Sameer Kumar Pal & Anr vs Sheikh Akbar & Ors

2

3. Brief facts necessary to dispose of this appeal are

recapitulated as under:

Appellants Sameer Kumar Pal and Subhash Chandra Pal,

both sons of Laxminarayan Pal (who were the plaintiffs in the

trial court), filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge,

Jabalpur. In the plaint, it was clearly incorporated that the

appellants were the owners in possession of Shop No.1214

(Old No.892), New Corporation Chowk, Wright Town,

Jabalpur. They purchased the said shop vide sale-deed dated

31.12.1991.

4. The appellants filed a suit for eviction against the

defendants (respondents herein) under section 12(1)(c) (that

the tenant has created nuisance), 12(1)(f) (for bona fide

requirement of landlord for non-residential purposes) and

12(1)(g) (bona fide requirements of landlord to carry out

repairs) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The

relevant parts of section 12 of the Act are set out as under:

"12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.--(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, only, namely--

3 (a) - (b) x x x

(c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein:

(d) - (e) x x x

(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purpose is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;

(g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated."

5. In the written statement filed in the trial court, the

respondents herein raised the main objection that the

appellants herein are not the owners of the suit property and

the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as

the suit property has been a Wakf property. It may be

pertinent to mention that in the written statement the 4

respondents nowhere took the plea that the suit property,

namely `Madras Hotel' is a joint family property. The trial

court held that the appellants were in bona fide need of

carrying on the business of sweets and for running a

restaurant. No other vacant property was in possession of the

appellants in Jabalpur. It was also held that the shop in

question is very old, unsafe and in dilapidated condition.

There is need to repair and carry out some structural changes

in the shop which cannot be carried out unless the same is

made available to the appellants. The trial court clearly held

that the appellants are in bona fide need of the suit property.

The trial court also held that the respondents have not paid

rent since September, 1992 and decided the issue of default in

favour of the appellants. The trial court categorically held that

the suit property is not the Wakf property and decreed the suit

of the appellants.

6. The respondents preferred first appeal before the court of

XIth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. The entire evidence

was re-appreciated by the appellate court independently and

the court clearly held that the respondents have failed to prove

that the appellants are in possession of any other non- 5

residential accommodation in the entire city of Jabalpur. The

first appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court. It

may be pertinent to mention that before the first appellate

court also, no plea was taken that the property in question,

namely the `Madras Hotel', was a joint family property. The

first appellate court dismissed the appeal.

7. Respondent nos. 1 & 2, aggrieved by the judgment of the

XIth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, preferred a second

appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.

8. The High Court in the impugned judgment, without any

pleadings or basis, held that the property namely `Madras

Hotel' is a joint family property. The High Court erroneously

observed that the property namely `Madras Hotel' was

purchased by the father of the appellants and his brothers,

whereas in fact the property was purchased by the appellants

vide sale deed dated 31.12.1991. The assumption of wrong

fact has led to total erroneous finding and conclusion. The

High Court in para 8 observed as under:

"......It is firmly established that the building known as `Madras Hotel' belongs to Laxminarayan Pal and his two sons who are the plaintiffs. That is their joint family property. This building was purchased 6

by Laxminarayan when he was carrying on business with his two brothers and the partition took place long after the acquisition of that building. In that partition that building was allotted to Laxminarayan alone......"

9. The High Court in the impugned judgment weaved out an

entirely new case. Neither there was any pleading nor it was

the case of the respondents either before the trial court or the

first appellate court. The High Court gravely erred in arriving

at the finding without any basis whatsoever. Subhash

Chandra Pal, PW1 was examined by the trial court and in his

testimony he categorically stated that he and his elder brother

Sameer Kumar were owners of the property in question.

10. The appellants have relied on Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala

Laxminarayan & Others AIR 1960 SC 335 in which this

court held that there is no presumption that any property

whether moveable or immoveable held by a member of a joint

Hindu family is joint family property. The burden lies upon

the person who asserts that a particular property is joint

family property to establish that fact.

11. The appellants further relied on Kuppala Obul Reddy v.

Bonala Venpata Narayan Reddy (dead) by LRs. (1984) 3 7

SCC 447 in which this court held that there were no pleadings

as to the properties being joint properties and no issue as to

joint family had been raised and there was no proper evidence

to make out any case of the properties being joint family

properties, was raised and no such issue could possibly have

been raised in absence of the pleadings. The court further

held that in absence of any pleading and any issue and further

in the absence of any proper evidence, the view expressed by

the learned judge of the High Court that the properties were

joint family properties is clearly unwarranted. There may be

presumption that there is a Hindu Joint Family but there can

be no presumption that the joint family possesses joint family

properties.

12. The appellants further relied on Mudi Gowda

Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh

(1969) 1 SCC 386 wherein this Court held that, of course,

there is no presumption that merely because the family is joint

so the property is also joint. So the person alleging the

property to be joint family property must prove it. In that

case, this Court further held that the burden of proving that

any particular property is joint family property is, therefore, in 8

the first instance, upon the person who claims it to be

coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of

the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any

acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed

to be joint family property. The Court carved out an exception

and observed that, "this is, however, subject to the limitation

that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the

property in question could have been acquired. It is only after

the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus

shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-

acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was

acquired without any aid from the family estate." In Mudi

Gowda Gowdappa Sankh (supra), this court heavily relied

upon the ratio of Privy Council judgment in Randhi

Appalaswami v. Randhi Suryanarayanamurti & Others

ILR 1948 Mad 440 wherein the legal position of Hindu Law

has been beautifully articulated by Sir John Beaumont. The

relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint 9

property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property."

13. In this view of the matter, we are constrained to set aside

the impugned judgment of the High Court. The High Court

was not justified in reversing the concurrent findings of fact in

this case. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that the

judgment and order of the trial court, as affirmed by the first

appellate court, is restored. In the facts and circumstances of

the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.

........................................J. (Dalveer Bhandari)

.......................................J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan) New Delhi;

July 28, 2010