we have

examined the records and the evidence with a hawk’s eye.

Since the learned counsel for the appellant had relied

primarily on the dying declarations, with reference to

various decisions we will have to first look at the decisions

placed before us. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra2 was a

Constitution Bench decision examining a reference based

on two conflicting decisions. The conflict was insofar as the

certification of the doctor regarding the condition of the

patient who makes the dying declaration. While one of the

decisions held that the certification should be to the effect

1 For brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’ 2 (2002) 6 SCC 710

Page 5 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 that the person making that declaration is in a fit state of

mind, another coordinate Bench held that if the materials on

record indicate the deceased to be fully conscious, the

declaration made immediately prior to death cannot be

ignored, merely for reason of the absence of a certification

by a doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to

make such a declaration. The Constitution Bench without

relying on the moral premise that ‘no man would like to meet

his maker with a lie in his mouth’, based itself on more

practical grounds. Their Lordships relied on the juristic

theory of such declaration being made in extremity, at the

time of imminent death, when every hope in life is gone,

every motive to falsehood is silenced and the only

inducement is the desire to speak truth. However, it was

observed that great caution has to be exercised in

considering the weight to be given to this species of

evidence on account of existence of many circumstances

which may affect the truthfulness and correctness of a

statement made, the author of which cannot be cross-

examined. There is always the possibility of tutoring or

prompting or a product of imagination, which the Court

Page 6 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 should be satisfied, does not exist. The Court also should be

satisfied as to the situation the injured is placed in to take

stock of the incident and identify the assailant as also the

fitness of mind & body to subsequently speak about it.

Normally, Courts look for medical evidence to assess the

mental condition of the deceased while making a dying

declaration, but it is not a rigid rule. Where, from the

attendant circumstances, as spoken of by the witnesses and

brought out by valid evidence if the Court is able to satisfy

itself that the declaration was made in a fit and conscious

state, then a contrary medical opinion cannot prevail and

even its total absence would be inconsequential. The

declaration made by a three Judge Bench that in the

absence of medical certification that the injured was in a fit

state of mind, it would be risky to accept the subjective

satisfaction of a Magistrate as to the state of mind was held

to be too broadly stated and not the correct enunciation of

law; deprecated as a hyper-technical view especially in that

case where there was available, certification of the doctor to

the effect that the patient was conscious, but without the

injured being expressly stated to be in a fit state of mind.

Page 7 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024

8. The law as elaborated in the Constitution Bench

decision would be sufficient to evaluate the dying

declaration in the present case. However, on the insistence

made by the appellant, who had lost both his parents in a

fire, an alleged murder which the Trial Court found

established and the High Court reversed on reasonable

doubt expressed, we would look at the other decisions also.

9. Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab3 was a case

of bride-burning with multiple dying declarations, the first

exonerating the accused, and then more, in one voice

implicating them. The first dying declaration recorded by a

police officer was in the presence of the mother-in-law,

which was resiled from in the declaration recorded by the

Executive Magistrate after two days. The earlier statement

was stated to be due to a threat that she would not be taken

to the hospital unless she spoke of an accidental fire. This

was repeated in the subsequent oral dying declarations, to

her uncle, and a Sub-Inspector which were believed by this

Court.

3 (2008) 4 SCC 265

Page 8 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024

10. Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi4 was a murder

by a lady and her son of the second wife and two children.

The conviction was on the sole basis of the dying declaration

made by the stepdaughter who was admitted to the hospital

with grievous injuries in the nature of stab wounds. On an

analysis of various decisions of this Court, the principles

were encapsulated in paragraph 22 which reads as under:

“22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that:

(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court.

(ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.

(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.

(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.

The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

4 (2010) 9 SCC 1

Page 9 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024

(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction.

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.

(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.

(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.

(x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.”

Therein the dying declaration, which was the FIS was

recorded by an Inspector in the presence of a doctor and

then registered as an FIR, signed also by the doctor

certifying her fit mental state.

Page 10 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024

11. Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh5

was again concerned whether a death by burning in the

marital house, was accidental or homicidal. After the dying

declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate within

two hours of the incident, an affidavit was sworn to by the

deceased exonerating the in-laws. Death having occurred a

month after the incident, the first declaration was held

truthful, which stood corroborated by PW2 and PW3 who

took the deceased with 60% burns to the hospital. The dying

declaration by the injured; burnt at only the lower part of

the body was found to be reliable since it gave a cogent and

possible scenario of the occurrence further corroborated by

stab wounds.

12. Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra6 dealt with four

dying declarations which consistently spoke about the role

played by the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law in

torching the injured. The mere fact that in one of the

statements, two others were implicated was found to be not

sufficient to discard the role of the in-laws. Satish Chandra

5 (2012) 4 SCC 327 6 (2013) 2 SCC 224

Page 11 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 v. State of M.P.7 dealt with a suicide in which the dying

declaration was made as a continuous narrative. It was held

that though this Court had found that statements in the form

of question and answer would be more appropriate, a

credible declaration should not be eschewed on the

grounds of existence of more details or presence of family

members, when there is no indication of tutoring by the

family. Amol Singh v. State of M.P.8 and Lakhan v. State of

M.P.9 clarified that it is not the plurality of dying

declarations that matter, but the reliability, which is the

significant aspect. Any inconsistency would only compel the

Court to examine it carefully, as to whether those are

material or not.

13. From a conspectus of the above decisions, it is clear:

That, a dying declaration is a very important species of

evidence capable of proving the crime proper and

identifying the accused, an exception to hearsay having

been provided by Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.

That, a dying declaration, for reliance should inspire

7 (2014) 6 SCC 723 8 (2008) 5 SCC 468 9 (2010) 8 SCC 514

Page 12 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 confidence in the Court as to its credibility. That, the Court

should be satisfied it is made by the deceased without any

prompting or tutoring or coercion or is a mere figment of

imagination. That, then conviction can be based solely on

the dying declaration and there is no requirement of any

corroboration. That, it can be reduced to writing or can be

oral, as testified by reliable witnesses. That, it can be one or

numerous and if more than one; exculpatory and

inculpatory, it is for the Court to find out which is believable.

That, it can be a lengthy one or a short one, so far as the

crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator

comes through. That, it can be a single narrative or in a

question and answer form. That, it can either have a history

of the rancour between the perpetrator and the victim or can

be merely the brief statement of the incident. That, the

capacity of the injured to make the statement, both physical

and mental, need not be necessarily certified by a doctor

and would rest again on the satisfaction of the Court on an

analysis of the testimony of the various witnesses and the

other evidence coming forth in trial. That, if the Court is

satisfied of the fit state of mind of the injured from the

Page 13 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 evidence on record, a contrary medical opinion or an

absence of it will be inconsequential. That, it can be made

before a Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, a Doctor, a Police

Officer, a relative or a third party whose presence is not

doubtful. That, the desire of the declarant to live, through

the truth despite fear of imminent death cannot be easily

brushed aside. The decisions also caution us that if the

statement is doubtful then one or more of the above aspects

could result in the dying declaration being eschewed

completely; based on the facts of each case.

14. As a corollary, it also has to observed: That, if there is

an iota of suspicion the Court has to look for corroboration.

That, the medical certification as to the physical and mental

state always aids in arriving at a satisfaction. That, in the

wake of multiple grievous injuries or a higher percentage of

burns, the declaration could be in question and answer

form, lending more credence as actually spoken of by the

injured as opposed to a long drawn out narrative, which

could be mistook as supplied by interested related parties.

That, a dying declaration recorded by the Judicial

Magistrate, adds credence since they are trained to record

Page 14 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 such declarations. That, as far as possible, the recording is

to be done in the presence of the Doctor and definitely not

in the presence of numerous bystanders; which could lead

to a defence being raised of prompting and tutoring. That,

the veracity of the declaration has to come forth from the

attendant circumstances as brought out in evidence.

15. We cannot but notice that in the present case, there is

a plethora of dying declarations which we will examine one

by one. There are two dying declarations reduced to writing

and quite a few oral ones, testified by the witnesses, the

written ones being examined first. The FIS itself is by the

victim recorded by PW7, PSI of the jurisdictional Police

Station, in the presence of PW1, the witness who came to the

crime scene on hearing a shout and saw the villagers trying

to put out the fire. The evidence of PW7 indicates that he was

informed of the fire in the village Mahadeopur by the SHO

of Banmankhi Police Station. PW7 immediately rushed to the

crime scene with the SHO and a Sub-Inspector and found the

house of the deceased completely gutted. The body of

Sarangdhar Singh was found burnt and his wife, Kamala

Page 15 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 Devi, as informed by the villagers, was taken to the hospital

for treatment.

16. Neither is evidence led of a diary entry made in the

police station, of the phone call to the SHO nor is the SHO

examined to speak on the phone call received. Strangely,

despite the SHO, the Sub-Inspector and the PSI; PW7, having

reached the scene there is no FIS recorded from any of the

persons who were at the spot, including the witnesses

paraded before Court, PW2, PW4 and PW5 who had not

accompanied the injured lady to the hospital. PW1 is said to

have taken the injured lady to the hospital along with his

brother Nirmal, Nirdhan and Ajay Yadav. PW7 deposed that

he went to the hospital, after carrying out the inquest of

Sarangdhar Singh, where the FIS was recorded as the

statement of the injured victim, Kamla Devi. The FIR narrates

about the details of her family, the enmity with the younger

son, and the crime, alleged on the younger son and the

daughter-in-law at 1.30 am. PW7, Investigating Officer (I.O)

took the thumb impression of PW1 and the deceased in the

FIS.

Page 16 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024

17. Interestingly, the FIR was registered at 9.00 am on

23.11.2016 while the police party had been to the scene of

occurrence where the villagers including the close relatives

of the deceased were gathered, when the fire was raging.

Even at the hospital where Kamala Devi was under

treatment the villagers and relatives had gathered and there

was no valid cause to record an FIS from the victim, who was

grievously scorched. If it had to be done, then it was

expedient that a medical certification was taken. The FIS has

a long narrative of the history of the family dispute, highly

improbable from a lady burned seriously. The FIS was

admittedly recorded when the villagers and relatives of the

deceased were standing around. These aspects considered

in the given circumstances puts to peril the veracity of the

FIS. Admittedly the deceased were inside the house and

presumably sleeping, given the time of the incident. There

is little possibility of the inmates of the house having seen

the crime proper and the possibility is more that the

villagers who gathered there could present a better picture,

especially the woman whose shouts woke the neighbours.

The attempt of the prosecution to give the FIS an elevated

Page 17 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 status of a dying declaration hence falls flat on that count too

as it does not inspire confidence.

18. We then come to the statement recorded by the BDO,

PW8 at 11.30 am on the same day at Sadar Hospital, Araria.

There, the narration about the history/motive was far lesser

but as earlier, the crime proper is said to have been

perpetrated by the younger son who came along with his

wife and two other unknown persons and set fire to the

residential house. PW7, I.O in his testimony before Court,

on questioning by the Court, stated that the dying

declaration is in his handwriting and the BDO signed it. PW7

& PW8, the BDO, an Executive Magistrate spoke of the

villagers and relatives of the injured being present when the

statement was recorded and that PW8 read over the

statement to the persons present. No invalidity perse comes

forth from that, but it raises questions, with reference to the

overall circumstances and the lurking suspicion of a false

accusation in the form of a declaration made by another

person or through prompting. The BDO also spoke of having

taken down the statement himself quite contrary to the

statement of the IO. It was deposed that a doctor was taking

Page 18 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 care of the injured in which circumstance a certification

could have been obtained about the fit state or at least the

consciousness of the injured. Neither was such a medical

certification taken nor does PW8 speak of the doctor having

informed him about the physical and mental condition of the

injured. The circumstances as coming out from the

testimony of PW7 and PW8 persuade us to disbelieve the

second dying declaration also for that too inspires no

confidence.

19. Now, we come to the testimonies of the witnesses as to

the incident itself. PW1 testified that he came out of his

house on hearing the shouts of the wife of Vido Yadav, at his

door steps and saw the house burning down. The husband

had died and the wife, Kamla Devi was alive but “burnt

little”. The dying declaration made by Kamla Devi to PW1

was that Soni, her daughter-in-law had poured hot water on

her body and A1 having put their house on fire. PW2 testifies

that he woke up on hearing Anmol Yadav’s wife shout and

on coming out of his house witnessed the burning down of

the house. It was his deposition that Kamla Devi was inside

the house and he along with PW1 and Ajay Kumar tore the

Page 19 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 window and took Kamla Devi out, not spoken of by PW1.

PW2’s deposition is that Kamla Devi told them that “you

people should immediately go and save Dadaji, Mukul and his

wife will kill him” (sic-as available from the translation from

the records). PW1 and PW2 testified that they along with

Ajay took Kamla Devi to the hospital in a tempo. PW3 spoke

of coming out of the house when Munnar Yadav’s daughter-

in-law started shouting. His testimony was that “the old lady

said that Mukul and his wife set the house on fire” (sic

deposition of PW3).

20. PW4 came out of his house on hearing a commotion

and tried to douse the fire. He spoke of many villagers

having gathered at the scene. He also spoke of Kamla Devi

having been burnt badly and found mumbling in a weak

state. Contrary to his statement under Section 161, Cr. PC,

he denied Kamla Devi having made a dying declaration.

PW5 was the brother of Sarangdhar Singh, who spoke of

Kamla Devi having come out after breaking the latch, with

the help of the villagers. He also spoke of a dying

declaration made by the injured, that Saurabh Kumar alias

Mukul and his wife Soni burned herself and her husband.

Page 20 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 PW6, the elder son of the deceased also deposed that when

he saw his mother at the hospital she made a statement

about the culpability of his brother and sister-in-law. PW7,

I.O however stated that no such statement was recorded

from PW6 under Section 161, in his cross-examination.

21. We would not discard the oral dying declarations for

reason of the inconsistency in narration. There cannot be

any insistence that the exact words of the victim should

come out from the witnesses. What has been narrated

conveys the culpability, if it can be believed. That being

said we cannot but notice that all the witnesses arrayed

before the Trial Court spoke of the villagers having reached

the spot before them. Three witnesses specifically spoke of

the shouts of a lady having woken them up. They described

the lady, differently, as Vido Yadav’s wife, Anmol Yadav’s

wife and the daughter-in-law of Munnar Yadav, from which

we can infer that there were at least two persons who saw

the fire, before the witnesses paraded before Court. Even

if it is assumed that the lady spoken of by the three witnesses

was the very same person, she was the best witness who

could have been examined with respect to the first

Page 21 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 indication of the crime. In fact, PW2 and PW3 specifically

speak of that lady having been engaged in threshing paddy.

There was every possibility of her having witnessed the fire

breaking out and could have better explained the causation.

The non examination of the crucial witness, spoken of by the

witnesses who reached the place later, on hearing her

shouts, is a very serious lacuna in prosecution.

22. In this context, we have to specifically notice the

defence; that PW1, who was managing the properties of the

deceased had an eye on it and he, in collusion with PW6 had

connived to exclude A1 from his due share. PW5, the

brother of the deceased husband also is alleged to have

aligned with the other son to exclude A1 from his

inheritance. PW1, PW5 & PW6, hence, according to the

accused are interested witnesses. PW2 is the nephew of

PW1 and PW3 is the brother of PW1 again disclosing an

interest against the accused . PW4, the grandnephew of the

deceased husband spoke only of having witnessed the fire

and the death of his granduncle and denied the dying

declaration, quite contrary to the version of the other

witnesses. All the witnesses spoke of a motive of the

Page 22 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 accused which was the exclusion of due share in the

properties of the deceased. PW6, the other son of the

deceased in answer to a question put by the Court

categorically stated that he and his brother will have 50%

share in the property and that he is willing to give the due

share of the property to the accused, which he had obtained

through a partition suit; thus demolishing the motive

projected by the prosecution. In the totality of the

circumstances, we are unable to find that the dying

declarations alleged to have been made to the witnesses are

credible or even probable, especially considering the fact

that the deceased is alleged to have made the statement

immediately after sustaining grievous burn injuries.

23. The postmortem report of the deceased husband

indicates that he sustained 100% burns. The degree of the

burn injuries suffered by the deceased wife is not

mentioned in the report prepared by PW10, the doctor who

carried out the postmortem. However, he stated that she

had sustained 60% injuries, which is stated for the first time

before Court and without the same being recorded in the

report. Surprisingly, PW10 also stated, on a specific query

Page 23 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 made by the Court that looking at the postmortem report,

the victim would have been in a fit state of mind to make the

dying declaration. We are unable to find any credence to

the said certification which a pathologist cannot discern by

merely looking at the postmortem report. The burn injuries,

pertinently are not confined to the lower body. The injuries

interalia are stated to be:

“Epidermal to Dermo Epidermal burn injury over both lower thigh and lower limb upto ankle, both upper limb, back of chest, abdomen, part of pelvis, right side face and neck with line of redness, hyperemia and areas of hyper coagulated tissues and blister formation at place.”

The injuries thus were not confined to the lower body and

even a medical expert examining the cadaver cannot come

to the conclusion that, when alive the deceased was in a fit

state of mind to give a dying declaration.

24. PW6 attempted to establish the enmity between his

father and brother by production of Exhibit P4 to P10,

complaints made by his deceased father and mother against

his brother. Exhibit P4 to P9 which were partially burnt

were said to have been obtained from the crime scene. It is

Page 24 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 pertinent here to notice that PW7, the I.O. did not think it fit

to even draw up a scene mahazar of the crime scene. From

the evidence, it is clear that the house was thatched and had

bamboo doors, good tinder for fire. The witnesses had

spoken of a gas connection in the house and the defence was

also that the fire was caused when the gas cylinder burst.

There was no investigation on that count and the I.O. did not

even carry out a forensic examination of the site to find out

the cause of fire, whether it was arson or accidental. In fact

the I.O in his evidence as PW7 stated that there were no half-

burnt items found in the crime scene which he had visited

four times. PW5, the brother of the deceased husband had

also stated in response to the query made by Court that the

entire goods of the house were burnt. It was stated that the

police had made a list of the goods that were saved from

burning and that the list was prepared in his presence. The

witness also deposed that since the goods were burnt, the

police had left them as such.

25. Exhibit P4 to P9, partially burnt complaints, according

to PW6 were recovered from the crime scene which he did

not think fit to handover to the I.O. The reliance placed by

Page 25 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 the trial court on the documents produced by PW6 cannot

be accepted, for its genuineness being suspect and the

same having been not produced before Court as required

in a criminal trial, after drawing up a seizure mahazar, as

recovered from the crime scene or even handed over by

one of the witnesses and the same being made a part of the

record of incriminating documents handed over to the

accused.

26. In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from

the evidence, we are convinced that the High Court was

perfectly correct in acquitting the accused. Rather than

providing a complete chain of circumstances, with the

connecting links establishing the guilt of the accused and

bringing forth no hypothesis other than the guilt of the

accused, here the circumstances bring out a conscious

effort to nail the accused with the crime of arson and pre-

meditated murder. Except PW4, the other witnesses spoke

of bitterness between the father and the son due to property

disputes. PW6, the son of the deceased and the brother of

A1 though spoke of the bitterness between his father and

brother, in the same breath deposed that he was willing to

Page 26 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 give 50% share of the properties to his brother; in which

event, there is no cause for enmity between the father and

the son. The testimonies of the witnesses paraded before

Court was that the entire village was against the conduct of

the younger son of the deceased. However, this was spoken

of by the interested witnesses as alleged by the defence.

PW1 was alleged to be interested in the properties of the

deceased and PW1, PW2 and PW3 were closely related.

PW5 is said to have aligned himself with PW6, the other son

of the deceased. PW4, another close relative did not speak

of enmity between the father and the son of such a gravity to

motivate the son to kill his father.

27. Further, PW1 himself stated that the second accused

and the children stayed at the house of the deceased for 20

days before the incident. It is also deposed that 17 days

prior to the incident the police took the deceased husband

and his son to the police station for counselling, not spoken

of by the I.O who was a PSI in the jurisdictional Police

Station. Pertinent is the fact that none of the witness spoke of

the presence of the accused in the village at any time

contemporaneous to the incident, especially when

Page 27 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 admittedly the accused along with their children were

staying at a different location. The memo of arrest is not

available in the records and the I.O makes a casual

reference to the arrest having been made on the road going

from Purnia to Banmankhi, near village Dhima. The accused

were alleged to have resided in the house of one Lali @

Lalwa, two weeks back when they came to the village, who

was not examined by the police or arrayed as a witness in

the prosecution launched.

28. The entire village had gathered at the scene of

occurrence and the witnesses paraded were not the persons

who reached there first. The lady spoken of by PW1 to PW3

whose shouts woke them up, had not been examined. PW2,

PW4 and PW5 also spoke of the deceased Kamla Devi

having been removed to the hospital by PW1 along with one

Nirdhan Yadav and Ajay Yadav, both of whom were not

examined before Court. There was a concerted effort by the

I.O not to bring any independent witnesses to the stand. The

investigation, according to us was a sham and was pre-

meditated, throwing to the winds every tenet of criminal

jurisprudence informed by due procedure. The

Page 28 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 prosecution, hence, was a farce, parading witnesses whose

testimonies fell flat. The investigation and the prosecution

was premised on the motive alleged and nothing more.

29. We would also notice with some anguish the manner

in which the trial court examined the accused under Section

313, Cr. PC. There were only four questions put to both the

accused. Question No.1 was with respect to the allegation

that on 23.11.2006 at around 1:30 in the night, the accused

together went to the house of the father of the first accused

with common intention and killed them by putting the house

to fire. The second question was about the allegation of the

house of Sarangdhar Singh having been torched and the

dying declaration made by Kamla Devi that the accused,

together with two unknown persons put the house on fire

and thus murdered Sarangdhar Singh. Question No.3 was

with respect to the allegation that 15 days before the

incident, the accused had gone to Mahadeopur village and

stayed in the house of Lali @ Lalwa and that four days before

the incident they went to their parents’ house. Question

No.4 was as to the defence. Both the accused replied in the

negative to the first three questions and the first accused in

Page 29 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 defence stated that PW1, the one who managed his father’s

properties, his elder brother PW6 and his uncle PW5, were

attempting to grab his property after excluding him from the

same.

30. We cannot but notice that none of the incriminating

circumstances including that of the motive, the complaints

filed by the deceased against A1, the various dying

declarations and the medical evidence were put to the

accused. We had, in the very same context in Criminal

Appeal No.860 of 2026, Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar

& Ors. dated 12.02.2026 (authored by one of us, Sanjay

Kumar, J.) with respect to the scanty questioning under

Section 313, Cr. PC without putting all the incriminating

circumstances to the accused, held as under:-

“Needless to state, the afore stated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again. We may refer to the recent judgment of this Court on this point in “Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” (2025) 2 SCC

385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused

Page 30 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused.

We may also note the earlier decision of another 3-Judge Bench of this Court in “Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra” (1973) 2 SCC 793 , wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused even though at the end of the long trial, the judge may be a little fagged out.

In the light of the aforestated settled legal principle, we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against Page 31 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained.

In the cited case, we had remanded the matter and restored

it to the files for resuming the trial from the stage of

questioning under Section 313, Cr.P.C. However, in this

case, we do not think such a measure is warranted,

especially when the evidence falls short of the standard

required in a criminal trial which is not a mere suspicion, a

‘maybe true’ but a ‘must be true’, evidently a long distance

to travel, the whole of this distance being paved with legal,

reliable and unimpeachable evidence resulting in a finding

of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, as held in Sarwan

Singh v. State of Punjab10.

31. We have found that the investigation carried out is

grossly deficient. The scene mahazar was not drawn up, no

forensic examination was carried out at the scene of crime

and no independent witnesses were arrayed. The causation

of fire not investigated, the presence of the accused in the

vicinity of the crime scene not established. The delay in

10 AIR 1957 SC 637

Page 32 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 registration of FIR despite the information having been

received at the police station earlier, and the police

personnel including the I.O having visited the scene of

occurrence where a number of villagers were present was

a serious lapse. The delay caused and the manner in which

the FIS was recorded in the present case throws suspicion

on the very conduct of the I.O. The dying declarations

should have been recorded with more caution and when

taken inside the hospital it should have ideally been

recorded in the presence of a Doctor, whose certification

also ought to have been obtained. The incriminating

circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to the

accused in its entirety, a solemn duty enjoined both on the

Court and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire

prosecution may fail for that sole reason. We reiterate these

aspects only to point out the lapses in investigation, which

could have been avoided, to provide some guidance at least

in the future.

32. A couple, at the fag end of their lives were burnt to

death and the cause, whether it’s a homicide or accidental

death, eludes civil society and throws a pall of suspicion on

Page 33 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024 their own son and his family, who will always carry the yoke

of dishonour. The son and daughter-in-law were accused of

parricide and were convicted by the trial court, later

acquitted by the High Court, which acquittal is now affirmed

by us. The trauma of arrest, incarceration and trial will

always scar the couple and more so their children who were

left orphaned, during the time when their parents were

imprisoned. We cannot but caution the investigators and the

Courts to strive to do better and follow accepted practises

and procedural rules to the hilt, when lives are lost or taken

and there is a possibility of false accusations being made,

putting to peril the reputations of the living.

33. The appeal is dismissed.

34. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

……...…….……………………. J.

(SANJAY KUMAR)

...………….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 11, 2026.

Page 34 of 34 Crl. A. @ SLP Crl.15378 of 2024