S.Nagaraj (D) By Lrs.& Ors vs B.R.Vasudeva Murthy & Ors

Permission to file Special Leave Petition (C)

Nos.18843/2007 and 18846/2007 granted. Delay condoned

and leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. We also 2

condone the delay in filing the applications for substitution

and allow the applications for substitution. We also allow the

applications for impleadment.

2. These Civil Appeals are directed against the common

judgment dated 22.12.2006 of the Division Bench of the High

Court of Karnataka in a batch of Writ Petitions in relation to

34 acres and 3 guntas of Inam land in Bangalore District

which was allotted by the State Government to an association

of teachers for construction of houses and for which the

Bangalore Development Authority has sanctioned a lay out

plan. The Bangalore Development Authority has filed Civil

Appeal No.3037/2007, the legal representatives of Inamdars

have filed Civil Appeal No.3038/2007, the Teachers' Colony

Residents Association has filed Civil Appeal No.3049/2007

and several owners of the house sites have filed the remaining

Civil Appeals.

Facts

3. The relevant facts briefly are that the Mysore (Personal &

Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 1954 (for short `the Inam 3

Abolition Act') was enacted for abolition of personal Inams and

other miscellaneous Inams in the State of Mysore, except

Bellari District. On the Inam Abolition Act coming into force

on 1.2.1959, all rights, title and interests vested in the

Inamdars ceased and vested absolutely in the State of Mysore

free from all encumbrances. Every Inamdar, however, was

entitled to be registered as an occupant of land and could

make an application before the Special Deputy Commissioner,

Inam Abolition, for such registration as an occupant.

4. Sreenivasa Rao and Babu Rao, two Inamdars, filed

applications for registration as occupants in respect of some

lands in Survey Nos. 45 and 47 of Jakkasandra village,

Bangalore South Taluk. When these applications were

pending before the Special Deputy Commissioner, Kendra

Upadhyayara Sangha (for short `the Sangha'), an association of

teachers, applied for grant of land for house sites to its

members and the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore

District, proposed grant of land measuring 34 acres 3 guntas

in Survey Nos. 45 and 47 of Jakkasandra village in favour of

the Sangha. The Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore, while 4

recommending the proposal of the Special Deputy

Commissioner, Bangalore District, for grant of the land in

favour of the Sangha, reported that the land in question was a

Devadaya Inam Land in respect of which applications for

occupancy rights were still pending settlement before the

Special Deputy Commissioner, Inam Abolition. The

Government of Karnataka in the Revenue Department by an

order dated 15.6.1979 accorded sanction for grant of the land

measuring 34 acres 3 guntas out of Survey Nos.45 and 47 of

Jakkasandra village in favour of the General Secretary of the

Sangha for providing house sites to the Members of the

Sangha subject to the decision in the dispute pending before

the Special Deputy Commissioner, Inam Abolition. The

Government also fixed a price of Rs.10,000/- per acre

amounting to Rs.3,40,750/- for grant of the land and a

conversion fine of Rs.4,000/- per acre in its order dated

15.06.1979 and the amounts were deposited by the Sangha.

5. On 4.8.1979, Sreenivasa Rao filed O.S. No.687/1979 in

the Civil Court, Bangalore, questioning the grant made by the

State Government in favour of the Sangha and praying for a 5

decree of permanent injunction against the Sangha in respect

of the land. On 1.11.1980, however, Sreenivasa Rao and Babu

Rao entered into an agreement with the Sangha to withdraw

the suit on receipt of Rs.2,000/- per acre in respect of 34

acres and 3 guntas of land in addition to the amount of

Rs.3,40,750/- deposited by the Sangha towards the price of

the entire land with the Government. Accordingly, on

8.11.1980 Sreenivasa Rao filed a memo in the Court saying

that he does not want to press O.S. No.687/1979 as the suit

has been settled out of court and on 10.11.1980 the Principal

Munsif, Bangalore, dismissed the suit as not pressed.

6. In the meanwhile, the Karnataka Inam Abolition Laws

(Amendment Act) 1979 amended the Inam Abolition Act

providing that the Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of

the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short `the

Tribunal') instead of the Special Deputy Commissioner, Inam

Abolition, will decide the claims for occupancy rights under

the Inam Abolition Act. Thereafter, the Tribunal by its order

dated 23.6.1982 passed in Case No. I.R.F. INA 419/1979-80

decided the claims of Sreenivasa Rao and Babu Rao for 6

occupancy rights in respect of the land and ordered the

confirmation of the occupancy rights in the suit land in favour

of Sreenivasa Rao and Babu Rao jointly. Pursuant to the

order dated 26.6.1982 of the Tribunal, Sreenivasa Rao and

Babu Rao withdrew the amount of Rs.3,40,750/- deposited

with the Government by the Sangha. During the years 1982

to 1990, the Sangha got the layout plan of the land of 34 acres

3 guntas allotted to the Sangha sanctioned from the Bangalore

Development Authority (for short the `BDA') and allotted sites

to its members and the members of the Sangha built houses

on some of these sites and some members also transferred

their house sites to others.

7. In the year 1990, however, Nagaraj, Venkojirao and

Narhari, the legal representatives of Sreenivasa Rao filed W.P.

No.11412/1990 in the Karnataka High Court challenging the

order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government of Karnataka

granting the land in favour of the Sangha. On 8.7.1992, the

legal representatives of Sreenivas Rao, namely, Nagaraj,

Venkojirao and Narhari also filed the suit O.S. No.4349/1992

for declaring the grant of the aforesaid land in favour of the 7

Sangha as null and void and for declaring all acts of the BDA

sanctioning the layout in respect of the suit land in favour of

the Sangha as illegal and for delivery of vacant possession of

the suit land to them. On 17.6.1995, the three legal

representatives of Sreenivasa Rao filed a memo in the Court of

Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore, for withdrawal of the suit

O.S. No.4349/1992 and on 24.9.1995 the suit was dismissed

as withdrawn by the Court. On 28.6.1996, W.P. No.

11412/1990 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the

Karnataka High Court. Nagaraj, Venkojirao and Narhari,

however, filed Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 against the order

passed by the learned Single Judge but the Division Bench of

the Karnataka High Court by its order dated 15.9.1998 after

deciding various issues raised by the parties dismissed the

writ appeal. Nagaraj and Narhari then filed SLP (C)

No.2833/1999 against the order dated 15.9.1998 passed by

the Division Bench before this Court and on 9.4.1999 this

Court, without issuing notice in the SLP and while disposing

of the SLP, made observations that if the proceedings pending

before the Special Deputy Commissioner with regard to the 8

claim of Inamdars have ended in favour of the petitioners who

have filed the SLP, it will be open to them to approach the

State Government for modification of the order granting land

to the Sangha. The Teachers' Colony Residents Association

(for short the `Association') which was impleaded as

respondent No.5 in SLP(C) 2833/1999 filed an application

before this Court for recalling the order dated 9.4.1999, but

this Court in its order dated 28.8.2000 in SLP(C) 2833/1999

observed that there was nothing adverse to respondent No.5-

Society and accordingly dismissed the application for recalling.

8. Thereafter, on 6.8.2002 the State Government of

Karnataka directed the Special Commissioner to acquire 14

sites in the layout developed by the Association with a further

direction to the Special Deputy Commissioner to allot 14 sites

to the family members of the Inamdars. The owners of the 14

sites filed W.P. Nos.32462-473/2002 in the Karnataka High

Court, challenging the order dated 6.8.2002 of the State

Government and by an order dated 28.11.2002 the learned

Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and

remitted the matter to the State Government with the direction 9

to comply with the order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court after

hearing the petitioners and the respondents in the writ

petitions and any other person interested in the matter. The

legal representatives of the Inamdars also filed Writ Petition

Nos.39046-48/2002 seeking deletion of a condition of the

grant made in their favour, but on 9.1.2003 they withdrew the

writ petitions as not pressed. The State Government of

Karnataka by its order dated 10.2.2003 then directed the

Special Deputy Commissioner to stop construction on the land

in dispute till disposal of the final proceedings and this order

dated 10.2.2003 was challenged before the Karnataka High

Court in W.P. No.8551/2003, but by an order dated 6.3.2003

the High Court while dismissing the writ petitions directed the

State Government to decide the matter within two months.

The Special Deputy Commissioner then submitted his report

to the Statement Government on 28.5.2003 and when the

State Government did not pass any order in compliance of the

order of this Court in SLP(C) 2833/1999, the Inamdars filed

I.A. No.3 in the aforesaid SLP alleging contempt and this Court

issued notice in the I.A. on 8.9.2003.

10

9. The Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, then

passed the order on 22.12.2003 directing that :

(a) The vacant civic amenity sites to an extent of 2 acres 34

guntas available be handed over to the Inamdars free of

cost.

(b) The land which is utilized by the BDA for formation of

the ring road has to be acquired by the BDA and the

compensation paid as this was private property.

(c) The vacant 182 sites which were available as on the day

of the inspection by the Special Deputy Commissioner,

Bangalore, on 28.5.2003 would be transferred to the

Inamdars or if the same was not available on date,

compensation in lieu of it from Sangha be paid to the

Inamdars.

(d) The Government will examine to allot 20 acres of land in

Survey No.148 of Kudlu village of Jigani Hobli, Anekal

Taluk, to compensate for the losses.

10. This order dated 22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue,

Government of Karnataka, was challenged before the

Karnataka High Court by the BDA in W.P. No.15614 of 2004, 11

the Sangha in W.P. No.26218 of 2004, the Teachers' Colony

Residents Association in W.P. No.7332 of 2004 and different

owners of house sites in W.P. Nos.20331, 10303, 12024,

12094, 14771, 14858, 16833, 17883, 20678, 22145, 25372,

32203, 36796 of 2004 and 21620 of 2005. The writ petitions

were heard analogously and decided by a common judgment

delivered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on

22.12.2006. The legal representatives of the Inamdars filed

Review Petition No.107/2007 against the common judgment

dated 22.12.2006 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court but the same was dismissed on 19.04.2007.

Findings in the impugned Judgment of the High Court

11. In the impugned judgment dated 22.12.2006, the High

Court has recorded the following findings and conclusions:

(i) The 34 acres 3 guntas of land in Survey Nos. 45 and

47 of Jakkasandra village, Bangalore South Taluk, did

not vest in the Government on 15.6.1979 because the

applications of the Inamdars for registration as

occupants in respect of the land under in Sections 9

and 10 of the Inam Abolition Act were pending before 12

the Special Deputy Commissioner and therefore the

State Government had no power to pass the order

dated 15.6.1979 according sanction for grant of the

land in favour of the Sangha and the Minister,

Revenue, Government of Karnataka, was justified in

passing the order dated 22.12.2003 cancelling the

grant in favour of the Sangha and ordering resumption

and restoration of 182 house sites in favour of the

Inamdars pursuant to the order dated 9.4.1999 of this

Court.

(ii) The order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government

sanctioning the grant of the land in favour of the

Sangha for allotment of house sites to its members

was void ab initio in law as Sections 79-A, 79-B and

63(7) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act provided for

allotment of land only for agricultural purposes and

the rights given under the provisions of the Act to

Inamdars in respect of land in question could not be

whittled down by the State Government in exercise of 13

its power under the Karnataka Land Grant Rules,

1969.

(iii) The Agreement executed by the Inamdars on

1.11.1980 in favour of the Sangha when the claim of

the Inamdars for registration had not been decided by

the Tribunal was not legal and was void and being an

unregistered agreement could not affect the rights of

the Inamdars to immovable property.

(iv) The orders passed by the Karnataka High Court in the

earlier proceedings in W.P. No.11412/1990 and W.A.

No.7574/1996 do not operate as res judicata as the

case of the Inamdars with reference to the provisions

of the Inam Abolition Act and law laid down by this

Court on various aspects were not considered in the

earlier writ petitions and writ appeal and the decisions

rendered by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court in W.A. No.7574/1996 was per incurium.

(v) The writ petitions filed by the allottees/purchasers of

the house sites against the order passed by the

Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka dated 14

22.12.2003 directing the Deputy Commissioner to

resume and restore 182 sites from the land earlier

sanctioned in favour of the Sangha to the Inamdars

were maintainable as the order entailed serious

consequences for the allottees/purchasers of the sites.

(vi) The order dated 22.12.2003 passed by the Minister,

Revenue, Government of Karnataka, pursuant to the

order of this Court dated 9.4.1999 in SLP(C) 2833 of

1999 canceling the grant in favour of the Sangha and

directing the Deputy Commissioner of the district to

resume and restore the lands to the extent of 182 sites

which were vacant was legal and valid.

(vii) In the facts and circumstances of the case,

particularly, when the members of the Sangha have

already constructed houses in the house sites and

have been residing for more than two decades, the

reliefs claimed in the writ petitions should be moulded.

The High Court accordingly quashed the direction in

the order dated 22.12.2003 of Minister, Revenue,

Government of Karnataka for resumption and 15

restoration of 182 sites in favour of the Inamdars and

directed the Sangha to allot to each legal

representative of the Inamdars a site measuring 40 X

60 feet in the same layout and in lieu of the 182 sites,

pay compensation for each site @ of Rs.1,00,000/- for

30 X 40 feet, Rs.1,75,000/- for 40 X 60 feet or

proportional amount for any other lesser or higher

dimension sites to the legal representatives of the

Inamdars equally. The High Court further directed

that until allotments of the sites and payment of the

compensation are made by the Sangha, no

construction shall be put up on the vacant sites and

status quo shall be maintained. The High Court

further held that the legal representatives of the

Inamdars are entitled to receive compensation in

respect of the land acquired by the BDA for formation

of the road, if any. The High Court also quashed the

direction in the order dated 22.12.2003 to examine

whether further 20 acres of land can be allotted to the

Inamdars.

16

Contentions of the parties before this Court

12. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing

for the legal representatives of the Inamdars (the appellants in

Civil Appeal No.3038 of 2007), referred to sub-Section (1) of

Section 3 of the Inam Abolition Act which states the

consequences of a notification under sub-Section (4) of

Section 1 in respect of any inam and submitted that the

expression "save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act" in

this provision saves the right of Inamdar under Section 9 of

the Act to be registered as an occupant in respect of the land

from the consequences of vesting even after a notification was

issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act. He

submitted that clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 makes

this position further clear by stating that upon an issue of a

notification under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act in

respect of any inam, the Inamdar shall cease to have any

interest in the inam "other than the interests expressly saved

by or under the provisions" of the Act. He contended that 17

clause (a) of sub-Section (3) of Section 10 of the Inam Abolition

Act further provides that no person shall be entitled to be

registered as an occupant under Section 9 unless the claimant

makes an application to the Tribunal (earlier the Special

Deputy Commissioner) within three years from the date of

vesting of the inam concerned or 31.12.1999 whichever was

later and clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 provides

that where no application is made within a period specified in

clause (a), the right of any person to be registered as an

occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in

the State absolutely and such land shall be disposed of in

accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. He

submitted that the legislative intent of the Inam Abolition Act,

therefore, was that so long as the application of Inamdar to be

registered as an occupant has been filed within the period

specified in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the

Act and such application is pending before the Tribunal

(earlier the Special Deputy Commissioner) the land in respect

of the inam does not vest in the State and such land cannot be

disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of 18

land. He submitted that the High Court was thus right in

coming to the conclusion in the impugned order that the State

Government had no power to pass the order dated 15.6.1979

according sanction for grant of land in favour of the Sangha,

because on 15.6.1979 the application of the Inamdars to be

registered as occupants in respect of the land was still pending

before the Special Deputy Commissioner. Mr. Dave submitted

that a reading of the order dated 15.6.1979 of the State

Government sanctioning the grant of land in favour of the

Sangha was "subject to" the pending proceedings of the

Inamdars for grant of occupancy rights and therefore once the

Tribunal passed the order dated 23.6.1982 in favour of the

Inamdars confirming their occupancy rights, the Inamdars

were entitled to become occupants of the land and the order

dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government was liable to be

cancelled. He submitted that since the Sangha did not

challenge the order of the Tribunal, the Sangha or its members

cannot, at this stage, question the right, title and interest of

the Inamdars to the land.

19

13. Mr. Dave next submitted that the High Court was also

right in coming to the conclusion in the impugned order that

the grant of land by the State Government by the order dated

15.6.1979 in favour of the Sangha for allotment of house sites

to its members was void ab initio as the land could only be

allotted for agricultural purposes and not for house sites

under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (for short `the Land

Reforms Act'. He also submitted that Section 79-A of the Land

Reforms Act prohibits acquisition of any land by any person or

a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income

of not less than Rs.2 lakhs from sources other than

agricultural lands. He further submitted that Section 79-B of

the Land Reforms Act prohibits any person other than the

person cultivating land personally from holding any land and

Section 80 of the Act further prohibits transfer of land to non-

agriculturists. He submitted that Section 81 of the Land

Reforms Act, however, provides that nothing in Section 79-A

or Section 79-B or Section 80 of the Act shall apply to the

transactions or to the institutions and companies mentioned

therein, but this Section does not exempt the grant of the land 20

made in favour of the Sangha. He argued that the order dated

15.6.1979 of the State Government making the grant or land

in favour of the Sangha was, therefore, hit by the statutory

provisions of Sections 79-A, 79-B and 80 of the Land Reforms

Act.

14. Mr. Dave further submitted that the finding of the High

Court in the impugned order that the agreement executed by

the Inamdars in favour of the Sangha was not legal and void

and did not affect the rights of the Inamdars in respect of the

immovable property was also correct. He argued that under

Section 23 of the Contract Act, an agreement which is opposed

to public policy is void and the agreement dated 1.11.1980 is

contrary to the public policy laid down in Sections 9 and 10 of

the Act conferring a statutory right of occupancy on the

Inamdar in respect of the inam land. He cited the decision of

this Court in Murlidhar Aggarwal and Another v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and Others [(1974) 2 SCC 472] in which

Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction

Act, 1947 was held to be based on public policy. He also

relied on the decision of this Court in Murlidhar Dayandeo 21

Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde and Another [(1995)

Supp. (2) SCC 549] in which an agreement entered into with a

tribal for purchase of 5 acres of land without prior permission

of the competent authority was held to be contrary to public

policy laid down in Article 46 of the Constitution of India and

as void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. He also referred

to the decision of this Court in Papaiah v. State of

Karnataka and Others [(1996) 10 SCC 533] for the

proposition that there can be no estoppel against a statute. He submitted that in Jayamma v. Maria Bai Dead by

proposed L.Rs. and Another [(2004) 7 SCC 459], this Court

has held that when an assignment or transfer is made in

contravention of statutory provisions, the consequence

whereof would be that the same is invalid and thus opposed to

public policy and the same shall attract the provisions of

Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

15. Mr. Dave submitted that Section 17 of the Registration

Act provides that any non-testamentary instruments which

purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or

extinguish any right, title or interest of the value of one 22

hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property has

to be registered compulsorily. He submitted that since the

agreement dated 1.11.1980 executed by the Inamdars in

favour of the Sangha is not registered, it cannot affect the

right, title and interest of the Inamdars in respect of the land.

In support of this proposition, he relied on Bhoop Singh v.

Ram Singh Major and Others [(1995) 5 SCC 709] and

Appineni Vidyasagar v. State of A.P. and Others [(2004)

11 SCC 186].

16. Mr. Dave also supported the conclusion of the High

Court in the impugned order that the orders passed by the

Karnataka High Court in earlier proceedings in W.P.

No.11412/1990 and W.A. No.7574/1996 do not operate as res

judicata. He submitted that the question of res judicata does

not arise because the order dated 15.6.1979 of the State

Government sanctioning the land in favour of the Sangha was

void ab initio. He cited the decisions of this Court in

Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Others. v. Dossibai

N.B. Jeejeebhoy [(1970) 1 SCC 613] and Smt. Bismillah v.

Janeshwar Prasad and Others [(1990) 1 SCC 207] in which 23

it has been held that an earlier decision will not be res

judicata when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction

which is prohibited by law. He submitted that in any case the

order dated 15.9.1998 passed by the Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court in W.A. No.7574/1996 was challenged

before this Court by the legal representatives of the Inamdars

in SLP(C) No.2833/1999 and by an order dated 9.4.1999

passed in the SLP, this Court permitted the legal

representatives of the Inamdars to apply to the State

Government for modification of the order dated 15.6.1979 of

the State Government sanctioning the grant of land in favour

of the Sangha. He argued that since there was a merger of the

order passed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court in W.A. No.7574/1996 in the order dated 9.4.1999

passed by this Court in SLP(C) 2833/1999, the order passed

by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court cannot

operate as res judicata. In support of this submission he

relied on Union of India v. All India Services Pensioners'

Association and Another [(1988) 2 SCC 580] and

Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another 24

[(2000) 6 SCC 359].

17. Mr. Dave submitted that in any case this Court has

held in State of Haryana and Others v. M.P. Mohla [(2007)

1 SCC 457] that if a subsequent cause of action arises in the

matter of implementation of a judgment and order, the fresh

cause of action can be subjected to a legal challenge. He also

cited the decision of this Court in Dharam Dutt and Others

v. Union of India and Others [(2004) 1 SCC 712] in which it

was held that a challenge to Ordinance withdrawn does not

operate as res judicata to challenge the Act. He also relied on

Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. and Another [(2004) 3

SCC 1] for the proposition that if a jurisdictional question is

wrongly decided, the principle of res judicata would not be

attracted.

18. Mr. Dave vehemently contended that the High Court

having recorded its findings and conclusions in favour of the

representatives of the Inamdars on all points should not have

denied the reliefs sought by the legal representatives of the

Inamdars and should not have quashed the directions in the

order dated 22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue, Government 25

of Karnataka, for resumption and restoration of 182 sites in

favour of the Inamdars. He submitted that in this appeal this

Court should restore the order dated 22.12.2003 of the

Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, for resumption

and restoration of 182 sites in favour of the Inamdars and for

examination to allot 20 acres of land in favour of the Inamdars

and should set aside the order passed by the Division Bench

of the Karnataka High Court.

19. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the

Teachers' Colony Residents Association (the appellants in Civil

Appeal Nos.3049/2007), on the other hand, submitted that

Inamdars were only entitled to the occupancy price of

Rs.10,000/- per acre amounting to Rs.3,40,750/- for the

entire land measuring 34 acres 3 guntas which was given as

grant by the State Government to the Sangha and they have in

fact withdrawn the amount of Rs. 3,40,750/-. He submitted

that in addition to the price of Rs.10,000/- per acre, the

Inamdars agreed by the agreement dated 1.11.1980 to take

from the Sangha a further amount of Rs.2,000/- per acre and

on receipt of Rs.2,000/- per acre withdrew O.S. No.687/1979 26

from the Court of Principal Munsif, Bangalore, in which the

grant of land made by the State Government in favour of the

Sangha by order dated 15.6.1979 had been challenged. He

submitted that after the suit of the Inamdars were dismissed

as withdrawn, the right to challenge the grant made in favour

of the Sangha by the State Government by order dated

15.6.1979 did not survive and, therefore, the legal

representatives of the Inamdars had no locus standi to

approach the Court again to challenge the grant of land made

by the State Government in favour of the Sangha. He

submitted that after the Inamdars have opted to receive the

price or compensation in lieu of the land, their legal

representatives cannot claim occupancy rights in respect of

the land now granted to the Sangha by the order dated

15.6.1979 of the State Government.

20. Mr. Rao next submitted that by the order dated

9.4.1999 passed by this Court in SLP (C) No.2833/1999 no

special leave to appeal against the order dated 15.9.1998 of

the Division Bench in W.A. No.7574/1996 was granted and,

therefore, the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka 27

High Court, which was challenged by the SLP, was not

disturbed by the ex-parte order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court.

He submitted that this is also clear from the order dated

28.8.2000 passed in I.A. No.1 in which this Court has

observed that the Court did not find anything adverse to the

respondent-society in the order dated 9.4.1999 and with this

observation dismissed I.A. No.1 which was filed by the

respondent-society to recall the order dated 9.4.1999. He

cited Taherakhatoon (D) by L.Rs. v. Salambin Mohammad

[(1999) 2 SCC 635] in which this Court has taken a view that

even where SLP is admitted and special leave is granted, the

appellant has to show special circumstances to justify this

Court's interference. He relied on Kunhayammed and

Others v. State of Kerala and Another [(2000) 6 SCC 359]

in which this Court has further held that an order refusing

special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of

the order under challenge and, therefore, an order refusing

special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger.

He vehemently argued that the judgment of the Division Bench

of the Karnataka High Court in W.A. No.7574/1996 did not 28

get merged in the order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court in the

SLP in which the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka

High Court was under challenge. He agued that as no special

leave was granted by this Court against the said order of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in W.A.

No.7574/1996, the contention of Mr. Dave that the judgment

of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in W.A.

No.7574/1996 got merged with the order dated 9.4.1999, is

misconceived.

21. Mr. Rao next submitted that the judgment dated

15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court

in W.A. No.7574/1996 had, therefore, become final and

binding on the parties and the rights which had accrued in

favour of the Sangha and its members to occupy the land

granted to its members by the Sangha under the judgment

dated 15.9.1998 could not be taken away by an executive

order and yet the Minister, Revenue, Government of

Karnataka, passed orders on 22.12.2003 canceling the grant

of land made in favour of the Sangha and issuing directions

for resumption and restoration of land to the extent of 182 29

sites in favour of the legal representatives of the Inamdars.

Mr. Rao relied on the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan

Pathak and Another v. Union of India and Others [(1978)

2 SCC 50] in which the Life Insurance Corporation claimed

that it was absolved of its obligation to carry out the writ of

mandamus issued by the Court because of the provisions of

an amending Act but this Court did not accept this plea of the

Life Insurance Corporation and held that there was nothing in

the amending Act which set at naught the effect of the

judgment of the Calcutta High Court or the binding character

of the writ of mandamus issued against the Life Insurance

Corporation. He also cited Virender Singh Hooda and

Others v. State of Haryana and Another [(2004) 12 SCC

588] in which this Court has held that the legislature can

change the basis on which a decision is given by the Court but

without changing the basis of a decision given by the Court

cannot set aside the individual decision of the Court inter

parties because this will amount to exercise of the judicial

power by the legislature which is against the concept of

separation of power. Learned counsel appearing for the 30

owners of the house sites in the Civil Appeals and the Special

Leave Petitions adopted all the arguments of Mr. Rao.

22. Mr. S.S. Javali, learned senior counsel appearing for

the BDA (the appellant in Civil Appeal No.3037 of 2007)

submitted that after the order dated 15.6.1979 of the State

Government sanctioning the grant of land in favour of the

Sangha, a private layout plan was submitted by the Sangha in

respect of the land and the BDA sanctioned the private layout

plan subject to conditions inter alia that the roads, civic

amenity sites, parks and all connections such as underground

drainage, water supply lines, shall vest with the BDA free of

cost. He referred to sub-section (5) of Section 32 of the

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 to show that the

BDA may call upon an applicant for layout plan to agree to

transfer the ownership of the roads, drains water supply lines

and open space laid out to the BDA permanently without

claiming any compensation therefor. He submitted that the

road, civic amenity sites, parks in the Survey Nos.45 and 47 in

Jakkasandra village had, therefore, become the property of the

BDA and yet by the order dated 22.12.2003 passed by the 31

Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, the vacant civic

amenity sites to an extent of 2 acres 34 guntas of the layout

plan were directed to be handed over to the Inamdars free of

cost and the land utilized by the BDA for formation of the Ring

Road as per the sanctioned layout plan was directed to be

acquired by the BDA and compensation paid to the Inamdars

as if such land was the private property of the Inamdars. He

submitted that the BDA, therefore, filed Writ Petition

No.15614/2004 before the Karnataka High Court challenging

the order dated 22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue,

Government of Karnataka, directing handing over of the civic

amenity sites to the Inamdars free of cost and directing

acquisition of the land forming the Ring Road and payment of

compensation to the Inamdars for such acquisition, but these

directions in the order dated 22.12.2003 of the Minister,

Revenue, Government of Karnataka, have not been set aside

by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the

impugned judgment.

23. Mr. Javali referred to earlier judgment dated

15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court 32

in W.A. No.7574/1996 to show that the Inamdars had filed

petitions before the BDA saying that they had entered into an

agreement with the Sangha and waived their right to challenge

the grant of land by the State Government in favour of the

Sangha and had also agreed not to take or prosecute legal

proceedings in respect of the disputed land and, therefore, had

acquiesced to the grant in favour of the Sangha. He also

referred to the aforesaid order of the Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 to show

that the Inamdars had agreed to carry out some work in the

land by the Sangha to co-operate with the Sangha for removal

of sheds which they claimed to be belonging to them. He

submitted that considering all these aspects, the BDA went

ahead and sanctioned the private layout plan of the Sangha.

24. Mr. Javali submitted that sub-section (2) of Section

38-A of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976

prohibits the BDA to sell or dispose of any area reserved for

public parks and playgrounds and civic amenities for any

other purpose and it further provides that any disposition so

made by the BDA shall be null and void. He submitted that in 33 Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and Others

[(1991) 4 SCC 54], this Court interpreting Section 38-A of the

Act held that the legislative intent of Section 38-A of the

aforesaid Act was to prevent the diversion of the user of area

reserved for public parks or civic amenities or for any other

purpose. He submitted that under Section 65 of the

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, the Government

has the power to give such directions to the authority as in its

opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the

purposes of the Act but in exercise of such power the State

Government cannot direct the BDA to hand over the properties

of the BDA free of cost to the Inamdars or to acquire the roads

which were already owned by the BDA and pay compensation

to the Inamdars. He relied on Bangalore Development

Authority and Others v. R. Hanumaiah and Others [(2005)

12 SCC 508] in which this Court has held that the power of

the Government under Section 65 of the Bangalore

Development Authority Act, 1976 is not unrestricted and the

directions which can be issued are those which are to carry

out the objective of the Act and not those which are contrary 34

to the Act and further held that the directions issued by the

Chief Minister to release the lands were destructive of the

purposes of the Act and the purposes for which the BDA was

created. He submitted that the directions in the order dated

22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue, Government of

Karnataka, to handover the vacant civil amenities sites to the

Inamdars and to acquire the land forming the Ring Road,

therefore are contrary and destructive of the objects of the Act

and cannot be sustained.

25. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel appearing for State

of Karnataka, supported the order dated 22.12.2003 passed

by the Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, by

referring to the reasons indicated in the order itself. He

further submitted that this order was passed by the Minister,

Revenue, Government of Karnataka, because of the pressure

of contempt put by the legal representatives of the Inamdars

on the Government saying that the order dated 9.4.1999 of

this Court in SLP (C) No.2833/1999 was not being complied

with by the State Government. He submitted that Minister,

Revenue, Government of Karnataka, has taken an equitable 35

view of the entire matter and has not disturbed those

members of the Teachers' Association or Sangha who have

already utilized the house sites for construction of the houses

and has directed resumption and restoration of only the 182

vacant sites in the land in favour of the Inamdars and

cancelled the earlier grant of land in respect of these 182 sites

in favour of the Sangha in exercise of powers under Rule 25 of

the Karnataka Land Grants Rules, 1969.

Our conclusions with reasons

26. The order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government

sanctioning the grant of 34 acres 3 guntas of land in favour of

the Sangha was earlier challenged before the Karnataka High

Court by the legal representatives of the Inamdars first before

the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 11412/1990 and on

dismissal of the writ petition by learned Single Judge, before

the Division Bench in W.A. No.7574/1996 and the Division

Bench dismissed the writ appeal of the legal representatives of

the Inamdars by its judgment dated 15.9.1998. We also find

that some of the contentions raised before us were also raised

before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ 36

Appeal No.7574/1996 and the Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court has recorded its findings on the

contentions in the judgment dated 15.9.1998. Hence, the

main question that we will have to decide is whether findings

recorded by the Division Bench in the judgment dated

15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 had become final and

binding on the parties, namely, the legal representatives of the

Inamdars, the State of Karnatka and the Sangha or Teachers'

Colony Residents Association.

27. On a reading of the judgment dated 15.9.1998 of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996, it appears that contentions were raised on

behalf of the legal representatives of the Inamdars that so long

as the claim petition for registration of the occupancy rights

under Sections 9 and 10 of the Inam Abolition Act was

pending decision before the Special Deputy Commissioner, the

State Government had no power to sanction grant of the land

measuring 34 acres 3 guntas in Survey Nos. 45 and 47 of

Jakkasandra village in favour of the Sangha and that in any

case the order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government 37

sanctioning the grant of land in favour of the Sangha was

subject to claim of the Inamdars to occupancy rights in

respect of the inam land. In the judgment dated 15.9.1998,

the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held:

"In the order it is specifically mentioned that the land in question is required for public purpose and if there are claims, they are eligible for occupancy certificate by price payable for the land. Therefore, it is manifestly clear that in case the rights of the claimants/inamdars are upheld, they are entitled for price payable for the land. Though the grant is subject to the order of the grant in favour of inamdars, it is made clear that the grant order in favour of Respondent No.3 that the Inamdars are entitled for the price of the land. Therefore, on this count, the order cannot be set back."

Thus, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the

judgment dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996

negatived the contention that the order dated 15.6.1979 of the

State Government sanctioning the grant of land in favour of

the Sangha was bad because the claim of the Inamdars for

registration under Sections 9 and 10 of the Inam Abolition Act

was pending before the Special Deputy Commissioner and

instead held that in case the claims of the Inamdars to 38

occupancy in respect of the inam land were upheld, they

would be entitled for the price payable for the land.

28. On a reading of the judgment dated 15.9.1998 of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996, we further find that it was contended on

behalf of the Sangha that the Inamdars have waived their

occupancy rights in respect of the inam land by entering into

the agreement dated 1.11.1980 and by receiving the amounts

towards the land price apart from the compensation of

Rs.3,40,750/- and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court accepted the contentions raised on behalf of the Sangha

and recorded the following findings:

"The above two paras in the Agreement make it clear that the Inamdars have agreed not to claim any right, not to prosecute with any legal proceedings and the agreement further shows that they agreed that it is open to Respondent No.3 - Society Members to enjoy the lands as they like and it is also stated that the existing sheds can be removed by Respondent No.3 - Society itself, for which they will co-operate and they also agreed to withdraw the suit filed in O.S. No.687/1979 pending on the file of the II Munsiff's Court, Bangalore. In pursuance of the agreement, they have filed a petition to withdraw the suit and the suit came to be withdrawn as settled out of court by an order dated 3.11.1980. Thus, the Inamdars 39

have acted upon the agreement by withdrawing the suit voluntarily. It is also not disputed that the Inamdars have received an amount of Rs.2,000/- per acre in one installment and another sum of Rs.49,000/- and thus, the conduct of the Inamdars shows that they have agreed not to prosecute the legal proceedings and they relinquish their right in the land and then they permitted respondent No.3 - Society to enjoy the land as they like and acted on the said agreement, they have withdrawn the suit and received the amount. Thus, the Inamdars have waived their right in the land."

29. It is thus clear that the Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court decided three issues in its judgment

dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996: first, that the

State Government had the power to sanction grant of the land

in Survey Nos.45 and 47 in Jakkasandra village in favour of

the Sangha by the order dated 15.6.1979 notwithstanding the

pendency of the claim of the Inamdars to be registered as

occupants of the land before the Special Deputy

Commissioner, Inam Abolition, and therefore the order dated

15.6.1979 of the State Government of Karnatka sanctioning

the land in favour of the Sangha cannot held to be bad;

second, in the event the claim of the Inamdars to be registered

as occupants of the land was subsequently allowed by the 40

Special Deputy Commissioner or by the Tribunal, the

Inamdars were not entitled to restoration of the land from the

Sanngha but were entitled for the price of the land; third, the

Inamdars had waived their right of occupation of the land by

the agreement dated 1.11.1980 and by withdrawing the suit

O.S. No.687/1979 in which they challenged the order dated

15.6.1979 of the State Government of Karnataka, sanctioning

the grant of land in favour of the Sangha and by receiving

Rs.2,000/- per acre and Rs.49,000/- in addition to the price of

Rs.10,000/- per acre totaling to Rs.3,40,750/-.

30. The judgment dated 15.9.1998 of the Division Bench

of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996

was sought to be challenged by the legal representatives of the

Inamdars before this Court in SLP (C) No.2833/1999, but this

Court did not grant special leave to the legal representatives of

the Inamdars to appeal and instead disposed of the SLP with

the following order:

"It appears from the order of grant made in favour of the respondent-society that it was made condition upon the outcome of the dispute which was pending then before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inam. We are now told that the said 41

proceedings have resulted in favour of the petitioners. If that is so, it would be open to the petitioners to approach the State Government for modification of the order granting land to the respondent-society. If such application is made, the State Government shall dispose of the same within the period of three months from the receipt of the application. The Special Lave Petition is disposed of accordingly."

Thereafter, an I.A. was filed by the Teachers' Colony Residents

Association which was the fifth respondent in the SLP and this

Court dismissed the I.A. by order dated 28.8.2000 with the

following order:

"We do not find anything adverse to the fifth respondent society in the order of this Court dated 9.4.1999 so as to recall the same. I.A. No.1 is therefore dismissed."

31. On interpreting the two orders dated 9.4.1999 and

28.8.2000 of this Court, we have no doubt that the decisions

on the three issues in the judgment dated 15.9.1998 of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996 were not disturbed by this Court in the SLP

and, therefore, the decisions on the three issues of the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal 42

No.7574/1996 became final and binding on the parties,

namely, the legal representatives of the Inamdars, the State

Government and the Sangha and its members.

32. In Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala

and Another (supra), this Court considered the question

whether there was any merger of the order under challenge in

the event this Court refuses special leave to appeal against the

order and R.C. Lahoti, J., as he then was, speaking for a

Bench of three Judges summed up the conclusions of the

Court in para 44 of the judgment on this question thus:

"(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution.

Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or 43

authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties."

Hence, an order refusing special leave to appeal does not

stand substituted in place of order under challenge and all

that it means is that this Court was not inclined to exercise its

discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. The aforesaid

law laid down by this Court however makes it clear that if the

order refusing leave to appeal makes a statement of law, such

statement of law is declaration of law by this Court within the

meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and if the

order records some finding other than the declaration of law

such finding would bind the parties thereto and also the

Court, Tribunal or Authority in any proceeding subsequent

thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being

the Apex Court of the country.

44

33. Applying the law laid down by this Court in

Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another

(supra) to the facts of the present case, the judgment dated

15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court

in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996, which was challenged in SLP

(C) No.2833/1999 before this Court, does not stand

substituted by the order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court in the

SLP because this Court has not granted special leave to appeal

against such judgment dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court. Further, the order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court in SLP

(C) No.2833/1999 does not contain any statement of law

which would amount to declaration of law by the Supreme

Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of

India. The order dated 9.4.1999 of this Court in SLP (C)

No.2833/1999, however, has taken note of the condition in

the order of grant made in favour of the Sangha that the grant

was subject to the outcome of the dispute which was pending

before the Special Deputy Commissioner, Inam Abolition, and

has further taken note of the fact that the proceedings have 45

resulted in favour of the legal representatives of the Inamdars

and thereafter left it open to legal representatives of the

Inamdars to approach the State Government for modification

of the order granting land to the Sangha and directed the State

Government to dispose of such application made on behalf of

the legal representatives of the Inamdars within a period of

three months from the receipt of the application. In the

aforesaid order dated 9.4.1999 in SLP (C) No.2833/1999, this

Court has therefore also not recorded any finding which would

be binding on the legal representatives of the Inamdars, the

State Government, the Sangha and its members, but has only

granted liberty to the legal representatives of the Inamdars to

approach the State Government for modification of the order

granting land in favour of the Sangha and has given further

direction to the State Government to dispose of such

application within the period of three months from the receipt

of the application of the legal representatives of the Inamdars.

Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the legal

representatives of the Inamdars before us that the judgment

dated 15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High 46

Court in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 got merged in the order

dated 9.4.1999 in SLP (C) No.2833/1999 and the findings on

the three issues in the order dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996 did not operate as res judicata and were not

binding on the legal representatives of the Inamdars, the State

Government, the Teachers' Colony Association or the Sangha

and its members, is misconceived.

34. In the common judgment impugned in the present

appeals, however, the High Court has taken a view that the

orders passed by the Karnataka High Court in the earlier

proceedings in W.P. No.11412/1990 and W.A. No.7574/1996

do not operate as res judicata as the case of the Inamdars with

reference to the provisions of the Inam Abolition Act and the

law laid down by this Court on various aspects were not

considered in the earlier writ petitions and writ appeal and the

decisions rendered by the Division Bench of the Karnataka

High Court in W.A. No.7574/1996 were per incurium. The

High Court has failed to appreciate that the principle of per

incurium has relevance to the doctrine of precedents but has 47

no application to the doctrine of res judicata. To quote

Rankin, C.J. of the Calcutta High Court in Tarini Charan

Bhattacharjee and Others v. Kedar Nath Haldar [AIR

1928 Calcutta 777 at 781]:

"The question whether decision is correct or erroneous has no bearing upon the question whether it operates or does not operate as res judicata. The doctrine is that in certain circumstances the Court shall not try a suit or issue but shall deal with the matter on the footing that it is a matter no longer open to contest by reason of a previous decision. In these circumstances it must necessarily be wrong for a Court to try the suit or issue, come to its own conclusion thereon, consider whether the previous decision is right and give effect to it or not according as it `conceives the previous decision to be right or wrong. To say, as a result of such disorderly procedure, that the previous decision was wrong and that it was wrong on a point of law, or on a pure point of law, and that therefore it may be disregarded, is an indefensible form of reasoning. For this purpose, it is not true that a point of law is always open to a party."

35. We now come to the argument of Mr. Dave that the

order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government sanctioning

grant of land in favour of Sangha for house sites was void ab 48

initio because of the prohibitions in Sections 79-A, 79-B and

80 of the Land Reforms Act and that if the Court holds that

the order dated 15.6.1979 was void ab initio on this ground,

the earlier decision dated 15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of

the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 would

not operate as res judicata. This argument of Mr. Dave is

based on the observations in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal

and Others. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (supra) that "when

the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is

prohibited by law" it does not operate as res judicata. We find

from a reading of the order dated 15.9.1998 of the Division

Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal

No.7574/1996 that a contention was raised on behalf of the

legal representatives of the Inamdars that there was no power

to grant land for house sites under the Karnataka Land

Grants Rules, 1969 but the Division Bench of the Karnataka

High Court negatived the said contention and held that under

Rule 20 of the Karnatka Land Grants Rules, 1969, the State

Government had the power to grant land to the Sangha for

house sites. We do not find from the judgment of the Division 49

Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.

7574/1996 that any contention was raised on behalf of the

legal representatives of the Inamdars that grant of land in

Survey Nos.45 and 47 of Jakkasandra village could not be

sanctioned in favour of the Sangha for house sites because of

the restrictions in Sections 79-A, 79-B and 80 of the Land

Reforms Act. If this ground of attack had not been taken by

the legal representatives of the Inamdars while challenging the

order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government sanctioning

the grant of land in favour of the Sangha, this contention

could not be raised by them before the High Court in a

subsequent proceeding because of the principle of constructive

res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the

Code of Civil Procedure which has been applied to writ

petitions. In Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers'

Association v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(1990) 2

SCC 715] a Constitution Bench of this Court observed at Page

741:

"The decision in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri [(1986) 1 SCC 100] further clarified the position by holding that an 50

adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case."

36. Nonetheless, as the Division Bench of the Karnataka

High Court had not decided this question in the judgment

dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 and the High

Court has decided this question in the impugned common

judgment dated 22.12.2006, we think it necessary to examine

this question in these Civil Appeals against the impugned

common judgment dated 22.12.2006. We find that Chapter V

of the Land Reforms Act is titled "Restrictions on holding on

transfer of agricultural lands" and the language of Sections 79-

A, 79-B and 80 shows that these provisions apply to only

"agricultural lands". We also find from the provisions of sub-

sections (2) and (7) of Section 95 of the Karnataka Land

Revenue Act, 1964 (for short `the Land Revenue Act') that the 51

land held for agricultural purpose can be permitted to be

diverted for other purposes on payment of fine. In the order

dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government sanctioning the

grant of the land in favour of the Sangha, it is clearly

stipulated that the Sangha shall pay such conversion fine to

be levied as per the rules made under the Revenue Act. The

Karnataka Land Grants Rules, 1969 made under Section 179

of the Land Revenue Act and in particular Rule 18 has also

made elaborate provisions for grant of building sites on

payment of price. Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory

Interpretation, 12th Edition at page 298 says:

"..............a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other statutes in pari materia, i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject-matter or forming part of the same system."

Sections 79-A, 79-B and 80 of the Land Reforms Act,

therefore, have to be read together with Section 95 of the Land

Revenue Act as all these provisions deal the same subject

matter, namely, agricultural lands. We therefore hold that the 52

law permitted the grant of the agricultural land in favour of

the Sangha for house sites on payment of conversion fine and

the grant made by the State Government in favour of the

Sangha by the order dated 15.6.1979 was not void ab initio on

this count.

37. Mr. Dave, however, is right in his submission that res

judicata will not operate as a bar for entertaining a fresh cause

of action and in the present case the order dated 22.12.2003

passed by the Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka,

gave rise to a fresh cause of action. But even where a fresh

cause of action arises, issues between the parties which have

been decided cannot be re-opened before the Court for fresh

adjudication between the same parties. In State of Haryana

and others v. M.P. Mohla [(2007) 1 SCC 457] (supra) cited

by Mr. Dave, this Court has held:

"22. ........ The dispute between the parties has to be decided in accordance with law. What, however, cannot be denied or disputed is that a dispute between the parties once adjudicated must reach its logical conclusion. If a specific question which was not raised and which had not been decided by the 53

High Court the same would not debar a party to agitate the same at an appropriate stage, subject, of course, to the applicability of principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata.

23. It is also trite that if a subsequent cause of action has arisen in the matter of implementation of a judgment a fresh writ petition may be filed, as a fresh cause of action has arisen."

38. The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the

findings of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in

the judgment dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996

that the order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government

sanctioning the grant of land in favour of the Sangha was valid

and that the Inamdars were only entitled to the price payable

for the land when their claims for registration under Sections

9 and 10 of the Inam Abolition Act were allowed and that the

Inamdars have waived their right of occupation in the land by

entering into the agreement dated 1.11.1980 and by accepting

the price of Rs.10,000/- per acre deposited by the Sangha and

the additional amount paid by the Sangha were binding not

only on the legal representatives of the Inamdars and the

Sangha but also on the State Government. While deciding the 54

application of the legal representatives of the Inamdars for

modification of the order dated 15.6.1979 sanctioning the

grant of land in favour of the Sangha, therefore, the State

Government could not ignore these findings of the Division

Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the judgment dated

15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996. In the order dated

9.4.1999 of this Court in SLP(C) No.2833/1999 there was no

mandamus to the State Government to modify or cancel the

order dated 15.6.1979 of the State Government sanctioning

the grant of land in favour of the Sangha, but there was only a

direction to the State Government to consider the application

of the legal representatives of the Inamdars for modification of

the order dated 15.6.1979. In the instant case, however, the

Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, while

considering the application of the Inamdars, ignored the

findings of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in

the judgment dated 15.9.1998 in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996

and took the view in his order dated 22.12.2003 that on the

competent authority granting occupancy right to the Inamdars

by the order dated 23.6.1982, the Inamdars had become the 55

rightful owners of the land and action would have to be taken

to cancel the grant made in favour of the Sangha.

39. In Madan Mohan Pathak and Another v. Union of

India and Others (supra), the Calcutta High Court in Writ

Petition No. 371 of 1976 had delivered the judgment dated

21.5.1976 issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Life

Insurance Corporation to pay annual cash bonus to Class III

and Class IV employees for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31,

1976 along with their salary for the month of April, 1976.

Against the said judgment of learned Single Judge of the

Calcutta High Court, Letters Patent Appeal was filed but by

the time Letters Patent Appeal came up for hearing, the Life

Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976

came into force and there was no provision in this Act

absolving the Life Insurance Corporation from its obligation to

carry out the writ of mandamus issued by the learned Single

Judge of the Calcutta High Court. For some reason or the

other, the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the

learned Single Judge was withdrawn by the Life Insurance 56

Corporation. P.N. Bhagwati, J., as he then was, delivering the

judgment on behalf of himself, Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ.

held that since the Life Insurance Corporation did not press

the Letters Patent Appeal, the judgment of the learned Single

Judge of the Calcutta High Court granting the writ of

mandamus became final and binding on the parties and in

these circumstances, the Life Insurance Corporation could not

claim to be absolved from the obligation imposed by the

judgment to carry out the writ of mandamus by relying on the

Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act,

1976. Bhagwati, J. held:

"9......If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life Insurance Corporation."

The judgment dated 15.9.1998 of the Division Bench of the

Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.7574/1996 had held

that on the occupancy rights of the Inamdars being confirmed, 57

the Inamdars would be entitled to only the price and that the

Inamdars had waived their right to occupy the land by

accepting the price and by accepting further additional

amounts from the Sangha and this judgment of the Division

Bench of the Karnataka High Court had not been disturbed by

this Court in SLP(C) No.2833/1999 and the Minister, Revenue,

Government of Karnataka, could not have taken a view that on

the confirmation of the occupancy rights of the Inamdars, the

grant of the land made in favour of the Sangha was liable to be

cancelled.

40. Once we hold that the grant made in favour of the

Sangha was not liable to be cancelled, the order of the

Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, directing that

the vacant 182 sites have to be transferred to the Inamdars or

compensation in lieu of the vacant 182 sites were to be paid by

the Sangha to the Inamdars, has to be set aside. Further, the

order of the Minister, Revenue, Government of Karnataka, that

the vacant civic amenity sites to an extent of 2 acres 34 guntas

must be handed over to the Inamdars free of cost and the 58

land, which is used by the BDA for formation of the ring road,

has to be acquired by the BDA and the compensation has to

be paid for this land to the Inamdars as if the same was

private property, has also to be set aside. This is because the

civic amenity sites measuring 2 acres 34 guntas and the ring

road were part of the land measuring 34.03 acres given on

grant to the Sangha. Moreover, at the time of sanctioning the

layout plan of the Sangha, the BDA had stipulated that the

roads, civic amenity sites, parks and all connections such as

underground drainage, water supply lines, shall vest with the

BDA free of cost. The civic amenity sites and the road,

therefore, had become properties of the BDA and it was the

BDA only which was empowered to deal with such properties

subject to Section 38-A and other provisions of the Bangalore

Development Authority Act, 1976. The order dated

22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue, Government of

Karnataka, directing that the civic amenity sites be handed

over to the Inamdars free of cost and directing that the BDA

will acquire the land comprised in the ring road after paying

compensation for the same, was thus without the authority of 59

law.

41. For the aforesaid reasons, the directions in the order

dated 22.12.2003 of the Minister, Revenue, Government of

Karnataka, for cancellation of grant made in favour of the

Sangha and for transfer of vacant 182 sites from the Sangha

to the Inamdars or for payment of compensation in lieu thereof

by the Sangha to the Inamdars and the directions in the order

dated 22.12.2003 to the BDA to handover the vacant civic

amenity sites to the Inamdars free of cost and to acquire the

land forming the ring road and pay compensation for such

acquisition, are set aside. The impugned common judgment

dated 22.12.2006 of the Karnataka High Court is also set

aside and the writ petitions filed before the Karnataka High

Court are allowed. The Civil Appeals are disposed of

accordingly. No costs.

..........................J. (Dalveer Bhandari) 60

..........................J. (A.K. Patnaik)

New Delhi, February 08, 2010.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 1480 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15209 of 2009)

S. Narahari Rao ...... Appellant

Versus

Sathyanarayana & Ors. ...... Respondents

ORDER

A.K. PATNAIK, J.

Leave granted.

The background facts in which this Civil Appeal has been

filed are that the appellant filed a suit being O.S. NO.1150 of

2009 in the City Civil Court, Bangalore, along with an

application for temporary injunction (I.A.No.1 of 2009) for 61

restraining the respondents from putting up any construction

on the suit property. On 18.02.2009, the City Civil Court,

Bangalore, while issuing summons/notices to the

respondents, directed the parties to maintain the status quo in

respect of the suit property. In response to the

summons/notices, the respondents appeared in the suit and

filed I.A. No.2 of 2009 praying to the City Civil Court to vacate

the order of status quo on the ground that the entire dispute

was pending before this Court in S.L.P. (C) No.10352 of 2007

and other connected SLPs filed against the common judgment

dated 22.12.2006 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court. The Trial Court took the view that since the entire

dispute is pending before this Court, this Court alone has

jurisdiction to consider grant of interim relief and by its order

dated 02.04.2009 rejected the application for temporary

injunction. The appellant thereafter filed Miscellaneous First

Appeal No.2519 of 2009 before the Karnataka High Court

against the order dated 02.04.3009 of the City Civil Court, but

the Karnataka High Court by its order dated 08.06.2009 also

dismissed the Miscellaneous First Appeal on the ground that 62

the subject-matter of the suit was also the subject-matter of

S.L.P. (C) No.10352 of 2007 before this Court.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties. On

12.07.2007, this Court granted leave in S.L.P. (C) No.10352 of

2007 and other connected SLPs. On grant of such leave, the

matters were re-numbered as Civil Appeal Nos.3038 of 2007

and other connected Civil Appeals. We have heard these Civil

Appeals and delivered a common judgment today setting aside

the common judgment dated 22.12.2006 of the Division Bench

of the Karnataka High Court and allowing the writ petitions

filed in the High Court.

Since we have decided the dispute pending before this

Court, we set aside the impugned order dated 08.06.2009

passed by the Karnataka High Court in Miscellaneous First

Appeal No.2519 of 2009 and the order dated 02.04.2009

passed by the City Civil Court, Bangalore, in I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of

2009 and remand the matter to the City Civil Court,

Bangalore, to hear the parties and decide the application for

temporary injunction and the suit in accordance with our 63

judgment delivered today in Civil Appeal Nos.3038 of 2007 and

other connected Civil Appeals.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No costs.

A copy of the judgment passed today in Civil Appeal

Nos.3038 of 2007 and other connected Civil Appeals be sent to

the City Civil Court, Bangalore.

..........................J. (Dalveer Bhandari)

..........................J. (A.K. Patnaik) New Delhi, February 08, 2010.