Samadhan S/O Sitaram Manmothe vs The State Of Maharashtra

2025 INSC 1351 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5001 OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6906 of 2025)

SAMADHAN S/O SITATRAM MANMOTHE …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASTHRA & ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 06.03.2025 passed by the

Bombay High Court at Aurangabad in Criminal Application No.

601 of 2025 dismissing the application filed by the appellant under

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for Signature Not Verified

short “BNSS”) seeking quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024, registered Digitally signed by NEETU SACHDEVA Date: 2025.11.24 16:44:59 IST Reason:

with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati

Page 1 of 24 Sambhajinagar City on 31.08.2024, for the offences punishable

under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (for short “IPC”), the appellant is before this Court.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned

counsel for respondent No.1-State and learned Amicus Curiae, Ms.

Radhika Gautham, for respondent No.2 as the latter has not

responded to the notice issued and served on her.

4. Briefly stated the facts of this case as per the prosecution are

that respondent No.2 had lodged a complaint with City Chowk

Police Station, District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City, stating

that she was married to a person ABC in the year 2019 and had a

minor daughter out of the said wedlock. However, due to

matrimonial discord with her husband and in-laws, she had been

residing separately since May 2020 and was living with her parents

at Rajangaon, Taluka Paithan, District Chhatrapati

Sambhajinagar.

5. In July 2020, respondent No.2 had filed a complaint against

her husband at the Women’s Grievance Redressal Centre, Office of

Superintendent of Police, Chatrapati Sambhajinagar. However,

owing to the failure of reconciliation between them, respondent

Page 2 of 24 No.2 initiated proceedings against her husband seeking alimony/

maintenance from him.

6. It is in connection with the said proceedings that respondent

No.2, on 27.01.2022, was introduced to the appellant, who is a

practising advocate in the courts of Aurangabad. Later, appellant

took respondent No.2’s contact number and the two regularly kept

in touch on WhatsApp and through phone calls. Over a period of

time, the appellant and respondent No.2 developed a close

relationship. It was then that the appellant proposed to meet

respondent No.2 in person at Vivekananda Garden in TV Centre.

During the course of their meeting, the appellant expressed his

desire to marry respondent No.2. However, owing to her troubled

marital past, respondent No.2 declined the proposal. Despite her

reluctance, the appellant continued to insist on marriage at each

subsequent meeting.

7. On 12.03.2022, the appellant called respondent No.2 to Hotel

Citizen, near Mill Corner, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, where he

once again expressed his desire to marry her and assured her that

he would marry her despite her concern that his mother might not

Page 3 of 24 approve of the alliance. Based on such assurance, the appellant

established physical relations with her.

8. Subsequently, in September 2022, the complainant

discovered that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child.

However, with the consent of the appellant, she aborted the child.

Thereafter, when respondent No.2 decided to part ways with the

appellant, he continued to assure her of marriage and engaged in

further sexual relations with her, as a result of which she got

pregnant again in July 2023 and later in May 2024. Both the

pregnancies were terminated.

9. On 20.05.2024, the appellant once again called respondent

No.2 to Hotel Citizen, where he engaged in physical acts with her.

Later, when respondent No.2 insisted on marriage, the appellant

flatly refused to marry her and further threatened to kill her if she

disclosed the matter to anybody.

10. Based on the aforesaid facts, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated

31.08.2024 came to be registered against the appellant for the

offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the

IPC at City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati

Sambhajinagar City.

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11. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an anticipatory bail

application bearing Criminal Bail Application No. 1841 of 2024

before the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad (hereinafter

referred to as “Trial Court”). The Trial Court, by order dated

19.09.2024, allowed the application and enlarged the appellant on

anticipatory bail. During the course of the investigation, both

respondent No. 2 and her mother, in their statements, supported

the prosecution’s version of events. Subsequently, on completion

of the investigation, a charge-sheet bearing No. 143 of 2024 dated

25.10.2024 came to be filed against the appellant under Sections

376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.

12. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an application

bearing Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025 before the Bombay

High Court at Aurangabad under Section 528 of the BNSS, seeking

quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024.

13. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court

refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the

appellant in FIR No. 294 of 2024 on the ground that a chargesheet

had already been filed and the matter was ready for trial; the

appellant could not sufficiently prove that the instant case was a

Page 5 of 24 clearly case of consensual relationship; that the relationship

between the appellant and respondent No.2 could be termed as a

fiduciary relationship inasmuch as the appellant was discussing

the maintenance case of respondent No.2 with her; and that in view

of the aforesaid, the facts of the present case warranted the

conduct of a trial to test the veracity of the allegations made by

respondent No.2 and to ascertain whether the acts alleged to have

occurred between the appellant and respondent No.2 were against

her will or otherwise.

14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned

counsel for the respondent-State and learned Amicus on behalf of

respondent No.2.

15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that

the appellant has been falsely implicated as there is no evidence

against him with respect to the commission of the offences

punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.

16. It is further submitted that the respondent No.2 is a well-

educated lady who is married and has a minor daughter. It was

contended that there is no divorce decree passed between

respondent No.2 and her husband. Therefore, during the

Page 6 of 24 subsistence of her marriage, respondent no.2 consequently entered

into a relationship with the appellant for a period of three years.

Further, during the subsistence of their relationship, no complaint

whatsoever was ever lodged by respondent No.2 against the

appellant. It was only in August 2024 after the appellant refused

to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- demanded by respondent No.2, that

in a fit of anger, she lodged the present criminal case against him.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand,

supported the impugned order and submitted that the allegations

made by respondent No.2 discloses commission of a cognisable

offence and warrants no interference at the threshold. It is

submitted that the veracity of the defence taken by the appellant

is a matter for trial and not for adjudication under the limited

jurisdiction of a petition for quashing.

18. Learned Amicus also supported the respondent-State by

contending that there is no merit in this appeal.

19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties

and having perused the material on record, the only question that

needs to be addressed is whether FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated

Page 7 of 24 31.08.2024, along with Chargesheet No.143 of 2024 filed on

25.10.2024 against the appellant herein, should be quashed.

20. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under

Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC. An offence of rape, if

established in terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under

Section 376 of the IPC. In the present case, the second description

of Section 376 is relevant which is set out below:

“376. Punishment for rape. – (1). Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub- section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

2. Whoever, -

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(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—

(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central Government or the State Government;

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(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;

(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861);

(d) “women's or children's institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children.”

21. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced

punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the

same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not

less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the

remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision

is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the

offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the

same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision

is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual

assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.

Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series

Page 9 of 24 of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a

single transaction.

22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the

pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual

assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity,

or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable

and unable to escape the situation.

23. In the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR and the

statement on record reveals that respondent No.2 met the

appellant, who is a practising advocate, for the first time in

reference to a case which was instituted by respondent No.2

against her husband. Thereafter, they exchanged numbers and

regularly kept in touch. Over a passage of time, respondent No.2

and the appellant developed a close relationship and started

meeting each other frequently. During this time, they established

sexual relations multiple times between 12.03.2022 to 20.05.2024.

The appellant contends that during the course of their relationship,

not once did respondent No.2 file a complaint regarding the alleged

non-consensual sexual relations, and it is inconceivable that the

appellant would force himself upon her for so many years without

Page 10 of 24 there being any protest or complaint from the side of respondent

No.2. Notably, it was only in August of 2024 when the appellant

refused to fulfil respondent No.2’s demand of payment of

Rs.1,50,000/- that the instant criminal case came to be instituted

against the appellant.

24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether

the appellant engaged in physical relationship with respondent

No.2 based on a deception or a false promise to marry.

25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on

respondent No.2’s claim that appellant established physical

relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the

appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of marriage

whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the

appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first

marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why,

despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No.2

continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations

with him even though she was already married.

26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September

2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with

Page 11 of 24 the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and

I will live my life”. At that time, the appellant again assured her

that they would get married and asked for some time from

respondent No.2, to which she refused. However, despite her

refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet

him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations with him.

27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of

this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein

the following observations were made:

“27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.

28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said

Page 12 of 24 that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” (underlining by us)

28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant

lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then

vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long

years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close

and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that

occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be

retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely

because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.

29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the

disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are

given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the

gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists

genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To

convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only

trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the

accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances

transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the

Page 13 of 24 criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound

concern and calls for condemnation.

30. In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764,

this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed

that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple

cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a

consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages

cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship

does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted

as under:

“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in

Page 14 of 24 the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.”

(underlining by us)

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a

country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social

and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a

woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to

physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would

culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such

circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very

foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than

absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand

vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was

illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of

fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain

sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and

dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC

be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the

same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible

Page 15 of 24 evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated

allegations or moral conjecture.

32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,

we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the

invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present

case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a

consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious.

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the

subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever

raised by respondent No.2 regarding the absence of consent in their

physical relations. It was only upon the appellant’s refusal to fulfil

her demand for payment of the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- that the

present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore,

the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between

12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on

31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of

sexual intimacy.

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation

that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled

respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it

Page 16 of 24 disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the

part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the

only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her

own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is

also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought

up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the

proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent

No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was

premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is

devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court

in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197,

whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in

a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its

nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such

relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise

of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot

be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant

portion of the judgment is extracted as under:

“33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in

Page 17 of 24 different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship.

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception.

35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident.

However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.

xxx

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us)

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36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court

observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant

that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was

consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by

him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was

merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High

Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

(2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this Court had stated that unless there

was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence

cannot be inferred.

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to

appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals

that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual,

inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he

expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2,

being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated

with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own

volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the

marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the

foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material

Page 19 of 24 on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties

was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express

statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised

in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when

the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.

38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court

in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:

“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 &

24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.

Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must

Page 20 of 24 examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

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24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us)

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39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335, this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the

powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not

necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to

the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may

be appropriate:

“102. xxx

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

xxx”

40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with

the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present

case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of

respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship

devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as

Page 22 of 24 contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In

our opinion, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction

under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained

of in the present case occurred within the contours of a

relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The

continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing

short of an abuse of the court machinery.

41. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court dated 06.03.2025 in

application under Section 528 BNSS bearing Criminal Application

No. 601 of 2025. The said application accordingly stands allowed.

Consequently, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024, registered

with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati

Sambhajinagar City under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the

IPC and Chargesheet No. 143 of 2024 dated 25.10.2024, filed in

the Court of the 3rd Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aurangabad,

accordingly stands quashed.

42. We express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered

by Ms. Radhika Gowtam, learned Advocate-on-Record who had

been appointed as Amicus Curiae in the matter. Registry of this

Page 23 of 24 Court is directed to pay honorarium of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen

Thousand only) to the learned Amicus Curiae.

…………………………………..J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J. (R. MAHADEVAN)

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 24, 2025.

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