Salam Samarjeet Singh vs The High Court Of Manipur At Imphal

2024 INSC 647 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.294/2015

SALAM SAMARJEET SINGH Petitioner

VERSUS

THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL & ANR Respondent

JUDGMENT

1. Heard Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the petitioner. The respondents – High Court

of Manipur and the Registrar General are represented by Mr.

Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel.

2. While deciding this writ petition filed under Article 32

of the Constitution of India, there was a difference of

Signature Not Verified opinion and having regard to the conflicting judgments Digitally signed by Deepak Joshi

rendered by the two learned Judges on 7.10.2016, the Date: 2024.08.31 15:01:21 IST Reason:

matter was directed to be placed before a three-judge Bench.

Page 1 of 26 Thereafter, when a similar question of law was found

pending before the Constitution Bench i.e., in Tej Prakash

Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others1 (for

short “Tej Prakash Pathak”), this case was tagged with the

said case. On 12.07.2023, however submission was made

before the Constitution Bench by the learned counsel for the

parties that reference to the Constitution Bench along the

lines in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is unnecessary and

therefore the difference of opinion between the two Judges

in the present case should be resolved by a three-Judge

Bench.

3. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the

parties, this case can be segregated and the Court should,

inter alia, consider the following aspects :-

“I. Can executive instructions in the form of a resolution of the Full Court override statutory rules made under Article 234/309?

II. Can the criteria of cut-off marks be introduced by a Full-Court Resolution without amending the rules after the written test is over without informing the candidate?

1 Tej Prakash Pathak And Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court And Ors. C.A. No. 2634/2013 & batch Page 2 of 26 III. Whether such a course of action amounts to procedural fairness/unfairness?”

4. Thereafter, an order was passed by the Constitution

Bench on 12.07.2023 to place the present matter for

hearing before a three-Judge Bench and that is how we are

posted with this case.

RELEVANT FACTS

5. The petitioner, who was an aspirant for the post of

District Judge (Entry Level) in the Manipur Judicial Service

Grade-I, responded to the advertisement dated 15.05.2013.

The petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Caste category and

he appeared in the written examination conducted in July

2013 for all the applicants. The High Court of Manipur

then issued a Notification on 17.10.2013 declaring that

none of the candidates had secured the minimum qualifying

marks in the written examination. A grievance was then

raised by the petitioner and eventually a corrigendum came

to be issued on 07.02.2014 declaring the petitioner to have

been successful in the written examination having scored

52.8% marks which satisfied the required benchmark of

50% for the Scheduled Caste category.

Page 3 of 26

6. Just before the interview test, the Full Court of the

Manipur High Court on 12.01.2015 decided to fix 40% as

the cut-off for the viva-voce examination and the petitioner’s

case is that this decision was never intimated to him. The

Full Court Resolution reflected that the 40% minimum

qualifying marks for passing the interview was fixed by

resorting to sub-Rule (3) of Schedule ‘B’ of the Manipur

Judicial Service Rules, 2005 (for short “MJS Rules,2005”),

which reads as under:-

"All necessary steps not provided for in these rules for

recruitment under these rules shall be decided by the

recruiting authority."

7. The petitioner who had secured 18.8 marks out of the

total 50 marks in the interview segment, was held to be

unsuccessful for not having the secured minimum

prescribed benchmark of 40%. At this stage, it may be noted

that the total marks allocated for the written examination

for the three papers were 300 and for the interview segment,

a total of 50 marks were prescribed. In his written

examination, the petitioner had secured 158.50 marks and

Page 4 of 26 18.8 marks in the interview, his total aggregate score in the

written examination plus viva-voce was 177.3 marks, out of

the total possible 350 marks. Thus, the percentage of

marks scored by the petitioner cumulatively stands at 50.6

percent. It is also pertinent to note that the Manipur High

Court subsequently on 9.3.2016 amended Schedule-B, Sub-

rule(3) to prescribe 40% minimum cut-off for the viva voce.

8. In the split judgment, Justice Banumathi upheld the

rejection of the petitioner for failing to secure minimum 40%

in the viva voce. It was observed that the fixation of 40%

minimum cut off for viva voce is in consonance with the

MJS Rules, 2005 as per Clause 1(3) of the General

Instructions provided in Schedule-B. Under the Mode of

Evaluation table, securing less than 40% marks has been

graded as ‘F’, which carries a grade value of ‘0’. In Justice

Banumathi’s opinion, it was therefore implicit that for a

‘pass’ in exam, a minimum of 40% marks must be obtained.

It was also noted that after participating in the viva voce,

the petitioner cannot turn around and challenge the

selection process.

Page 5 of 26

9. On the other hand, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh, held that

the rejection in viva voce test is wrongful as it violated the

statutory mandate which provided for selection based on the

cumulative grade value obtained in the written exam and

viva voce. It was noted that Grade ‘F’ for marks below 40%

as provided in the evaluation table, corresponds to securing

‘0’ marks and nothing beyond that. Grade ‘F’ is not an

indicator of failure in the examination.

ARGUMENTS

10. Before this Court, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior

Counsel for the writ petitioner would argue that when no

minimum marks were prescribed in the viva-voce segment

at the time when the recruitment commenced through the

advertisement dated 15.05.2013, the Full Court could not

have fixed minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce since

the unamended MJS Rules, 2005 never envisaged minimum

marks in the viva-voce segment. According to the counsel,

this is a case of midway change of rules of the game and

therefore it is argued that the opinion expressed by Justice

Shiva Kirti Singh should be accepted by this larger Bench. It

Page 6 of 26 was contended that the present case is covered by the

decision of the five-judge Constitution Bench of this Court

in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors vs High Court of Kerala & Ors2 (for

short “Sivanandan CT”).

11.1 On the other hand, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior

Counsel would refer to the General Instructions contained

in Schedule ‘B’ to the MJS Rules, 2005 to say that the

petitioner was required to obtain 50% marks in the written

examination to be eligible for the viva-voce segment which

he did. The counsel however contends that those scoring

below 40% in the interview, as per the mode of evaluation,

should be considered in the ‘Fail’ category and here since

the petitioner had secured less than 40% in the viva-voce

segment, he was rightly held to be unsuccessful.

11.2 According to the counsel, the decision in Sivanandan

C.T.(supra) , can have no application in the present facts as

in that case, the Rules were amended after the interview

was over but in the present case, the requirement of

minimum 40% in the interview segment was decided before

the interview commenced.

2 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 994 Page 7 of 26 11.3. Mr. Hansaria also drew our attention to the

subsequent decisions of this Court in Kavita Kamboj v. High

Court of P&H3 (for short “Kavita Khamboj”) and Abhimeet

Sinha v High Court of Patna4(for short “Abhimeet Sinha”) to

buttress his submission that the minimum marks for

interview can be prescribed by the High Court and is not

violative of the recommendations of the Shetty Commission

and the decision of this Court in All India Judges Assn. v

Union of India5 (for short “All India Judges(2002))”.

12. Going by the above submissions, the following issues

arise for our consideration:

A. Can the executive instructions in form of a resolution of the Full Court by prescribing minimum marks for interview, override statutory rules made under Article 234/309? B. Whether the High Court’s decision frustrates the legitimate expectation of the petitioner?

Issue A

13. To answer the issue, a reference to the unamended

Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005 is necessary:

“Schedule B to the MJS Rules of 2005

3 (2024) 7 SCC 103 4 (2024) 7 SCC 262 5 (2002) 4 SCC 247 Page 8 of 26 Clause 1:

Competitive Examination/Limited Departmental Examination

(i) Written examination of 3 papers for 100 marks each

(ii) Interview :Viva-voce of 50 marks

Clause 3:

General Instructions:

(i) All candidates who obtained 60% or more marks or corresponding grade in the written examination shall be eligible for viva-voce examination, provided that SC/ST candidates who obtained 50% or more marks or corresponding grade in the written examination shall be eligible for viva-voce examination.

(ii) Selection of candidate shall be made on the basis of cumulative grade value obtained in the written and viva- voce examination.

(iii) All necessary steps not provided for in these rules for recruitment under these rules shall be decided by the recruiting authority.

(iv) Mode of evaluating the performance of Grading in the written and viva-voce examination shall as below:

Percentage of Grade Grade marks Value

70% & above O 7 65% to 69% A+ 6 60% to 64% A 5 55% to 59% B+ 4 50% to 54% B 3 45% to 49% C+ 2 40% to 44% C 1

Below 40% F 0

Page 9 of 26

Numerical marks obtained for each question in written examination are to be graded as per the above chart and thereafter all the grade values are to be added up and divided by total number of questions, thereby arriving at a Cumulative Grade value Average (CGVA), which inturn is to be again graded as per the above chart.

(v) The same vigorous and objective grade value exercise is also recommended for the viva-voce examination as well.

(vi) Final selection list will be readied by combining the cumulative grade value obtained in the written examination and viva-voce examination.”

14. The unamended Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005

prescribes the mode of evaluating and grading the

performance in the written and viva-voce examination.

Those who secured below 40% are classified in the ‘F’

category with zero grade value. However, Sub clause (iv)

clearly indicates that the “final selection list will be readied

by combining the cumulative grade value obtained in the

written examination and viva-voce examination.”

15. Interestingly, the MJS Rules 2005 came to be amended

on 09.03.2016, after conclusion of the present recruitment

process whereby, 40% minimum qualifying marks in the

viva-voce segment were prescribed. This would also indicate

Page 10 of 26 that the Rules as unamended, did not have the requirement

of minimum 40% in the viva-voce segment and such

qualifying marks came to be incorporated only vide

Resolution adopted by the Full Court on 12.01.2015.

16. If the evaluation and selection of the petitioner would

have been carried out on the basis of the unamended Rules,

the petitioner having cumulatively secured 50.65% by

combining both the written and the interview segment and

would have been awarded ‘B’ Grade as per the mode of

evaluation prescribed under sub-Clause (iv) of Clause 3

under Schedule ‘B’ of the MJS Rules 2005. With ‘B’ Grade,

the petitioner cannot logically be placed in the category of

failed candidates.

17. As was noticed earlier, the relevant advertisement for

filling up the vacancy in the entry-level post of District

Judge was initiated through the advertisement published on

15.05.2013 which reflected that the recruitment shall be

governed by the MJS Rules 2005. The duly filled application

was presented by the petitioner and he secured the

minimum benchmark of 50% marks as a Scheduled Caste

Page 11 of 26 category candidate, in the written examination. If the

unamended Rules were to be made the basis for evaluation

of the performance, the petitioner with his 18.8 marks in

the interview out of the maximum permissible 50 marks

would have qualified, as his cumulative score (written

158.50 and viva 18.8) would have been 177.3 out of total

350 marks. His percentage in aggregate will then be 50.6%

and this would have ensured his success as per the

unamended MJS Rules.

18. In application of the MJS Rules 2005, we are quite

certain that there was no cut-off marks or pass marks

prescribed for the viva-voce examination in the present

process when the recruitment advertisement was published.

The subsequent amendment to the Rules with effect from

09.03.2016, cannot be applied to the present recruitment

process where the petitioner participated. Moreover, the

unamended Rules explicitly provided that the cut-off in the

written test for SC/ST Candidates would be 50% and the

final list would be calculated by combining the cumulative

grade value in both written and viva voce.

Page 12 of 26

19. During the course of arguments, Mr. Hansaria,

Learned Senior Counsel for the High Court relied on the

decisions of this Court in Kavita Khamboj(supra) and

Abhimeet Sinha(supra) to emphasize the importance of

interview for selection in the higher judiciary. In this regard,

we must observe that it is well-settled that prescribing

minimum marks for interview is not violative of the Shetty

Commission report and the judgment of this Court in All

India Judges(2002)(supra). This Court in a recent judgment

in Abhimeet Sinha(supra) examined the following aspects:-

“34.1. ((i) Whether the prescription of minimum marks for viva voce is in contravention of the law laid down by this Court in All India Judges (2002) [All India Judges Assn. (3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508] which accepted certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission?

34.2. (ii) Whether the prescription of minimum marks for viva voce is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India?”

20. It was opined in the above judgment that the

prescription of minimum marks for the viva voce is not

violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Page 13 of 26 Discussing the recommendations of Shetty Commission and

the precedents of this Court, it was held that All India

Judges (2002) is sub-silentio on the aspect of minimum

marks for interview and cannot be said to have

authoritatively pronounced on doing away with minimum

marks for interview.

21. However, in our view, even though prescribing minimum

marks for interview may not be manifestly arbitrary, the

present case is on the failure to make the selection, in

accordance with the unamended MJS Rules, based on

aggregate marks secured by the petitioner in the written

examination and the viva-voce test. This aspect was also

discussed in Abhimeet Sinha (supra):

“68. The implications of the split judgment in Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur [Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur, (2016) 10 SCC 484 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 147] will next bear consideration. Banumathi, J. in her judgment noticed that All India Judges (2002) [All India Judges Assn. (3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508] is sub silentio on the aspect of minimum cut-off marks for the viva voce test. In his dissenting judgment, Shiva Kirti Singh, J. had not expressed any

Page 14 of 26 disagreement on the said sub silentio observation but left it open for determination in a future case. There again, the dissent of Singh, J. was based on the fact that minimum cut-off was not prescribed in the recruitment rules and were brought in midway through the recruitment process, just prior to the stage of interview, by resolution of the Court. Here however the prescription of minimum cut-off in the recruitment process was notified for information of the candidates well before the commencement of the selection process under the Patna High Court and also under the Gujarat High Court and this distinguishing feature will have to be borne in mind.”

22. The judgment in Abhimeet Sinha (supra) reiterated the

following position in case of inconsistency between the

recommendations of Shetty Commission and the rules

framed by the High Court as per the proviso to Article 309 of

the Constitution of India:

“(i) In case of inconsistency between the recommendations and the Rules, primacy should be given to the existing statutory rules.

(ii) In the absence of existing Rules, the High Court should follow the directions of this Court.

60. For the sake of completeness, we may however clarify that even though the statutory rules can be supplemented to fill in gaps as held in Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P&H [Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P&H, (2024) 7 SCC 103] , the High Court cannot act contrary to the Rules [Sivanandan

Page 15 of 26 C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, (2024) 3 SCC 799 :

(2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 67].” [emphasis supplied]

23. Applying the above legal proposition, it is seen that in this

matter, the mode of evaluation was provided for in the Rules.

This is not a case where the Rules were silent. Mr. Hansaria,

placed considerable reliance on the decision of this Court in

Kavita Khamboj(supra), where a three-judge bench of this

Court while upholding the prescription of minimum 50%

marks in interview for promotion as District Judges, observed

that the rules can be supplemented to fill in the gaps.

However, it particularly distinguishes the instances where the

Rules specifically provide for the mode of evaluation. In this

regard, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court speaking

through DY Chandrachud CJI, itself notes that the matter

would have been entirely different if the Rules specifically

provided that the final merit list would be on the basis of

aggregate marks:

“52. Moreover, the Rules in the present case are entirely silent in regard to the prescription of a minimum eligibility for clearing a competitive test, on the one hand, and the viva voce, on the other hand. If the Rules were to specifically provide in a

Page 16 of 26 given case that the criterion for eligibility would be on the combined marks of both the written test and the viva voce, the matter would have been entirely different. [P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141, para 44 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] Rule 6(1)(a) and Rule 8 being silent as regards the manner in which merit and suitability would be determined, administrative instructions can supplement the Rules in that regard. This is not a case where the Rules have made a specific provision in which event the administrative instructions cannot transgress a rule which is being made in pursuance of the power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution. For instance, if the Rules were to provide that there would be a minimum eligibility requirement only in the written test, conceivably, it may not be open to prescribe a minimum eligibility requirement in the viva voce by an administrative instruction. Similarly, if the Rules were to provide that the eligibility cut-off would be taken on the basis of the overall marks which are obtained in both the written test and the viva voce, conceivably, it would not be open to the administrative instructions to modify the terms.”

[emphasis supplied]

24. In the present case, the Resolution (12.1.2015)

prescribing qualifying marks for viva voce is not a case of

Page 17 of 26 supplementing the rules but appears to us as a case where

the Rules pertaining to the final selection of candidates,

have been substituted. Therefore, the decision in Kavita

Khamboj(supra) is clearly distinguishable.

25. On the other hand, the decision in Sivanandan C.T.

(supra), is squarely applicable to the facts of the present

case. In that case, the Court held that the Kerala High

Court erred in fixing the minimum cut-off contrary to Rule

2(c)(iii) of Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Special

Rules,1961 which provided that the aggregate of the

written test and the viva voce would be taken into

consideration for appointment. There also, the Rules were

subsequently amended in 2017 to prescribe minimum cut-

off of 35% in the viva voce. It is essential to note that while

the intention for introducing a minimum cut-off through

the High Court Resolution may be bona fide, in the present

case, it is not grounded in legality as it cannot override the

statutory rules. The minimum marks for interview was

prescribed through a High Court Resolution without

amending the rules.

Page 18 of 26

26. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the

executive instructions cannot override statutory Rules

where the method of final selection by combining the

cumulative grade value obtained in the written and the

viva voce examinations is specified categorically. Issue A is

answered accordingly.

Issue B

27. The second issue that falls for our consideration is

whether the High Court’s decision frustrates the substantive

legitimate expectation of the petitioner. In Sivanandan CT

(supra), a constitution bench of five judges of this Court

speaking through Chandrachud DYC J. succinctly

explained the principle as under:

“40. The principle of fairness in action requires that public authorities be held accountable for their representations, since the State has a profound impact on the lives of citizens. Good administration requires public authorities to act in a predicable manner and honour the promises made or practices established unless there is a good reason not to do so. In Nadarajah [R. (Nadarajah) v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., 2005 EWCA Civ 1363] , Laws, L.J. held that the public authority should objectively justify that

Page 19 of 26 there is an overriding public interest in denying a legitimate expectation. We are of the opinion that for a public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation, it must objectively demonstrate by placing relevant material before the court that its decision was in the public interest. This standard is consistent with the principles of good administration which require that State actions must be held to scrupulous standards to prevent misuse of public power and ensure fairness to citizens.

“45. The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to include the principles of good administration. Since citizens repose their trust in the State, the actions and policies of the State give rise to legitimate expectations that the State will adhere to its assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent, transparent, and predictable manner. The principles of good administration require that the decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.”

28. The Court therein observed that an individual who

claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of

legitimate expectation has to establish : (i) the legitimacy

of the expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate

expectation led to a violation of Article 14. Page 20 of 26

29. Let us now apply the above principle to the present

case. The unamended MJS Rules, 2005 generated a

legitimate expectation in the candidate that the merit list

would be drawn based on the aggregate of the total marks

secured both in the written examination and the viva voce

examination. Moreover, the petitioner had no notice about

the minimum cut-off for the viva-voce segment which was

introduced just on the eve of the viva-voce test, well after

the conclusion of written examination. If the candidate had

been informed in advance, he could have prepared

accordingly, ensuring a fair and predictable process.

30. The petitioner in this case, is on a similar footing as the

petitioners in Sivandandan CT (supra) where it was noted

as under:

“13. In the above backdrop, it is evident that when the process of selection commenced, all the candidates were put on a notice of the fact that : (i) the merit list would be drawn up on the basis of the aggregate marks obtained in the written examination and viva voce; (ii) candidates whose marks were at least at the prescribed minimum in the written examination would qualify for the viva voce; and (iii) there was no cut-off applicable in respect of the marks to be

Page 21 of 26 obtained in the viva voce while drawing up the merit list in the aggregate.”

31. In the present case, no notice was given to the petitioner

regarding the imposition of minimum 40% marks for

interview. Prescribing minimum marks for viva voce

segment may be justified for the holistic assessment of a

candidate, but in the present case such a requirement was

introduced only after commencement of the recruitment

process and in violation of the statutory rules. The decision

of the Full Court to depart from the expected exercise of

preparing the merit list as per the unamended Rules is

clearly violative of the substantive legitimate expectation of

the petitioners. It also fails the tests of fairness,

consistency, and predictability and hence is violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

32. Before we conclude, we may also advert to the contention

that after participating in the recruitment process, the

unsuccessful candidates cannot turn around and challenge

the recruitment process6. We are of the view that it is equally

6 Madan Lal v. State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal (2008) 4 SCC 171; Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi (2013) 11 SCC 309 ; Anupal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 173 Page 22 of 26 well-settled that the principle of estoppel cannot override the

law7. Such legal principle was reiterated by the Supreme

Court in Dr.(Major) Meeta Sahai Vs. Union of India8 where it

was observed as under:

“17. However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection process.”

33. In light of the above discussion, the opinion of Justice

Shiva Kirti Singh is upheld. This Court is not in agreement

with the opinion rendered by Justice Banumathi.

34. The petitioner, is therefore, entitled to be declared

successful in the recruitment test. It is also noteworthy that

despite getting more than 50% marks in the written exam,

7 Krishna Rai v Banaras Hindu University (2022) 8 SCC 713 8 (2019) 20 SCC 17 Page 23 of 26 he was only called for the interview round after he filed a

Right to Information (RTI) Application to know his marks. A

corrigendum was later issued by the High Court in this

regard.

35. It would be unjustified to deny the sole SC candidate,

who successfully qualified both the written exam and the

interview, in accordance with the then existing rules.

36. Following the above conclusion and to avoid disturbing

the seniority of those who are already serving in the same

cadre vis-à-vis the petitioner who is found entitled to

recruitment, the following order is passed:

I. The High Court should declare the petitioner to be

successful by virtue of his scoring 50.6% in aggregate

marks in the recruitment tests. He be issued

appointment order. However, the appointed petitioner will

be entitled to seniority only from the date of his

appointment. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any

actual monetary benefits for any period prior to his

appointment.

Page 24 of 26 II. The appointee should be given notional seniority from

the year 2015 when the interview was conducted. It is

however made clear that this notional seniority is only for

the purpose of superannuation benefits.

III. The above directions be implemented within four

weeks from today.

37. The matter stands disposed of and answered on the

above terms. Parties to bear their own cost.

……..............……....………..... J.

[HRISHIKESH ROY ]

..….........………….................. J. [ SUDHANSHU DHULIA ]

……................………….......... J.

[ S.V.N. BHATTI ]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 22, 2024

Page 25 of 26 ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.5 SECTION X

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).294/2015

SALAM SAMARJEET SINGH Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL & ANR. Respondent(s)

([ TO GO BEFORE THREE HON'BLE JUDGES ]

IA No. 4/2017 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS IA No. 3/2016 - DIRECTION IA No. 1/2015 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDL. DOCUMENT)

Date : 22-08-2024 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTI

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Adv.

Mr. Ahanthem Romen Singh, Adv.

Ms. Oindriala Sen, Adv.

Mr. Mohan Singh, Adv Mr. Aniket Rajput, Adv.

Ms. Khoisnam Nirmala Devi, Adv.

Mr. Rajiv Mehta, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, AOR Ms. Kavya Jhawar, Adv.

Ms. Nandini Rai, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

The Writ Petition is disposed of in terms of the

reportable judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, stand closed.

(DEEPAK JOSHI) (KAMLESH RAWAT) ASST. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the File)

Page 26 of 26