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Sahab Singh (D) Thr. Lrs vs Director General

Supreme Court26 November 2025

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. Where a disciplinary inquiry establishes misconduct in the form of suppression of the fact of involvement in a criminal case and failure to intimate the employing authority of arrest and detention in breach of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the penalty of dismissal from service is disproportionate and will be quashed where the employee had completed a substantial period of service and the misconduct was limited to non-disclosure rather than participation in the underlying criminal act. 2. Where an employee charged with misconduct receives an honourable acquittal in the criminal proceedings on the basis that he was not present at the place of occurrence and was performing his official duties elsewhere, the dismissal from service imposed on the basis of non-disclosure of those criminal proceedings is rendered unjustifiable and will be modified to a lesser penalty. 3. Upon modification of a dismissal order to one of compulsory retirement, the employee or his legal representatives are entitled to arrears of pension calculated from the date of the original dismissal order, and in the event of the employee's death during the pendency of proceedings, the family is entitled to family pension in accordance with law.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025 INSC 1497 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.13402 OF 2015

SAHAB SINGH (D) THROUGH LRs. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

DIRECTOR GENERAL, RPF, RAIL BHAWAN & OTHERS … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

Being aggrieved by the order dated 29.07.2015 passed by

the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ Petition

No.6411 of 2012 by which the writ petition filed by the original

appellant assailing his dismissal from service was itself dismissed

and no relief was granted to him, the present appeal has been

filed before this Court.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RADHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.24 12:20:55 IST Reason: 1

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the instant case are that the

appellant was recruited as a Constable in the Railway Protection

Force (hereinafter, “RPF”) on 01.08.1994. In the year 2006, the

appellant was posted at the Shahdara Post, Delhi.

3. On 13.03.2007, a First Information Report being FIR No.

45/2007 was registered with Police Station Babri, District

Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, under Sections 363 and 366 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”). The aforesaid FIR

was registered against five persons, including the appellant, his

father, and his brothers, alleging the abduction of a girl. It was

alleged that the appellant’s brother, Rajeev, committed the main

offence, while the appellant was accused of abetting and assisting

him.

4. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the Police filed a

charge-sheet dated 06.07.2007 only against the main accused,

Rajeev. However, in the year 2010, acting on an application filed

by the complainant under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”), the Sessions Court

summoned the appellant. Charges were framed against the

2 appellant on 08.08.2010. Subsequently, due to non-appearance,

non-bailable warrants were issued, and the appellant was taken

into judicial custody on 29.11.2010. He was eventually released

on bail on 01.01.2011.

5. Immediately thereafter, the Respondent-Authorities served

Charge-Sheet dated 12.01.2011 upon the appellant under Rule

153 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 alleging: firstly,

that the appellant concealed facts pertaining to his involvement in

the criminal case, and secondly, he had failed to intimate the

department regarding his arrest and detention.

6. An Inquiry Report dated 10.05.2011 was submitted, which,

inter alia, categorically noted that on the date of the alleged

criminal incident, the appellant was on duty at his post in Delhi.

Notwithstanding this finding, the Senior Circle Security

Commissioner, RPF, Northern Railway, passed an order dated

24.06.2011 dismissing the appellant from service.

7. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant preferred a

Revision Petition, which was dismissed by the Inspector General,

Chief Protection Commissioner on 18.01.2012. Aggrieved, the

3 appellant subsequently preferred an appeal before the Director

General, RPF, which also did not yield any relief. Consequently,

the appellant approached the High Court of Delhi by filing W.P.(C)

No. 6411/2012 on 08.08.2012 seeking reinstatement.

8. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the trial in the

criminal case concluded. By judgment and order dated

16.11.2013 in Session Trial No. 1457/07, the Additional Sessions

Judge, Muzaffarnagar, U.P., acquitted the appellant of all charges

under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the IPC. The Trial Court

specifically observed that on the date of the incident, the

appellant was performing his official duties in Delhi and was not

present at the place of occurrence.

9. Despite the acquittal and the specific finding regarding the

appellant’s plea of alibi, the High Court, vide the impugned

judgment dated 29.07.2015, dismissed the Writ Petition. The

High Court observed that the acquittal was based on technical

considerations and held that the Respondent-Authorities’

decision borne out of appellant’s failure to disclose his detention

and prosecution called for no interference.

4

10. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants (legal

representatives of original appellant) and learned ASG for the

respondents. We have perused the material on record including

the impugned order.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

dismissal from service is erroneous on two grounds: firstly, there

was no misconduct whatsoever on the part of the appellant and

therefore, the very initiation of the proceeding against him was an

abuse of the process of law. He therefore submitted that the

entire proceeding, including the order of dismissal, ought to be

quashed. Secondly and alternatively, it was submitted that during

the pendency of this appeal, the appellant died on 03.10.2023 at

the age of 54 years. In the circumstances, the order of dismissal

may at least be converted to one of compulsory retirement as the

appellant is no longer alive to be reinstated and at least his family

may be benefitted monetarily by receiving the arrears of pension

from the date of dismissal as well as family pension from the date

of his demise.

5

12. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

impugned order may be set aside or in the alternative, modified

and relief may be granted to the appellant’s family members who

have been brought on record.

13. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for

the respondents supported the impugned order and contended

that the order of dismissal is not disproportionate; that the

appellant, though having completed approximately seventeen

years of service, was guilty of misconduct which was established

after holding an inquiry; and that the order of dismissal was

affirmed by the appellate authority as well as Revisional authority

and the High Court also did not interfere in the matter. Therefore,

at this stage, merely because the appellant has since passed

away, relief cannot be granted by modifying the order of dismissal

to one of compulsory retirement. Learned ASG submitted that

there is no merit in this appeal and the same may be dismissed.

14. We have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar in

light of the impugned order and the facts of the case. No doubt,

the misconduct has been proved in the disciplinary inquiry which

6 was in the nature of suppression of the fact of his involvement in

a criminal case, and further suppression of his arrest and

detention which he was required to bring to the notice of the

authority under the provisions of the Central Civil Services

(Conduct) Rules, 1964. But the same not having been done, could

not have resulted in dismissal from service. Any other penalty

could have been imposed on the appellant herein. In the

circumstances, we hold that the punishment of dismissal from

service was disproportionate, particularly when the appellant had

already completed approximately seventeen years of service and

was entitled to further career progression and monetary benefits

on his retirement if any other punishment could have been

imposed on him.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that there

was an honourable acquittal in the criminal proceedings which

were instituted against the family members of the deceased.

Therefore, the dismissal from service is all the more injurious to

the appellant and his family.

7

16. We have taken note of the fact that during the pendency of

this appeal, the appellant died on 03.10.2023 and he had the

benefit of an honourable acquittal in the criminal proceedings

which were instituted against him and two other family members.

17. We have found that having regard to the nature of the

imputation against the appellant herein, the dismissal from

service was wholly disproportionate. Hence, the punishment of

dismissal is converted/modified to one of compulsory retirement

with pension payable in accordance with law. Consequently, the

appellant shall, and now his legal representatives shall, with

effect from 24.06.2011 which was the date of dismissal and on

his demise, receive arrears of pension and family pension in

accordance with law.

18. The pensionary benefits shall be computed and the same

shall be released to the legal representatives of the deceased

appellant within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt

of the copy of this judgment.

8

19. The appeal is allowed in part in the aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J. (R. MAHADEVAN)

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 26, 2025.

9

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